B-50.com, LLC v. InfoSync Services, LLC
Filing
57
MEMORANDUM OPINION RE CLAIM CONSTRUCTION. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 10/15/2012) (Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
B-50.COM, LLC,
Plaintiff,
VS.
INFOSYNC SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant.
§
§
§
§ Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-1994-D
§
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this patent infringement action concerning a method of generating custom reports
of restaurant point-of-sale data, the court construes disputed claim limitations of United
States Patent No. 6,633,851 (“the ‘851 patent”).
I
Plaintiff B-50.com, LLC (“B-50”) holds the ‘851 patent, which recites “[a] method
of generating custom reports based on restaurant point-of-sale data transferred between
multiple remote computing devices and a central computing device.” D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. In
general, the method contemplates that a user will log on to a website and select a range of
point-of-sale data to populate a type of report format that the user customizes. The user will
then choose to generate a report and determine how the report is to be communicated to the
user. B-50 sues defendant InfoSync Services, LLC (“InfoSync”), alleging contributory
patent infringement and active inducement of patent infringement.
The parties dispute the construction of claim limitations in claim 1 of the ‘851 patent.
The court need only construe the disputed claim limitations. See, e.g., Vivid Tech., Inc. v.
Am. Sci. & Eng’g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
II
The construction of patent claims is a matter reserved exclusively for the court.
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996). The court begins with
the words of the claim. See, e.g., Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1341
(Fed. Cir. 2001). “[T]he words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary
meaning,’” which is “the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in
the art in question at the time of the invention.” Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303,
1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d
1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). “[T]he person of ordinary skill in the art is deemed to read the
claim term not only in the context of the particular claim in which the disputed term appears,
but in the context of the entire patent, including the specification.” Id. at 1313. When “the
meaning of a claim term as understood by persons of skill in the art is . . . not immediately
apparent . . . the court looks to ‘those sources available to the public that show what a person
of skill in the art would have understood [the] disputed claim language to mean.’” Id. at
1314 (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111,
1116 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). “Those sources include ‘the words of the claims themselves, the
remainder of the specification, the prosecution history, and extrinsic evidence concerning
relevant scientific principles, the meaning of technical terms, and the state of the art.’” Id.
(quoting Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116).
“[T]he claims themselves provide substantial guidance as to the meaning of particular
-2-
claim terms.” Id. “The claims, of course, do not stand alone. Rather, they are part of ‘a fully
integrated written instrument,’ consisting principally of a specification that concludes with
the claims. For that reason, claims ‘must be read in view of the specification, of which they
are a part.’” Id. at 1315 (citations omitted) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 978, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
“[T]he specification ‘is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis.
Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.’” Id.
(quoting Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582). “It is therefore entirely appropriate for a court, when
conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written description for guidance as to
the meaning of the claims.” Id. at 1317.
“In addition to consulting the specification, [the] court ‘should also consider the
patent’s prosecution history, if it is in evidence.’” Id. (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at 980).
“Although [the Federal Circuit has] emphasized the importance of intrinsic evidence in claim
construction, [it has] also authorized district courts to rely on extrinsic evidence, which
‘consists of all evidence external to the patent and prosecution history, including expert and
inventor testimony, dictionaries, and learned treatises.’” Id. (quoting Markman, 52 F.3d at
980). “However, while extrinsic evidence ‘can shed useful light on the relevant art,’ . . . it
is ‘less significant than the intrinsic record in determining the legally operative meaning of
claim language.’” Id. (quoting C.R. Bard, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 388 F.3d 858, 862
(Fed. Cir. 2004)). “[E]xtrinsic evidence in general” is viewed “as less reliable than the patent
and its prosecution history in determining how to read claim terms.” Id. at 1318.
-3-
III
The court first construes the disputed terms in the preamble of claim 1 of the ‘851
patent.
A
The preamble of claim 1 states:
A method of generating custom reports based on restaurant
point-of-sale data transferred between multiple remote
computing devices and a central computing device, the method
comprising[.]
D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. The parties dispute the terms “custom reports” and “central computing
device.”
