Williams v. Nash et al

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL - Ordered that the Civil Rights Complaint filed by pltf be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous. This dismissal qualifies as a "strike" under the prison litigation reform act. (Ordered by Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 5/30/2012) (plh)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION

MICHAEL ANTHONY WILLIAMS, PRO SE, $
also known as MICHAEL A. WILLIAMS, $
TDCJ-CID No. 1445347,
$
Previous TDCJ-CID No. 731471,

I
I

Plaintiff,

$
$

v.

$

Major DARRELL K. NASH,
Sgt. LEO J. RAMIREZ,

and

2:12-CV-0120

$
$
$
$

Defendants.

$

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff MICHAEL ANTHONY WILLIAMS, acting pro se and while

a prisoner

confined in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions

Division, has filed suit pursuant to Title 42,United States Code, section 1983 complaining
against the above-referenced defendants and has been granted permission to proceed in forma
pauperis.

By his complaint, plaintiff states that, when defendant Sgt. RAMIREZ was able to
confirm plaintiff was a member of a Security Threat Group, the Mandingo Warriors, plaintiff was
assigned to new housing outside of the dorm and his

job was terminated by defendant

Major NASH. Plaintiff says the defendants had him placed on the Security Threat Group, or
STG,
are

list. Plaintiff

argues this constitutes rucial discrimination because the Mandingo Warriors

"an organization and tribe of African culture and descent." Plaintiff argues that Major Nash

said no gang of any type is allowed to work in maintenance or be housed in the dorms, but there

are "Crips, bloods, Texas Synicute [sic], Ayran [sic] Nation, Ayran [sic] Brotherhood

living and

working in Maintance [sic] dept. living in the dorms building."
As relief, plaintiff requests the Security Threat Group designation be removed from

plaintiff and from all members of the Mandingo Warriors in TDCJ.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
When a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity, the Court must evaluate the complaint and dismiss it without service
process,
a

of

Aliv. Higgs,892F.2d438,440 (5th Cir. 1990), if it is frivolousr, malicious, fails to state

claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 1915A; 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2). The same standards

will

support dismissal of a suit brought under any federal law by a prisoner confined in any jail,

prison, or other correctional facility, where such suit concems prison conditions. 42 U.S.C.
1997e(c)(1). A Spears hearing need not be conducted for every pro se complaint. Wilson

v.

Barrientos,926F.2d 480, 483 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991)2.
The District Judge has reviewed the facts alleged by plaintiff to determine if his claim
presents grounds for dismissal or should proceed to answer by defendants.

'A claim is frivolous ifit lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact, Booker v. Koonce,2 F.3d I 14, I l5 (5th Cir. 1993); see,
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, I 12 S.Ct. I 728, I 733, I I 8 L.Ed.zd 340 (1992).
zCf, Greenv. McKasHe,788
F.2d II16, I 120 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Ofcourse, our discussion ofSpears should not be interpreted
to mean that all or even most prisoner claims require or deserve a Spears hearing. A district court should be able to dismiss as
frivolous a significant number of prisoner suits on the complaint alone or the complaint together with the llatson
questionnaire. ").

THE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Although prison inmates do not lose all their constitutional rights when they enter prison,

"lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.o' See, Sandin

v.

conner,515 U.S. 472,485,115 S.Ct. 2293, r32L.8d.2d 418 (1995), quoting Jones v. North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,433 U.S. I19,I25,97 S.Ct. 2532,53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977),
quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S, 266,285,68 S.Ct. 1049,93 L.Ed. 1356 (1948), Thus, "the
exigencies of prison administration justifu ... more stringent restrictions on prisoners' speech and
association than would be permissible on the outside ." McNamara v. Moody, 606

F

.2d 621, 623

n.3 (5th Cfu.1979). The inherent demands of institutional correction, the deference owed to

prison administrators, and the subjugation of individual liberty that lawful incarceration
necessarily entails justifies the attempts by prison officials to ascertain inmate membership in
groups deemed a threat to the security of the institution and actions taken to control that threat.
See

Jones,433 U.S. at 132,97 S.Ct. at2541, (recognizing that prison administrators may curtail

an inmate's ability to exercise constitutional rights to prevent "disruption of prison order," ensure

stability, or to advance other "legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment").
Prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty or properfy interests in their prison job
assignments. Jaclrsonv. Cain,864F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1989)(state prisoner); Bulger v. US.
Bureau of Prisons,65 F.3d 48 (5th Cir. 1995)(federal prisoner). Therefore, the fact that plaintiff
lost his prison job assignment does not provide a basis to support a claim under section 1983.

