Allstate Insurance Company et al v. Plambeck et al

Filing 224

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE. The Rule 12(b)(2) and Rule 12(b)(3) motion to dismiss filed by the Magelaner Defendants [Doc. #56], and the Rule 12(b)(7) motions to dismiss filed by the Chiropractic Defendants and RMC [Docs. #5 1, 791 should be denied. (see order) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan on 01/30/09) (lmp)

IN THE LINITED STATESDISTRICTCOURT N O R T H E R NDISTRICTOF TEXAS D A L L A S DIVISION A L L S T A T E INSURANCECOMPANY. E T AL.
Plaintiffs.

VS. D.C., M I C H A E LKENT PLAMBECK, E T AL.
Defendants.

N O . 3-08-CV-0388-M

F I N D I N G S AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE U N I T E D STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE In this civil RICO action, DefendantsThomasMagelanerand Magelaner& Associates,Ltd. ( " t h e MagelanerDefendants")have filed a combinedRule l2(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of p e r s o n ajurisdiction and Rule 12(bX3)motion to dismissfor impropervenue. DefendantRainbow l M a r k e t i n g Consultants,Inc. ("RMC") and a group of defendantsconsisting of chiropractors, ("the ChiropracticDefendants") c h i r o p r a c t i cclinics, office staff, and some outsidetelemarketers parties. For Rule l2(b)(7) motions to dismissfor failure to join indispensable h a v e filed separate the reasonsstatedherein. the motions should be denied.r I. This is an action brought by Allstate InsuranceCompanyand three of its affiliates to recover m o r e than $2 million paid to chiropractorsin Texas, Ohio, Indiana, and Alabama as a result of
' RMC and the ChiropracticDefendants alsosoughtdismissal ofplaintiffs'original complaintunderRule 9(b) requestedalternativerelief under Rule l2(e) in the form of a more definite a n d Rule l2(bX6), while all defendants raisedby thesemotions,the court orderedplaintiffs to file a RICO s t a t e m e n t .Insteadof addressing pleadingdefects the did and an amended complaint,and deniedthe motionswithout prejudice. (SeeDoc. #97). Defendants c a s estatement n o t renew their Rule 9(b), Rule l2(bX6), or Rule l2(e) motions after plaintiffs amendedtheir pleadings.

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allegedly fraudulent billings for unreasonable unnecessary and chiropractic services. (SeePlf. First A m . Compl at 6, !f l; RICO Case Stmt. at l, $ l(l)). The defendants can be groupedinto three

b r o a d categories:(l) licensedchiropractors, (2) chiropracticclinics, and their employees; outside telemarketersand marketing firms; and (3) attorneysand law firms who representaccidentvictims treated by the chiropractors. In their most recent complaint, plaintiffs describea schemewhereby telemarketers review police reportsto obtainthenamesofpersonsinvolved in automobileaccidents. Persons who are identified in the police reports as "not at fault" are then solicited by the t e l e m a r k e t e r s visit a chiropracticclinic. (SeePlf. First Am. Compl. at 6, fl 2 & 58,\2561' RICO to C a s eStmt. at2, $ 1(1),14, $ 2(8), & 16-18,$ 2(10)-(12)). Accordingto plaintiffs,the accident v i c t i m s are lured to the clinics with offers of free services. (SeePlf. First Am. Compl. at 585 9 ,flfl 260-61;RICO CaseStmt.at 2, $ l(1),14, $ 2(8),& 16-17,$ 2(10)). During their initial visit, x-rays. (SeePlf. First t h e accidentvictims submit to a "1O-Point Examination"and,in somecases, are A m . Compl. at 6, fl 3; RICO CaseStmt. at 2, $ 1(1)). Plaintiffs allegethat theseexaminations and that x-ray films either aursory and sometimesperformed by unlicensedchiropractic assistants, d o not exist or are of such inferior quality as to be useless diagnosticpurposes. (SeePlf. First for A m . Compl. at62-63,nn279,283). Regardless the actualclinicalfindings,the accident of victims a r e told that they have seriousinjuries that requireimmediatetreatment.(Seeid. at 6,\3,7,n 5, &