B
B-50 contends that “custom reports” are “the result of executing the ‘custom report
format.’” P. Br. 6.1 InfoSync counters that “custom reports” means “static information
generated using the custom report format, which may be directly displayed, printed or
emailed.” D. Br. 6. The parties dispute whether custom reports consist of static information
and whether the construction of “custom reports” should include the ways in which a report
is communicated to a user.
The court agrees with the first half of InfoSync’s proposed construction because the
claim language, specification, and drawings demonstrate that “custom reports” consist of
1
In this memorandum opinion, “P. Br.” and “D. Br.” mean B-50’s and InfoSync’s
opening claim construction briefs, respectively. “P. Resp. Br.” and “D. Resp. Br.” mean B50’s and InfoSync’s responsive claim construction briefs, respectively.
-4-
static information. “Custom reports” consist of static information because the report is
generated before it is displayed or otherwise communicated to the user, and because there
is no evidence that the contents of a report automatically change or update.2 The claim
language states that, after the selection operations culminate, a custom report is generated and
the restaurant-industry user is able “to view or obtain the generated custom report.” D. Br.
Ex. 1 at 43 (emphasis added). The specification and drawings likewise demonstrate that the
“custom report” is already generated before it is communicated to the user. Fig. 3 illustrates
the method’s process and shows that in one step a custom report is generated and then in the
next step the generated custom report is communicated to the user. Id. at 5. The
specification describes that “the custom report is communicated to a human being.” Id. at
34. The method’s description of an already-generated custom report’s being communicated
to a user does not encompass a report with dynamic, continually updating data, such as a web
page that automatically refreshes its information.3 B-50 does not present any argument to
2
Because the parties do not point to extrinsic evidence, the court considers only
intrinsic evidence in construing the term “custom reports.”
3
The specification does not mention the refreshing or updating of information
contained in an already-generated report. It does describe an automatic report-generating
process, called a subscription, which is recurring reports that are automatically generated and
communicated to the user at a specified frequency. D. Br. Ex. 1 at 36. But the subscription
process creates a new report instead of updating the information in a previously generated
and communicated report. Id.
The specification’s only descriptions of a website refreshing information relate to
updating the list of already-generated reports on the requested reports screen, id. at 35, and
updating the web page that shows the selections a user made in setting up a report
subscription. Id. at 36.
-5-
contest that the information in custom reports is static. The court concludes that “custom
reports” consist of static information.
The court declines to construe “custom reports” to include the provision that the
reports “may be directly displayed, printed or emailed.” D. Br. 6. This part of InfoSync’s
proposed construction is superfluous because the meaning of “custom reports” does not
depend on how the generated reports are communicated to the user. Furthermore, InfoSync’s
proposed construction fails to list all of the possible ways of communicating a report. The
specification provides a non-exclusive list of communication modes: “The custom report can
be communicated by direct display at one of the computing devices, by email to a designated
party, otherwise over the Internet, in hard copy, or in the other ways described above.” D.
Br. Ex. 1 at 34. The specification explains that “as technology advances, the invention likely
will use other modes of communication and interaction with the Internet, not just those
known at present.” Id. The claim language recites only that the user views or obtains the
report “using the Internet.” Id. at 43. The court therefore declines to accept InfoSync’s
proposed description of how custom reports are communicated.
The court construes “custom reports” to mean “static information that is generated
using the custom report format.”
C
The court next construes “a central computing device.” B-50 asserts that “a central
computing device” means “a system of servers or higher-end machines which store, process
and/or transmit information to and from multiple remote computing devices.” P. Br. 7
-6-
(emphasis added). InfoSync responds that “central computing device” means “a single
server or higher-end machine at the top of the hierarchical relationship which stores,
processes and transmits information to and from multiple remote computing devices.” D. Br.
7 (emphasis added). The parties’ proposed constructions present two issues: (1) whether “a
central computing device” means multiple central computing devices or a single central
computing device, and (2) whether the central computing device itself can consist of multiple
servers or higher-end machines, or only a single server or higher-end machine.4
1
The court turns first to a threshold issue. “Central computing device” is one of four
disputed terms in the ‘851 patent that have already been construed in prior litigation brought
by B-50 against an unrelated defendant. See Order Adopting the Special Master’s Final
Report and Recommendation on Claim Construction, B-50.com, LLC v. Xformity, Inc., No.
