United States of America v. Hand-Bostick et al
Filing
206
Memorandum Opinion and Order: After considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes, for the reasons herein explained, that, while Defendants engaged in conduct subject to penalty under I.R.C. §§ 6700( a)(2)(A), 6700(a)(2)(B), 6694(a), and 6694(b)(2)(B), an injunction under sections 7407, 7408, or 7402(a) of the IRC is not necessary to prevent Defendants from engaging in the same or similar prohibited conduct or interfering with tax adminis tration or enforcement in the future. The court therefore denies the Government's request for injunctive relief under sections 7407, 7408, and 7402(a) of the IRC. Judgment will issue by separate document as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. (Ordered by Judge Sam A Lindsay on 10/8/2014) (jrr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALLY HAND-BOSTICK
and ELIZABETH SPINELLI,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:09-CV-1075-L
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure following a bench trial on Plaintiff United States of
America’s (“Plaintiff,” “Government” or “United States”) claims that remained after summary
judgment.1
I.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff originally brought this action against numerous individual defendants in the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida on April 2, 2009, requesting permanent
injunctive relief under the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). The Government’s claims against
Defendants Edward Adams, Timothy Adams, Sally Hand-Bostick (“Hand-Bostick”), and Elizabeth
Spinelli (“Spinelli”) (collectively, “Defendants”) were severed and transferred to this court on June
2, 2009. On April 27, 2010, Edward Adams and Timothy Adams each stipulated to a permanent
1
This memorandum opinion and order addresses the Government’s remaining claims for injunctive relief under
26 §§ U.S.C. 7402(a), 7407, and 7408 of the Internal Revenue Code for alleged violations of 26 U.S.C. §§
6700(a)(2)(A), 6700(a)(2)(B), 6694(a), and 6694(b)(2)(B).
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 1
injunction with the Government. The Government filed its Amended Complaint against HandBostick and Spinelli on August 16, 2010. In its Amended Complaint, the Government seeks an
injunction against Defendants pursuant to sections 7402(a), 7407, and 7408 of the IRC to prevent
the recurrence of alleged violations of the IRC and conduct that interferes with the enforcement and
administration of the internal revenue laws. More specifically, the Government requests that HandBostick, Spinelli, and anyone in active concert or participation with them be permanently enjoined
from:
a.
organizing, promoting, or selling any tax shelter, plan, or other arrangement,
that advises or assists customers to attempt to violate the internal revenue
laws or unlawfully evade the assessment or collection of their federal tax
liabilities;
b.
making or furnishing false statements, in connection with such organization,
promoting, or selling, about the allowability of any deduction or credit, the
excludability of any income, or the securing of any tax benefit by the reason
of participating in any such tax shelter, plan or other arrangement;
c.
making or furnishing gross valuation overstatements (within the meaning of
IRC § 6700) in connection with such organization, promoting, or selling;
preparing or assisting in the preparation of federal tax returns relating to any
abusive tax shelter, plan or arrangement;
d.
e.
engaging in any other activity subject to penalty under I.R.C. §§ 6694, 6695,
6700, 6701, or any other penalty provision in the Internal Revenue Code;
f.
engaging in conduct designed or intended to, or having the effect of,
obstructing or delaying any Internal Revenue Service investigation or audit;
and
g.
engaging in any other conduct that interferes with the proper administration
and enforcement of the internal revenue laws.
Pl.’s Am. Compl. 1-2. The Government also requests that Hand-Bostick be permanently enjoined
“from preparing or filing federal tax returns for anyone other than [herself] and from advising or
assisting anyone with respect to any federal tax matter.” Id. at 2.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 2
On March 7, 2011, Hand-Bostick and Spinelli moved for summary judgment on all of the
Government’s claims for injunctive relief, contending that there was no evidence to establish that
they knew or should have known about the fraudulent tax scheme. They also maintained that the
permanent injunctive relief requested by the Government was unwarranted because there was no
indication that a permanent injunction is necessary to prevent recurrence of the complained of
conduct. The Government, in response, maintained that genuine disputes of material fact existed
with respect to these matters and that its claims for permanent injunctive relief under sections
7402(a), 7407, and 7408 of the IRC for IRC violations should be allowed to proceed to trial. On
September 12, 2011, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ summary judgment
motion. The motion was granted with respect to the following:
•
Any theory of recovery advanced by the [G]overnment that alleges that the
[]Defendants possessed “actual knowledge” of the fraudulent nature of the tax
scheme is dismissed with prejudice;
•
The [G]overnment’s claim for injunctive relief under section 7408 alleging that the
[]Defendants engaged in conduct subject to penalty under section 6701 is dismissed
with prejudice;
•
The [G]overnment’s claim for injunctive relief under section 7407 alleging that the
Moving Defendants acted “willfully” under section 6694(b) is dismissed with
prejudice; and
•
The [G]overnment’s claim for injunctive relief under section 7407 alleging that the
Moving Defendants engaged in fraudulent or deceptive conduct [that] substantially
interferes with the proper administration of the Internal Revenue law is dismissed
with prejudice.
In all other respects, the court denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion, and the Government’s
remaining claims were set for trial. A five-day bench trial of these claims was conducted from May
8, 2012, to May 14, 2012. Hand-Bostick, Spinelli, and Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) Agent Jean
Lane (“Lane”) testified during the trial. The court also heard testimony from the following taxpayers
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 3
for whom Hand-Bostick prepared tax returns, which included tax credits available under section 45K
of the IRC for the production and sale of fuel from nonconventional sources, commonly known as
“FNS Credits”: Janelle Cook Mason, Vernon Tucker, Laura Edwards, Robert Pasqual, Kimberly
Patton, Vinson Stanphill, and Larry Jones. A number of exhibits, to which there were no objections,
were preadmitted at the beginning of the trial pursuant to the parties’ Joint List of Exhibits (Doc.
180). All other evidence admitted during the course of the trial was subject to any objections by the
parties. The parties filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on October 4, 2012.
On March 20, 2013, the court heard closing arguments by the parties.
Based upon a preponderance of the evidence, the court makes the following findings of fact
and conclusions of law as required by Rule 52(a).2 The facts contained herein are either undisputed,
or the court has made the finding based on the credibility or believability of each witness. In doing
so, the court considered all of the circumstances under which the witness testified, including: the
relationship of the witness to Plaintiff or Defendants; the interest, if any, the witness has in the
outcome of the case; the witness’s appearance, demeanor, and manner of testifying while on the
witness stand; the witness’s apparent candor and fairness, or the lack thereof; the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the witness’s testimony; the opportunity of the witness to observe or acquire
knowledge concerning the facts to which he or she testified; the extent to which the witness was
contradicted or supported by other credible evidence; and whether such contradiction related to an
2
In preparing this memorandum opinion and order, the court carefully considered the trial testimony and
exhibits and applied the standard in this circuit for findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Century Marine Inc. v.
United States, 153 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998) (discussing standard for findings and conclusions under Rule 52). In
accordance with that standard, the court has not set out its findings and conclusions in “punctilious detail” or “slavishly
traced the claims issue by issue and witness by witness, or indulged in exegetics, parsing or declaiming every fact and
each nuance and hypothesis.” See id. The court instead has limited its discussion to those legal and factual issues that
form the basis of its decision. Id.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 4
important factor in the case or some minor or unimportant detail. When necessary, the court
comments on the credibility of a witness or the weight to be given to a witness’s testimony. To the
extent any conclusion of law is deemed to be a finding of fact, it is adopted as such; and likewise,
any finding of fact that is deemed to be a conclusion of law is so adopted.
II.
Findings of Fact
This case arises out of an expansive fraudulent tax scheme masterminded by Greg Guido
(“Guido”) and George Calvert (“Calvert”). The scheme involved tax credits available under section
45K of the IRC for the production and sale of fuel from nonconventional sources, commonly known
as “FNS Credits.” Producers of qualified fuels under section 45K will often end up with more FNS
Credits than they need in a given year to eliminate their tax liability, and unused credits cannot be
carried forward into subsequent tax years. Therefore, in certain situations, producers are allowed to
monetize their excess FNS Credits and sell or assign them to third parties, allowing the producers
to derive some benefit from their unused credits.
