Wilson v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON COMMISSIONER'S DECISION. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding at step three regarding the applicable listings, his credibility analysis, and his evaluation of Plaintiff's treating physicians. The Court orders that the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and this social security action is dismissed, with prejudice. Signed by Magistrate Judge Keith F. Giblin on 9/29/14. (mrp, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
REMONICA B. WILSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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NO. 9:13-CV-64

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the Local Rules for the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, the parties’ consent and order of the District Court, the abovecaptioned civil action is before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for consideration of
all matters and entry of judgment. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, instituted this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s
(hereafter “Commissioner”) decision regarding her Social Security benefits.
I. Background
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits (DIB)1 on September 7, 2010 (Tr. 108-113),
claiming a disability onset date of July 26, 2009 (Tr. 131) due to sickle cell, depression and anxiety
(Tr. 135). Following agency denials of her applications (Tr. 52-64), Plaintiff requested and received

1

Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), authorized by Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
provides an additional resource to the aged, blind, and disabled to assure their income does not fall below the
poverty line. Disability insurance benefits ("DIB"), authorized by Title II of the Social Security Act, provides
income to individuals who are forced into involuntary, premature retirement. Eligibility for SSI requires proof
of indigence and for DIB requires proof of insured status. Additionally, applicants seeking benefits under
either program must prove disability within the m eaning of the Social Security Act, which defines disability
in virtually identical language for both programs. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d), 1382c(a)(3), 1382c(a)(3)(G); see
also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a) (2014).

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an evidentiary hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) (Tr. 65-67, 24-49). ALJ Churchill
(“ALJ Churchill” or “the ALJ”) convened a hearing on September 10, 2012 (Tr. 24-49). Testimony
was heard from the plaintiff and vocational expert (“VE”) Thomas Irons. Id. Ms. Wilson waived
her right to representation and appeared at the hearing without an attorney or representative.
On October 23, 2012, ALJ Churchill issued his findings. (Tr. 7-23). The ALJ found that the
plaintiff has the severe impairments of sickle cell and affective mood disorders. (Tr. 12, Finding No.
3). The ALJ next found, however, that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments which meet or medically equal the severity of listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 for presumptive disability. (Tr. 12, Finding No. 4). The ALJ determined that
Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work. (Tr. 13, Finding No.
5). ALJ Churchill further concluded that Ms. Wilson an sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour work day, can
stand for 6 hours in an 8 hour work day, and can lift/carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds
occasionally. Id. He found that she can engage in occasional posturals and that she should avoid
heights. Id. Regarding the plaintiff’s mental limitations, the ALJ concluded that she can concentrate
and respond appropriately and she can perform detailed tasks. Id.
The ALJ next found that the plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as
an admissions clerk, classified as sedentary semi-skilled work. (Tr. 17, Finding No. 6). Therefore,
the ALJ finally concluded that the plaintiff had not been under a disability as defined by the Social
Security Act from July 26, 2009, the onset date, through the date of his decision. (Tr. 17, Finding
No. 7). The plaintiff appealed that decision. The Appeals Council of the Social Security
Administration (SSA) affirmed ALJ Churchill’s decision, making it the final decision of the
Commissioner. (Tr. 3-5).
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Plaintiff then filed her appeal in this federal court, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision denying the application for Social Security disability benefits. See Complaint (doc.
#1). The parties have since filed their briefs (doc. #20, doc. #21) and the Court has received the
transcript. Accordingly, the case is ripe for review.
II. Judicial Review
United States district courts may review decisions of the Commissioner. See 42 U.S.C. § 405
(2011). However, Congress limits the scope of judicial review to determinations of whether (a) the
Commissioner applied proper legal standards and (b) the decision is supported by substantial
evidence. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289,
292 (5th Cir. 1992). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept to support a conclusion. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995) (internal citations
omitted). It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance. Id. When the Commissioner applies proper principles and her decision is supported by substantial evidence, the
Commissioner’s findings are conclusive and must be affirmed. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389
(1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 305 U.S. 197, 230 (1938));
see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Reviewing courts, therefore, give the Commissioner’s decisions great deference. Leggett,
67 F.3d at 565-66. Courts may not re-weigh evidence, try issues de novo, or substitute their
judgments for those of the Commissioner. Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 1994). A
court cannot reverse the Commissioner simply because the court might have decided the case
differently in the first instance. Elfer v. Texas Workforce Comm’n, 169 F. App’x 378, 380 (5th Cir.
2006); see also Ripley, 67 F.3d at 555 (stating that the court may not substitute [its] judgment for that
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of the Secretary). When the Commissioner fails to apply correct principles of law, or when
substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner’s decision, the governing statute authorizes
a reviewing court to enter, upon the pleadings and the transcript of the record, a judgment modifying,
or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the
cause for a rehearing. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Thus, courts have power to remand for further
administrative proceedings, or they may direct the Commissioner to award benefits without a
rehearing. Ordinarily, courts remand for further administrative proceedings to address and cure
deficiencies. See, e.g., Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2000).
III. Law Governing Disability Determination and the ALJ’s Findings
The law requires the Commissioner to make individualized determinations of whether
claimants have disabilities that make them eligible to receive benefits authorized under the Social
Security Act. See Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466 (1983). To satisfy this duty, the
Commissioner utilizes a five-step sequential evaluation analysis. When a claimant is found disabled
or not disabled at any step, remaining steps are not considered. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4) (2014).
This procedure has judicial approval as a fair and just way for determining disability applications
in conformity with the Social Security Act. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 153 (1987) (citing
Heckler, 461 U.S. at 461) (The use of the sequential evaluation process “contribute[s] to the
uniformity and efficiency of disability determinations”).
The five steps - with explanatory parenthetical commentary - generally are as follows:
1.