04-0542-B (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2006) (Boyle, J.) (“Xformity Order”).5 InfoSync contends
4
The parties’ constructions also differ regarding whether the central computing device
is “at the top of the hierarchical relationship.” Judge Boyle adopted this hierarchy
description in her claim construction. See B-50.com, LLC v. Xformity, Inc., No. 04-0542-B,
Order at 6-7 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2006) (Boyle, J.). B-50 offers no argument to dispute this
part of the construction. The court deems it unnecessary to describe the “central computing
device” as at the top of a hierarchical relationship. By addressing hierarchy, such a
description defines the term “central,” which need not be separately defined in construing “a
central computing device.” See infra § III(C)(3) (construing “a central computing device”
as “one system of servers or higher-end machines which stores, processes, and transmits
information to and from multiple remote computing devices”).
5
Of the terms disputed in this case, Judge Boyle construed “central computing device,”
“defining a custom report,” “report initiating page,” and “the selection operations include.”
See Xformity Order 10-11.
-7-
that issue preclusion should apply and bar B-50 from relitigating the terms already construed
in B-50’s prior infringement action against Xformity, Inc. (“Xformity”). See TM Patents,
L.P. v. IBM Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 370, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying issue preclusion to
claim construction in plaintiff’s subsequent lawsuit under same patent).
Issue preclusion requires a final judgment. See J.R. Clearwater Inc. v. Ashland Chem.
Co., 93 F.3d 176, 179 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Finality is an essential component of the concepts
of both res judicata and collateral estoppel [i.e., issue preclusion].”); see also Hartley v.
Mentor Corp., 869 F.2d 1469, 1471 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that to determine principles
of issue preclusion, Federal Circuit looks to law of circuit where appeal would ordinarily lie
in non-patent case). Although finality for preclusion purposes may require a lesser threshold
than finality for appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, see Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth
Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir. 1961), a bare, initial claim construction ruling is
not a final judgment fit for issue preclusion. In Lummus Judge Friendly reasoned that finality
for preclusion purposes “turns upon such factors as the nature of the decision (i.e., that it was
not avowedly tentative), the adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity for review.” Id.
The Fifth Circuit has “declined to adopt this more flexible notion of finality,” instead
refusing to apply issue preclusion where appellate review is unavailable and the district court
can revise its ruling at its discretion prior to final judgment. See J.R. Clearwater, 93 F.3d at
179 n.2 (citing Avondale Shipyards v. Insured Lloyd’s, 786 F.2d 1265, 1270-71 (5th Cir.
1986)).
An initial claim construction ruling like Judge Boyle’s lacks the required finality
-8-
because a district court can continually revisit and revise its claim constructions throughout
the litigation. See Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Envtl. Int’l, L.C., 460 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (“[A] district court may engage in claim construction during various phases of
litigation, not just in a Markman order.”). Furthermore, there is scant opportunity to appeal
a claim construction ruling until after the ruling is applied to decide the litigants’ claims and
defenses. The Federal Circuit consistently rejects requests to review bare claim construction
rulings. See Portney v. CIBA Vision Corp., 401 Fed. Appx. 526, 529 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting
that Federal Circuit had only once granted petition to review merits of claim construction
ruling under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)); Linear Tech. Corp. v. Impala Linear Corp., 31 Fed.
Appx. 700, 702-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (denying review sought under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)
because summary judgment ruling did not address all parties affected by the claim
construction order, which would have resulted in premature claim construction review).
Although the court declines to treat Judge Boyle’s construction of the ‘851 patent as
preclusive, it will defer to her construction, where appropriate, to further the patent law goal
of uniformity. See Markman, 517 U.S. at 391 (expressing that benefit of treating claim
construction as question of law is promotion of uniformity and “intrajurisdictional certainty
through the application of stare decisis”); Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Linear Techs. Corp., 182
F.Supp.2d 580, 589 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (recognizing that deference to another judge’s claim
construction is ideal where it “would not run afoul of fairness considerations”). Additionally,
“the undersigned invariably gives serious and respectful consideration to the decisions of
other judges of this court on questions of law—and typically follows them because they are
-9-
usually correct and because predictability in such matters is desirable.” SEC v. Cuban, 798
F.Supp.2d 783, 788 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.).