With respect to the FNS Credits at issue in this case, Guido and Calvert claimed to own and
operate several methane gas production facilities on landfills located in various parts of the country
through an entity they created called Gas Recovery Partners 2, GP (“GRP2”). Beginning in 2003,
Louis Powell (“Powell”), a Texas promoter involved in the scheme, started representing to taxpayers
and tax preparers, including Hand-Bostick, that he had obtained the rights to millions of dollars of
FNS Credits derived from GRP2 facilities through an entity that he created called U.S. Energy
Credits (“USEC”). Hand-Bostick is a tax return preparer, who began preparing tax returns in 1991
and, as of the date of the trial in this case, continues to prepare federal tax returns for clients.
Hand-Bostick testified that she anticipates preparing federal tax returns for clients for the foreseeable
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 5
future. Hand-Bostick sold her tax preparation services through her company National Express Tax.
Hand-Bostick also sold Drake Software to professional tax return preparers from 1990 to
approximately 2009. During that time, Hand-Bostick attended annual tax preparation update training
sessions offered by Drake. Hand-Bostick also attended training sessions and classes offered by the
National Association of Tax Preparers. Hand-Bostick completed high school but did not go to
college. She has had no legal training.
Hand-Bostick first learned about FNS Credits in the summer of 2003 while attending a
meeting for the Texas Society of Enrolled Agents. Hand-Bostick sat at a vendor’s table for Drake
Software at the meeting. Powell gave a presentation at the meeting about FNS Credits. Through her
position at Drake Software, Hand-Bostick knew that Powell was an Enrolled Agent and tax preparer,
and she believed that he was either the incoming or outgoing president of the Enrolled Agents
Society when he gave the presentation.
After finishing his presentation, Powell approached Hand-Bostick and spoke to her
personally about the FNS Credits. Powell explained that he had developed a program that taxpayers
could use to claim FNS Credits as needed to reduce or eliminate their federal tax liability. Powell
represented to Hand-Bostick that her customers could purchase an interest in one of his several
partnerships that qualified for FNS Credits due to the ownership interests in fuel production facilities
operated by GRP2, and that her customers could take FNS Credits on their federal income tax returns
based on their percentage of ownership in the fuel sold by those facilities.
Powell also provided Hand-Bostick with a pamphlet prepared by USEC, which she reviewed.
The pamphlet marketed FNS Credits as a means to “HELP YOUR CLIENTS LESSEN THEIR TAX
BURDEN WHILE INCREASING YOUR PERSONAL INCOME” and indicated that some
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 6
taxpayers “may be able to COMPLETELY ZERO OUT THEIR TAX!” Defs.’ Ex. 36. In addition,
the pamphlet indicated that the taxpayer’s “tax liability . . . determines the benefit” and that:
As a tax professional, you know that personal tax research or trust in someone else’s
research is the only tested method of significance. We at U.S. Energy Credits have
done the research. Our team includes EAs, CPAs, former IRS revenue agents,
attorneys, CFPs, and oil and gas industry experts. Personally, we have owned and
operated a private tax office in Texas since 1974. Our office has been using FNS
credits for ten years on individual tax returns. Specifically, since 1994, six IRS
private letter rulings have been handed down which have continued to allow the
assignment of Section 29 credits to third parties.
Id.
Although Hand-Bostick was not familiar with USEC, she testified that this paragraph in the
USEC pamphlet was significant to her in evaluating the FNS Credit program promoted by Powell
because she thought his willingness to put in writing what he had explained verbally to her indicated
that he had done the necessary due diligence regarding the FNS Credits that he was promoting.
Powell also told Hand-Bostick that she could earn a 5% commission on all FNS Credits that she
claimed on her customers’ tax returns. Hand-Bostick did not fully understand the FNS Credits and
did not ask Powell to provide any support for his representations regarding the FNS Credits or his
ownership in the fuel production facilities. She relied on Powell’s representations that he had the
claimed interests in the fuel production facilities, that all necessary due diligence had been
conducted, and that monetization of the FNS Credits was proper.
