Thomas v. Randall County et al

Filing 46

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 39 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by Potter County, Texas (Ordered by Senior Judge Mary Lou Robinson on 11/20/2017) (vls)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF'TEXAS
AMARILLO DIVISION
JOHNIE RAY THOMAS.

Plaintiff,
NO. 2:17-cv-00133-J
POTTER COLINTY, et

a1.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendant Potter County, Texas's Motion to Dismiss, filed on
October 16,2017, and the Plaintiffs response, filed on October 23,2011. For the following
reasons, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED.

On July 27, 2017, Plaintiff filed this suit against Defendants Potter County, Terry
Easterling, LaDonna Reining, Debbie Gaines, Desi Ware, Ruben Hurt, and Robert Thompson
under 42 U.S.C $ 1983 alleging various violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment

rights. Defendants Desi Ware, Ruben Hurt, and Robert Thompson were severed for improper
venue. Claims against Defendants Terry Easterling, LaDonna Reining, and Debbie Gaines were
dismissed on the grounds of expiration of statute of limitations.

A final judgment in their favor

was entered. This Order addresses claims asserted against Defendant Potter County, who does

not raise the affirmative defense of statute of limitations in their 12(bX6) motion, but instead
correctly asserts that Potter County cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of the Potter
County Community Supervision and Corrections Department (CSCD).

Rule 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of an action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(bX6). If the complaint lacks a required element which is a
prerequisite to obtaining relief, dismissal is proper. Clarkv. Amoco Prods. Co.,794F.2d967,
970 (5th Cir. 1986). In reviewing a motion for 12(b)(6) dismissal, the Court must consider all of

plaintiff s well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503, 529 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Great Plaints Trust Co.

v.

Morgan, Stanley, Dean, Witter, & Co., 3 13 F.3d 305, 3 12 (5th Cir. 2002)).
Whether a defendant is acting on behalf of the state or the local government is
determined by state law and by an analysis of the duties alleged to have caused the constitutional

violation. Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674, 677 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 522U.5. 828 (1997).
Regarding the CSCD and its characterization as either a state or county entity, it is established

law in the Fifth Circuit that correctional departments, such as the Potter County CSCD, are an
arm of the state. See Clarkv. Tarrant County, Tex.,798F.2d736 (5th Cir. 1986). At the time
relevant to Plaintiff s claims against Potter County and the officers employed by the CSCD,

community supervision was govemed by article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Under former article 42.12, authority to set the conditions of community supervision was, and

still is, vested in state trial judges. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 42.12, $ 1 1(a), (b) (West
Supp. 2016). The Fifth Circuit rn Clark noted that probation departments are controlled by state

district judges who are, "undeniably elected state officials." Clark at744. The Clark court,

interpreting former article 42.12, funher noted that, "the coincidence of county lines and judicial
districts is not required. The statute was enacted to address a statewide problem and to put
control of probationers in the hands of state officers." Id. at 745. The Court also noted rn Clark
that the Texas Attorney General has interpreted former article 42.72, "as intending to give

control of probation departments to state judicial districts. Id. at744.
Regarding vicarious liability, allowing local governments to be liable for a state judge's

judicial acts "would subvert the message of Monell that municipalities cannot be vicariously
liable under $ 1983." Carbalanv, Vaughn,760F.2d662,665 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,474U.S.
1007 (1985); see Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv,s. o.f City o.f New York,436 U.S. 658 (1978). The

holding rn Carbala,? was recently reiterated in Davidson v. City of Stafford, Texas where the

Fifth Circuit held that local governmental entities cannot be found liable under section 1983 for
the acts of state agents on a theory of vicarious liability or respondeat superior. Davidson v. City
of Stafford, Texas,848 F.3d 384,395 (5th Cir. 2011).In Stem v, Ahearn, the Fifth Circuit stated

that, "Harris County, like all instruments of county government, cannot be held vicariously liable

for the actions of state agencies." Stem v. Ahearn,908 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit
has consistently ruled that local govemments are not vicariously liable for the actions of state
agencies. This Court adheres to that precedent in ruling that Potter County is not liable for the

actions of the Potter County CSCD.

While Potter County is

a named defendant,

Plaintiff s claims focus exclusively on the

officers of the CSCD and their actions taken in the course of their employment. In the present
case,

Plaintiff attempts to hold Potter County liable for actions taken by CSCD officers. It is well

established in the Fifth Circuit that County Community Supervision and Corrections
Departments, such as the Potter County CSCD, are an arm of the state, and thus the county
cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions of a state agency.

By suing Potter County, and attempting to hold Potter County liable for the actions of the
CSCD, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the above
reasons, Potter County's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
SIGNED this the 2Othday of November,2017.

s/ ltary Lou Robinson
MARY LOU ROBINSON
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE