Scott v. Amarillo Heart Group, L.L.P.

Filing 58

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: See Opinion and Order for specifics. (Ordered by Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 4/10/2013) (egb)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AMARILLO DIVISION
CANDANCE M. SCOTT"

$
$

PLAINTIFF,

$

vs.

3

CNIL ACTION CAUSE NUMBER

$

AMARILLO HEART GROUP, LLP,

2:12-CY-Il2-J

$
$

DEFENDANT.

$

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Candance Scott and Defendant Amarillo Heart Group, LLP filed on April 5,2013
cross-motions regarding Plaintiff

Court

will:

s

entitlementto equitable remedies. Forthe following reasons, the

1) not order Plaintiff Scott's reinstatement to her employment at the Amarillo Heart

Group, 2) award one year of front pay to the Plaintiff in the total amount of $49,000.00, 3) deny

Plaintiffs request for Court-ordered training of the Defendant's management and employees,4)
order a remittitur of $9,000.00 on the jury's finding of back pay from the date of termination to the
date of trial, and 5) find that there is suffrcient evidence to sustain the jury's award of punitive
damages. The Court will enter judgment upon the jury's verdict as modified herein.

Background
The parties have stipulated that: 1) Plaintiff Scott worked for the Amarillo Heart Group as
a

Nuclear Medicine Technologist, 2) she was initially hired on a temporary basis in September of

20l0,and was hired on a full-time basis on January 1,2011, 3)

she was paid $27.00 per hour by the

Amarillo Heart Group, and 4) the Amarillo Heart Group terminated her on February

lI,20II

.

After her termination, Plaintiff Scott timely filed her EEOC charge of discrimination on April

21,2011. She received her February 8,2012, right to
2012, against the Defendant pursuant to Title

sue letter, and

filed this lawsuit on May 7,

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. $

2000e-5(f)(3) & (g), mirror provisions of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (the Texas
version of Title VII), as well as a claim of wrongful termination pursuant to 42 U.S.C' $ 1981./r

Plaintiff alleged at trial that when she reported racially discriminatory behavior to her
supervisors andto Amarillo HeartGroupmanagement, DefendantAmarillo Heart Group didnothing

to remedy the situation but, instead, terminated Plaintiff for pretextual reasons. The jury returned
a verdict in Plaintiff s favor on damages for lost wages and benefits in the past, and awarded
significant punitive damages. The jury found that her termination was retaliatory because she
engaged

in the protected activity of complaining about race discrimination, and fuither found by

clear and convincing evidence that Defendant Amarillo Heart Group engaged in retaliatory
termination with malice or reckless indifference to Plaintiff Scott's employment rights.
Reinstatement
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not requested reinstatement at the Amarillo Heart Group,
that her job position at the Amarillo Heart Group has been filled by an innocent incumbent for two
or more years now, that reinstatement would require the employer to displace an existing employee,
and that reinstatement would create a very uncomfortable employment situation for the Plaintiff.

For these reasons, the Court finds and concludes that court-ordered reinstatement of the Plaintiff

would not be an appropriate remedy . See Palasota v. Haggar Clothing Co., 499 F.3d 474,488-89
(5th Cir. 2001).

t

$ 198L "Equal rights under the law:

(a) Statement of equal rights. All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every Stateand Tenitory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
fJl anA equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
(b) 'Make and enforce contracts' defined. For purposes ofthis section, the term 'make and enforce contracts'
includes the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
(c) Protection against impairment. The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law'"

Front Pay
An award of front pay is meant to compensate

a

plaintiff for wages and benefits she would

have received from the defendant employer in the future
See Palasota,

if not for the Defendant's wrong actions.

supre,499 F.3d at489-90; Gamble v. Birmingham Southern R.R. Co., 5I4F.2d678,

684 (5th Cir. 1975). The Court finds that front pay should be awarded as an equitable remedy in the

amount of $49,000.00. In arriving atlhatconclusion, the Court has considered the jury verdict and
the evidence admitted attrialon the amount of Plaintiff Scott's expected annualized earnings at the

Amarillo Heart Group. The Court has considered and accounted for the expenses to the Plaintiff in
obtaining comparable employment within her field of expertise during 2012.