After claiming FNS Credits on her own 2002 tax return, Hand-Bostick decided to offer the
FNS Credits to her customers and invited Powell to her office in late 2003 to go over the details of
the FNS Credit program again to make certain she understood it and would know how to present it
to her customers. Powell accepted Hand-Bostick’s invitation and gave a presentation regarding the
FNS Credits and provided additional materials about the credits. Hand-Bostick invited two other
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 7
tax preparers to attend the presentation so that they could also learn about FNS Credits—Mark
Johnson, a tax preparer in Hand-Bostick’s office, and Vinson Stanphill, a tax return preparer who
Hand-Bostick knew through Drake Software.
Powell provided Hand-Bostick with a booklet titled “US Energy Credits Guidebook,” which
contained instructions on how to claim FNS Credits for customers. The booklet instructed that, for
customers interested in taking FNS Credits, an assignment request must be sent to USEC, together
with: (1) a down payment of $100 to use the credits in the taxable year for which the customer
wanted to use the FNS Credits; and (2) a promissory note to pay for the credits by the following
April 15. Hand-Bostick’s customers did not make the $100 down payment to USEC or sign and
send a promissory note in the taxable year that the credits were claimed. Hand-Bostick instead
followed Powell’s instructions to send him a list of likely FNS credit customers with an estimate of
the number of credits each customer would require for 2003 tax year. According to Hand-Bostick,
Powell then assigned the number of estimated credits to each of her customers on the list.
Hand-Bostick testified that she thought that the assignment process used by Powell entitled her
customers to take FNS Credits on their 2003 tax year when she prepared the returns in 2004.
Hand-Bostick first advised her customers by letter about the FNS Credits opportunity in 2003
but did not actually speak to any of her customers on the list about the program until 2004. After
determining her customers’ tax liability for 2003, Hand-Bostick explained to her customers how they
could reduce their tax liability by using FNS Credits. Hand-Bostick calculated the number of FNS
Credits for which each customer qualified by using a Tax Calculator and showed her customers that
they could reduce their tax liability by approximately 20% by claiming the FNS Credits on their
returns. When her customers agreed to claim the FNS Credits in 2004 on their 2003 tax returns,
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 8
Hand-Bostick printed the transaction documents from the Tax Calculator, including the partnership
agreement, assignment agreement, and promissory note, which were all backdated to January 2,
2003, and provided them to her customers when they came to her office to have their tax returns
prepared. When the paperwork was complete, Hand-Bostick had her customers write a check to
USEC for the price of the number of FNS Credits the customer used. Hand-Bostick then revised the
customers’ 2003 tax returns to add the FNS Credits and other numbers from the Tax Calculator
before submitting the returns to the IRS. Hand-Bostick did not understand how the Tax Calculator
generated the numbers that she included in her customers’ tax returns and was unable to explain how
the numbers were calculated. Hand-Bostick always waited to forward her customers’ documentation
and checks for the FNS Credits to USEC until after they received their refund.
In mid-2004, Powell introduced Hand-Bostick to Guido and Calvert and told her that they
were taking over the FNS Credit program. Powell also informed her that her customers’ partnership
interests would now be “working interests” in a GRP2 production facility. After Powell’s departure,
Hand-Bostick worked directly with GRP2 for the 2004 tax year. Before this point in time,
Hand-Bostick did not know Guido or Calvert and had never heard of GRP2. In exchange for
recruiting other tax preparers to offer FNS Credits to their customers, Guido offered Hand-Bostick
a 5% commission for all FNS Credits that were processed through her office, and an additional 10%
commission on all FNS Credits that she personally sold. Hand-Bostick accepted the offer and
recruited other tax return preparers to sell the FNS Credits. She also established a company in 2004,
CynDan, to process the FNS Credit paperwork and commissions for twelve tax return preparers and
herself for the 2004 and 2005 tax years.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 9
Before Guido took over, Powell told Hand-Bostick that there were no more FNS Credits.
