Matthews v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration

Filing 18

Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision and therefore AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford on 3/11/2025) (skh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
ABILENE DIVISION
TINA M.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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Case No. 1:23-cv-00213-BT

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Tina M.’s 1 civil action seeking judicial review
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of a final adverse decision by the Commissioner of
Social Security (ECF No. 1). This action is before the undersigned United States
Magistrate Judge by consent of the parties. See Pl.’s Consent (ECF No. 9). For the
reasons explained below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that she is disabled due to a variety of physical and mental
impairments, including high blood pressure, bipolar disorder, depression,
hypertension, sleep apnea, and knee and back pain. Admin R. 98, 195, 250 (ECF
No. 14-1). Plaintiff was born in 1985, and she claims that she has been disabled

1 The Court uses only Plaintiff's first name and last initial as instructed by the May

1, 2018, Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and
Immigration Opinions issued by the Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
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since 2021. Admin. R. 19, 43, 180, 304; Pl. Brief 2 (ECF No. 15). She has an
eleventh-grade education and past work experience as a home health aide, a
housekeeper, and a cashier/clerk. Admin. R. 44, 55; Pl. Brief 2.
Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income (SSI) under Title XVI of
the Social Security Act (the “Act”) on April 26, 2021. Admin. R. 19, 170–72, 18083, 304; Pl. Brief 1. Her claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
Admin. R. 19, 94–96, 107–08; Pl. Brief 1–2. Thereafter, Plaintiff requested a
hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who conducted a telephonic
administrative hearing on February 6, 2023. Admin R. 39–61; Pl. Brief 2.
The ALJ found Plaintiff was not disabled and thus was not entitled to
disability benefits under the Act. Admin R. 16–18, 32–33; Pl. Brief 14. Utilizing the
five-step sequential evaluation, 2 the ALJ first found that Plaintiff has not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since April 26, 2021, the application date and her

“In evaluating a disability claim, the [ALJ] conducts a five-step sequential
analysis to determine whether (1) the [plaintiff] is presently working; (2) the
[plaintiff] has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an
impairment listed in appendix 1 of the social security regulations; (4) the
impairment prevents the [plaintiff] from doing past relevant work; and (5) the
impairment prevents the [plaintiff] from doing any other substantial gainful
activity.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff
bears the initial burden of establishing a disability through the first four steps of
the analysis; at the fifth step, the burden shifts to the ALJ to show that there is
other substantial work in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform. Id.
at 448; Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
A finding that the plaintiff is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step
review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923 (citing
Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995)); Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d
55, 58 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Barajas v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1984)
(per curiam)).
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alleged onset date. Admin R. 21. At the second step, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff
experienced severe impairments of “obesity[;] hypertension; lumbar degenerative
disk disease and scoliosis; sleep apnea; and bipolar disorder II disorder.” Admin
R. 21. At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s severe impairments did
not meet or medically equal any listed impairment in appendix 1 of the social
security regulations. Admin R. 22.
Next, the ALJ conducted a residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment.
She found that Plaintiff had the RFC to
Perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except where the
claimant can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch, but must
avoid climbing and crawling. The claimant must avoid commercial
driving or operating motor vehicles as part of job duties. The claimant
can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, make
simple work related decisions, and adapt to occasional changes in a
routine work setting. The claimant can accept instructions, and is
capable of occasional interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the
public that is superficial and task oriented. The claimant can maintain
attention, concentration, and work pace to perform simple tasks
independently within a regular work schedule and complete a normal
workday and workweek with ordinary supervision.
Admin R. 25.
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have any past relevant work.
Admin R. 32. Lastly, the ALJ concluded that, considering the testimony of a
vocational expert (VE) and Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC,
she could perform jobs including photo finisher, marker, bagger, lens inserter,
polisher, and final assembler, and that such jobs exist in significant numbers in the
national economy. Admin R. 32–33. Thus, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was

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not disabled under the Act and, therefore, not entitled to receive disability benefits.
Admin R. 33.
Plaintiff appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, which denied
her request for review. Admin R. 1; Pl. Brief 2. Plaintiff then filed this action in
federal district court, which contends that the ALJ failed to consider the severity
of Plaintiff’s knee impairment and its effect on the RFC, and further argues that
the RFC is not supported by substantial evidence of record. Pl’s Brief 1, 14–15, 20–
21.
Legal Standards
The Court's “review of Social Security disability cases ‘is limited to two
inquiries: (1) whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence on the
record as a whole, and (2) whether the [ALJ] applied the proper legal standard.’”
Copeland v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Perez v. Barnhart,
415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005)). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971); see Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923 (“Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla and less than a preponderance.”).
The ALJ, and not the courts, resolves conflicts in the evidence; the Court
may not “reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo.” Martinez v. Chater, 64
F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Hence, the Court may not substitute its
own judgment for the ALJ's, and it may affirm only on the grounds that the
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Commissioner stated to support her decision. Copeland, 771 F.3d at 923. If the
Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, the findings are
conclusive, and the Commissioner's decision must be affirmed. Martinez, 64 F.3d
at 173. A reviewing court must defer to the ALJ's decision when substantial
evidence supports it, even if the court would reach a different conclusion based on
the evidence in the record. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 1995).
Nevertheless, the substantial evidence review is not an uncritical “rubber
stamp” and requires “more than a search for evidence supporting the [ALJ's]
findings.” Hill v. Saul, 2020 WL 6370168, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020) (quoting
Martin v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1027, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)), adopted by 2020 WL
6363878 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2020) (Lindsay, J.). The Court “must scrutinize the
record and take into account whatever fairly detracts from the substantiality of the
evidence supporting” the ALJ's decision. Id. (quoting Martin, 748 F.2d at 1031). A
no-substantial-evidence finding is appropriate only if there is a “conspicuous
absence of credible choices” or “no contrary medical evidence.” Id. (citation
omitted).
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ made two errors that warrant remand. First,
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by failing to consider whether Plaintiff’s knee
impairment constituted a severe impairment and by not considering the
impairment in the RFC finding. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not
correctly consider all of Plaintiff’s mental impairments on her RFC—specifically by
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not accounting for her Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score or her
alleged inability to finish tasks. Pl. Brief 20–24. After reviewing the hearing
decision and the administrative record, the Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ did not commit
harmful error.
1. Any error committed by the ALJ with respect to the severity of Plaintiff’s
knee impairment is harmless because it was considered in the RFC
assessment.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ “failed to consider whether [Plaintiff’s] knee
impairment constituted a severe impairment” and consequently “failed to consider
the effect of [her] knee impairment” on the RFC. Pl. Brief 14. In response, the
Commissioner argues that “any failure to term [Plaintiff’s] knee impairment as a
‘severe’ impairment is harmless because the ALJ considered the impact of this
impairment in the RFC,” as she discussed the effects of Plaintiff’s knee pain
throughout the decision. Comm’r. Brief 3 (ECF No. 16).
As a general rule, if an ALJ “fails to specifically determine the severity of a
claimant’s impairments at step two, remand is not required if the ALJ proceeds to
the remaining steps of the disability analysis and considers the alleged
impairment’s—or its symptom’s—effects on the claimant’s ability to work at those
steps.” Tipler v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 2233627, at *13 (N.D. Tex. May 3, 2019),
adopted by, 2019 WL 2234707 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2019). By contrast, failure to
consider whether a condition is a severe impairment can be reversible error when
the ALJ never addresses the condition in its decision. See Kimberly P. v. Kijakazi,
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2023 WL 7309497, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2023) (Rutherford, J.) (finding that
the ALJ’s “fail[ure] to acknowledge or discuss [plaintiff’s brain atrophy and TBI]
anywhere in her decision, let alone consider whether they were medically
determinable impairments,” was not harmless error), adopted by, Kimberly P. v.
Kijakaza, 2023 WL 7309430 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 6, 2023); Boothe v. Colvin, 2013 WL
3809689, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 23, 2013) (noting that “a case where the ALJ fail[s]
to consider impairments at all” would not be harmless error).
Here, the ALJ did not make a specific severity finding regarding Plaintiff’s
alleged knee impairment. But this is not a case where the ALJ failed to
acknowledge or discuss the impairment at all. Instead, the ALJ’s written decision
notes Plaintiff’s reports to various medical professionals of “chronic knee pain” and
“difficulty walking.” Admin R. 26. The ALJ’s decision also discusses Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony that knee pain “limited her standing to 15 minutes at a time, and
sitting to up to an hour at a time” and “prevented her from working.” Admin R. 25.
The ALJ’s decision specifically recites Plaintiff’s testimony that she “use[d] a
shower chair when bathing [and a] walker once in a while due to her knees,” Admin
R. 25–26, and that, while she “enjoyed going for walks” and was generally
“independent in her personal care activities,” she “use[d] her friend’s walker to sit
on or move around with” and “used her friend’s shower chair to sit on when her
knees would give her trouble.” Admin. R. 29, 30.
After considering this evidence, the ALJ limited Plaintiff’s RFC to
performing light work “except where the claimant can occasionally balance, stoop,
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kneel, and crouch, but must avoid climbing and crawling.” Admin. R. 25. Thus, any
error that the ALJ made by not explicitly determining the severity of Plaintiff’s
knee impairment is harmless because the ALJ clearly considered her alleged knee
impairment and resulting limitations in determining her RFC. Boothe, 2013 WL
3809689, at *5 (“[A]ssuming arguendo that the ALJ erred by not finding [the
plaintiff’s impairments] severe, the error is harmless because the ALJ considered
these condition in his RFC analysis); see also Reliford v. Colvin, 2013 WL 1787650,
at *12–13 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2013) (finding that “even if the ALJ’s failure to make
a specific severity finding with regard to foot pain” was an error, it was harmless
because he considered the medical evidence of such pain and the resulting
limitations in the remaining steps of the analysis); Gibbons v. Colvin, 2013 WL
1293902, at *18–19 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2013) (explaining that “even if the ALJ
committed error in excluding [plaintiff’s] arthralgia and polyarthralgias in his
disability analysis, such an error was harmless because the ALJ considered the
effects of Plaintiff’s chronic pain syndrome on her ability to work, and incorporated
them in his RFC assessment by limiting her to light work [where] she [is] allowed
to stand and stretch at regular intervals,” as compared to the ALJ’s harmful error
in excluding plaintiff’s arthritis because it was “not addressed . . . at any step of the
disability analysis” and “nothing in the ALJ’s narrative discussion could reasonably
be said to incorporate” how that condition limits the ability to work).

