Hayward et al v. Chase Home Finance LLC et al
Filing
17
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 5 Motion to Remand, denying 4 Motion to Dismiss and granting 4 Motion for More Definite Statement. The plaintiffs are granted leave to their complaint, within fifteen days of this date. (Ordered by Senior Judge A. Joe Fish on 7/18/2011) (skt)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARK HAYWARD, ET AL.,
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Plaintiffs,
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VS.
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CHASE HOME FINANCE, LLC, ET AL., )
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Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:10-CV-2463-G
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are (1) the motion of the plaintiffs, Mark Hayward
(“Hayward”) and Richard Galvan (“Galvan”) (collectively, the “plaintiffs”), to
remand this case to the state court from which it was previously removed, and (2) the
motion of the defendants, Chase Home Finance (“Chase”) and Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) (collectively “the defendants”), to dismiss the
claims against them or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. For the
reasons set forth below, the motions to remand and to dismiss are denied, and the
motion for a more definite statement is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2007, Hayward and Galvan executed a promissory note and a
deed of trust in favor of Network Funding to secure financing to purchase a home
(“the property”) in Dallas County, Texas. Plaintiffs’ Application for Temporary
Restraining Order (“Application”), attached to Defendants’ Notice of Removal
("Notice"), as Exhibit C-1 at 1-2 ¶¶ 1-2 (docket entry 1). Chase acted as servicer of
the loan. Id. at 2 ¶ 4. Due to a financial hardship caused by Hayward losing his job
in February 2009, Hayward and Galvan apparently fell behind on their mortgage.
See id. at 2 (bottom half of page) ¶¶ 1-2. In September 2009, Chase sent Hayward
and Galvan a notice of intent to foreclose on the property. Plaintiffs’ Original
Petition (“Petition”), attached to Notice, as Exhibit C-1 at 3 ¶ 11. Hayward requested
a loan modification from Chase. Id. Chase then offered Hayward and Galvan a Trial
Payment Period Plan, but they could not afford to make the payments Chase
requested under the plan. Id. In March 2010, Chase appointed a substitute trustee
to conduct a foreclosure on the property. Application at 2 ¶ 3. On September 21,
2010, Hayward and Galvan received a letter from Chase stating that Chase would not
foreclose on the property before their modification evaluation process was complete.
Id. at 3 ¶ 5. Two weeks later, on October 5, 2010, the property was sold to Fannie
Mae at a foreclosure sale. Id. at 3 ¶ 6. Three days later, on October 8, 2010,
Hayward and Galvan received another letter from Chase stating that Chase would not
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foreclose on the property before their modification evaluation process was complete.
Id. at 3 ¶ 7. The following week, Fannie Mae sent Hayward and Galvan a notice to
vacate and a “Cash for Keys” agreement, giving them until November 7, 2010, to
vacate the property. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 8-9.
On November 10, 2010, Hayward and Galvan filed suit against Chase and
Fannie Mae in the 14th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. See Notice
¶ 1. Hayward and Galvan sought damages for wrongful foreclosure, slander of title,
breach of the Texas Debt Collection Practices Act, and unreasonable debt collection
practices under Texas common law. See generally Petition. In their application for a
temporary restraining order, Hayward and Galvan seek injunctive relief preventing
Fannie Mae from interfering with their quiet enjoyment of the property pending trial
on the merits. See Application at 7 ¶ 31. Finally, Hayward and Galvan seek a
judgment declaring (1) that their property was wrongfully foreclosed, (2) that neither
Chase nor Fannie Mae is the proper holder of the promissory note, (3) who currently
holds the note and how much is owed on it, and (4) that quiets title to the property
in them. See id. ¶¶ 10-11.
On December 3, 2010, Chase and Fannie Mae timely removed the case to this
court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 based upon diversity-of-citizenship
jurisdiction. Notice at 1-2. Chase and Fannie Mae also filed a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted or,
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alternatively, for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Chase Home Finance
LLC and Federal National Mortgage Association’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim or Alternatively, Motion for More Definite Statement (“Motion to
Dismiss”) at 1 ¶ 3 (docket entry 4).
