Valcho v. Dallas County Hospital District

Filing 157

Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 124 Motion to Open and Close at Trial, and to Initiate the Presentation of Evidence filed by Dallas County Hospital District. (see order) (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 8/28/2009) (klm)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION ANGELA VALCHO, Plaintiff, VS. DALLAS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT d/b/a PARKLAND HEALTH AND HOSPITAL SYSTEM, Defendant. § § § § Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1853-D § § § § § § §

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In this action by a hospital nurse against her former employer to recover unpaid wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act

("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., defendant moves to open and close at trial and to initiate the presentation of evidence. the reasons that follow, the court denies the motion.1 I Plaintiff Angela Valcho ("Valcho") sues defendant Dallas County Hospital District, doing business as Parkland Health and Hospital System ("Parkland"), to recover under the FLSA. Parkland For

moves to open and close at trial and to initiate the presentation of evidence.
1

After Parkland filed the motion, the court issued a

Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of "written opinion" adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a "written opinion[ ] issued by the court" because it "sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court's decision." It has been written, however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case, and not for publication in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly.

memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part Parkland's motion for summary judgment. See Valcho v. Dallas

County Hosp. Dist., 2009 WL 2486031, at *1, *10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.). Parkland argues that the normal order at

trial should be altered because it bears the burden of proving that Valcho was an exempt employee under the FLSA. Parkland contends in its motion that the outcome of the exemption question is the predominant issue in the case. II This court has the discretion to alter the normal sequence of trial presentations. See Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 1300, 1311 It has previously allowed a defendant

(5th Cir. Dec. 1981).

bearing the primary burden of proof to open and close at trial. See, e.g., Sweet Jan Joint Venture v. FDIC, 809 F. Supp. 1253, 1258 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (Fitzwater, J.). Likewise, courts presented with

FLSA cases similar to this one have agreed to reassign the right to open and close. See, e.g., Reyes v. Tex. EzPawn, L.P., 2007 WL

3143315, at *3 (S.D. Tex. 2007) ("[F]airness mandates that the party which in bears the the case burden should of be proof on the to central and issue close

remaining first.").

entitled

open

The court declines to reverse the trial sequence in this case, however, because Valcho's status as an exempt employee, and

Parkland's burden of proof on this issue, were made irrelevant by -2-

the court's summary judgment ruling.

Valcho's disputed exempt

status was only pertinent to the period before March 30, 2005. "March 30, 2005 corresponds to the last day Parkland classified Valcho as a professional exempt from the FLSA's overtime pay requirements. On March 30, 2005 Parkland reclassified Valcho and

other nurses as nonexempt employees and began paying them time and one-half for overtime hours." see also id. at *4­*7. dismissing Valcho's Valcho, 2009 WL 2486031, at *1 n.2;

The court "grant[ed] summary judgment for unpaid overtime wages, and

claims

dismissing her claim for unpaid straight-time wages for the period before March 30, 2005." summary judgment as to Id. at *10. Valcho's Although the court denied claims, none of them See

other

implicates the question of her status as an exempt employee. id. at *7­*8.

Therefore, any argument that Valcho's status as an

exempt employee is the predominant issue in this case falls away,2 as does Parkland's argument for seeking the right to open and close.

Because the claims involving analyze whether, Parkland would be

2

court's summary judgment ruling disposed of all the exemption question, the court need not had those claims survived summary judgment, entitled to reversal of the sequence at trial. -3-

*

*

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Accordingly, Parkland's July 13, 2009 motion to open and close at trial and to initiate the presentation of evidence is denied. SO ORDERED. August 28, 2009.

_________________________________ SIDNEY A. FITZWATER CHIEF JUDGE

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