6 3 , 1 2 8 5 ; RICO Case Stmt. at 2, $ l(1)). The chiropractors"convert" the accidentvictims into treating patients by promising that they never will be personallyliable for any treatmentcosts. (See P l f . First Am. Compl. at 63-64, n 282,286). Instead,the chiropractorsagreeto look only to proceeds payment. (Seeid. at 64, fl 286). Oncethe accidentvictims becomepatients, insurance for they are referred to lawyers associatedwith the clinics. (See id. at 66, n 296). The lawyers send

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retention letters to automobile insurers- like plaintiffs - advising that they representthe patients. That effectivelyprecludesthe insurersfrom independentlycommunicating with thepatientsto verift t h e i r condition. (Seeid, at66,n299). At the clinics, the patientssubmitto a setcourseof treatment d e s i g n e dto maximize insurancebillings. (Seeid. at 7, \ 6 & 65, n 2%; RICO CaseStmt. at 3, by claims on behalf of the patients, $ 1(l)). The lawyersparticipatein the scheme filing insurance w h i c h includeexpenses allegedlyunnecessary for (See chiropractic treatment. Plf. First Am. Compl. a t 7 , \ 7 &,68, fl 309; RICO CaseStmt.at 3, $ 1(l)). When the claimsare settled, proceeds the are d e p o s i t e dinto trust accountsheld in the nameof one of the associated lawyersor law firms. (See P l f . First Am. Compl. at 69,fl 312). P l a i n t i f f s allege that the ringleader of this insurancescam is Defendant Michael Kent P l a m b e c k("Plambeck"), chiropractor Arlington,Texas. (Seeid. at 9, fl 18 &23, !J81; RICO a in to C a s eStmt. at 5, $ 2(l)). According to plaintiffs, Plambeckrecruitsnewly licensedchiropractors Group, Inc. ("CSG"), a Texas w o r k in clinics managedand controlledby ChiropracticStrategies of c o r p o r a t i o n . (SeePlf. First Am. Compl. at 12,fl 34; RICO CaseStmt. at 5, $ 2(1). Seventeen t h e CSG clinics are locatedin the Arlington area. (SeePlf. First Am. Compl. at 13-17,ti'lT 38-54). P l a m b e c kallegedlytrains CSG chiropractors the processes "conversion"and "retention" by in of p r o v i d i n g scriptsthat emphasize importance convincingpatients of the that theyhavespinalinjuries t h a t require immediatecare regardless any diagnosticfindings. (SeeRICO Stmt. at 5, $ 2(1)). of A n y chiropractorwho fails to comply with these"conversion" and "retention"policiesis terminated b y CSG. (Seeid. at 6, $ 2(1)). Plambeckand his CSG clinics also participatein the referral of p a t i e n t s lawyersand law firms. (SeePlf.FirstAm. Compl at23,l84; RICO Stmt.at 6, $ 2(l) & to 1 3 , S 2(7)).

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On March 6,2008, plaintiffs sueddefendants Dallas federalcourt for: (1) violations of in t h e RacketeerInfluencedand Comrpt Organizations ("RICO") Act, l8 U.S.C. $ 1961,et seq.; (2) violations of the Ohio and Indiana racketeering statutes; and (3) fraud, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment under Texas law. Three groups of defendantshave filed preliminary Rule 12 motions. T h e Magelaner Defendantshave filed a combined Rule l2(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of p e r s o n a ljurisdiction and Rule 12(bX3) motion to dismiss for improper venue. RMC and the C h i r o p r a c t i cDefendants have filed separate Rule l2(b)(7) motions to dismissfor failure to join as partiesmorethan 700patients indispensable who received chiropractic treatment.The motionshave been fully briefed and are ripe for determination. II. jurisdiction and venue. In their motion, the T h e court first considers issuesof personal the jurisdiction over ThomasMagelaner, maintainthat the court lackspersonal M a g e l a n e rDefendants neither Ltd., because a n Ohio personalinjury lawyer, and his law firm, Magelaner& Associates, defendantconductsbusinessin the Stateof Texas. The MagelanerDefendantsfurther contendthat venue is not proper in the Northem District of Texas becauseplaintiffs have failed to show thal a substantialpart of the eventsor omissions giving rise to their claims occurred in this district. A. T h e exercise of personaljurisdiction over a defendantmust always comport with the r e q u i r e m e n t sof due process. When a federal court sitting in diversity attempts to exercise e x t r a t e r r i t o r i a ljurisdiction over a nonresidentdefendant,theserequirementsare met where the defendanthasminimum contactswith the forum state.SeeBusch v. Buchman,Buchman & O'Brien, L a w Firm, I 1 F.3d 1255, 1258(5th Cir. 1994)(citing cases); also Quilling v. Stark,No. 3-05see -4-