The Commissioner ascertains whether an applicant currently engages in substantial
gainful activity. (If so, a finding of non-disability is entered and the inquiry ends.)

2.

The Commissioner determines whether an applicant has a severe impairment or
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combination of impairments. (If not, the inquiry ends and a finding of non-disability
is entered.)
3.

The Commissioner determines whether any severe impairment(s) equals or exceeds
those in a Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpt. P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”)2.
(If so, disability is presumed and benefits are awarded. If not, the analysis continues.)

4.

The Commissioner determines whether any impairment(s) prevents the claimant
from engaging in regular previous employment. (If so, a prima facie case of
disability is established and the burden of going forward (to the fifth step) shifts to
the Commissioner. See Chaparro v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 1008, 1010 (5th Cir. 1987)).

5.

The Commissioner determines whether other work exists in the national economy
which the applicant can perform. (If so, the burden shifts back to the applicant to
show he cannot perform the alternative labor. See id.; Taylor v. Bowen, 782 F.2d
1294, 1298 (5th Cir. 1986); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f) (2014).

Under the first four steps of the analysis, the burden lies with the claimant to prove disability.
Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. The analysis terminates if the Commissioner determines at any point during
the first four steps that the claimant is disabled or is not disabled. Id. Once the claimant satisfies
his or her burden under the first four steps, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to
show that there is other gainful employment available in the national economy that the claimant is
capable of performing. Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden may

2

Appendix I, Subpart P, Part 404 of the Regulations lists im pairments and indicators of
medical severity. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 (2014). A person whose impairment meets or equals an
impairment in the Listing is presumptively disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d) (2014); see Soc. Sec. R. 88-3c
(1988), 1988 W L 236022, at *7.

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be satisfied either by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines of the regulations or by expert
vocational testimony, or other similar evidence. Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir.
1987).
IV. Points of Error
Here, Plaintiff alleges two general points of error, as follows:
(1) the Plaintiff contends she “has established by objective medical evidence a mental and
physical disability in accordance with the Listings of Impairments”; and
(2) the Commissioner and ALJ “did not properly consider all of the element[s] of subjective
evidence.”
V. Discussion and Analysis
A.

Whether Plaintiff Established that Her Impairment(s) Meet the Listings

The plaintiff’s first point of error suggests that the ALJ erred at step three when he concluded
that Ms. Wilson did not meet a Listing under 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, entitling
her to presumptive disability. As stated above, Plaintiff has the burden of proof at step three to show
that she has a mental and physical impairment which meets a Listing.
The ALJ concluded that the “signs, symptoms and history of treatment presented in the
evidence of record are inconsistent with any impairment of listing-level of severity.” (Tr. 12).
Regarding plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ discussed Listing 12.04 and 12.06 and analyzed
the appropriate factors under those Listings. Id. See also 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1, §§ 12.04 and 12.06. Listing 12.04 applies to affective disorders and Listing 12.06 governs
anxiety-related disorders. See §§ 12.04 and 12.06.
To meet Listing 12.04, the regulations require that the claimant meet a level of severity. See
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§ 12.04. The claimant must satisfy both paragraph A and B of Listing 12.04 or Paragraph C. Id.
Paragraph A requires medically documented persistence of one of several symptoms.3 Paragraph
B requires that the symptoms result in at least two of the following: (1) marked restrictions of daily
living; (2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; (3) marked difficulties in
maintaining concentration, persistence or pace; or (4) repeated episodes of decompensation, each of
extended duration. See § 12.04, Paragraph B. In the alternative, Paragraph C requires “[m]edically
documented history of a chronic affective disorder of at least 2 years duration that has cause more
than a minimal limitation ability to do basic work activities, with symptoms or signs currently
attenuated by medication or psychosocial support,” and one of three symptoms listed in Paragraph
C. Id. at Paragraph C.
The ALJ’s opinion demonstrates that he evaluated Ms. Wilson’s mental impairments under
the Listings, addressing the levels of criteria enumerated in Listing 12.04. He discussed the
plaintiff’s mild restrictions in daily living, including her ability to do chores; her moderate
difficulties in social functioning; her moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence
and pace; and noted that she had experienced no episodes of decompensation which have been of
extended duration (Tr. 13).