On December 22, 2010, Hayward and Galvan filed a motion to remand,
arguing that removal was improper because there is not complete diversity of
citizenship between the parties and because the amount in controversy does not
exceed the requisite $75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand
and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (“Motion for Remand”) at 2 (docket entry
5).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Remand
Federal law permits defendants to remove “any civil action brought in a State
court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28
U.S.C. § 1441(a). Because removal deprives “the state court of an action properly
before it, removal raises significant federalism concerns, which mandate strict
construction of the removal statute.” Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Independent School
District, 44 F.3d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1995). See also Matter of Crystal Power
Company, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5694, at *4 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2011); Texas
Instruments Inc. v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 266 F.R.D. 143, 146 (N.D. Tex.
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2010) (J. Fish). Therefore, “any doubts concerning removal must be resolved against
removal and in favor of remanding the case back to state court.” Cross v. Bankers
Multiple Line Insurance Company, 810 F. Supp. 748, 750 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (J. Means).
See also Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 530
U.S. 1229 (2000). The party seeking removal bears the burden of establishing
federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corporation, 855 F.2d 1160, 1164 (5th
Cir. 1988); Texas Instruments, 266 F.R.D. at 146.
There are two primary bases on which a district court may exercise jurisdiction
after removal: the existence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and complete
diversity of citizenship among the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Here, Chase and
Fannie Mae alleged only diversity of citizenship as a basis of this court’s jurisdiction.
The court can exercise diversity jurisdiction after removal only if three
requirements are met: (1) the parties are of completely diverse citizenship, see 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a); (2) none of the properly joined defendants is a citizen of the state
in which the case is brought, see 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b); and (3) the amount in
controversy is more than $75,000, excluding interest and costs, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a). See also Texas Instruments, 266 F.R.D. at 146.
Diversity of citizenship exists only when none of the defendants is a citizen of
the same state as any of the plaintiffs. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Here, both plaintiffs
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are citizens of Texas. See Petition ¶ 1. Thus, if either Chase or Fannie Mae is a
citizen of Texas, diversity of citizenship is defeated.
The citizenship of a limited liability company is determined by the citizenship
of all of its members. See, e.g., Harvey v. Grey Wolf Drilling Company, 542 F.3d 1077,
1080 (5th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted); Greene v. Moody, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
59309, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2010) (J. Fish). Chase is a limited liability
company with only one member -- Chase Home Finance, Inc. (“Chase Corporation”)
-- which is a corporation. Notice at 4 ¶ 5(b)(ii). Thus, Chase’s citizenship is
determined by the citizenship of Chase Corporation. See id.; Harvey, 542 F.3d at
1080.
A corporation is a citizen of (1) the state where it was incorporated and (2) the
state of its principal place of business. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Chase Corporation
was incorporated in Delaware and its principal place of business is New Jersey.
Notice at 4 ¶ 5(b)(ii). Thus, Chase Corporation is a citizen of both Delaware and
New Jersey. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
Fannie Mae is a federally chartered corporation. Notice at 4 ¶ 5(b)(iii).
Because a federally chartered corporation is incorporated under acts of Congress,
rather than under state laws, it generally has national citizenship but no state
citizenship. See Bankers Trust Company v. Texas & Pacific Railroad Company, 241 U.S.
295, 309 (1916). In a suit where one of the defendants has only national citizenship
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but no state citizenship, diversity is impossible because the suit is not between
citizens of different states. See id. at 309-10.
There are two exceptions to the general rule that a federally chartered
corporation has only national citizenship. First, a federal corporation that limits its
business activities to only one state is a citizen of that state for jurisdictional
purposes. See, e.g., Engelmeyer v. Production Credit Association of Midlands, 652 F. Supp.
1235, 1236 (D.S.D. 1987); Burton v. United States Olympic Committee, 574 F. Supp.
517, 519 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The second is where Congress has passed legislation
specifying that the corporation is a citizen of a particular state for jurisdictional
purposes. See Engelmeyer, 652 F. Supp. at 1237; Burton, 574 F. Supp. at 519. Fannie
Mae’s charter states that it “shall maintain its principal office in the District of
Columbia . . . and shall be deemed, for purposes of jurisdiction and venue in civil
actions, to be a District of Columbia corporation.” 12 U.S.C. § 1717(a)(2)(B). Thus,
Fannie Mae is a citizen of the District of Columbia. See id.; Engelmeyer, 652 F. Supp.
at 1237.
