Muhammad v. Newell et al

Filing 53

Memorandum Order granting 47 Motion to Dismiss filed by W.K. Newell, City of Terrell, TX. The claims against Newell in his official capacity are dismissed as redundant. (see order) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan on 3/4/09) (klm)

IN THE UNITEDSTATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT TEXAS OF D A L L A SDIVISION
HERBERTAMEEN MUHAMMAD Plaintiff, VS. W . K . NEWELL,ET AL.
Defendants.

$ $ $ $ $ $ $ $ $

NO.3-08-CV-r426-BD

MEMORANDUM

ORDER

Defendants City of Tenell, Texas("the City") andW.K. Newell ("Newell") havefiled a Rule 12(bX6) motion for partial dismissalof certainclaims in this civil rights action brought under federal and Texas law. As grounds for their motion, defendantscontendthat plaintiff has failed to statea federal civil rights claim againstthe City and that the TexasTort Claims Act ("TTCA") bars all state law claims against Newell in his individual capacity. Defendants further argue that the claims againstNewell in his official capacityare redundantof thoseagainstthe City. The issueshave been briefed by the parties and the motion is ripe for determination. A district court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim "only if it appearsthat with the allegations." n o relief could be granted underany setof factsthat could be provenconsistent J a c l $ o n v. City of BeaumontPolice Dept.,958 F.2d 616,618 (5th Cir. 1992),quoting Barrientosv. cert.denied111 S.Ct.795 Reliance Life Ins. Co.,9llF.2d 1115,l116 (5th Cir. 1990), Standard ( 1991). In orderto survivedismissal,the plaintiff must plead "enoughfactsto statea claim to relief on t h a t is plausible its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544,727S.Ct. 1955,1974, 167 L.F,d.zd 929 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculativelevel." Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1965. While a complaint need not contain detailedfactual a l l e g a t i o n s ,the plaintiff must allegemore than labelsand conclusions.Id. at 1964-65. The court must acceptall well-pleaded facts as true and view the allegationsin the light most favorable to the p l a i n t i f f . SeeIn re Katrina Canal BreachesLitig.,495 F.3d 191,205 (5th Cir. 2007),cert. denied s u b n o m . , X a v i e r U n i v . o f L o u i s i a n a v . T r a v e l e r s C a s u a l t y P r o p e r t y C o . o f A m e r i c a , l 2 S 1230 S.Ct. (2008). Judged againstthis standard,the court determinesthat plaintiff has failed to statea federal torts c i v i l rights claim against City. A municipalityis not vicariouslyliable for the constitutional the municipal liability undersection underthe theoryof respondeat superior. Instead, o f its employees (2) 1 9 8 3requiresproof of threeelements:(l) a policymaker1' an official policy; and (3) a violation o f constitutionalrights whose "moving force" is the policy or custom. SeeHampton Co. National S u r e t y ,LLC v. Tunica County,543 F.3d 221,227 (5th Cir.2008), citing Piotrowski v. City of (2001).Anofficialpolicymaybe H o u s t o n , z 3 7 F . 3 d 5 6 7 , 5 7 8 ( 5 t h C i r .cert.denied,l22S.Ct.53 ), either a written policy or a "persistentwidespreadpractice . . . which, although not authorizedby offrcially adoptedand promulgatedpolicy, is so common and well settledas to constitute a custom municipal policy." Lswson v. Dallss County,286 F.3d 257,263 (5th Cir. t h a t fairly represents v. 2 0 0 2 ) ,quoting Webster City of Houston,735 F .2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984). Where,as here,the c h a l l e n g e dconductrelatesto an informal policy or a customof behavioramongmunicipal police o f f i c e r s ,theplaintiffmust pleadsufficientfactswhich, ifproved, show "a patternof similar incidents by i n which citizenswere injured and endangered intentionalor negligentpolice misconductand/or throughoutthe police force." or t h a t seriousincompetence misbehaviorwas generalor widespread denied,ll3 S.Ct.462(1992).The F r a i r e v . CilyofArlington,957F.2d1268,1278(5thCir.),cert. critical inquiry is whether the governing body or official policymaker had constructive or actual

knowledge the persistent widespread of and violationsof constitutional rights. Seeid. at 1278-79; (5th s e ealsoBennett Cityof Slidell,728F.2d762,768 Cir. 1984), v. cert.denied,l05S.Ct.3476