These findings on Paragraph B of Listing 12.04 are supported by

substantial evidence in the record, including the findings of Dr. Barron and Dr. Geary.
On November 30, 2010, Dr. Verna L. Barron, Ph.D., conducted a clinical interview and
mental status examination with Ms. Wilson (Tr. 267-269). Dr. Barron concluded that Ms. Wilson’s

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Examples of the symptoms for affective disorder required by Paragraph A include anhedonia or
pervasive loss of interest in almost all activities, appetite disturbance with change in weight, sleep disturbance,
decreased energy, feelings of guilt or worthlessness, and difficulty concentrating. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Appendix 1, § 12.04, Paragraph A.

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thoughts seemed logical, she was oriented, and her memory was intact (Tr. 268). Barron also found
that the plaintiff’s attention and concentration were somewhat compromised and her judgment is at
least slightly compromised. Id. Dr. Barron also noted that Ms. Wilson clearly appeared to
exaggerate her deficits during most of the mental status examination. Id.
On January 5, 2011, Thomas Geary, Ph.D., issued his report of a psychiatric review
conducted on the claimant (Tr. 270). He found that Wilson had affective disorders coexisting with
nonmental impairments. Id. Dr. Geary concluded that a mental impairment is present that does not
precisely satisfy the diagnostic criteria listed in Paragraph A of Listing 12.04. See id.; Compare 20
C.F.R., Part 404, Appendix 1, § 12.04, Paragraph A. He found that she has mild restriction in daily
living, moderate difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration, persistence or
pace, and no episodes of decompensation, each of extended duration (Tr. 280). Dr. Geary finally
concluded that there was no evidence establishing that Ms. Wilson has a medically documented
history of affective disorder of at least 2 years’ duration that has cause more than a minimal
limitation of ability to do any basic work activity with signs or symptoms currently attenuated by
medication or psychosocial support, and any one of the other symptoms listed in Paragraph C of
Listing 12.04 (Tr. 281). This evidence, along with Dr. Barron’s findings, clearly supports the ALJ’s
findings at step three regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments under the Listings.
Although the ALJ does not specifically address the Listing for the sickle cell impairment
at step three, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that plaintiff failed to meet her burden
in establishing that she meets the Listing for sickle cell. Listing 7.05 specifically requires the
following:

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“A. Documented painful (thrombotic) crises occurring at least three times during the 5
months prior to adjudication; or
B. Requiring extended hospitalization (beyond emergency care) at least three times during
the 12 months prior to adjudication; or
C. Chronic, severe anemia with persistence of hematocrit of 26 percent or less; or
D. Evaluate the resulting impairment under the criteria for the affected body system.”
20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, § 7.05 (Listing for “sickle cell disease, or one
its variants.”) The record lacks evidence of documented painful thrombotic crises, extended
hospitalizations, or evidence of chronic, severe anemia. On January 31, 2011, Dr. Bramharm
Reddy, Ms. Wilson’s regular hematologist, noted that she has done fairly well with sickle cell
disease, she has not required any hospitalization recently, and has only needed intermittent narcotic
pain medications for pain control (Tr. 304.) He noted again in 2012 that she has done fairly well
with occasional hospital admissions (Tr. 444). A review of the objective medical records reveals
no sickle cell symptoms reaching the level of severity required by Listing 7.05. See id; see also Tr.
at 304, 375, 381, 385, 390, 395, 398-99, 407, 411, 416, 420, 450). Substantial evidence accordingly
supports the finding that the plaintiff has not shown that her impairment meets or medically equals
the specific requirements of the sickle cell Listing.
Furthermore, the plaintiff’s brief fails to point to specific medical evidence supporting a
finding that her impairments meet the Listings at issue. In fact, she does not identify which Listing
she alleges the ALJ erred in considering. The majority of her brief focuses on her subjective
assessment of her symptoms and the personal problems that her impairments cause. See Plaintiff’s
Brief (doc. #20), at pp. 3-6. She references her medications and lab results, but this medical
information does not comport with the specific criteria of evidence required to meet the Listings
at issue. She does not reference specific objective medical evidence establishing that her