CV-1976-L,2006WL 1683442at*2 G\f.D.Tex. Jun. 19,2006). However,the due process analysis is different when personaljurisdiction is predicatedon a federal statutethat allows for nationwide s e r v i c e ofprocess. In such cases,Congress has effectively provided for the national exerciseof p e r s o n ajurisdiction over a defendant l basedon his contacts with the United States.Stark,2006WL 1 6 8 3 4 4 2at *2. Thus, "while the Due ProcessClausemust be satisfiedif a forum is to acquire p e r s o n ajurisdiction over a defendant, l sovereignty definesthe scopeof the dueprocess test." Busch, l l F.3d at 1258. jurisdiction without conductingan W h e r e , as here,the court decidesthe issueof personal e v i d e n t i a r yhearing,theplaintiff hasthe burdenof establishing prima faciecaseofjurisdiction over a defendant. SeeKevlin Services, Inc. v. LexingtonStateBank,46 F.3d 13, l4 (5th t h e nonresident allegationsin the complaint, and any C i r . 1995). The court must acceptas true all uncontroverted f a c t u a l conflicts must be resolvedin favor of the plaintiff. Bullion v. Gillespie, 895 F.2d 213,217 governmotions to dismissfor impropervenue. See TransFirst ( 5 t h Cir. 1990). Similar standards WL H o l d i n g s ,Inc. v. Phillips,No. 3-06-CV-2303-P,2007 631276at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 1,2007). B. The federal RICO statuteprovides, in pertinent part: (a) underthis chapteragainstany Any civil actionor proceeding person may be instituted in the district court of the United Statesfor a n y district in which suchpersonresides,is found, has an agent,or transactshis affairs. (b) In any actionundersection1964of this chapterin any district in c o u r t of the United States which it is shownthat the endsofjustice require that other parties residing in any other district be brought before the court, the court may causesuch parties to be summoned, and processfor that purposemay be servedin anyjudicial district of t h e United Statesbv the marshalthereof.

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18 U.S.C.$1965.Most courtshaveinterpreted section1965(b) confernationwide jurisdictionin to a RICO action over nonresident jurisdiction over defendants the plaintiff can establishpersonal if a t leastone defendant under section1965(a).2 See Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros,lnc.,576 F.Supp.2d 7 6 5 , 7 7 8 - 7 9(N.D. Tex. 2008) (citing cases); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel,No. 3-08-CV-0279-L, 2 0 0 8 WL 4936488at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008) (citing cases). Stateddifferently, if a RICO p l a i n t i f f c a n showthat at leastone defendant is "resides, found,hasan agent,or transacts affairs" his i n the forum, thenjurisdiction is proper as to all other defendants "the ends ofjustice require." if R o l l s - R o y c e , 5 7 F.Supp.2dat779; Paolinov. Arg,,ll Equities, 6 L.L.C.,401 F.Supp.2d712,718 ( W . D . T e x . 2005). Due process suchcases satisfiedif the nonresident in is defendant sufficient has m i n i m u m contacts with the United States.SeeBusch,l I F.3d at 1258;Rolls-Royce,576 F.Supp.2d a t 782. C. I t is undisputed that Michael Kent Plambeck, the alleged mastermind of the RICO c o n s p i r a c y ,residesin the Northern District of Texas,and that 17 of his CSG clinics are locatedin this district. Nor is there any disputethat the MagelanerDefendants,who representaccidentvictims i n Ohio and occasionally Indiana,haveminimum contacts in with the United States.Therefore, the