Guido and Calvert, however, told Hand-Bostick that there were extra credits available for 2003 that
she could sell to her customers. Hand-Bostick promoted these extra credits to some of her customers
in the fall of 2004 and recommended that they amend their 2003 returns to include the newly
available FNS Credits to obtain a higher refund. Hand-Bostick also recommended to other tax return
preparers that they prepare amended 2003 tax returns for their customers. For her own customers,
Hand-Bostick prepared the amended returns to include FNS Credits in the same manner that she had
done in preparing the original 2003 tax returns by using backdated documentation and having her
customers make out checks to one of Guido’s companies. She then provided her customers with
a breakdown of the money that they saved using the FNS Credits. In December 2006, after Calvert
told Hand-Bostick that the FNS Credits were no longer available, she provided her customers with
a backdated form that purported to assign their FNS interests back to Calvert and Guido on January
1, 2006. Between 2004 and 2005, Hand-Bostick sold approximately $1.5 million in disallowed FNS
Credits to her customers, and earned $225,000 to $300,000 in commissions.
Spinelli is a certified public accountant (“CPA”) and provided services as a tax return
preparer during the time of the events that gave rise to this case. Spinelli also obtained a college
degree from the University of Texas at Dallas in 1987 with an emphasis in accounting. Spinelli
usually refers her customers to other CPAs when she feels that she is not qualified to prepare their
tax returns. To obtain her CPA license, Spinelli took approximately 130 hours of courses and was
required to pass a series of examinations. Spinelli must take forty hours of continuing education per
year to maintain her CPA license. Spinelli typically took tax classes from the Texas A&M Extension
Foundation and the CPE Depot, including general and advanced tax workshops. These workshops
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 10
provided information on topics including individual income tax returns, legislative changes, and tax
credits. Like Hand-Bostick, Spinelli intends to continue to prepare tax returns for customers in the
future.
Spinelli first learned about FNS Credits in 2004 and called Hand-Bostick to learn more about
them. Hand-Bostick told Spinelli that she was offering the credits to her clients through USEC via
GRP2, and she referred Spinelli to Powell for additional information. During a telephone call,
Powell told Spinelli that he had visited all the landfills in the United States and seen signs indicating
that GRP2 was operating part of the landfill. Spinelli ultimately relied on Powell’s representations
that he had personally visited all of the landfills to ensure that they were functioning properly. Aside
from this one conversation with Powell, Spinelli received all of her information about the FNS
Credits from Hand-Bostick. Thereafter, Spinelli began offering FNS Credits to her customers at her
tax preparation business using a method similar to that used by Hand-Bostick that included the use
of backdated documents. Like Hand-Bostick, Spinelli did not understand the mechanics of how the
FNS Credits worked. Between 2004 and 2006, Spinelli sold approximately $500,000 of FNS
Credits to her customers that were ultimately disallowed, and earned approximately $25,000 in
commissions. Spinelli stopped selling FNS Credits in 2006 when Hand-Bostick told her that the
FNS Credits were no longer available, and she provided her customers with the same backdated form
that purportedly assigned their FNS interest back to Calvert and Guido on January 1, 2006.
The IRS started investigating the FNS Credit scheme in 2004 and began disallowing FNS
Credits in 2006. Between December 2006 and March 2007, Hand-Bostick learned that the IRS was
auditing customers of other tax preparers and requesting documentation to support the FNS Credits
taken. Hand-Bostick wrote to Guido, requesting his assistance in responding to certain requests for
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 11
information by the IRS.
Guido sent Hand-Bostick some documents purporting to contain
information responsive to the IRS’s requests. After learning that one of her customers was being
audited in May 2007, Spinelli contacted Hand-Bostick, who told Spinelli that she should talk to
Guido. Spinelli wrote Guido on May 24, 2007, seeking advice that she could give to her customer
because she did not have the information needed to substantiate her customer’s claim for FNS
Credits in response to the audit. Guido told Spinelli to contact Walter Drakeford (“Drakeford”), an
attorney for GRP2, about her customer’s audit. Guido similarly advised Hand-Bostick to contact
Drakeford with questions. Drakeford told Spinelli that he would provide documentation needed to
respond to the IRS audit, but he never did. As a possible solution, Spinelli and Hand-Bostick also
asked Drakeford to transfer or reassign their customers to other wells. This never happened.
In the fall of 2007, Hand-Bostick and Spinelli were contacted by agent John McGuire
(“McGuire”) with the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS and IRS Revenue agent Lane.