Moreover, on numerous occasions, the Fifth Circuit has held that "[i]nmates have no protectable
property or liberty interest in custodial classification." Whitley v. Hunt, 158 F.3d 882, 889 (5th

Cir. 1998)(change in security classification based on allegedly inaccurate information). Since

a

prison inmate has no protectable liberty interest or property interest in his prison job assignment
or his custodial classificati on, Wilson v. Budney,976 F.2d 957,958 (5th Cir. 1992), it is clear

plaintiff has no liberty interest in retaining or obtaining classification

as a General Population

Inmate eligible to house in the dorms or work in maintenance, Sandin v. Conner, 515lJ.S. 472,
484 (1995). This claim lacks an arguable legal basis and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams,490

u.s. 319,

109

s.ct. 1827, I04L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

As to plaintiff s argument that his treatment is racially discriminatory, plaintiff does not
allege all African-Americans are disqualified from living in the dorms or from working in
maintenance, only that those who are members of the Mandingo Warriors are so disqualified. To
state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a $ 1983

plaintiff must allege that

a state actor

intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of membership in a protected class or
due to an irrational or arbitrary state classification unrelated to a legitimate state objective.

Washingtonv. Davis,426 U.S.229,247-48,96 S.Ct.2040,2051-52,48L.8d.2d597 (1916);

Sternv. Tarrant County Hospital District,778F.2d 1052 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.denied,476 U.S.
1108, 106 S.Ct. 1957, 90L.Ed.2d 365 (1986). A classification neither involving fundamental
rights nor proceeding along suspect lines is accorded a strong presumption of validity and does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of
treatment and some legitimate govemmental purpose. Heller v. Doe,509 U.S.

312,ll3

S.Ct.

2637,2642, I25 L.F,d.zd257 (1993). Furthermore, the failure to articulate the purpose of
rationale of a classification is not fatal, and the classification "must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a

rational basis for the classification."

Id.

The rational basis for the treatment of members of the

Mandingo Warriors differently from other non-Mandingo Warrior inmates is clear from

plaintiffls factual allegations; and the Court will afford

the judgment of prison

officials in

security matters such as this the deference it is due.

Plaintiff also asserts members of gangs primarily consisting of African-Americans, such
as the

Crips and the Bloods, and members of gangs primarily consisting of Caucasians, such

as

Aryan Nations, are housed in the dorms and working in maintenance. Plaintiff does not state the
defendants have been able to

veriff

such membership or that those inmates have not renounced

that membership. Further, he does not state how he could have personal knowledge of such

facts. Nevertheless, if this allegation is true, it conclusively disproves plaintiff s claim of racism
as the basis

for treating the Mandingo Warriors differently from these other Security Threat

Groups.

Plaintiff

s claim that the classification of the Mandingo Warriors as a Security Threat

Group is a product of racism lacks an arguable basis in law and is frivolous. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 109 S.Ct. 1827, I04L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).

CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. sections

l9l5A

and 1915(e)(2), as well as Trtle 42, United

States Code, section 1997e(c)(l),

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Civil Rights Complaint filed pursuant to Title 42,
United States Code, Section 1983, by plaintiff MICHAEL ANTHONY WILLIAMS be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE AS FRIVOLOUS.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

THIS DISMISSAL QUALIFIES AS A "STRIKE" UNDER THE PRISON LITIGATION
REFORM ACT.

A copy of this Order shall be mailed to plaintiff and to any attorney of record by first
class mail.

The Clerk shall also provide a copy of this order by regular mail, facsimile transmission,
or e-mail to: (1) the TDCJ-Office of the General Counsel, P.O. Box 13084, Austin, Texas,
78711, Fax Number (512) 9362159; (2) the Inmate Trust Fund, P.O. Box 629, Huntsville, Texas

77342-0629, fax [phone]; and (3) the District Clerk for the Eastern District of Texas,
Tyler

Division,2ll west

Ferguson, Tyler, Texas, 75702, Attention: Manager of the

Three-Strikes List.

It is SO ORDERED.
Signed this

the L2(^"

day

of

2012.