(1 e8s).
in The only allegations plaintiffs amended complaintthat evenremotelyimplicatethe City
are: Defendant Newell had a custom and practice of unfairly targeting Plaintiff in an attempt to run Plaintiff out of town. Policymakers within the City of Terrell and its police department actually or constructively knew of DefendantNewell's custom of targeting and d e p r i v i n gPlaintiff of his rights underboth the Constitutionand laws of Texas. This is evidencedby DefendantNewell's many arrestsand interactions with Plaintiff as well as Defendant Newell's comment e x p r e s s l ystatingthat the peopleof Tenell did not like "[Plaintiffs] knowledge, k i n d . " However,evenhavingsuchactualor constructive the City of Terrell acted with deliberate indifference regarding the rights. As a result,this o n g o i n gviolation of Plaintiffs constitutional practice or custom led to the deprivation of Plaintiffs state and c o n s t i t u t i o n a lrights at issuein this case. ( P l f . First Am. Compl. at 4-5, fl 12). Not only doesplaintiff fail to identify the policymakerswho allegedly condoned Newell's conduct, but nothing in the complaint suggeststhat the City had a persistentand widespreadpracticeof depriving plaintiff ofhis constitutional rights. To the contrary, p l a i n t i f f alleges only two encounterswith Newell--one on November 26, 2007, when Newell citation,(seeid. at2,fl7), and one to t h r e a t e n e d arrestplaintiff if he did not sign a criminal trespass plaintiff for attemptedburglary (seeid. at 3, 'lJ8). o n November 28,2007, when Newell arrested T h e s eallegations,even if viewed in the light most favorableto plaintiff, fall short of establishing a " p a t t e r n o f s i m i l a r i n c i d e n t s " n e c e s s a r y t o g i v e r i s e t o m u n i c i p a l l i a b i l i t y u n d e r 4 2 U$S . C . . 1983. S e eWinegarnerv.City ofCoppel/,No. 3-05-CV-1757-L,2007WL 1040877at*6-7 (N.D. Tex. Apr. (5th Cir. Apr. 23,2008) (dismissing civil 5 , 2 0 0 7 ) , affd,275 Fed.Appx.359,2008WL 1817825 r i g h t s claim againstcity where plaintiff failed to identiff specific policymaker responsiblefor

promulgating rati8/ing policy); Pivonka Collins,No. or unconstitutional v. 3-02-CV-0742-G,2002 W L 1477455 at*4 (N.D.Tex.Jul.5,2002)(same). alsoReyes Cityof MiamiBeach,No. 07See v. (dismissing rightsclaim 2 2 6 8 0 - C 1 V , 2 0 0 8 686958 *13-14(S.D.Fla.Mar. 13,2008) civil WL at against wherethe only factsalleged relatedto a singlearrestandtherewasnothingto suggest city that a final policymaker ratifiedthe misconduct); Mott v. OfficerJohn Does/, No. 07-CV-00280R E B - C B S , 2 0 0WL 648993 *4 (D. Colo.Mar.4,2008)(same). 8 at prosecution, malicious wrongfulimprisonment, Nor canplaintiff sueNewellfor falsearrest, distress. Underthe TTCA: a s s a u l tandintentional , inflictionof emotional
(a) The filing of a suit under this chapteragainsta governmental unit constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff againstany individual employeeof the governmentalunit regarding t h e samesubjectmatter. (b) The filing of a suit againstany employeeof a governmental u n i t constitutes an irrevocable election by the plaintiff and immediately and forever bars any suit or recovery by the plaintiff against the governmental unit regarding the same subject matter unlessthe sovernmentalunit consents.
:1.*t *