2
Judge Boyle held that “a central computing device” means a single central computing
device, not multiple central computing devices. Xformity Order 10. InfoSync urges the
court to reach the same conclusion in this case. B-50 argues that the indefinite article “a” in
“a central computing device” means “one or more.”
Although B-50 correctly states the general rule, the Federal Circuit has explained that
it has “not set a hard and fast rule that ‘a’ always means one or more than one . . . . When
the claim language and specification indicate that ‘a’ means one and only one, it is
appropriate to construe it as such even in the context of an open-ended ‘comprising’ claim.”
Harari v. Lee, 656 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Here, the context of “a central
computing device” evinces the patentee’s clear intent to limit “a” to the singular. See TiVo,
Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 516 F.3d 1290, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[T]he question
whether ‘a’ or ‘an’ is treated as singular or plural depends heavily on the context of its use.”).
As Judge Boyle explained, the context shows that “a” means “one” because when the
claim language refers to multiple items it consistently uses terms that signify more than one.
See Xformity Order 9. For example, the claim language describes “multiple remote
computing devices,” “one or more report formats,” and “at least one of the remote locations.”
D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. In contrast, the claim language uses “a” to describe singular items in the
method, such as “starting from a report initiating page,” or “generating a custom report . . .,
- 10 -
the custom report being based on point-of-sale data.” Id. “In other words, B-50 knew how
to specify multiples when it so chose.” Xformity Order 9; see also D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43 (as an
example, claim 1(b) states “displaying on a page one or more remote locations.” (emphasis
added)).
The ‘851 patent’s description of its method also supports construing “a central
computing device” as singular. The method includes “transferring point-of-sale data to a
central computing device from multiple computing devices at multiple remote locations.”
D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43 (Claim 1(a)). Claim 2 describes the process of “communicating the custom
report format over the Internet from the central computing device.” Id. Claim 9 provides
that the method comprises “storing point-of-sale data for each of the remote locations at a
location associated with the central computing device.” Id. at 44 (emphasis added); see
Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314 (expressing value of using other claims in patent as source of
enlightenment for meaning of claim term). The ordinary meaning of the claim language
describes data coming from multiple locations to one central device, being stored in that
device, and then being communicated from that device.
B-50 responds that the specification describes the possibility of multiple central
computing devices. The specification states that “although only one central computing
device is illustrated, embodiments of the invention contemplate multiple central computing
devices if needed or desired for a particular application or environment.” D. Br. Ex. 1 at 33
(emphasis added). Although this portion of the specification does not support construing “a
central computing device” as a single central computing device, the court agrees with Judge
- 11 -
Boyle that the specification’s language is not determinative. See Xformity Order 8. “A court
may not use the specification to reset the clearly defined boundaries of the different claims.”
RF Del., Inc., v. Pac. Keystone Techs., Inc., 326 F.3d 1255, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Here,
properly construed, the claim language limits “a central computing device” to a single central
computing device, which the specification cannot contradict. See id. (quoting Renishaw PLC
v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1998)) (“Although one may
look to the written description to define a disputed term . . . ‘the resulting claim interpretation
must, in the end, accord with the words chosen by the patentee to stake out the boundary of
the claimed property.’”).
3
The parties also dispute whether “a central computing device” is a single server or
higher-end machine, or a system of servers or higher-end machines. The court construes “a
central computing device” as one system of servers or higher-end machines.
A single central computing device is not necessarily limited to one server or machine,
and the claim language contemplates that the central computing device could consist of more
than one processor and storage device. Claim 18, a dependent claim, recites, “The method
of claim 1, wherein transferring point-of-sale data to a central computing device includes
transferring point-of-sale data to at least one processor and at least one storage device.” D.
Br. Ex. 1 at 44 (emphasis added). Because independent claims are broader than dependent
claims, “a central computing device” in claim 1 is presumed to include and exceed the scope
of claim 18’s description. See Bradford Co. v. Conteyor N. Am., Inc., 603 F.3d 1262, 1271
- 12 -
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining that independent claim’s scope is presumed to be broader than
that of dependent claim); see also Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biolitec, Inc., 618 F.3d 1354, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that dependent claim’s recitation of wavelengths between 200 nm
and 650 nm meant that independent claims were not confined to that range). Therefore, “a
central computing device” in claim 1 can include multiple servers or higher-end machines.
