Scott v. Crockett Independant School District

Filing 89

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING 82 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by Judge Ron Clark on 3/22/17. (ljw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
HARRY FRED SCOTT,
Plaintiff,
v.
CROCKETT
DISTRICT,

INDEPENDENT

Defendant.

SCHOOL

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:15-CV-142

ORDER OVERRULING OBJECTIONS AND ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The court referred this case by order to the Honorable Zack Hawthorn, United States
Magistrate Judge, for pretrial management on September 30, 2015. The court has received and
considered Judge Hawthorn’s report and recommendation (Doc. No. 82), which recommends
granting Defendant Crockett Independent School District’s (“CISD”) motion for summary
judgment and dismissing Plaintiff Harry Fred Scott’s claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Scott has filed objections to the report
and recommendation. Doc. No. 82
A party who files timely, written objections to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation is entitled to a de novo determination of those findings or recommendations to
which the party specifically objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2)-(3).
“Parties filing objections must specifically identify those findings [to which they object].
Frivolous, conclusive or general objections need not be considered by the district court.” Nettles
v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by
Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).

Although Scott filed his objections to Judge Hawthorn’s report five days after the fourteenday objection period, the court chooses to review the report and recommendation de novo and
concludes that his objections are without merit. Because Scott is proceeding pro se, his pleadings
are necessarily held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” and are
liberally construed by the court. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Perez v. United
States, 312 F.3d 191, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2002). Notwithstanding the lesser pleading standards given
to pro se parties, Scott’s objections are difficult to decipher as they fail to specifically identify the
magistrate judge’s findings to which he objects. The objections also include seemingly unrelated
medical records as attachments. See Doc. No. 87, pp. 10-29.
Accordingly, the court will construe Scott’s objections as a challenge to the magistrate
judge’s ultimate conclusion that CISD is entitled to summary judgment on all of his federal law
claims. After reviewing the report and recommendation de novo, and liberally construing his
objections, the court finds they are without merit. For the same reasons set forth by the magistrate
judge, the court finds CISD has shown there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. To the extent Scott claims it was error for the magistrate
judge to fail to appoint counsel to assist him with these proceedings, as a general rule, a civil rights
complainant does not have a right to appointment of counsel unless his case presents exceptional
circumstances. Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). As held previously by
the magistrate judge, and affirmed by the district judge formerly assigned to this case, there are no
exceptional circumstances present to justify the appointment of counsel. See Doc. Nos. 3, 12, 33,
77.
Accordingly, the objections filed by Scott are overruled and the report and recommendation
of the magistrate judge is ADOPTED. Scott’s claims under Title VII and § 1983 are dismissed

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with prejudice. The court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Scott’s state law
assault claim and that claim is dismissed without prejudice to Scott’s ability to reassert it in state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). All pending motions in this matter are denied and the Clerk of
Court is directed to close this case. A final judgment will be entered separately.
So ORDERED and SIGNED this 22 day of March, 2017.

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Ron Clark, United States District Judge

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