2 A circuit split has developedon the issue of which subsection the RICO of statutegrants nationwide jurisdiction. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have determined that subsection 1965(b) confers n a t i o n w i d eserviceof processin RICO cases.,See United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co.,l38 F.3d 65, 7l (2d PT C i r . 1998); Lisqkv. MercantileBancorp,Inc.,834F.2d668,671(7th Cir. 1987),cert.denied,l08 S.Ct. A72(1988); B u t c h e r ' sUnion Locql No.498 v. SDC Investments, lnc.,788 F.2d 535,539-39(9th Cir. 1986);Coryv. AztecSteel B u i l d i n g ,Inc.,468F.3d 1226,1230(lOth Cir.2006), cert. denied,127S.Ct.2134(2007). The Fourthand Eleventh C i r c u i t s h a v e h e l d t h a t s e c t i o n l 9 6 5 ( d ) i s t h e r e l e v a n t s u b s e c tSeeESABGroup, ion. Inc.v.Centricut, Inc.,126F.3d6l7, 6 2 6 - 2 7 (4th Cir. 1997),cert. denied,I l8 S.Ct. B6a Q998); Republicof Panamav. BCCI Holdings, I l9 F.3d 935,942 ( l lth Cir. 1997). Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet decidedthe issue,most federalcourtsin Texas,includingtwo j u d g e s in this district, have followed the majority rule. See Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heras, Lnc.,576 F.Supp.2d765,779 ( N . D . Tex.2008); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel,No. 3-08-CV-0279-L,2008 WL 4936488 *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, at 2 0 0 8 ) ;Hqwkinsv. The UpjohnCo.,890 F.Supp. 601, 605-06(E.D.Tex.1994).

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jurisdiction overtheMagelaner courtmay exercise personal Defendants undersection1965(b)if "the e n d sofjustice require. " "[T]he 'endsofjustice' is a flexible concept uniquelytailoredto the factsof eachcase."Cory

v . AztecSteelBuilding,Inc., 468 F.3d 1226,1232(1OthCir. 2006),cert. denied,127S.Ct.2134 ( 2 0 0 7 ) . In a RICO action,the "endsofjustice" requirenationwideserviceof process further the to C o n g r e s s i o n aintent of allowing "plaintiffs to bring all membersof a nationwide [ ] conspiracy l b e f o r ea court in a singletrial." Butcher'sUnion Local No. 498 v. SDC Investments, Inc.,788F.2d 5 3 5 ,539 (9th Cir. 1986), citingSanders UnitedStates,373 v. U.S. l, L7,83 S.Ct.1068,1078,l0 L . E d . 2 d 148 (1963);accordJohnsonv. Investacorp, Inc., No. 3-89-CV-2607-H, 1990WL 25034 a t +1 (N.D. Tex. Jan.31, 1990).Nationwideservice process of alsopromotes "endsofjustice" the w h e r e , as here, numerousdefendants reside in different states,and there likely is no alternative f o r u m in which jurisdiction would be properas to all defendants SeeJohnson,1990WL25034 at . * 2 (exerciseof nationwidejurisdiction under section 1965 was appropriatewhere at least three defendants were Texas residentsand other defendants residedin such diverselocalesas Florida. C a l i f o r n i a , Illinois, Missouri, and Colorado);seealso Hewlett-PackordCo. v. Byd:Sign,./rc.,No. 6 - 0 5 - C V - 4 5 6 , 2 0 0 6 W L 2 8 2 2 1 5 1at *10 (E.D. Tex. Sept.28, 2006). While recognizing that the RICO statute authorizes nationwide service of process, the Magelaner Defendantsarguethat the "endsofjustice" do not require that they be brought before the court becauseplaintiffs have failed to "plead with particularity overt actswithin the forum taken in furtheranceofthe conspiracy." (SeeMagel. Def. Reply at 5). This argumentmissesthe mark. There is no requirementthat a plaintiff plead or prove that a nonresidentdefendantcommitted an overt act within the forum in furtheranceof a RICO conspiracy. All that is required is for the plaintiffto show

