Mitchell v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice et al
Filing
14
Memorandum Opinion and Order IT IS ORDERED THAT: Plaintiffs claims against each of the named Defendants in their individual, official, or supervisory capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS; Plaintiffs due process claims and free exerci se claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS; and Plaintiffs claims under RLUIPA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS. Judgment shall be entered accordingly. This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 19 15(g) and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996). Dismissal of this action does not release Plaintiff or the institution where he is incarcerated from the obligation to pay any filing fee previously imposed. See Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1997). Any pending motions are DENIED. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge E. Scott Frost on 12/3/2011) (chmb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
COSTROMA MITCHELL,
Institutional ID No. 689820,
SID No. 2665509,
Previous TDCJ Nos. 439543, 598408,
Plaintiff,
v.
TEXAS DEPT. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, et al.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:11-CV-045-BL
ECF
Assigned to U.S. Magistrate Judge
ORDER TO DISMISS WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 on July 29, 2010 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff alleges that officials at the French Robertson
Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) deprived him of free exercise of his
religious beliefs under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) and
deprived him of due process of law insofar as he was given a disciplinary case for refusing to keep
a medical appointment at the Montford Unit Hospital after obtaining a pass to observe a religious
holiday on the date of said appointment. This case was reassigned to the United States magistrate
judge on March 14, 2011 (Doc. 7). On May 19, 2011, the court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant
to Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 1985), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff appeared at
the hearing and testified in his own behalf. Plaintiff indicated his consent to proceed before the
United States magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (Doc. 8).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court has conducted a review of Plaintiff’s complaint,
as supplemented by Plaintiff’s Spears hearing testimony. The court has also considered Plaintiff’s
November 14, 2011 advisory, wherein Plaintiff indicated that he seeks to withdraw his request for
an award of damages and instead seeks an award of attorneys fees.
I.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, as supplemented by his exhibits and his testimony, Plaintiff claims that:
1.
During all times relevant to the claims, Plaintiff was confined to the Robertson Unit.
2.
Plaintiff identifies himself as a Sunni Muslim.
3.
Plaintiff was reviewed for parole on June 4, 2010; Plaintiff was told that if denied for
parole at that time, he could again be considered if he did not receive any major disciplinary cases.
4.
Plaintiff sought and obtained a pass to observe a religious holiday on September 10,
2010, at the end of Ramadan.
5.
Plaintiff indicated in January 2005 that he did not ever want to go to the Montford
Unit for treatment.
6.
On June 7, 2010, Plaintiff was seen in the unit infirmary regarding his request for
glasses. A request to see the doctor was submitted so that an appointment could be scheduled.
7.
Plaintiff learned on September 10, 2010 that the medical appointment was scheduled
at the Montford Unit. Plaintiff refused to be transported to the appointment at the Montford Unit.
8.
Plaintiff was given a disciplinary case for refusing to keep his medical appointment.
The disciplinary case was graded as a major case. Plaintiff was found guilty and was sanctioned with
loss of commissary and recreation privileges for 30 days, as well as 30 days of lost good time.
Plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief and an award of attorneys fees.
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II.
ANALYSIS
In both proceedings in forma pauperis and civil actions brought by a prisoner against a
governmental entity, officer, or employee, the court is required under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915-1915A to
dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint if the complaint is frivolous or malicious or
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. These provisions thus apply to this prisoner
civil rights action. Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir. 1999). A “complaint may be
dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) if it has no arguable basis in law or
in fact.” Ruiz v. United States, 160 F.3d 273, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1998). A claim has no arguable basis
in law or fact if it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or if, after providing the plaintiff
the opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are clearly baseless.
Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998). The court is authorized sua sponte to test whether
the proceeding is frivolous or malicious even before the service of process or before an answer is
required to be filed. Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 440 (5th Cir. 1990); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c)(1). A questionnaire or evidentiary hearing may be used to assist the court in determining
whether the case should be dismissed under these provisions. See Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892
(5th Cir. 1976) (use of questionnaire to develop the factual basis of the plaintiff’s complaint);
Spears, 766 F.2d 179 (use of an evidentiary hearing).
The court has reviewed Plaintiff’s arguments and claims in his complaint, his testimony at
the Spears hearing, and his additional filings to determine whether Plaintiff’s claims present grounds
for dismissal or present cognizable claims which require the Defendants to answer and the case to
proceed.
