Box v. Dallas Mexican Consulate General
Filing
140
Memorandum Opinion and Order re: 132 MOTION to Permit Enforcement of Judgment filed by Blake Box. Following the district courts reasoning in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., the Court finds that a § 1610(c) order is appropriate here. Therefore, Box's Motion to Permit Enforcement (ECF No. 132) is hereby GRANTED. (Ordered by Judge Reed C. O'Connor on 1/30/2017) (mem)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
BLAKE BOX d/b/a BLAKE BOX
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v.
DALLAS MEXICAN CONSULATE
GENERAL,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
Civil Action No. 3:08-CV-01010-O
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Permit Enforcement of Judgment (ECF No.
132), filed July 29, 2016. Plaintiff Blake Box asks that the Court issue a finding under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(c) that a “reasonable period of time has elapsed” since this Court entered judgment so
that Box may take collection action against Defendant Dallas Mexican Consulate General. On
October 20, 2016, the Court found that a reasonable period of time had elapsed since it entered
judgment, but ordered Box to provide further briefing identifying the specific property against
which he sought execution. Oct. 20, 2016 Order 5–6, ECF No. 136.
In response, Box clarified that he has not yet identified assets and is not seeking
attachment of any specific assets at this point. Pl.’s Br. 1, ECF No. 137. He reiterated his
request that the Court enter an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c).1 Id. at 2. The Consulate filed a
response to Box’s brief opposing any “blanket grant of authority to enforce Judgment.” Def.’s
In his response brief, Box also asked that the Court grant his request “to seek postjudgment discovery
pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Pl.’s Br. 2, ECF No. 137. However, an order from the
Court is not required for Box to engage in postjudgment discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2).
Therefore, the Court does not address the discovery matters discussed in the parties’ respective briefs.
1
1
Resp. 2, ECF No. 138. Mr. Box then submitted a reply identifying previous cases in which §
1610(c) orders permitting enforcement have been granted. See generally, Pl.’s Reply, ECF No.
139. Having considered the parties’ additional briefing, the Court finds that Box’s Motion to
Permit Enforcement should be granted.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1609 foreign sovereigns are immune from attachment or execution to
satisfy a judgment. However, this immunity is subject to exceptions outlined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1610(a) and (b). In order to execute against property subject to these exceptions, the party
seeking execution must obtain from a court an order authorizing attachment or execution under
§ 1610(c). 28 U.S.C. § 1610(c); Connecticut Bank of Commerce v. Republic of Congo, 309 F.3d
240, 247 (5th Cir. 2002), as amended on denial of reh’g (Aug. 29, 2002) (“Only a court may
execute against a foreign sovereign’s property under the FSIA.”). Section 1610(c) provides:
No attachment or execution referred to in subsections (a) and (b) of
this section shall be permitted until the court has ordered such
attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable
period of time has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the
giving of any notice required under section 1608(e) of this chapter.
28 U.S.C. § 1610(c). In this case, the notice requirement of § 1608(e) is not at issue and the
Court previously held that a sufficient period of time had elapsed since the entry of judgment.
Oct. 20, 2016 Order 5–6, ECF No. 136. Therefore, the requirements of § 1610(c) have been
satisfied. The only remaining question is whether a § 1610(c) order is proper.
The Consulate contends “Box is not entitled to a blanket grant of authority to enforce the
Judgment. Rather . . . Box must first show that a specific ‘property subject to attachment or
execution qualifies for one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity’ in § 1610 of the
FSIA before a grant of enforcement is appropriate.” Def.’s Resp. 2, ECF No. 138 (quoting Oct.
20, 2016 Order 3–4, ECF No. 136). In light of the additional briefing, the Court disagrees.
2
A § 1610(c) order in the context of this case would not “authorize the attachment or
execution of particular property—or any property at all.” Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v.
Russian Fed’n, 798 F. Supp. 2d 260, 270 (D.D.C. 2011). Rather, it would ease Box’s procedural
barriers as he sought discovery in aid of execution. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(2). As the District
Court for the District of Columbia held in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S. v. Russian Fed’n:
The purpose of obtaining an order finding compliance with §
1610(c) [] is to permit a FSIA plaintiff to establish that one of the
prerequisites is satisfied so that the plaintiff may pursue specific
attachments without worry over any lingering § 1610(c)
requirements. In light of the severe hurdles to enforcement of
judgments that often face FSIA plaintiffs, a 1610(c) order makes
practical sense. But such orders say nothing about the remaining
jurisdictional immunities that must be overcome before an order
granting the attachment or execution of particular property may
issue.
798 F. Supp. 2d at 271 (citing Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 800 (7th Cir.
2011)).
Following the district court’s reasoning in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of U.S., the Court
finds that a § 1610(c) order is appropriate here. Therefore, Box’s Motion to Permit Enforcement
(ECF No. 132) is hereby GRANTED. An enforcement order will issue separately.
SO ORDERED on this 30th day of January, 2017.
_____________________________________
Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?