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impairments have affected her in the specific manner required by the Listings. For an impairment
to meet or medically equal a listing, “the claimant must provide medical findings that support each
of the criteria for the equivalent impairment condition.” Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 619 (5th
Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a) (2014). An impairment that
manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify. See Sullivan v.
Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530 (1990). Furthermore, the ALJ does not err by failing to specifically
consider a listing if the record evidence shows that the claimant did not meet the criteria. Bordelon
v. Astrue, 281 F. App’x 418, 422 (5th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s argument alone - absent objective
medical evidence - does not substantiate a claim of meeting or equaling a Listing. See Waymire v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:10-CV-510, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143458, at *11 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 2, 2011) (Guthrie, J.); adopted by 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139801 (Dec. 5, 2011).
Plaintiff’s fails to establish how the ALJ erred in considering the criteria of the applicable
listings and she does not point to objective medical evidence contradicting the ALJ’s findings at
step three. She has, accordingly, failed to meet her burden in establishing that her impairments,
singularly or in combination, are severe enough to meet or equal the applicable requirements set
forth in the Listings, thus entitling her to a presumptive finding of disability. This point of error
is accordingly overruled.
B.

The ALJ’s Consideration of the Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints

Subjective symptoms standing alone, absent supporting medical evidence, are insufficient
to support a disability finding. See Salgado v. Astrue, 271 F. App’x 456, 460 (5th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (citing SSR 96–7P and 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529). The ALJ is the fact finder and may
determine the credibility of witnesses and medical evidence. See Greigo v. Sullivan, 940 F.2d 942,
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945 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The regulations provide that when making a disability
determination, the adjudicator must consider subjective symptoms, including pain, and the extent
to which those symptoms can be reasonably accepted as consistent with the objective medical
evidence and other evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a) (2014). The ALJ is required to follow a twostep “objective-subjective” process in evaluating the claimant’s subjective evidence and the
applicant’s credibility, if a credibility determination is necessary. See Salgado, 271 F. App’x at
458. Under this two-step process to evaluate an applicant’s subjective claims, the adjudicator must
first determine whether there is an impairment that reasonably produced the symptoms of which the
claimant complains. Id. If the adjudicator finds no impairment, the individual is not disabled. Id.
If an impairment is identified, the adjudicator then considers the applicant’s statements about
symptoms and the remaining evidence in the record to determine the strength of the symptoms and
how the symptoms affect the credibility of the applicant’s claims about symptoms. Id.
Here, at the first step - the objective evaluation - the ALJ found that the plaintiff’s
“medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged
symptoms[.]” (Tr. 14). However, as for the claimant’s statements regarding the intensity,
persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms, the ALJ concluded that they “are not credible to
the extend they are inconsistent with the above residual functional capacity assessment.” Id. The
ALJ went on to state that “the record fails to document any neurological deficits, significant
orthopedic abnormalities, or serious dysfunction of bodily organs, which would preclude the
performance of all work-related activities.” Id.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) provides a non-exclusive list of seven factors to be considered
in making the second determination as to the credibility of a claimant’s subjective complaints. See
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20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3); Ashford v. Commissioner, No. 6:11CV155, 2013 WL 598902, 2013
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29651, at *13-*14 (E.D. Tex. March 4, 2013) (Love, J.). Specifically, this section
states that factors relevant to the claimant’s symptoms, such as pain, which the adjudicator will
consider, include:
(i)

claimant’s daily activities;

(ii)

location, duration, frequency and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

(iii)

precipitating and aggravating factors;

(iv)

type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication
taken to relieve pain or other symptoms;

(v)

treatment, other than medication, undertaken to relieve pain
or other symptoms;

