Geils v. Patin

Filing 149

Memorandum Opinion and Order granting in part and denying in part 147 MOTION for Attorney Fees Costs and Expenses filed by Jason Dean Geils. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 11/18/2013) (jrr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JASON GEILS,
Plaintiff,
v.
DON PATIN,
Defendant.

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No. 3:11-CV-0650-B

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Jason Dean Geils’ (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs,
and Expenses (doc. 147). After reviewing the motion and relevant law, the Court GRANTS in part
and DENIES in part Plaintiff’s motion as follows.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights claim against Defendant Don Patin for
use of excessive force. The case went to trial on August 19, 2013 and lasted four days. On August
22, 2013, the jury found Defendant liable and awarded Plaintiff $80,000 in compensatory damages.
On September 18, 2013, the Court entered its written Final Judgment (doc. 145) on the jury’s
verdict. Plaintiff now moves the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 for an award of attorneys’
fees, costs, and expenses associated with the civil rights litigation.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
In an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the court may, in its discretion, “allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988(b). The
Fifth Circuit has described the basic procedure and standard for determining attorneys’ fees as

follows:
The determination of a fees award is a two-step process. First the
court calculates the “lodestar” which is equal to the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the
community for similar work. The court should exclude all time that
is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. Once the
lodestar amount is calculated, the court can adjust it based on the
twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974).
Smith v. Acevedo, 478 Fed. App’x 116, 124 (5th Cir. 2012)(quoting Jimenez v. Wood Cnty, 621 F.3d
372, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2010)). The Johnson factors are (1) time and labor required for the litigation;
(2) novelty and difficulty of the questions presented; (3) skill requisite to perform the legal services
properly; (4) preclusion of other employment; (5) customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or
contingent; (7) limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; (8) amount involved and the
result obtained; (9) experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) “undesirability” of the
case; (11) nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in
similar cases. 488 F.2d at 717-19. Accordingly, the Court will apply the lodestar method and make
adjustments, if necessary, according to the Johnson factors.
III.
ANALYSIS
1.

Attorneys’ Fees
The first step in the lodestar analysis requires the Court determine the reasonable number

of hours expended by Plaintiffs’ attorneys on the lawsuit, as well as the reasonable hourly rate for
those attorneys involved. Smith, 478 Fed. App’x at 124; Williams v. Kaufman Cnty, No. 397CV0875L,
2003 WL 21755913, at *5 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2003). Here, Plaintiff’s two attorneys have provided
affidavits attesting to the amount of work performed in this case. According to their filings, Plaintiff’s
counsel, Scott H. Palmer, performed 140.35 hours at an hourly rate of $375.00, while co-counsel,

J.R. Fletcher, performed 216.40 hours at an hourly rate of $250. Palmer Aff. 1; Fletcher Aff. 1. Both
attorneys substantiate their claims with invoices, which list descriptions of their activities as well as
the amount of time expended for each.
After reviewing Plaintiff’s affidavits and supporting documents, the Court finds that the time
expended by the attorneys was reasonable. This litigation spanned three years and required
considerable legal and logistical work by Plaintiff’s counsel. Much of Plaintiff’s counsels’ work was
observed first-hand by the Court by review of the summary judgment matierals and later at the trial
and pretrial conferences. The invoices make clear the extensive coordination and preparation
performed to bring the case before the Court and eventually prevail at trial. Nothing in the invoices
indicates that counsel was billing for “excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented” time.
Smith, 478 Fed. App’x at 124. Consequently, the Court finds that Mr. Palmer’s 140.35 hours and
Mr. Fletcher’s 216.40 hours were reasonable.
With respect to their hourly rates, the Court also finds that the amounts were reasonable.
Both attorneys aver that their rates are in line with the range of fees customarily charged in Dallas
County for similar legal services. Palmer Aff. 2, 4; Fletcher Aff. 3. In light of these affidavits as well
as the Court’s own knowledge of rates charged for legal services by attorneys with similar levels of
skill, competence, and experience in the area, the Court is comfortable using the attorneys’ rates to
calculate the lodestar.
Thus, the Court accepts the Plaintiffs’ the two lodestar figures: (1) $52,632.381 for Mr.
Palmer and (2) $54,100.00 for Mr. Fletcher. Considering the twelve Johnson factors described above,
particularly the degree of success obtained, the Court finds that it is not necessary to make any
adjustment to the lodestar. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1933) (noting that the “most