McGuire advised Defendants that the IRS was investigating whether GRP2 owned the property
interests that were used to claim the FNS Credits. Lane advised Defendants that their customers did
not own property interests necessary to take the FNS Credits. McGuire subpoenaed documents from
Spinelli and interviewed her about the credits. Spinelli, who had retained attorney Larry Jones
(“Jones”) to assist with her customer’s audit, asked Jones to speak with McGuire. By January 2008,
the FNS Credits claimed by Defendants’ customers were disallowed by the IRS because the
promoters of the program did not own any interest that would support FNS Credits. Spinelli
nevertheless continued to believe that Guido or Drakeford had the documentation necessary to
support her customers’ claims to FNS Credits.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 12
Beginning in 2009, for 2008 tax returns, Hand-Bostick and Spinelli began claiming
thousands of dollars in long-term capital loss deductions on their customers’ 2008 federal income
tax returns, relating to their customers’ purported interests in gas-producing properties. HandBostick and Spinelli each described the asset related to the loss as GRP2 and stated that it
represented the disallowed FNS Credit interest purchased by their customers. Hand-Bostick
continued asserting a long-term capital loss through 2010 for the tax year 2009, and Spinelli started
asserting theft loss deductions related to the disallowed FNS Credits on her customers’ tax returns
in mid-2008.
III.
Conclusions of Law
The parties agree that the Government has the burden of proof on its claims and that the
evidentiary standard is a preponderance of the evidence. As previously indicated, the Government
seeks a permanent injunction against Defendants under sections 7402(a), 7407 and 7408 of the IRC
for alleged violations of I.R.C. §§ 6700(a)(2)(A), 6700(a)(2)(B), 6694(a), and 6694(b)(2)(B). Section
7407 of the IRC authorizes the United States to bring a civil action to enjoin any person who is a
“tax return preparer” from further engaging in conduct subject to penalty under section 6694 or
further acting as a tax return preparer. I.R.C. § 7407. Section 7408 of the IRC applies to actions to
enjoin specified conduct related to tax shelters and authorizes the United States to bring a civil action
to enjoin any person from further engaging in conduct subject to penalty under section 6700 to
prevent recurrence of such conduct. I.R.C. § 7408. Section 7402 of the IRC acts as a catch-all
provision and authorizes the United States to seek an injunction against a defendant “as may be
necessary or appropriate for the enforcement of the internal revenue laws.” I.R.C. § 7402(a).
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 13
A.
Conduct Subject to Penalty Under Sections 6700(a)(2)(A) and 6700(a)(2)(B)
It is a violation of section 6700(a)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code when any person, in
organizing or participating in any arrangement, makes or furnishes a statement concerning the
allowability of any deduction or tax credit that she knows or has reason to know is false or fraudulent
as to any material matter. I.R.C. § 6700(a)(2)(A). Section 6700’s “reason to know standard” has
been treated as equivalent to “should have known” and “allows imputation of knowledge so long as
it is commensurate with the level of comprehension required by the speaker’s role in the transaction”
but does not include a duty of inquiry. United States v. Campbell, 897 F.2d 1317, 1322 (5th Cir.
1990).
It is a violation of section 6700(a)(2)(B) for any person, in organizing or participating in any
arrangement, to make or furnish a gross valuation overstatement as to any material matter. Id. §
6700(a)(2)(B). Section 6700(a)(2)(B) eliminates the requirement of scienter.
See I.R.C. §
6700(a)(2)(B); United States v. Campbell, 704 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d, 897 F.2d
1317 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Scienter need not be shown to hold a person liable for gross valuation
overstatements.”). The IRC defines “gross valuation overstatement” as follows:
[A]ny statement as to the value of any property or services if (A) the
value so stated exceeds 200 percent of the amount determined to be
the correct valuation, and (B) the value of such property or services
is directly related to the amount of any deduction or credit allowable
under chapter 1 to any participant.
I.R.C. § 6700(b)(1).
In United States v. Woods, the Supreme Court held that the gross
valuation-misstatement penalty applies in cases in which the transactions in question are found to
lack economic substance. 134 S. Ct. 557, 562-63 (2013). The Government contends that Defendants
engaged in both types of prohibited conduct in connection with the FNS Credit scheme. The
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 14
Government contends that Defendants provided gross valuation overstatements to their customers
in violation of section 6700(a)(2)(B), when they assigned a value to landfill ownership interests that
in actuality did not exist and were worth nothing. The Government contends that, because the
interests were worth nothing, assigning any value to those interests would have been in excess of 200
percent of the correct valuation.