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A.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint
Plaintiff filed an advisory with the court seeking to amend his Complaint. The court has
found that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint should be granted; the court notes that Plaintiff
has withdrawn his request for damages; Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and an award of attorneys
fees.
B.
Free Exercise of Religion/RLUIPA Claims
Plaintiff argues that under the Religious Land Use of Institutionalized Persons Act
(“RLUIPA”), Defendants are required to use the least restrictive means of limiting free exercise of
religion. He alleges that permitting a disciplinary case to be filed against him for his refusal of
transport to the Montford Unit despite his pass to observe the end of Ramadan and Jumah forced him
to choose between a non-trivial benefit and following his faith.
Prisoners retain those First Amendment rights that are consistent with their status as prisoners
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523
(1984). While imprisonment “necessarily entails a loss of manifold rights and liberties,” a prisoner’s
right to practice his religious beliefs is protected. Muhammad v. Lynaugh, 966 F.2d 901, 902 (5th
Cir. 1992). This right is, however, subject to reasonable restrictions and limitations necessitated by
penological goals. Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995). A prisoner “is not free to do that
which he might wish to do, nor may he do allowable things at a time and in a manner he might
prefer.” Muhammad, 966 F.2d at 902. Several factors are relevant in determining whether a prison
regulation infringes on an inmate’s constitutional rights: (1) is there a valid, rational correlation
between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest advanced; (2) are there
alternative means of exercising the rights that remain available to the inmates; and (3) what is the
impact of an accommodation in favor of the inmate on prison staff, other inmates, and the allocation
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of prison resources generally. Id. A prisoner’s First Amendment rights may be circumscribed when
legitimate penological objectives such as institutional order and security outweigh the concerns
associated with preservation of the inmate’s right. See Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 404,
419 (1989). The court will accord “great deference to prison administrators’ judgments regarding
jail security.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 745 (5th Cir. 2002).
The RLUIPA mandates that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results
from a rule of general applicability unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
The RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A). A
government regulation substantially burdens a “religious exercise” for the purposes of the RLUIPA
if it “truly pressures the adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly
violate his beliefs.” Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has
found that the RLUIPA does not permit recovery in the form of damages against a State. Sossamon
v. Lone Star State of Tex., 131 S. Ct. 1651, 1660 (2011).
The court accepts Plaintiff’s allegation that he is a practicing Sunni Muslim. However,
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that he has been prevented from exercising his belief or that
he has been substantially burdened in exercising his religion. Plaintiff testified that he has practiced
his religious beliefs for over 25 years, that he was issued a pass so that he could observe certain
religious celebrations at the end of Ramadan, and that he had previously indicated his refusal of all
treatment at the Montford Unit for non-religious reasons. Plaintiff’s factual allegations accepted
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as true demonstrate that although he was issued a pass for religious observance, he also had refused
any treatment “for any reason”at the Montford Unit because of “three useless trips he had previously
taken to the Montford Unit”, as indicated in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Plaintiff indicated that he would
not seek any treatment at the Montford Unit.
These factual allegations demonstrate that no
Robertson Unit or TDCJ policies forced him to choose between following his religious beliefs or
enjoying some generally available, non-trivial benefit. Adkins, 393 F.3d at 569- 70. Plaintiff has
repeatedly indicated that he chose to refuse care, and thus chose to be exposed to a disciplinary case
or conviction. Therefore, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim lack an arguable basis in law or fact and should
be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
Plaintiff also asserts claims against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Brad
Livingston, Rick Thaler, Warden Eddie Wheeler, Assistant Warden Leal and Dennis Melton.
Personal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action. Thompson v. Steele,
709 F. 2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). Prison officials “cannot be automatically held liable for the
errors of their subordinates.” Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 2003). Supervisory
officials may be held liable only if: “(i) they affirmatively participate in the acts that cause
constitutional deprivations; or (ii) [they] implement unconstitutional policies that causally result in
plaintiff’s injury.” Mouille v. City of Live Oak, Tex., 977 F.2d 924, 929 (5th Cir. 1992). Vicarious
liability does not apply to § 1983 claims. Pierce v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, Institutional Div.,
37 F. 2d 1146, 1150 (5th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, fail to demonstrate that
these Defendants were personally involved in the alleged constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff bases
his claims against C. Lawson, and Wardens Wheeler and Leal in part on their roles in denying his
grievance; the Fifth Circuit has made it clear that a “prisoner has a liberty interest only in ‘freedoms
from restraint . . . imposing atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary
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incidents of prison life.’” Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Orellana v.
Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995) and Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). Plaintiff
does not “have a federally protected liberty interest in having these grievances resolved to his
satisfaction.” Id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against any Defendant for denial of his grievances
lack an arguable basis in law or fact and should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS
FRIVOLOUS. Plaintiff’s claims based on vicarious liability and supervisory capacity also lack an
arguable basis in law or fact and should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
C.
Due Process Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of due process of law insofar as the case was graded
a major case and thus affected his parole eligibility.
In the context of the disciplinary hearing process, a prisoner’s rights, if any, are governed by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Wolff
v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974). Inmates who are charged with institutional rules violations
are entitled to rights under the Due Process Clause only when the disciplinary action may result in
a sanction that will infringe upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472 (1995). Such liberty interests may emanate from either the Due Process Clause itself
or from state law. See Ky. Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Liberty
interests arising from state law are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not
exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process
Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (internal citations omitted).
Only those state-created substantive interests that “inevitably affect the duration of [a prisoner’s]
sentence” may qualify for constitutional protection under the Due Process Clause. Id. at 487. See
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also Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31-32 (5th Cir. 1995). Thus, a prisoner’s loss of good-time credits
as a result of punishment for a disciplinary conviction, which increases his sentence beyond the time
that would otherwise have resulted from state law providing mandatory sentence reductions for good
behavior, must be accompanied by certain procedural safeguards in order to satisfy due process.
Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1997). However, a prisoner has a protected liberty
interest in the loss of accrued good time only if he is eligible for release to mandatory supervision.
Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 2000). The protections afforded by the Due
Process Clause thus do not extend to “every change in the conditions of confinement” which
adversely affects prisoners. Madison, 104 F.3d at 767.
Due process requires that the prisoner receive (1) a twenty-four hour advance written notice
of the hearing on the claimed violation; (2) an opportunity to be heard, including the ability to call
witnesses and present evidence in his defense, when consistent with institutional safety and
correctional goals; and (3) a written statement of the fact-finder detailing the evidence relied upon
and the reasons for the disciplinary action. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-67; see, e.g., Hallmark v.
Johnson, 118 F.3d 1073, 1080 (5th Cir. 1997) (no due process violation in denying inmate names
of alleged co-conspirators when no injury has been established). Due process also requires at a
minimum that “some evidence” in the record supports the disciplinary decision. Superintendent,
Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Morgan v. Dretke, 433 F.3d 455, 457 (5th Cir.
2005); see, e.g., Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 734 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (inmate’s civil
rights suit alleging that no evidence supports disciplinary action against him properly dismissed as
record revealed that “some evidence” supported charge). The “some evidence” standard is extremely
deferential. Morgan, 433 F.3d at 457. The “some evidence” requirement was met where the
correction officer’s testimony and defendant’s own statement about striking another inmate
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constituted “some evidence” to support the board’s decision to punish an inmate for fighting.
Banuelos, 41 F.3d at 234.
1.
False Disciplinary Cases
Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Wendy Doane initiated disciplinary proceedings against him
without probable cause; that Lt. Swaner, in considering informal resolution, permitted the case to
go forward; that Major Lofton graded the Plaintiff’s disciplinary case as a major case; and that
Captain Hopper, the disciplinary hearing officer, found Plaintiff guilty of the disciplinary case
despite the policy indicating that Plaintiff could refuse treatment and without considering Plaintiff’s
pass for religious observance or the possibility of downgrading the case.
The court notes that
malicious prosecution no longer provides an independent basis for a section 1983 claim in the Fifth
Circuit. Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir. 2003) (“[N]o . . . freestanding
constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution exists.”). Thus, an inmate’s claim that an
officer initiated disciplinary proceedings against him without probable cause does not state a claim.