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that at leastone defendant"resides,is found, hasan agent,or transactshis affairs" in the district, that the nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the United States,and that "the ends of j u s t i c e " requirethe exercise ofpersonaljurisdiction over the nonresident.Plaintiffs haveeasilymet that burden. To the extent the Magelaner Defendants attempt to challenge the sufficiency of p l a i n t i f f s ' RICO allegations, Rule l2(b)(2) motion is not a proper vehicle for suchan attack. a jurisdiction doesnot T h e MagelanerDefendants that the exerciseof personal also suggest c o m p o r t with the constitutionalrequirement due process.(SeeMagel. Def. Reply at 5). "While of t h e expansive minimum contactstest under a nationwide serviceof processprovision does not o b v i a t e due processconcems,the Fifth Circuit has [ ] held that, in the context of a nationwide justice s e r v i c eofprocessprovision,'it doesnot offend traditionalnotionsof fair play and substantial to exercisepersonaljurisdiction over a defendantresiding within the United States."' Rolls-Royce, ThisargumentisforeclosedbyFifthCircuit 5 7 6 F . S u p p . 2 d a t 7 8 2 , q u o t i n g B u s c h F.3dat1258.3 ,11 precedent. jurisdiction over the MagelanerDefendants I n sum,the court determines that it haspersonal b e c a u s e : (l) Michael Plambeck,the allegedringleaderof the RICO conspiracy,residesin this (3) with the United States; havesufficientminimum contacts d i s t r i c t ; (2) the MagelanerDefendants allowing plaintiffs to bring all membersof the alleged conspiracybefore the court in a single trial furthers the "ends of justice;" and (4) there is no alternative forum in which jurisdiction would be p r o p e rasto all defendants.The sameanalysiscontrolsthe resolutionof the venueissue. Dismissal is o f the MagelanerDefendants not warrantedunder either Rule 12(b)(2)or Rule l2(b)(3).

I Although anotherFifth Circuit panel has criticized the Busch test for exercising personaljurisdiction over a nonresident in see defendant a nationwideserviceof processease, Bellaire GenerolHospital v. Blue CrossBlue Shield followed by o f Michigan,9T F.3d 822,826 (5th Cir. 1996),Buschhasnever beenovemrled and has beenconsistently d i s t r i c t courtswithin the circuit. SeeRolls-Royce, 576 F.Supp.2dat 782.

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m.
Thecourtnextconsiders whether failuretojoin morethan700patients the who weretreated b y theChiropractic Defendants requires dismissal thiscase.Underthefederal the of rules,a court m a ydismiss case "failureto join apartyunder for a Rule19." FEo.R. Ctv. P. 12(bX7). Rule 19 p r o v i d e sin pertinent , part:
A personwho is subjectto serviceof processand whosejoinder will jurisdiction must bejoined as n o t deprivethe court of subject-matter pady if: a (A) in that person's absence,the court cannot accord complete r e l i e f amongexisting parties;or that person claims an interestrelating to the subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action in the person's absence may:

(B)

(i)

as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protectthe interest;or leave an existing party subjectto a substantial r i s k of incurringdouble, multiple,or otherwise i n c o n s i s t e n t obligations because of the interest.

(ii)

jurisdiction, the partycannotbe joined without destroying F p p . R. Ctv. P. l9(a)(l). If a necessary c o u r t must determinewhether,"in equity and good conscience," action shouldproceedamong the the t h e existing partiesor be dismissed.FBn.R. Ctv. P. 19(b). In making that determination, court m u s t consider: (1) the extent to which a judgment rendered in the person's absence might prejudicethat personor the existing parties; t h e extentto which anyprejudicecould be lessened avoided or bv:

(2)

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(A) (B) (C)

protective provisions thejudgment; in shaping relief;or the othermeasures;

(3)
(4)

w h e t h e ra judgment renderedin the person'sabsence would be adequate;and whether the plaintiff would have an adequateremedy if the a c t i o n were dismissedfor nonioinder.