(e) If a suit is filed underthis chapteragainstboth a governmental unit and any of its employees,the employeesshall immediately be unit. d i s m i s s e don the filing of a motion by the governmental (b) T e x . Cry. PRAC. Rerra. & Copn AI.IN.$ 101.106(a), & (e) (Vernon 2005). Texas courts have interpretedthis statuteto requirethe plaintiffto make an irrevocableelection, at the time suit is filed, between suing the govemmental unit under the TTCA, or proceedingagainstthe employee alone. S e eSingletonv. Casteel,267 S.W.3d 547,550-52(Tex. App.--Houston[14th Dist.] 2008, pet. d e n i e d ) ;Brown v. Xie,260 S.W.3d 118, 12I-23 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,no pet.). the " B e c a u s e Tort Claims Act is the only, albeit limited, avenuefor common-lawrecoveryagainst

the government, all tort theories alleged against a govemmental unit, whether it is sued alone or t o g e t h e rwith its employees, assumed be 'under[the Tort Claims Act]' for pu{poses section are to of 1 0 1 . 1 0 6 . " SeeMission Consolidated Independent SchoolDist. v. Garcia,253 S.W.3d 653,659 ( T e x . 2008). In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he "brings causes of action against Defendants Newell and the City of Terrell for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and intentionalinfliction of emotionaldistress[.]" (SeePlf. First Am. Compl. a t 2,16). Although plaintiff now arguesthat his claims for assaultand intentional infliction of

are e m o t i o n a ldistress madeonlyagainstNewell,(SeePlf. Resp.at6), nowhereinhiscomplaintdoes plaintiff distinguish between the two defendantswhen requesting damageswith respectto those claims. Moreover, plaintiff doesnot abandonhis claims againstthe City for false arrest,wrongful thesetort claims againstthe City, plaintiff is d e t e n t i o n ,and malicious prosecution. By asserting barred from suing Newell under any theory of recovery "regarding the same subject matter." See CooB ArvN.$ 10 1. 106.' G a r c i a , 2 5 3 S,W.3d at 659,citing Tnx. Cry. Pne,c.& Rnrvr. Finally, plaintiff cannot sue Newell in his official capacity. Such claims are redundant of those brought againstthe City. SeeBeall Legacy Partners, L.P, v. City of Waxahachie,No. 3-0516,2006),citingKentuclryv.Graham,473U.S. C V - 1 9 4 2 - D , 2 0 0 6 W L 3 5 3 4 7at*2(N.D.Tex.Feb. 1 S , 7 5 9 ,1 6 6 , 1 0 5 . C t .3 0 9 9 , 3 1 0 58 7 L . E d . z dI 1 4 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . CONCLUSION Rule 12(b)(6) motion for partial dismissal [Doc. #471 is F o r these reasons,defendants' g r a n t e d . Plaintiffs federalcivil rights claim againstthe City of Terrell is dismissedfor failure to
' Ordinarily, the court would allow plaintiff to amendhis complaint in order to cure this pleading defect. H o w e v e r , Texascourtshave held that a plaintiff cannotavoid the statutoryright of dismissalunder section l0 I . 106(e) b y filing an amendedcomplaint. See Villasanv. O'Rourke, 166 S.W.3d 752,762 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, pet. denied).

pleada basisfor municipal liability under42 U.S.C.$ 1983. The state W. law claimsagainst K. underTex. Civ. Prac.& Rem. CodeAnn. $ N e w e l l in his individual capacity dismissed are are as l 0 l . 106(e).Theclaimsagainst Newellin his official capacity dismissed redundant. S O ORDERED. D A T E D : March4.2009.

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