Id. Plaintiff testified that he refused to be transported to the Montford Unit, that he had previously
refused, and that he intended to never be treated at the Montford Unit. To the extent that Plaintiff
claims that Doane brought the disciplinary proceedings against him without probable cause to do so
and to the extent that Plaintiff claims that Swaner, Lofton, and Hopper deprived him of due process
of law in grading the disciplinary cases, considering the case, and in finding him guilty, Plaintiff’s
claims fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and should be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
Plaintiff also alleges that the disciplinary cases affected his eligibility for parole. Prisoners
may become eligible for release under Texas law on parole or under a mandatory supervised release
program. See Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. “Parole” is the “discretionary and conditional release of an
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eligible prisoner . . . [who] may serve the remainder of his sentence under the supervision and control
of the pardons and paroles division.” Id. “Mandatory supervision” is the “release of an eligible
prisoner . . . so that the prisoner may serve the remainder of his sentence not on parole, but under
the supervision and control of the pardons and paroles division.” Id. Texas has not created a
constitutionally-protected liberty interest in parole or in the procedures attendant to parole decisions.
See Creel v. Keene, 928 F.2d 707, 712 (5th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 305 (5th
Cir. 1997); cf. Malchi, 211 F.3d at 957 (5th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff indicated that he is not eligible for mandatory supervised release. Rather, Plaintiff
bases his claims on the fact that his eligibility for parole was delayed as a result of the disciplinary
case. Inasmuch as the Fifth Circuit has recognized that “[i]n Texas, it is entirely speculative whether
an inmate will actually obtain parole,” Plaintiff’s claims fail to implicate any constitutionally
protected interest. Madison, 104 F.3d at 768. Plaintiff’s claim that the disciplinary cases violated
the RLUIPA because the cases may affect his parole eligibility lack an arguable basis in law or fact.
Plaintiff’s allegations about the disciplinary cases affecting his eligibility for parole, accepted as true,
fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and should be DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
D.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has indicated that he is asserting claims against certain Defendants in official
capacities, because he is seeking injunctive relief.
The court has already found that each of
Plaintiff’s claims asserted against each of the Defendants lack an arguable basis in law or fact and
should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
The Eleventh Amendment bars claims against a state brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Aguilar v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Justice, Institutional Div., 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing
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Farias v. Bexar County Bd. of Trustees for Mental Health Mental Retardation Servs., 925 F.2d 866,
875 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991)). A state’s sovereign immunity is not waived for claims pursuant to 1983.
Id. (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 338 n.7 (1979)). Moreover, the State of Texas has not
consented to this suit. Id. (citing Emory v. Tex. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 748 F.2d 1023, 1025 (5th
Cir. 1984)). As an instrumentality of the state, TDCJ is immune from a suit for money damages
under the Eleventh Amendment. Talib, 138 F.3d at 213. Federal claims against state employees in
their official capacities are the equivalent of suits against the state. Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207,
209 (5th Cir. 1996). The Eleventh Amendment immunity thus extends to TDCJ-ID officers acting
in their official capacity. Aguilar, 160 F.3d at 1054.
In Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court carved out an exception to
Eleventh Amendment immunity noting that a state cannot confer authority on its officers to violate
the Constitution or federal law. See Aguilar, 160 F.3d at1054. However, under this exception an
individual official may be liable only for implementing a policy that is “itself [ ] a repudiation of
constitutional rights” and “the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Oliver v. Scott, 276
F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir.
1985)). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate any such policy. Plaintiff’s claims against the
Defendants and against TDCJ in their official capacities lack an arguable basis in law or fact and
should be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
III.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing discussion of the issues, the evidence, and the law,
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
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1.
Plaintiff’s claims against each of the named Defendants in their individual, official,
or supervisory capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
2.
Plaintiff’s due process claims and free exercise claims are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.
3.
Plaintiff’s claims under RLUIPA are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS
FRIVOLOUS.
Judgment shall be entered accordingly. This dismissal shall count as a qualifying dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996). Dismissal of
this action does not release Plaintiff or the institution where he is incarcerated from the obligation
to pay any filing fee previously imposed. See Williams v. Roberts, 116 F.3d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir.
1997).
Any pending motions are DENIED.
A copy of this order shall be sent by first class mail to all parties appearing pro se and to any
attorney of record by first class mail or electronic notification.
SO ORDERED.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2011.
_____________________________________
E. SCOTT FROST
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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