Matthews v. Pilgrims Pride

Filing 48

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING 44 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS. Signed by District Judge Ron Clark on 9/12/18. (ljw, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT OURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
CHRISTINA MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff,

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v.
PILGRIM’S PRIDE CORP.,
Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 9:17-CV-0082

MEMORANDUM ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Local Rules for the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas, this matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Keith F.
Giblin for entry of findings and recommendation on case-dispositive motions and determination
of non-dispositive matters.

On August 9, 2018, Judge Giblin entered his report and

recommendation (Doc. No. 44) recommending that the District Court grant the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.
Plaintiff, a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis, timely filed objections to the
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. No. 46). The Court has accordingly
conducted a de novo review of the objections and the response in relation to the pleadings, the
record, and the applicable law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). After
careful consideration, the Court concludes that the objections are without merit.
Plaintiff objects to the magistrate judge’s findings that Plaintiff failed to provide any
evidence supporting her allegations of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment/hostile work
environment. Plaintiff appears to argue that Judge Giblin erred in finding that the allegations in

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her union statement were not sufficient to carry her burden of proof—in effect, Plaintiff argues
that her union statement served not only to lay out her allegations against Defendant but also as
evidentiary support for those allegations. See Objections, at p. 1. Plaintiff also argues that the
magistrate judge should have required Defendant to prove that the allegations in her union
statement were not true. In other words, Plaintiff argues that Judge Giblin did not apply the
deferential standard owed to pro se litigants and that his failure to do so caused him to misinterpret
her allegations and improperly analyze the case. See Objections, at p. 4.
The Court is unconvinced that the magistrate judge failed to apply the pro se standard to
Plaintiff’s allegations, that he erred in finding Plaintiff did not carry her burden of proof, and that
the Defendant should have been required to disprove the allegations in Plaintiff’s union statement.
The Court concludes that, even applying the deferential standard owed to pro se litigants, Plaintiff
failed to support her allegations as discussed in the Report and Recommendation.
At the outset, the Court finds that Judge Giblin did grant Plaintiff the proper leniency owed
to a pro se litigant. In a Title VII discrimination case in which a Plaintiff presents no direct
evidence of discrimination, the Plaintiff must instead establish a prima facie case for any claim to
succeed. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). As the magistrate judge
noted, Plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for her discrimination claims.
Notwithstanding this initial finding, Judge Giblin nevertheless assumed that Plaintiff had
established a prima facie case. Judge Giblin’s decision to proceed with the analysis, despite
Plaintiff’s initial failure to establish a prima facie case, clearly demonstrates that he “liberally
construe[d]” Plaintiff’s complaint and “appl[ied] less stringent standards” to her claims as a pro se
litigant.1 Grant v. Cuellar, 59 F.3d 523, 524 (5th Cir. 1995).

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The magistrate judge also afforded Plaintiff the same leniency with respect to her retaliation claim and proceeded
with the analysis despite Plaintiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case. Regarding Plaintiff’s harassment claim, the

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In any event, the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant summary judgment was
based on Plaintiff’s failure to produce any evidence supporting her allegations in her union
statement, let alone any evidence demonstrating that the nondiscriminatory reasons Defendant
provided for its actions were merely pretextual. The Court emphasizes that a judge’s role at the
summary judgment stage is to consider whether there is any genuine issue of fact while making all
justifiable inferences in the non-moving party’s favor. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In
other words, if the facts are clear and the non-moving party—in this case, Plaintiff—has failed to
produce any evidence indicating there is a key fact that could be in question, then a motion for
summary judgment must be granted. Here, the record clearly demonstrates that Plaintiff based her
claims against Defendant only on her union statement and did not provide any evidence indicating
that Defendant’s actions against her, while facially legitimate, were actually pretextual. See Grant,
59 F.3d at 524 (dismissing a case where the appellant’s brief did “little more than restate the
relevant factual events leading to his original complaint”). Thus, applying the lenient pro se
standard, the magistrate judge correctly determined that the Court should grant Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment.2
The Court has considered the objections and Judge Giblin’s report. Having conducted a
de novo review, the Court is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate

magistrate judge found that Plaintiff did not establish a prima facie case. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge,
however, and concludes that, even under the pro se standard, Plaintiff failed to “make any relevant arguments” with
respect to her harassment claim. See Ramirez v. Isgur, 544 F. App’x 532, 533 (5th Cir. 2013). Thus, the finding on
Plaintiff’s harassment claim does not indicate that the magistrate judge failed to grant Plaintiff leniency.
The Court also agrees with the magistrate judge’s analysis regarding Plaintiff’s “Response to Defendants [sic]
Summary Judgement [sic].” (Doc No. 36); see Report, at p. 13. With respect to any new claims Plaintiff asserted
outside her pleadings, not only are they untimely, but they are not supported by argument or with reference to any
authority, and thus, any new claims are abandoned. Ramirez, 544 F. App’x at 533 (“Even pro se briefs must make
relevant arguments and cite relevant authorities . . . [and because] [a]ppellants fail to do so, . . . we deem their
contentions abandoned.”).
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judge are correct. It is therefore ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation on Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 44) is ADOPTED. The Plaintiff’s objections (Doc. No. 46) are
OVERRRULED.

This Court therefore ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. No. 32) is GRANTED.
The Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendant Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., on the
plaintiff’s causes of action for discrimination, retaliation, and harassment/hostile workplace
environment. Those claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice.
So ORDERED and SIGNED September 12, 2018.

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Ron Clark, Senior District Judge

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