B.
Conduct Subject to Penalty Under Sections 6694(a) and 6694(b)(2)(B)
It is a violation of section 6694(a) of the IRC for a tax return preparer to prepare any return
that contains an unreasonable position that the tax return preparer reasonably should have known was
unreasonable. I.R.C. § 6694(a). The Government contends that Defendants violated this provision
every time they prepared a tax return for their customers claiming false FNS Credits. Defendants
maintain that they did not violate this provision because they did not have the requisite scienter.
Alternatively, Defendants assert that their conduct falls within this section’s “reasonable cause
exception.” It is a defense under section 6694(a) “if it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the
understatement and the tax return preparer acted in good faith.” I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (“reasonable
cause exception”).
It is a violation of section 6694(b)(2)(B) of the IRC for a tax return preparer to recklessly
prepare a return containing an understatement of tax liability. I.R.C. § 6694(b)(2)(B). Courts
interpret the “reckless or intentional disregard of rules” language under section 6694(b) as a
negligence standard. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 789 F. Supp. 788, 812-13, n.17 (N.D. Tex.
1992) (“The legislative history of Code section 6694 also supports this interpretation [of a negligence
standard].”). Negligence is defined as including “any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 15
with the provisions of [the Internal Revenue Code].” I.R.C. § 6662(c); Bailey, 789 F. Supp. at 81213.
C.
Standard for Injunctive Relief
As previously noted, the Government contends that both Defendants should be enjoined from
engaging in the specific conduct that gave rise to this lawsuit. In addition, the Government contends
that a broader injunction is appropriate as to Hand-Bostick. Specifically, the Government contends
that Hand-Bostick should be enjoined “not merely from engaging in specified misconduct, but
should be barred altogether from acting as a federal tax preparer.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶¶ 225, 231,
238, and 243.
Sections 7407 and 7408 of the IRC allow injunctive relief when appropriate to prevent the
recurrence of prohibited conduct. I.R.C. § 7407(b)(2), 7408(b)(2). Thus, to be entitled to injunctive
relief under sections 7407 and 7408, the Government has the burden of establishing: (1) Defendants
engaged in conduct subject to penalty under sections 6700 or 6694; and (2) injunctive relief is
appropriate to prevent the recurrence of such conduct. To obtain a broader injunction prohibiting a
person, such as Hand-Bostick, from acting as an income tax return preparer, the Government must
demonstrate, in addition to the above requirements: (1) that the person has “continually or
repeatedly” engaged in the prohibited conduct; and that (2) “an injunction prohibiting such conduct
would not be sufficient to prevent such person’s interference with the proper administration of [the
tax laws].” I.R.C. § 7407(b)(2). Courts customarily consider the totality of circumstances and the
following factors in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief under sections 7407 and
7408: (1) the gravity of harm caused by conduct; (2) the extent of the defendant’s participation and
her degree of scienter; (3) whether the infraction was isolated or recurrent in nature and the
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likelihood that the defendant’s business activities might again involve her in such transactions; the
defendant’s recognition of her own culpability; and the sincerity of the defendant’s assurances
against future violations. See United States v. Buttorff, 761 F.2d 1056, 1062-63 (5th Cir. 1985);
Bailey, 789 F. Supp. at 816. Section 7402(a) “encompasses a broad range of powers necessary to
compel compliance with the tax laws” and “has been used to enjoin interference with tax
enforcement even when such interference does not violate any particular statute. United States v.
Campbell, 704 F. Supp. 715, 730 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff’d as modified by 897 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir.
1990) (citing United States v. Ernst & Whinney, 735 F.2d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1050 (1985)).
D.
Application of Law to Facts
The court concludes that Defendants engaged in conduct subject to penalty under I.R.C. §§
6700(a)(2)(A), 6700(a)(2)(B), 6694(a), and 6694(b)(2)(B) because it was unreasonable and reckless
for them, as tax return preparers, to recommend to their customers that they take FNS Credits when
they admittedly did not understand the basis for their customers’ entitlement to take such credits.