To support their argument that this court should remand the case, Hayward
and Galvan contend that Chase and Fannie Mae had a continuing and substantial
connection with Texas, sufficient to subject them to the general jurisdiction of Texas
courts. See Motion for Remand at 2. Hayward and Galvan correctly conclude that,
when a business’s contacts with a state subject it to the general jurisdiction of that
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state, “specific jurisdiction analysis becomes moot.” Id. The plaintiffs fail to realize,
however, that specific and general jurisdiction analysis is only relevant when
considering personal jurisdiction. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.
A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). Chase and Fannie Mae have not challenged the
authority of courts within Texas to exercise jurisdiction over them. In fact, Chase and
Fannie Mae waived their right to challenge personal jurisdiction when they omitted
the defense from their motion to dismiss. See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 12(g)(2), (h)(1)(A).
See also Golden v. Cox Furniture Manufacturing Company, 683 F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir.
1982); Prime Lending v. Moyer, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9724, at *10-11 (N.D. Tex.
May 28, 2004) (J. Fish). Thus, any personal jurisdiction analysis, general or specific,
is moot.
To determine the amount in controversy, the court looks first to a plaintiff’s
state court petition. See, e.g., Manguno v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance
Company, 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002); Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Company, 63
F.3d 1326, 1335 (5th Cir. 1995); Chambers v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 79167, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2006) (J. Fish). If the amount in
controversy is not facially apparent from the petition, the burden falls on the
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000. See Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335 (citing De Aguilar v. Boeing
Company, 11 F.3d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1993)); Chambers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79167,
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at *7. The defendant may present this evidence in the notice of removal or a separate
affidavit. See Allen, 63 F.3d at 1335; Chambers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79167, at
*7-8. “While post-removal affidavits may be considered in determining the amount
in controversy at the time of removal, such affidavits may be considered only if the
basis for jurisdiction is ambiguous at the time of removal.” Chambers, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79167, at *8 (citing Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 233 F.3d 880, 883 (5th
Cir. 2000)).
The amount in controversy in actions seeking declaratory judgment or
injunctive relief is the “the value of the right to be protected or the extent of the
injury to be prevented.” Hartford Insurance Group v. Lou-Con Inc., 293 F.3d 908, 910
(5th Cir. 2002); accord St. Paul Reinsurance Company, Limited, v. Greenberg, 134 F.3d
1250, 1252-53 (5th Cir. 1998). See also Chambers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79167, at
*10. “The court makes the amount in controversy determination from the
perspective of the plaintiff; the proper measure is the benefit or value to the plaintiff,
not the cost to the defendant.” See Chambers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79167, at *10
(citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 257 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Hayward and Galvan seek unspecified compensatory and exemplary damages
for wrongful foreclosure, slander of title, breach of the Texas Debt Collection
Practices Act, and unreasonable debt collection practices under Texas common law.
See generally Petition. Hayward and Galvan also seek injunctive relief preventing
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Fannie Mae from interfering with their quiet enjoyment of the property pending trial
on the merits. See Application at 7 ¶ 32. Finally, Hayward and Galvan seek a
declaration (1) that their property was wrongfully foreclosed, (2) that neither Chase
nor Fannie Mae is the proper holder of the promissory note, (3) that specifies who
currently holds the note and how much is owed on it, and (4) that quiets title to the
property in them. See id. ¶ 10-11.
Hayward and Galvan’s original petition and application for temporary
restraining order are silent regarding the value of any of their claims and the amount
in controversy is not otherwise apparent. See generally Petition; Application. The
burden, therefore, falls on Chase and Fannie Mae to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Allen, 63 F.3d at
1335; Chambers, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79167, at *7. Chase and Fannie Mae have
presented no evidence that demonstrates the amount of damages Hayward and
Galvan seek for their tort claims. Rather, the only evidence Chase and Fannie Mae
have produced regarding the amount in controversy is an appraisal of the property
from the Dallas Central Appraisal District, which shows that the fair market value of
the property is $416,000. Appraisal, attached to Defendants Chase Home Finance
LLC and Federal National Mortgage Association’s Appendix in Support of Response
to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Remand (“Response to Motion to Remand”), as Exhibit A-1,
(docket entry 11-2). Thus, the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional
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threshold only if Chase and Fannie Mae are correct that the amount in controversy is
equal to the fair market value of the property.