InfoSync’s proposed construction, allowing for only “a single server or higher-end machine,”
is unduly narrow.
The court construes “a central computing device” to mean “one system of servers or
higher-end machines which stores, processes, and transmits information to and from multiple
remote computing devices.”
IV
The court next construes the disputed limitations in the first paragraph of claim 1(b).
A
Claim 1(b) recites:
(b) a restaurant-industry user logging into a web site for the
purpose of defining a custom report format using an
Internet-browser interface, wherein such defining is initiated
with web-based report generating selection operations starting
from a report initiating page and concluding with a report
request selection, wherein the selection operations include[.]
D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. The parties dispute the following limitations: “defining a custom report
format,” “custom report format,” “web-based report generating selection operations,” “report
initiating page,” “report request selection,” and “the selection operations include[.]” P. Br.
- 13 -
9-14; D. Br. 9-15, 17-18, and 20.
B
Regarding “web-based report generating selection operations,” the parties dispute
whether to construe it as a whole or in parts.6 The court construes the phrase as a whole
because, in context, it essentially means selection operations that occur on the Internet for
the purpose of generating a report. “Web-based” in this context means an operation that
occurs on the Internet rather than on the user’s computer offline. The parties agree on two
constructions of “selection operations”: “clicking or selecting something” and “entering data
into ‘operative data-entry fields.’” See Jan. 27, 2012 Joint Claim Construction Statement 3
(“Jt. Cl. Constr. Statement”). “Report generating” means that the selection operations
generate a report. The phrase as a whole serves as an introduction before the claim language
recites the selection operations. Therefore, the court construes “web-based report generating
selection operations” to mean “selection operations that occur on the Internet to generate a
report.”7
6
InfoSync contends that “web-based report” has a separate, unrelated meaning from
“generating selection operations.” InfoSync posits that “web-based report” is describing the
type of completed report that displays if the user chooses delivery of the report through the
Internet. Such a construction is misplaced considering the context, because claim 1(b) recites
the selection operations process, whereas the steps of generating the report and
communicating it to the user are described in parts (c) and (d).
7
The term “selection operations” is construed as the parties agree in the Joint Claim
Construction Statement. See Jt. Cl. Constr. Statement 3.
- 14 -
C
Claim 1(b) recites that the “web-based report generating selection operations” start
from “a report initiating page.” D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. B-50 asserts that “report initiating page”
means “any screen where a user can ‘define a custom report format.’” P. Br. 12. InfoSync
disputes that the term means “any screen,” and instead proposes Judge Boyle’s construction:
“a starting page for defining a custom report.”8 D. Br. 17-18.
Viewing a “report initiating page” in context, the claim language recites “selection
operations starting from a report initiating page and concluding with a report request
selection.” D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. Because selection operations start from a report initiating
page, the court agrees with Judge Boyle’s construction that “report initiating page” means
“a starting page,” not “any screen.”
The court construes “report initiating page” to mean “a starting page for defining a
custom report format.”
D
Although InfoSync proposes a construction of “report request selection,” the court
concludes that it is unnecessary to construe this limitation.
InfoSync’s proposed
construction—“clicking a button that requests the generation of a custom report,” D. Br.
19—adds nothing material to the term’s ordinary meaning. B-50 maintains that no
construction is necessary. The court is not obligated to construe a claim term that has an
8
Judge Boyle adopted the construction proposed by the special master. See Xformity
Order 10-11 (adopting special master recommendation).
- 15 -
ordinary meaning when there is no dispute over the scope of the term. See O2 Micro Int’l
Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (requiring
claim construction of term with ordinary meaning because of dispute over term’s scope);
Mentor H/S, Inc. v. Med. Device Alliance, Inc., 244 F.3d 1365, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding that district court did not err in declining to construe claim terms that had ordinary
meanings given “heavy presumption” in favor of ordinary meaning).