In making its award of front pay, the Court has considered the fact that the Plaintiffs
particular area of expertise is a area where jobs are difficult to locate. The Defendant agrees that
there are only six similar or substantially equivalent jobs within the local job market. The Court
finds that the employees holding those jobs are generally long-term employees, and that there is little
employee turnover in that employment area. Therefore, while there is a duty on the part of the

Plaintiff to diligently try to seek substantially equivalent employment, she needs some additional
time in order to do so. There is obvious evidence that, had she remained employed with Amarillo
Heart Group and had she been treated as its other employees were treated, Plaintiff Scott would have
had long-term employment with the Amarillo Heart Group. There is also sufficient evidence that

it is extremely difficult,

because of the nature of her employment, for her

to find additional

comparable employment. Nevertheless, substantially equivalent employment within her area at some

time will become available, although it is impossible for the Court to speculate exactly what point
in time that might be. The Court believes and finds that this front pay award gives her approximately
a

year in which to seek that type of substantially equivalent employment and still maintain the degree

of other income that she's employed.
The Court finds that front pay in the amount of $49,000 is the best that the Court can do in

calculating what is reasonable to her in seeking

-

and continuing to seek

equivalent employment, and perhaps being able to obtain

it.

-

other substantially

In aniving at that amount, the Court

has considered the undisputed fact that

Plaintiff was able to partially mitigate her damages by finding

some comparable employment during 2012. It is further undisputed, and the Court so finds, that the

Plaintiff thereby earned approximately $20,000 during 2012, but that her costs and expenses in
earning that amount were over $11,000 during 2012. Deducting $9,000 from the Plaintiffs
annualized $58,500 income from the Amarillo Heart Group leaves one year of front pay awarded in
the total amount of $49,000.00 appropriate in this case.

Of course, as the court cases recognize, this is a speculative endeavor that the Court must
engage in, and

it is impossible for anybody to know, for

comparable employment

will

sure, exactly what and when that other

become available, but the Court concludes that this amount is a

reasonable calculation on the basis of the evidence that is before the Court concerning the nature

of

Plaintiff Scott's employment, her personal qualifications, and the availability, not only in Amarillo
but in other areas, of finding substantially equivalent employment.

Injunctive Relief
The Court denies Plaintiff s request for the injunctive relief of court-ordered EEO training
for the Defendant's management and employees. It has not been shown at this time to be necessary
for Defendant's supervisors or upper management to be EEO trained, under the specific facts of this
case. In light of the jury's award of significant punitive damages, the Court is reasonably confident
that the Defendant's senior management is now aware of their EEO anti-discrimination and anti-

retaliatory obligations.
The requested court-ordered posting of

a

notice to the Defendant's employees regarding their

Equal Employment Opportunity rights is denied because it has not been shown to be necessary.
There is no evidence that the Defendant is not already complying with its legal obligations regarding

posting of required EEO notices. See 42. U.S.C. $ 2000e-10./'z

,

"(a) Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization, as the case may be,
shall post and keep posted in conspicuous places upon its premises where notices to employees,
applicants for employment, and members are customarily posted a notice to be prepared or approved by
the Commission setting forth excerpts from or, summaries of, the pertinent provisions of this subchapter
and information pertinent to the filing of a complaint."

Punitive Damages
The Court finds that the jury's punitive damages award is an acceptable verdict by the jury
on the issue of the appropriateness of an award of punitive damages. The Court notes that the

jury

found by clear and convincing evidence that the Defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference
to Plaintiff Scott's employment rights when it terminated her, because she engaged in the protected

activity of complaining about race discrimination. That finding is well supported by the credible
evidence at trial, and there has not been any request by the Defendant that the Court modiff that

award. The amount found and awarded by the jury is

a reasonable amount under the facts

of this

case. It is a sufficient amount adequate both to punish the Defendant and to deter the Defendant and
others from engaging in similar conduct in the future.

The amount found and awarded by the jury is in conformance with the credible evidence

regarding whether the Defendant made "good faith efforts" to prevent discrimination

in

the

workplace, its actual anti-discrimination policies, and its actual efforts to educate its employees on
the anti-discrimination laws. Considering how the Defendant actually responded to

Plaintiff Scott's

complaints of discrimination, how it failed to respond adequately to her reports of discrimination,
and how it ultimately responded to her complaints by choosing to terminate the

Plaintiff because of

her reports, clearly a protected activity, both an award of punitive damages and the amount awarded

here are warranted under the facts of this case.