Further, all of the FNS Credit transactions by Defendants were based on backdated documents
purportedly effective the year before they were actually made. Defendants’ knowing use of backdated
documentation to claim the FNS Credits in preparing their customers’ tax returns should have been
a red flag and alerted them that something was amiss regarding the allowability of the credits taken.
Accordingly, even though they had no duty of inquiry under section 6700, the court concludes that
Defendants, as tax return preparers, reasonably should have known that it was unreasonable and
reckless for them to recommend FNS Credits to their customers and prepare tax returns for their
customers in which FNS Credits were claimed. The court also concludes that Defendants furnished
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gross valuation overstatements to their customers when they assigned a value to nonexistent
ownership interests that lacked any economic substance or value.
Although the court concludes that Defendants engaged in penalty conduct, it does not believe
that an injunction is necessary or appropriate in this case. The court in no way condones Defendants’
conduct, but its analysis does not end here because it must also determine whether an injunction is
necessary in light of the facts of this case. Based on the court’s extensive observations of Defendants
during trial of this case and other factors, the court concludes that an injunction is not warranted
under sections 7407, 7408, or 7402(a) of the IRC to prevent a recurrence of Defendants’ prohibited
conduct or interference with tax enforcement in the future. In all of the years that Defendants have
prepared tax returns, this is their first infraction, and the court previously found that there was no
evidence they had actual knowledge regarding the illegality of the FNS Credits claimed on behalf
of their customers. To support its contention that an injunction is necessary to prevent the recurrence
of prohibited conduct, the Government focuses on Defendants’ preparation of tax returns claiming
capital and theft loss deductions. The Government contends that Defendants should have and would
have known that claiming such deductions was improper under the circumstances if they had
researched applicable federal and Texas statutory and case authority or sought out legal advice from
a tax attorney.
The court disagrees that either Hand-Bostick or Spinelli, as tax preparers, should be held to
the standard of a seasoned attorney with full knowledge of statutory and case authority, and the
Government has not presented any evidence or authority that persuades the court that tax preparers
are held to the same standard as attorneys or are required in every instance to seek the advice of a
tax attorney. Moreover, given the timing of the claimed losses and Defendants’ testimony that they
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 18
thought that the deductions were appropriate at the time, the court concludes that Defendants’
conduct in this regard is not sufficiently indicative that they will continue to participate in or promote
fraudulent tax credits or tax shelter schemes.
The court’s determination that an injunction is not warranted in this case also turns in large
part on the credibility of Defendants’ testimony and the court’s observation of Defendants during
the trial of this case. Overall, the court found Defendants’ testimony and their assurances that they
would not engage in similar conduct in the future to be sincere. The court believes that Defendants
have learned their lesson and will be deterred by their knowledge of the severity of potential
penalties they could face if they violate the internal revenue laws in the future. After having to
endure the costly and lengthy legal proceedings in this case and the Government’s exhaustive
investigation for more than seven years; experiencing public shame, humiliation, and disfavor with
clients; being the target of an IRS investigation, and knowing that some participants in the scheme
received criminal convictions, Defendants would be more than foolish to engage in the same or
similar conduct again in the future. The court will therefore deny the Government’s request for an
injunction against Defendants under sections 7407, 7408, or 7402(a) of the IRC with respect to
specific misconduct. As the court does not believe that an injunction with respect to specific conduct
is necessary, it follows that the broader injunctive relief requested as to Hand-Bostick is also
unnecessary.
IV.
Conclusion
After considering the totality of the circumstances in this case, the court concludes, for the
reasons herein explained, that, while Defendants engaged in conduct subject to penalty under I.R.C.
§§ 6700(a)(2)(A), 6700(a)(2)(B), 6694(a), and 6694(b)(2)(B), an injunction under sections 7407,
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 19
7408, or 7402(a) of the IRC is not necessary to prevent Defendants from engaging in the same or
similar prohibited conduct or interfering with tax administration or enforcement in the future. The
court therefore denies the Government’s request for injunctive relief under sections 7407, 7408, and
7402(a) of the IRC. Judgment will issue by separate document as required by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 58.
It is so ordered this 8th day of October, 2014.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
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