(vi)

any other measures used to relieve pain or other symptoms;
and

(vii)

other factors concerning functional limitations and restrictions due to pain
or other symptoms.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) (2014). Although an ALJ must give specific reasons for
a credibility determination, “neither the regulation nor interpretive case law requires that an ALJ
name, enumerate, and discuss each factor in outline or other rigid, mechanical form. It suffices
when the administrative decision is sufficiently specific to make clear that the regulatory factors
were considered.” Ashford, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29651, at *14 (quoting Prince v. Barnhart, 418
F. Supp. 2d 863, 871 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (Hines, J.) (adopted by Prince v. Barnhart, 418 F. Supp. 2d
863 (E.D. Tex. 2005)).
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The record reveals that the ALJ considered the enumerated factors as follows:
Factor 1 (daily activities):
The ALJ noted that the plaintiff is able to drive, care for her kids and perform household
chores (Tr. 17). She spends most of her days watching television or sleeping. Id.
Factor 2 (location, duration, frequency and intensity of symptoms):
The ALJ noted that the claimant’s sickle cell crisis had been well-controlled and that the
examinations of the record of the claimant’s allegations of pain failed to reveal any evidence that
the claimant’s impairments produce the ongoing symptoms alleged by the claimant.

Id.

Additionally, he found that the results of the psychological evaluation did not disclose any evidence
that the claimant experienced a mental disorder which significantly affected her ability to perform
the mental requirements of basic work-related activities. Id.
Factor 3 (precipitating and aggravating conditions):
There is no indication that the plaintiff complained of aggravating conditions.
Factor 4 (type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medications):
The ALJ noted a lack of any objective evidence of record that the claimant experiences any
disabling side-effects from prescribed medications.4 Id.
Factor 5 (treatment, other than medication, to relieve symptoms) and Factor 6 (other
measures to relieve symptoms):
There is no mention of treatment other than medication to relieve symptoms.

4

In her brief, Plaintiff complains that the side effects of her medications prevent her from being able
to drive to and from work. See Plaintiff’s Brief, at p. 2. This statem ent is contradicted by the objective
evidence in the record showing that she was able to drive to and from her doctor appointments, at a minimum.

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Factor 7 (other factors):
The ALJ’s discussion does not take any other factors into consideration other than those
stated above.
The ALJ therefore based his credibility determination on several of the enumerated factors
when they were relevant. Additionally, the record shows that he considered and discussed the
objective evidence as compared to the plaintiff’s subjective statements. For example, he notes that
at least twice she was assessed with sickle cell without crisis (Tr. 14-15). He uses this information
in disregarding Dr. Penny Jeffery’s opinion that the claimant was unable to work (Tr. 15, Tr. 405).
As noted by the Commissioner’s brief, it also appears that Dr. Jeffery’s statements are inconsistent
with the medical evidence as a whole and they appear to be primarily based on plaintiff’s subjective
reports to Dr. Jeffery (Tr. 405). As the ALJ points out, the claimant appeared well-developed and
well-nourished during her examinations and was reported to have done “fairly well” on at least two
occasions by her treating hematologist. Id. Considering the medical evidence as a whole, as
compared to plaintiff’s subjective allegations about her symptoms and their effectsm the Court
concludes that the ALJ did not err in assessing the plaintiff’s credibility and her subjective
complaints under SSR 96-7p and the applicable regulations. The ALJ’s decision to afford
diminished weight to the plaintiff’s subjective complaints is further supported by Dr. Barron’s
report that the claimant “clearly exaggerated” her deficits during the mental status examination.
Id. The ALJ must consider a claimant’s subjective complaints, but may find that those complaints
are not credible or exaggerated in light of the objective medical and other evidence of record. See
Parker v. Astrue, No. 11-294-SCR, 2012 WL 5384821, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156606, at *20

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(M.D. La. Nov. 1, 2012). The ALJ is not required to give subjective evidence precedence over
objective evidence. Id. (Internal citations omitted).
The plaintiff failed to establish that the ALJ erred in his method of weighing plaintiff’s
subjective complaints.

The ALJ’s discussion sufficiently articulates reasons for according

diminished weight to plaintiff’s subjective complaints and the record contains substantial evidence

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supporting the ALJ’s credibility determination. Plaintiff’s point of error, therefore, fails.
VI.

Conclusion and Order of the Court

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding at step three regarding the applicable
listings, his credibility analysis, and his evaluation of Plaintiff’s treating physicians. Therefore, the
undersigned concludes that the Commissioner did not err in her decision denying the plaintiff’s
application for disability benefits. The Court accordingly ORDERS that the Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED and this above-entitled social security action is DISMISSED, with
prejudice. The Court will enter final judgment separately.

SIGNED this the 29th day of September, 2014.

____________________________________
KEITH F. GIBLIN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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