E
The court next construes “the selection operations include.” This phrase introduces
claim 1(b)’s list of selection operations that a user implements to define a report format. As
claim 1(b) recites, the user specifies at least one type of report format, one or more remote
locations, and one or more dates or date ranges. See D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. InfoSync contends
that the court should construe “the selection operations include” to mean that claim 1(b)’s
method requires all three of the listed selection operations, instead of allowing just one or
two. B-50 does not respond directly to this position; it contends that the court need not
construe this phrase because the parties already agree on the construction of “selection
operations.”9
Judge Boyle construed the phrase “the selection operations include” to mean that the
method requires all of the specified selection operations. See Xformity Order 10-11
(adopting Xformity special master recommendation). The court agrees. Claim 1(b)’s list of
9
B-50’s argument overlooks the importance of “include” in the phrase “the selection
operations include.”
- 16 -
selection operations is introduced with the phrase “the selection operations include.” The
Federal Circuit “has consistently interpreted ‘including’ [to mean] that the listed elements
(i.e., method steps) are essential but other elements may be added.” Lucent Techs., Inc. v.
Gateway, Inc., 525 F.3d 1200, 1214 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1344-45 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). Therefore, the court construes “the
selection operations include” to mean the method of claim 1(b) requires all of the claimed
selection operations specified in claim 1(b).
F
Regarding “defining a custom report format,” B-50 asserts that this phrase means “a
process by which a user performs the ‘selection operations’ preparatory to generating a
‘custom report.’”
P. Br. 9.
InfoSync maintains that Judge Boyle’s more detailed
construction is proper: “the process in which the restaurant industry user specifies each of
the report format, remote location, and date or date range options based on what is displayed
for the restaurant industry user in the claimed selection operations.”10 D. Br. 9-10; see
Xformity Order 10-11 (adopting special master recommendation).
B-50’s construction is overly generic and InfoSync’s is unnecessarily descriptive.
Because “defining a custom report format” is a description of a step in claim 1’s method, its
construction should serve as a clear guide to reading claim 1, but it need not repeat what the
10
Judge Boyle’s construction includes the following statement at the end: “as a result
of which the restaurant-industry user may then generate a custom report.” Xformity Order
10-11 (adopting special master recommendation).
- 17 -
claim plainly recites. The court construes “defining a custom report format” to mean “the
process in which the restaurant-industry user performs each selection operation specified in
claim 1(b).”
G
The parties also dispute the construction of “custom report format.” B-50 seeks a
generic construction: “that which is defined through performing ‘selection operations.’” P.
Br. 9. InfoSync proposes a detailed construction, as it did with “defining a custom report
format,” that lists each selection operation. D. Br. 11. Consistent with the court’s
construction of “defining a custom report format,” it construes “custom report format” to
mean “a report format defined by a restaurant-industry user through performing each
selection operation specified in claim 1(b).”
V
The court next addresses InfoSync’s proposed constructions for terms in claim 1(b)’s
first indented paragraph. InfoSync proposes constructions for a number of terms that B-50
contends should not be construed because they do not need any definition apart from their
ordinary and customary meaning. The court agrees with B-50 that the following terms need
not be construed: “report formats”; “accesses”; “selected portion”; and “defined in one or
more queries used to populate the at least one report format.” See Mentor H/S, 244 F.3d at
1380 (affirming decision not to construe terms that had ordinary meanings).
- 18 -
VI
The parties dispute the meaning of “can be” in claim 1(b)’s second indented
paragraph.
The relevant claim language states: “the selection operations include: . . . displaying
on a page one or more remote locations associated with the restaurant-industry user
according to one or more user permissions that can be assigned by an administrator on a
user-by-user basis.” D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43 (emphasis added). Although the parties focus their
dispute on the meaning of “can be,” the fundamental disagreement is whether the method
requires an administrator to assign user permissions. InfoSync contends that “can be” means
“optional or not required,” which would mean that it is optional for the administrator to
assign user permissions. B-50 responds that “can be” does not mean “optional,” but instead
means that the administrator “has the power or ability” to assign user permissions, which
supports B-50’s position that user permissions are required.
The court reads the claim language to mean that the method requires the assignment
of user permissions and these permissions may be assigned on a user-by-user basis. For
example, in the selection operation where the user specifies certain remote locations for the
report, the web page only displays the “remote locations associated with the restaurantindustry user according to one or more user permissions.” D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43. The
specification states that “[g]eneral users will have different permissions than administrators”
and that a user’s access will be limited depending on the user’s position in the company. Id.
at 34. This intrinsic evidence shows that user permissions are necessary to define which
- 19 -
remote locations a particular user can select for a report. Without an assigned user
permission, a user would be unable to use the system because no remote locations would be
displayed for selection. The method requires the assignment of user permissions; this step
is not optional, as InfoSync contends.