I d . ; seealso HS Resources, Inc. v. Wingate,327F.3d 432,439 (5th Cir. 2003). The party seeking d i s m i s s a lmust provethat an absent partyis both necessary underRule 19(a)andindispensable under R u l e 19(b). SeePayan v. ContinentalTire North Americe,Lnc.,232F.R.D. 587, 589 (S.D. Tex. 2005). In their motions, RMC and the Chiropractic Defendantsmaintain that the clinic patients are partiesto this suit because:(l) the patientshave an interestin whethertheir chiropractic necessary treatments werefraudulent;(2) thepatientsshouldbe given an opportunityto "speakfor themselves" a s to the reasonableness necessity their treatments; and of and (3) a judgment in favor of plaintiffs to w o u l d entitle the patientsto relief, thereby subjectingdefendants a risk of incurring multiple o b l i g a t i o n s (SeeRMC Mot. at l7; Chiro. Def. Mot. at 30).4 RMC further arguesthat the clinic . p a t i e n t sshould be joined as partiesbecause for they contracted with the chiropractors a courseof

a In their reply, the ChiropracticDefendants offer an additionalreason why the clinic patientsshouldbejoined parties to this suit-they participated in the alleged fraudulent activity and should be required to sharethe risk of any as judgment, (SeeChiro. Def. Reply at 4-6). Even if the court considers adverse this untimely argument, Rule l9 doesnot joint tortfeasors, personsagainstwhom a defendantmay have a claim for r e q u i r e the joinder of co-conspirators, or c o n t r i b u t i o n . SeeNottinghamv, GeneralAmericanCommunications Corp.,81 1 F.2d 873, 880 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 0 8 S.Ct. 158 (1987)("Ult is well-established Rule l9 doesnot requirethejoinder ofjoint tortfeasors."); Payan, that parties,andthe generalrule is that a plaintiff cannot 2 3 2 F.R.D. at 589 ("Joint tortfeasors not typically indispensable are b e forcedto sueajoint tortfeasoron the theorythat an absentjointtortfeasorautomatically the subjects otherdefendants t o a risk of multiple or inconsistent InsurqnceCo4p. No. 7 -03-CV-222-R,2004 obligations. lilalker v. Inter-Americas "); , W L 1620790at *3 Qri.D.Tex. Jul. 19,2004) (same).

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treatment. (SeeRMC Mot. at 16-17). Assuming theseconclusoryassertions sufficient to satisff are t h e necessity elementof the Rule 19 analysis, defendants havefailed to show that the clinic patients c o u l d not be joined without destroyingsubject matterjurisdiction. "A prerequisiteto a proper dismissal for failure to join an indispensable party is that the absentparty, if added,would divest the jurisdiction." Augustv. Boyd GamingCorp., 135 Fed.Appx., 731,732,20Q5 c o u r t of subject-matter W L 1475640at * I (5th Cir. Jun. 22,2005). See qlsa Pawer Equities, Inc. v. Atlas Telecom S e r v i c e s - U S AInc., No. 3-06-CV-1892-G,2007 WL 43843at *4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2007) (court , cannot conduct Rule 19(b) analysiswithout evidencethat the absentparties could not be joined in the suit). In this case,federal subject matterjurisdiction is predicatedon the RICO statute. There i s no argument, much lessevidence, thatjoining any of the 700 clinic patientswould divestthe court o f subjectmatterjurisdiction, Federal courts are reluctantto grant motions to dismiss basedon Project, Inc. v. n o n j o i n d e r ,and the court shoulddeclinesto do so here. SeeInclusiveCommunities WL 5191935at *9 T e x a sDept. of Housingand Community Affairs, No. 3-08-CV-0546-D,2008 ( N . D . Tex. Dec. 11,2008). RECOMMENDATION T h e Rule l2(b)(2) and Rule l2(bx3) motion to dismissfiled by the MagelanerDefendants and [ D o c . #56], andthe Rule l2(b)(7) motionsto dismissfiled by the ChiropracticDefendants RMC be [ D o c s .#51,791should denied. A copy of this report and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner p r o v i d e dby law. Any party may file written objections the recommendation to within l0 daysafter b e i n g servedwith a copy. See28 U.S.C. $ 636(b)(1);Fep. R. Ctv. P.72(b). The failure to file w r i t t e n objections will bar the aggrievedparty from appealingthe factual findings and legal -11-

conclusions of the magistratejudge that are acceptedor adoptedby the district court, except upon g r o u n d s plain enor. SeeDouglassv. UnitedServices of Automobile Ass'n,7gF.3d 1415,1417(5th C i r . 1996). D A T E D : January 30.2009.

fuIAGISTRATE STATES JUDCE

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