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2. The ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ did not account for all of Plaintiff’s mental
impairments in determining the RFC by “not consider[ing], or even mention[ing]
[Plaintiff’s] GAF scores in her decision, or explain[ing] why such GAF scores were
unpersuasive.” Pl. Brief 22. In response, the Commissioner argues that GAF scores
are not determinative medical opinions. Comm’r Brief 6.
Before the 2017 amendments of the social security regulations, an ALJ’s
failure to address a claimant’s GAF score in his written decision could be reversible
error. See, e.g., Williams v. Saul, 2020 WL 8254286, at *1, 6 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 30,
2020) (concluding that the ALJ reversibly erred by not discussing a doctor’s GAF
score assigned to the plaintiff, who had filed for disability benefits in January 2017,
because the then-existing regulations under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 requires an ALJ
to “consider all medical opinions in the record,” including a GAF score), adopted
by, 2021 WL 211812 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2021); Ayala v. Saul, No. 7:19-cv-24-OBP, 2020 WL 1226879, at *3–4, Dkt. 1 at 1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2020) (concluding
that “the ALJ’s failure to reference and ‘explain the rejection of’ [plaintiff’s] GAF
scores ‘justifies a remand’” when plaintiff filed for benefits in June 2015).
However, under the new regulations—which apply to claims, like Plaintiff’s,
filed on or after March 27, 2017, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504—an ALJ does not need
to analyze “‘a decision made by any other governmental agency or
nongovernmental entity about whether [the claimant is] disabled, blind,
employable, or entitled to any benefits.’” Lashunda Y. F. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL
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10311505, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2022) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504). This
applies to GAF scores because they are decisions made by a nongovernmental
entity about whether a claimant is disabled. Id. Here, Plaintiff applied for
supplemental security income (SSI) on April 26, 2021, see Admin. R. 21, and thus
the ALJ’s failure to address Plaintiff’s GAF score in her written decision was not
error. See Lashunda Y. F., 2022 WL 10311505, at *1 (holding that the ALJ did not
err in failing to address plaintiff’s GAF score in his written decision because the
new regulations applied to plaintiff’s claim); Macias v. Saul, 2021 WL 2266171, at
*7 (W.D. Tex. June 3, 2021) (applying the amended version of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504
when the claimant filed for disability benefits six months after March 27, 2017 and
concluding “the ALJ did not err in not discussing and not giving any weight to [the
claimant’s] GAF score” because the ALJ was not obligated to do so under the new
regulations).
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by
substantial evidence because it does not account for Plaintiff’s alleged occasional
inability to complete tasks. Pl. Brief 21–25. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that even
though the ALJ “found generally persuasive the findings of State agency
psychological