Assigning user permissions is mandatory, but the mode of assigning them is optional.
The claim language refers to “user permissions that can be assigned by an administrator on
a user-by-user basis.” Id. at 43. The specification further explains: “Administrators have the
right to make changes to how the system is configured, the power to create user profiles and
passwords[.]” Id. at 34. The patent’s intrinsic evidence demonstrates that administrators
have the power to assign user permissions on a user-by-user basis, but the claim does not
state that “user permissions must be assigned on a user-by-user basis.” This portion of the
claim limitation is optional.
The court construes “can be” and the surrounding claim language to mean that the
method’s mandatory user permissions may be assigned at an administrator’s option on a userby-user basis.
VII
In claim 1(b)’s third indented paragraph, the parties dispute three terms: “displaying,”
“operative data-entry fields,” and “substantially only those required to obtain.” The court
declines to construe “displaying” or “substantially only those required to obtain” because
each has an ordinary meaning that renders further explanation unnecessary. See Mentor H/S,
244 F.3d at 1380; Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 810 F.Supp.2d 795, 805 (E.D. Tex.
- 20 -
2011) (declining to construe term that had clear meaning that would be readily
understandable to jury).
Regarding “operative data-entry fields,” InfoSync first contends that the proper term
to be construed is “data-entry fields.” D. Br. 23. But the claim language supports construing
the phrase “operative data-entry fields” as a whole. The relevant claim language states:
displaying on a page one or more operative data-entry fields
configured to process a selection operation . . . that specifies one
or more dates or date ranges, wherein the operative data-entry
fields are substantially only those required to obtain the dates or
date ranges[.]
D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43 (emphasis added). Because the claim language repeats the entire phrase
“operative data-entry fields,” the context implies that the patentee considered the phrase a
unified term and did not intend to separate “operative” from “data-entry fields.”
The parties propose similar constructions of “operative data-entry fields.” InfoSync
asserts that it means “places on a screen where the restaurant-industry user may enter data
for a selection operation.” D. Br. 23. B-50 proposes a more detailed construction: “places
on a screen where a ‘restaurant-industry user’ may enter data values for the specific report
type, including data values used to specify a date or date range.” P. Br. 15. The additional
detail in B-50’s construction is superfluous because the context of “operative data-entry
fields” already demonstrates that these fields are intended for entering data that specify dates.
See D. Br. Ex. 1 at 43 (claim 1(b), which recites “operative data-entry fields configured to
process a selection operation . . . that specifies one or more dates or date ranges”). Therefore,
the court construes “operative data-entry fields” to mean “places on a screen where the
- 21 -
restaurant-industry user may enter data for a selection operation.”11
VIII
In claim 1(d) the parties dispute the construction of three terms: “enabling,” “to view
or obtain,” and “the generated custom report.”
Claim 1(d) states: “enabling the
restaurant-industry user to view or obtain the generated custom report using the Internet.”
The court deems it unnecessary to construe “enabling” or “the generated custom
report.” InfoSync proposes constructions for both: “enabling” means “to give power to do
something,” and “the generated custom report” means “the custom report that has been
generated by the preceding steps.” D. Br. 26, 29. B-50 maintains that neither term needs to
be construed. The court concludes that, in context, the terms “enabling” and “the generated
custom report” have their ordinary meaning.
InfoSync seeks a construction of “to view or obtain” to clarify that it means “to either
view or obtain, but not both.” D. Br. 27. B-50 does not dispute this construction, but instead
contends that the phrase is self-explanatory and needs no construction. The court concludes
that the phrase “to view or obtain” should be construed and that it means “to either view or
obtain, but not both.” See Kustom Signals, Inc. v. Applied Concepts, Inc., 264 F.3d 1326,
1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (agreeing with district court construction that “or” meant “‘a choice
11
Of course, the balance of the paragraph limits the types of data to be entered.
- 22 -
between either one of two alternatives, but not both’”).
October 15, 2012.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE
- 23 -
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?