Johnson v. Duncan et al

Filing 115

Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 105 MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. (Ordered by Judge Jane J. Boyle on 6/10/2019) (epm) Modified text on 6/11/2019 (svc).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JOSEPH JOHNSON, JR,
Plaintiff,
v.
AFFILIATED COMPUTER SERVICES,
INC., and ACS EDUCATION
SOLUTIONS LLC,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-2333-B

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment. Doc. 105. For the reasons
that follow, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
On November 16, 2010, Joseph Johnson, Jr. (“Johnson”) filed a complaint seeking a
declaratory judgment relieving him of his obligation to repay student loans. Doc. 1, Compl. After
giving Johnson multiple opportunities to amend his complaint, this Court granted Defendants’,
Affiliated Computer Services, Inc. (“ACS”) and ACS Education Solutions LLC (“ACSES”), Motion
to Dismiss on September 9, 2011, and dismissed the claim with prejudice due to Johnson’s continual
disregard and abuse of the rules of this Court. Doc. 68, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17.
Shortly thereafter, the Court entered final judgment and ordered that Johnson take nothing on his
claims. Doc. 69, Final J.
On October 3, 2011, Johnson then moved for relief from judgment under Rules 60(b)(1), (3),
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(4), and (6) arguing that the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under diversity jurisdiction
since the amount pled was less than $75,000. Doc. 71, Relief from J., ¶¶ 3, 5, 7. The Court denied
this motion on February 1, 2012. Doc. 82, Order Den. Relief from J.
On February 9, 2012, Johnson then filed a motion to vacate the September 9, 2011 order and
subsequent final judgment by raising similar arguments made in his previously denied motion for
relief from judgment. Doc. 85, Mot. to Vacate. The Court denied the motion to vacate. Doc. 86,
Order Den. Mot. to Vacate. On February 10, 2012, Johnson filed an appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Doc.
87, Notice of Appeal. The Fifth Circuit affirmed this Court’s dismissal and held that the Court had
subject-matter jurisdiction over this case at all times. Johnson v. Affiliated Comput. Servs., Inc., 500
F. App’x. 265, 266 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
Now, almost eight years after the Court dismissed his claims, on May 1, 2019, Johnson filed
this Motion for Relief from Judgment under Rule 60(b)(4) and (6) “to modify the dismissal . . . to
instead dismiss it without prejudice.” Doc. 105, Mot. for Relief from J., 1. Johnson cites to the
Supreme Court case of Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016), as bestowing derivative
sovereign immunity upon ACS and ACSES, which he argues denied this Court subject-matter
jurisdiction over the Defendants. Id. Having been fully briefed by the parties, the Court proceeds to
determining whether its prior judgment should be disturbed.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The purpose of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) “is to balance the principle of finality
of a judgment with the interest of the court in seeing that justice is done in light of all the facts.”
Hesling v. CSX Transp. Inc., 396 F.3d 632, 638 (5th Cir. 2005). In order to see that justice is done,
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a court may relieve a party from final judgment. Parker v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 464 F. App’x 224, 228
(5th Cir. 2010). A Rule 60(b) motion “must be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons (1),
(2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). “[A]
‘reasonable time’ depends on the facts of each case, taking into consideration [(1)] the interest in
finality, [(2)] the reason for the delay, [(3)] the practical ability of the litigant to learn earlier of the
grounds relied upon, and [(4)] prejudice to other parties.” Osborne v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 379
F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ashford v. Steuart, 657 F.2d 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 1981)). No
matter the standard applied, “district courts have ‘considerable discretion in deciding whether to
grant or deny a motion to alter a judgment.’” Cloud v. Quarterman, WL 806911, *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
14, 2007) (quoting Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 921 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Under Rule 60(b)(4), a court may relieve a party from final judgment when “the judgment
is void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). The Fifth Circuit has recognized “two circumstances in which a
judgment may be set aside under Rule 60(b)(4): 1) if the initial court lacked subject matter or
personal jurisdiction; and 2) if the district court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of
law.”1 Callon Petroleum Co. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 204, 208 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Carter v.
Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1006 (5th Cir. 1998)). Under the first circumstance, any challenge to
jurisdiction “should be sustained only where there is a clear ‘usurpation of power’ or ‘total want of
jurisdiction.’” Callon Petroleum Co., 351 F.3d at 208 (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 64–65
(2d. Cir. 1986)).
Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to “relieve a party . . . from final judgment, order or proceeding

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Here, Johnson only Motions for Relief from Judgment under the first circumstance due to the
court’s alleged lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Doc. 105, Mot. for Relief from J., 1.