Hayward and Galvan argue that the amount in controversy is equal to the fair
market value of the property only when measured from the defendants’ perspective.
This is because they do not seek a declaration granting them outright ownership of
the property, but only that “they owe Defendants no debt and that Defendants do
not hold or possess the Note.” Motion for Remand at 4 (emphasis in original
omitted). Hence, Hayward and Galvan also seek “a declaration of which party is the
current holder of the Note.” Id. Thus, Hayward and Galvan allege that, measured
from their viewpoint, the value of a declaration that quiets title to the property in
them is nothing because a favorable judgment “will not award Plaintiffs any greater
rights or interest in the Property than Plaintiffs already possess.” Id. at 4-5. The
court disagrees.
Hayward and Galvan profess that they desire a declaration that some party
other than Chase and Fannie Mae has an interest in the property or the promissory
note, yet they have not joined or even identified any such party. The Texas Supreme
Court has held that a court does not have jurisdiction to declare the rights of parties
who are not before the court because any opinion adjudicating the rights of absent
parties would be purely advisory. See Brooks v. Northglen Association, 141 S.W.3d 158,
163-64 (Tex. 2004). See also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(a) (“When
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declaratory relief is sought, all persons who have or claim any interest that would be
affected by the declaration must be made parties.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a) (“A person
who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the action if . . . he
claims an interest relating to the subject of the action. . . .”). Thus, in this suit, the
court only has jurisdiction to declare the rights of Hayward, Galvan, Chase, and
Fannie Mae. Due to this limitation, if the court concludes that neither Chase nor
Fannie Mae holds the promissory note and quiets title in Hayward and Galvan, it
could not declare that the interest claimed by Fannie Mae belongs to an unnamed
party. Rather, the court would have to declare that the interest claimed by Fannie
Mae belongs to Hayward and Galvan. See Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 163; TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a).
When “a right to property is called into question in its entirety, the value of
the property controls the amount in controversy.” Waller v. Professional Insurance
Corporation, 296 F.2d 545, 547-548 (5th Cir. 1961). Hayward and Galvan seek an
order from this court declaring that the title Fannie Mae bought at the foreclosure
sale is invalid. See Application at 4 ¶ 11. If the court denies this request, Fannie Mae
will hold indefeasible title to the entire property. See Deed of Trust, attached to
Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Plaintiffs, Objection and in the Alternative,
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Response to Motion to Dismiss”), as
Exhibit K, sec. 22 (docket entry 14-11). See also Brooks, 141 S.W.3d at 163; TEX.
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CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.006(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 39(a). If the court grants this
request, Hayward and Galvan will hold the same. Thus, Hayward and Galvan’s
request for a declaration that quiets title to them calls into question a right to the
property in its entirety and the amount in controversy is equal to the value of the
property. See Waller, 296 F.2d at 547-48. Because the fair market value of the
property is $416,000, the amount in controversy exceeds the $75,000 jurisdictional
threshold. See Appraisal.
Because the parties are completely diverse, and because the requisite amount is
in controversy, Hayward and Galvan’s motion for remand is denied.
B. Motion to Dismiss
When a claim is originally brought in a Texas state court and then removed to
federal court, Texas procedural law determines whether the claim survives a motion to
dismiss. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 202 F.3d 770, 787 (5th Cir. 2000); White v. BAC Home
Loans Servicing, LP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116891, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2010)
(J. Fish); SFTF Holdings, LLC v. Bank of America, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29036, at *2
(N.D. Tex. Marc. 22, 2011) (J. Fish). Hayward and Galvan originally filed all of their
claims in a Texas state court, so Texas pleading standards apply to all of their claims.
Under Texas’s “fair notice” pleading standard, the test is “whether the opposing party
can ascertain from the pleading the nature and basic issues of the controversy and
what testimony will be relevant.” See Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auld, 34
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S.W.3d 887, 896 (Tex. 2000) (citing Broom v. Brookshire Brothers, Inc., 923 S.W.2d
57, 60 (Tex. App.--Tyler 1995, writ denied)). See also Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d
609, 612 (Tex. 2007); TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(a). Pleadings need only “consist of a
statement in plain and concise language of the plaintiff’s cause of action. . . . That an
allegation be evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall not be grounds for objection
when fair notice to the opponent is given by the allegations as a whole.” TEX. R. CIV.