Prejudgment Interest
Prejudgment interest should be awarded in order to make a plaintiff whole, as a refusal to
award prejudgment interest ignores the time value of money. Thomas v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal
Justice, 297 F.3d 36I,373 (5th Cir. 2002). A prevailing plaintiff s request for an equitable award
of prejudgment interest should be granted "in all but exceptional circumstances." Bituminous Cas.

Corp. v. Vacuum Tanks, Inc., 75 F.3d 1048, 1057 (5th Cir. 1996)(quoting Am. Int'l Trading Corp.
v. Petroleos Mexicano,s, 835 F.2d 536,541 (5th
arises under federal law,

"it

Cir. 1987))(applying Texas law). Where an action

is within the discretion of the district court to select an equitable rate

of

prejudgmentinterest." Hansenv.ContinentalIns.Co.,940F.2d97I,984(5thCir. 1991).TheFifth

Circuit has o'approved the imposition of the federal rate of interest in Title VII cases as making

plaintiff whole, but

a

has not held that only the federal rate of interest is appropriate" for calculating

prejudgment interest. Williams v. Trqder Publ'g Co., 218 F.3d 481, 488 (5th Cir. 2000)(citing
Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 600 (1st Cir. 1987)).
Under Title VII, courts generally should calculate interest on past damages based on the date
of the adverse employment action. Prejudgment interest should apply to all past injuries, including
pastemotional injuries. Prejudgmentinterestisnotrecoverable, however, forfuture emotionalharm
under Title

VII.

Thomas v. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice,297 F.3d361,372-73 (5th Cir.2002).

Plaintiff Scott is entitled to prejudgment interest on her award of back pay and benefits.
The Fifth Circuit has held that where a claim is governed by a federal statute and the statute

is silent on the issue of prejudgment interest, "state law is an appropriate source of guidance."
Hansen,940
1

193 (5th

F

.2d at 984 (quoting United States ex rel. Canion v. Randall & Blake, 817 F.2d

Cir. 1987));

Sept.16, 2010) (in

see

1

I 88,

also Wesley v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 2010 WL 3606095, *2 (N.D. Tex.

Title VII

case,

"[i]n the

absence of a federal statute that establishes the rate

of

prejudgment interest, state law guides the court's discretion in determining the interest rate").

Accordingly, the Court looks to Texas state law regarding prejudgment interest, as set forth
in the Texas Finance Code Sections 304.003(a) and (c), which provide that prejudgment interest
shall accrue at the rate of 5oh per year, which does not compound, when the prime rate as published
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is less than
20 1 0

WL 3606095, at * 1 (applyrng

5Yo

5o/o, as

it is today. See Wesley,

interest rate). Prejudgment interest may not be assessed or

recovered, however, on an award of exemplary damages, Tex. Civ. Prac.

& Rem. Code Ann. $

41.007 (Vernon 1997), and under Texas law does not begin to accrue on the date of a plaintiff

s

termination.

With an exception that is immaterial under the facts of this

case, "prejudgment interest

accrues on the amount of ajudgment during the period beginning on the earlier of the 180th day after

the date the defendant receives written notice of a claim or the date the suit is filed and endins on

the day preceding the date judgment is rendered." Tex. Fin. Code Ann. $ 304.104 (Vernon Supp.

2004-05). "Prejudgment interest is computed

as simple interest and does not compound." Id.

Although the record shows when Plaintiff Scott was terminated (February Il,2011), and the
date she filed her discrimination charge with the EEOC

(April 2l ,2011), the date, if any, upon which

she notified the Defendant that she was making a claim against

it is unclear. Under Texas law, her

prejudgment begins to accrue 180 days after that unknown date. The Court will therefore use the
next known date, the date Scott's EEOC right-to-sue letter was issued (February 8,2012) as the date
to commence the accrual of prejudgment interest. By that known point in time the Amarillo Heart
Group had been notified of Plaintiff s claims by the EEOC.
Post-judgment interest will be at the interest rate, compounded annually, governing federal
court judgments,28 U.S.C. $ 1961(a). See Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Tiner Assoc., lnc.,288
F

.3d222,234 (5thCir.2002)(regardless ofwhether

a cause

of action is based on state law or federal

law, federal law determines post-judgment interest, and the federal post-judgment interest applies
even in diversity cases).

Conclusion
Judgment will be entered for the Plaintiff in conformance with this opinion and order.

It is SO ORDERED.

Signed this

the

/ft

day of Apr1l,2013.

OBINSON
TES DISTRICT JU