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for . . . any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Accordingly, relief from
judgment should only be applied in “extraordinary circumstances.” Liljeberg v. Health Servs.
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988) (citing Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 207
(1950)). Important to this case, the basis for challenge of the judgment must have been absent at the
time of appeal so that Rule 60(b) may not serve as an end run around the statutory limitations of the
appeals process. Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1985).
III.
ANALYSIS
In this case, after examining the factors for a “reasonable time” under Rule 60(c)(1) the
Court concludes that Johnson’s Motion is untimely. First, reversing the Court’s decision disturbs the
finality of the proceedings that have already progressed for more than eight years and through
multiple motions to relieve or vacate the judgment. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Townsley, 2009
WL 10669894, at *3 ( W.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2009) (waiting two years weighed against finality). Second,
Johnson provides no explanation in his Motion or Reply Breif for delay in filing his Motion. See First
RepublicBank Fort Worth v. Norglass, Inc., 958 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding there was no
“meaningful justification” to wait two years to file the motion). Third, Johnson also provides no
explanation in his Motion or Reply Brief for an inability to earlier learn about the basis for his
Motion. Lastly, reversing the Court’s decision heavily prejudices ACS and ACSES since this would
allow Johnson to refile his claim in this Court—or another court—which forestalls a resolution of
the current claim indefinitely and would likely impose further legal costs upon ACS and ACSES.
Furthermore, reversing the judgment could possibly prevent ACS and ACSES from collecting
Johnson’s student loan debt. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 2009 WL 10669894, at *3 (finding that
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a debt collector would be prejudiced from collecting a debt if the Court granted relief from
judgment).
The Court, and subsequently the Fifth Circuit, has previously found that this Court had
subject-matter jurisdiction at all times and now the Court does not find that this case otherwise
presents an “extraordinary circumstance” warranting relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).
Additionally, the basis for the challenge of the judgment existed at the time of the appeal. While
Campbell-Ewald Co. was decided in 2016—after the dismissal, appeal, and all subsequent
motions—Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Corp., 309 U.S. 18 (1940), was decided in 1940 and serves
as the primary basis for Johnson’s legal theory. In essence, Johnson argues that the September 9, 2011
dismissal of his claim is void since this Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction since ACS and
ACSES have derivative sovereign immunity. Doc. 105, Mot. for Relief from J., 2–3. Johnson cites
to Campbell-Ewald Co. and Yearsley as the basis for his argument that ACS and ACSES derived
sovereign immunity from the United States by operating “as an arm or agent of the . . . government.”
Doc. 105, Mot. for Relief from J., 2 (quoting Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371,
1379 (5th Cir. 1980)). Thus, Johnson argues that ACS and ACSES are immune from suit and this
Court never had subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. Doc. 105, Mot. for Relief from J., 3.
In Yearsley, the Supreme Court held that if the government conferred authority to perform
a project upon a contractor then, the contractor assumes no liability for performing as directed. 309
U.S. at 20–21. This is the crux of Johnson’s argument and he quotes this exact section in CampbellEwald Co., which directly quotes from Yearsley. Doc. 105, Mot. for Relief from J., 4. Thus, the
applicable case law from Yearsley—stated in 1940—regarding derivative sovereign immunity did not
change in Campbell and if it did, Johnson fails to argue how it changed. To further evince a lack of
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change in case law, the dissents in Campbell-Ewald Co. only disagree with whether the matter was
moot before reaching the Supreme Court and not about the application of derivative sovereign
immunity. See 136 S. Ct. at 677–78 (Roberts, J., dissenting); Id. at 683 (Alito, J., dissenting). Thus,
the Court finds no change in applicable law or the absence of applicable law that was not already
present at the time of appeal.
Additionally, Johnson provides no explanation for why a finding of derivative sovereign
immunity for ACS and ACSES would change the outcome of his case since ACS and ACSES would
then be immune from suit. Campbell-Ewald Co. explicitly states that any immunity derived from the
sovereign by an agency performing work for the United States is not absolute. Id. at 672. The
exception to immunity is “[w]hen a contractor violates both federal law and the Government’s
explicit instructions.” Id. at 672. Thus, unless Johnson could prove a violation of federal law and
government instructions, ACS and ACSES would maintain derivative sovereign immunity and are
immune from suit. But Johnson fails to provide, and the Court does not find, any factual allegations
of an exception to derivative sovereign immunity, which would then allow him to sue ACS and
ACSES and potentially alter the outcome of his case. Thus, in addition to finding this Motion
untimely, the Court is unwilling to find this presents an “extraordinary circumstance” to disturb this
Court’s prior judgment.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment.

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SO ORDERED
SIGNED: June 10, 2019.

_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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