King v. Life School et al
Filing
76
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 68 Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Irma Carrillo Ramirez on 11/3/2011) (mcrd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
LORA KING,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIFE SCHOOL, et. al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-0042-BH
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pursuant to the order of reassignment, filed May 12, 2010, and the consent of the parties, this
matter was transferred for the conduct of all further proceedings and entry of judgment. Before the
Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, filed August 23, 2011 (doc. 68). Based
on the relevant filings and applicable law, the motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Lora King is an African American female and a former employee of Life School.
In June 2009, the school informed her that her employment would not be continued in the
subsequent school year. She filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) in September 2009, alleging race discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”). The EEOC dismissed her complaint and issued a right-to-sue letter
the following month. On January 11, 2010, Plaintiff filed this action against the school, its
superintendent, and its principal claiming race discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, and
age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Plaintiff alleged
that she was wrongfully terminated without prior warning or discipline while employees who were
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Caucasian, less senior, and younger were retained despite receiving warnings; the principal retaliated
against her for raising concerns about inappropriate things within the school’s administration such
as discrimination; and the superintendent accepted the retaliation despite being aware of her good
character. The civil cover sheet accompanying her complaint also alleged gender discrimination
under Title VII, and discrimination under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (“USERRA”).
On May 11, 2010, the principal and the superintendent moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s Title VII
claims against them. The motion was granted on June 24, 2010, and the claims were dismissed with
prejudice. On January 28, 2011, the school moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII
race discrimination claim. The motion was granted on April 26, 2011, and her race discrimination
claim against the school was dismissed with prejudice. Her retaliation and gender discrimination
claims under Title VII, her age discrimination claim under the ADEA, and her claims under the
USERRA remained pending for trial. On May 4, 2011, the school moved to dismiss those claims
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff responded to the motion on May 25, 2011, and
appeared to raise new claims in her response, including claims for racial discrimination, harassment,
and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The school’s motion to dismiss was granted on August 9, 2011; Plaintiff’s USERRA claim
against it was dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, and her age discrimination under
the ADEA, and her retaliation and gender discrimination claims under Title VII, were dismissed
without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff’s attempt to raise new
claims was construed as a motion to amend, and she was allowed 14 days to file a procedurally
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proper motion for leave to file an amended complaint that explained why she should be allowed to
amend her complaint at such a late stage of the proceedings. Plaintiff filed the motion on August
23, 2011. With a timely filed response and reply, the motion is now ripe for determination.1
II. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff moved to amend her complaint to add new claims on May 25, 2011, almost a year
after the June 28, 2010 deadline specified in the amended scheduling order for filing motions for
leave to amend pleadings, in response to a motion to dismiss her remaining claims.
Motions to amend made before the expiration of a scheduling order’s deadline are governed
by Federal Rule of Civil procedure 15(a)(2), which provides that a court “should freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008).
Post-deadline motions to amend, however, are governed by Rule 16(b)(4)’s more stringent standard,
which provides that once a scheduling order has been entered, it “may be modified only for good
cause and with the judge’s consent.” Id. (citing S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Ala.,
N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)). “The good cause standard requires the party seeking relief
to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the
extension.” S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 535 (citation omitted). Only after a party has shown good
cause for not meeting the scheduling order deadline does the more liberal standard of Rule 15(a)
apply to the court’s decision to grant or deny leave. Fahim, 551 F.3d at 348 (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co.
v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003)). Four factors are relevant in determining
whether good cause exists to permit a post-deadline amendment: (1) the explanation for the failure
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On September 27, 2011, the school moved for leave to file a sur-reply to Plaintiff’s reply in support of her
motion to amend. (See doc. 72.) Since the motion to amend has been denied, a sur-reply is unnecessary, and the
motion for leave to file a sur-reply is DENIED as moot.
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to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) the potential prejudice
in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. See Sw.
Bell, 346 F.3d at 546 (citing S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536).
A. Explanation for Failure to Timely Move
Plaintiff explains her failure to timely move for an amendment to include her §§ 1981 and
1983 claims in her complaint as resulting from her pro se status and being unacquainted with many
of the rules and procedures of the court. She states that these claims were part of her original
complaint, but she was unable to articulate the subject matter in its full capacity. Even if Plaintiff
is proceeding pro se, she has not explained why she waited almost 20 months after she filed the case
and nearly 11 months after the deadline for amendment to assert her claims. She has failed to
provide a persuasive explanation for her failure to timely move for leave to add her new claims. The
first factor therefore does not favor an amendment.
B. Importance of the Amendment
With respect to the“importance” prong of the “good cause” standard, Plaintiff does not make
any argument. Consequently, this factor also does not favor an amendment.
C. Potential Prejudice from the Amendment
While Plaintiff does not make any argument with respect to the fourth factor, the school
argues that there is potential prejudice from the proposed amendment. It argues that it has been
forced to expend public funds for over a year and a half in continued defense against Plaintiff’s
claims. It contends that all of her claims so far have been found meritless, and allowing her to assert
new claims based on the same alleged facts would unjustly prolong this lawsuit and the financial
burden on it in continuing its defense. Additionally, it argues that the claims are new and the
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defenses applicable to the dismissed claims are not necessarily applicable to the new claims.
Because allowing the new claims would require essentially restarting the lawsuit for amended
pleadings, discovery, and motions, the court finds that there is potential prejudice from the proposed
amendment and that the third factor does not favor an amendment.
D. Availability of a Continuance
Plaintiff does not make any arguments with respect to the fourth factor of the “good cause”
analysis, and the court finds that it also does not favor an amendment. Granted that Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, she moved for leave to amend almost 20 months into the case and nearly 11
months outside the deadline for such motions. A continuance is not advisable at such a late stage
of trial especially when all of her other claims have already been dismissed. Even if a continuance
is granted, it would not cure the potential prejudice to the school of having to answer these new
claims and continue a financially burdensome defense.
Considering the four factors together, Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to establish that
good cause exists to permit a post-deadline amendment of her complaint. See S&W Enters., 315
F.3d at 536; Unger v. Taylor, 368 F.App’x 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2010) (affirming district court’s denial
of a motion to amend in the face of movant’s argument that he was pro se and had “inartfully pled”
his claims; he had filed the motion nearly 11 months after the deadline for amendments, he had
failed to explain the tardiness of the motion, trial in the case was imminent, and defendants had not
consented to the amendment).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint is DENIED.
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SO ORDERED on this 3rd day of November, 2011.
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IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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