P. 45 (b). “Fair notice” provides the “opposing party information sufficient to enable
him to prepare a defense.” Horizon/CMS Healthcare, 34 S.W.3d at 897 (quoting Roark
v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982)).
In addition to applying liberal standards to pleadings, Texas courts only
dismiss a complaint at the pleading stage if the pleadings affirmatively demonstrate
an incurable defect. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007).
Minus an incurable defect, a complaint is subject, at most, to an order to replead.
See id. (concluding that a plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to replead if
the pleadings “do not affirmatively demonstrate an incurable defect”); Gallien v.
Washington Mutual Home Loans, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 856, 862-63 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
2006, no pet.) (“[A] trial court cannot dismiss a plaintiff's entire case with prejudice if
the pleadings state a valid cause of action, but are vague, overbroad, or otherwise
susceptible to valid special exceptions.”); Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658
(Tex. 1998) (“When the trial court sustains special exceptions, it must give the
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pleader an opportunity to amend the pleading.”); Peek v. Equipment Service Company,
779 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Tex. 1989) (“Unless the petition affirmatively demonstrates
that no cause of action exists or that plaintiff’s recovery is barred, we require the trial
court to give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend before granting a motion to
dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.”).
Chase and Fannie Mae assert that Hayward and Galvan’s petition “is devoid of
factual allegations supporting specific causes of action upon which relief may be
granted,” “provide[s] only conclusory statements,” and forces Chase and Fannie Mae
to guess at the facts giving rise to the causes of action asserted and the duties and
obligations they allegedly violated. Chase Home Finance LLC and Federal National
Mortgage Association’s Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim or Alternatively, Motion for More Definite Statement (“Brief in Support of
Motion to Dismiss”) at 3, 7, 10 (docket entry 4-1). While Chase and Fannie Mae
successfully argue that the complaint is not a model for clarity, they fail to
affirmatively demonstrate an incurable defect. Thus, the motion to dismiss is denied.
C. Motion for a More Definite Statement
Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the party moving for a more definite
statement “shall not only point out the particular pleading excepted to, but . . . shall
also point out intelligibly and with particularity the defect, omission, obscurity,
duplicity, generality, or other insufficiency in the allegations in the pleading excepted
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to.”* TEX. R. CIV. P. 91. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide district judges
discretion to order the plaintiff to replead a complaint that has been removed from
state court. See FED. R. CIV. P. 81(c)(2).
While repleading is generally disfavored, Chase and Fannie Mae point out,
with particularity, defects in all of Hayward and Galvan’s causes of action. See
generally Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss. For example, the complaint does not
set forth the elements of any of the causes of action; contains apparent
contradictions, see Petition at 3-4 (alleging that “Chase committed a wrongful
foreclosure by . . . [d]emanding amounts that were not actually due in order to avoid
foreclosure”) (emphasis added); alleges statutory violations, but does not specify what
sections of the statute were violated, see id. at 5; and consists of merely one
conclusory sentence for the slander of title claim, see id. at 4. The court agrees with
Chase and Fannie Mae, Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 10, that the
pleading “is so vague [and] ambiguous that [they] cannot reasonably be required to
frame a responsive pleading.” Chase and Fannie Mae’s motion for more definite
statement is accordingly granted.
Hayward and Galvan shall replead their case, if they can, so as to state the
liability of Chase and Fannie Mae under their various causes of action. Hayward and
*
While the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure refer to this as a “special
exception,” it is analogous to a motion for more definite statement under the Federal
Rules. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(e) with TEX. R. CIV. P. 91.
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Galvan should also be aware that their repleaded complaint will be subject to the
stricter federal standards regarding sufficiency of pleading under the federal rules and
case law.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Hayward and Galvan’s motion to remand is
DENIED, Chase and Fannie Mae’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, and Chase and
Fannie Mae’s motion for more definite statement is GRANTED. The plaintiffs are
granted leave to their complaint, within fifteen days of this date, for the purpose of
more clearly stating their claims. Failure to file and serve an amended complaint
within that time will result in dismissal of this case without further notice.
SO ORDERED.
July 18, 2011.
___________________________________
A. JOE FISH
Senior United States District Judge
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