consultant

Elizabeth

Bergmann-Harms,

Ph.D.,

at

the

reconsideration level,” the ALJ did not acknowledge Dr. Bergmann-Harms’s
finding that Plaintiff’s mental impairments “would occasionally interfere with her
ability . . . for task completion.” Pl. Brief 22 (citing Admin. R. 86). Plaintiff argues
that even though the ALJ “specifically cited” Plaintiff’s inability to finish tasks
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occasionally “as a basis for finding [she] has a moderate limitation in her ability to
concentrate, persist, or maintain pace,” the ALJ did not account for such
distractibility in the RFC finding. Pl. Brief 21. In response, the Commissioner
argues that the ALJ’s decision also sufficiently noted instances where Plaintiff’s
focus and concentration were said to be “good,” Comm’r Brief 7–8, and that,
“based on the evidence of record . . . the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff can
‘understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions, make simple work
decisions . . .’ accounted for moderate limitations in concentration.” Comm’r Brief
7–8 (citing Admin. R. 25).
The Court finds that the ALJ’s RFC finding is supported by substantial
evidence of record. First, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s selected quote from Dr.
Bergmann-Harms is misleading as it does not include the surrounding sentences,
which support the ALJ’s RFC finding:
The claimant is able to carry out simple instructions. Her anxiety and
depressive reaction as well as alleged hallucinatory experience and
pain/fatigue would occasionally interfere with her ability for
sustained concentration and persistence or for task completion.
However, the claimant would be able to complete tasks at an
acceptable pace.
Admin R. 84. Moreover, the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff has a “moderate limitation”
with regards to “concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace,” Admin. R. 24, is
properly accounted for through the RFC finding that Plaintiff is capable of
“understand[ing], remember[ing], and carry[ing] out simple instructions [and]
mak[ing] simple work related decisions, Admin R. 25. See Jackson v. Colvin, 2015

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WL 7681262, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 2015) (concluding that “the ALJ's mental
RFC determination limiting [plaintiff] to the performance of carrying out only
simple instructions [and] making simple decisions . . . is not contradictory to the
ALJ's finding . . . that [plaintiff] was moderately limited in her ability to maintain
concentration, persistence, or pace” and citing cases with same holding), adopted
by, 2015 WL 7582339 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 25, 2015); see also Dominick S. v. Kijakazi,
2022 WL 2874705, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 12, 2022) (Rutherford, J.) (finding—and
noting that other courts have similarly found—that “limiting a plaintiff to the
ability to carry out ‘detailed but not complex tasks’ is consistent with an ALJ’s
determination that a plaintiff had moderate limitations with regard to
concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace”), adopted sub nom., Simonetti v.
Kijakazi, 2022 WL 2872490 (N.D. Tex. July 20, 2022).
Conclusion
The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision and therefore AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision.
SO ORDERED.
March 11, 2025.
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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