Jones v. Chesapeake Energy Corporation et al

Filing 35

ORDER that Judge Giblin's Report and Recommendation 25 is adopted. It is further ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 17 is granted. It is also ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint 1 is dismissed with prejudice. Additionall y, the Court ORDERS that all pending motions (Doc. 22, Doc. 23, Doc. 27,Doc. 28, Doc. 29, Doc. 30) are DENIED as moot. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case pursuant to this order of dismissal, and this constitutes a final judgment for appeal purposes. Signed by District Judge Ron Clark on 2/7/19. (ljw, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
LUFKIN DIVISION
CARLA MORELAND JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORP.;
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, INC.;
CHESAPEAKE OPERATING, LLC;
CHESAPEAKE EXPLORATION, LLC;
AND CHESAPEAKE ENERGY
MARKETING, INC.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION 9:17-CV-194

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND DISMISSING CASE
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), the Local Rules for the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas, the District Court referred this matter to United States
Magistrate Judge Keith Giblin for entry of recommended disposition. On October 26, 2018, Judge
Giblin entered his report and recommendation (Doc. 25) recommending that the District Court
grant the Defendant Chesapeake Energy Marketing, Inc.’s (Chesapeake or Defendant) motion to
dismiss. The Court agrees with the magistrate judge's findings and conclusions and adopts the
report and recommendation.
Plaintiff Carla Moreland Jones (Jones or Plaintiff), a pro se litigant, timely filed her
Objection to Judge Recommendation of Dismissal (Objection). (Doc. 32). The Court has reviewed
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Plaintiff’s objections, to the extent they exist, and Defendant’s response (Doc. 34) de novo in
relation to the pleadings, the record, and the applicable law. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); see also 28
U.S.C. § 636(b). After careful consideration, the Court concludes that the objections are without
merit.
As an initial matter, the Court does not find that Plaintiff made a specific objection to any
portion of the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. To the extent that Plaintiff refers to
Judge Giblin’s report and recommendation, she says only the following: “I, the Plaintiff Object to
Judge [Giblin’s] Recommendation of dismissal and ask the Court to accept my claim as follows
against Chesapeake Energy[.]” (Doc. 32), at p. 1. The remainder of Plaintiff’s Objection does not
refer to the report and recommendation, let alone identify specific errors in Judge Giblin’s
description of the facts or his legal analysis. See generally id. at pp. 1-5. Instead, Plaintiff appears
to renew her argument that Chesapeake Energy committed fraud against her and her family. Based
on Plaintiff’s failure to identify a specific objection, the Court finds that her Objection is without
merit.
In any event, even if the Court decided to resolve Plaintiff’s objections by accepting her
continued allegations of fraud, and the attached documents, as further evidence of her claims, see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3), Jones nevertheless fails to provide any indication that Chesapeake Energy
committed fraud. In the Objection, Jones alleges that Defendant entered incorrect information,
changed information, or omitted information from a series of forms and maps. Id. For example,
Plaintiff identifies Form W-15, which shows Chesapeake as the operator of a particular well and
includes its operator number, but Jones claims that the form should have listed BRG Corporation—
a drilling corporation—as the operator because BRG Corporation’s drilling permit number was
listed in the box titled “Drilling Permit Number.” See id. at p. 13. To be sure, Plaintiff correctly

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states that BRG Corporation’s drilling permit number is listed in Form W-15. See id. at p. 9
(separate form identifying BRG Corporation’s permit number). However, Jones does not explain
why Chesapeake should have identified BRG Corporation as operator, let alone why it constitutes
fraud for Chesapeake not to have done so. Lastly, Plaintiff also does not explain how the allegedly
fraudulent forms relate to her claims against Chesapeake. In other words, Plaintiff fails to allege
any facts indicating fraud occurred or that the fraud relates to her claims.
Based on Plaintiff’s failure to properly object to the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, and her failure to identify any fraudulent activity, the Court adopts Judge
Giblin’s findings and legal conclusions as the findings and conclusions of the Court.
The Court therefore ORDERS that Judge Giblin’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 25)
is adopted. It is further ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is granted. It
is also ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) is dismissed with prejudice.
Additionally, the Court ORDERS that all pending motions (Doc. 22, Doc. 23, Doc. 27,
Doc. 28, Doc. 29, Doc. 30) are DENIED as moot.
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case pursuant to this order of dismissal, and this
constitutes a final judgment for appeal purposes.
So ORDERED and SIGNED February 7, 2019.

____________________________
Ron Clark, Senior District Judge

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