1

The Court recognizes that 140.35 hours multiplied by an hourly rate of $375 is $52,631.25. The
Court attributes to rounding the negligible difference ($1.13) between this sum and the figure provided by
Plaintiff.

critical factor” in determining an award of fees is the degree of success obtained). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $106,732.38 is GRANTED.
2.

Costs
Plaintiff’s counsel Palmer and Fletcher also request $1,369.78 and $50.00, respectively, for

fees associated with: mediation, courtroom media setup for trial, parking for trial, and courier services
to Defendant. Palmer Aff. 1-2. In claims for fees pursuant to § 1988 “[a]ll reasonable out-of-pocket
expenses, including charges for photocopying, paralegal assistance, travel, and telephone, are plainly
recoverable . . . because they are part of the costs normally charged to a fee-paying client.” Associated
Buildings & Contractors of Louisiana, Inc. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 919 F.2d 374, 380 (5th Cir.
1990). “Whether these expenses are reasonable is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.” Id.
Plaintiffs have submitted invoices and receipts to support their request for costs. Further, they
have attested to the fact that these expenses were reasonably and necessarily incurred during the
litigation. Palmer Aff. 4; Fletcher Aff. 4. Reviewing these materials and the relevant law, the Court
finds these costs are reasonable and of the kind that would normally be charged to a fee-paying
client.2 Consequently, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for costs in the amount of

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The Court notes that the Fifth Circuit denied an award of mediation costs in Mota v. University of
Texas Houston Health Science Center, 261 F.3d 512, 530 (5th Cir. 2001). However, the Court does not think
that decision should affect its award in the present matter because the Mota case concerned the award of
costs “within the limited category of expenses taxable under Title VII.” Id. As this case addresses costs under
§ 1988 pursuant to a § 1983 action, the Court does not find it necessary to exclude them from the present
award. See Williams, 2003 WL 21755913, at *11 n.12.

$1,404.78.3 4
3.

Contingent Appellate Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Plaintiff requests $50,000 in attorney’s fees in the event Defendant appeals

unsuccessfully to the Fifth Circuit, and $100,000 if Defendant petitions the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari and it is granted. Mot. 6-7. Though Plaintiff is correct that a “long and
consistent line of Fifth Circuit precedent allows awards of attorney’s fees for both trial and appellate
work,” Mot. 6, he fails to highlight a single case that awards fees based on prospective appeals.
Further, this Court is not aware of any authority that allows for an award based on hypothetical
appellate work in a § 1983 action. Consequently, the Court DENIES without prejudice Plaintiff’s
request for attorney’s fees with respect to appeal.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Specifically, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $106,732.38,
and Plaintiff’s request for costs in the amount of $1,404.78. However, the Court DENIES without
prejudice Plaintiff’s request for fees for future appellate work.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: November 18, 2013.

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The Court recognizes that Plaintiff requests $1,446.78 in his prayer for relief, however the
supporting documents only reflect a total of $1,404.78. See Mot. 7. In particular, Mr. Palmer’s documents
support an award of $1,354.78, and Mr. Fletcher’s documents support an award of $50.00. Consequently, the
Court grants relief only for the amounts that are substantiated.
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Because the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to costs under § 1988, it does not address Plaintiff’s
simultaneous claim under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920. However, it should be noted none of the costs for which
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement is included among the limited categories enumerated by § 1920. See U.S.C. §
1920.

_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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