Gray et al v. Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC
Filing
22
Memorandum Opinion and Order granting 13 Motion to Join Union as a Necessary Party, filed by Oncor Electric Delivery Company LLC. (Ordered by Judge Sam A Lindsay on 11/30/2011) (ctf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DON GRAY AND FREDDIE EVANS,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ONCOR ELECTRIC DELIVERY
COMPANY, LLC,
Defendant,
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Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-00781-L
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant’s Motion to Join Union as a Necessary Party, filed September
8, 2011. After carefully reviewing the motion, briefing, record, and applicable law, the court grants
Defendant’s Motion to Join Union as a Necessary Party.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs Don Gray and Freddie Evans (“Plaintiffs”) originally filed this action on March
11, 2011, in the 44th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, asserting claims for retaliation
and race discrimination under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act and Texas Labor Code
against their employer Oncor Electric Delivery Company, LLC (“Oncor”) and seeking payment of
lost wages resulting from the alleged discrimination, as well as other damages. Among other things,
Plaintiffs contend that they were paid lower wages than other similarly situated non-African
American employees.
On April 15, 2011, Oncor removed the action to federal court based on federal question
jurisdiction. Oncor alleged in its Notice of Removal that Plaintiff’s claims were completely
preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because they are “inextricably
Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 1
intertwined” with a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“Agreement”) entered between Oncor and
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 69 (“Union”). Oncor maintained that
because the Agreement governs seniority, salary grade, and wages, Plaintiffs’ wage discrimination
claims cannot be resolved without resorting to the Agreement. On September 8, 2011, Oncor moved
to join the Union as a necessary party to the lawsuit under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Oncor’s motion to join the Union as a necessary party is based essentially on the same
allegations as those asserted in its Notice of Removal. Oncor also contends in its motion that it will
be subject to inconsistent legal obligations if the Union is not joined as a defendant. Plaintiffs did
not contest the removal of this action but oppose Oncor’s request to join the Union as a necessary
party.
II.
Joinder Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 requires joinder of a party in two situations if such
joinder will not destroy the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a). A person must
be joined if complete relief cannot be accorded among the existing parties in the person’s absence.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). A person must also be joined if he claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and disposing of the action in his absence may “impair or impede the person’s
ability to protect that interest; or leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
19(a)(1)(B). “While the party advocating joinder has the initial burden of demonstrating that a
missing party is necessary, after an initial appraisal of the facts indicates that a possibly necessary
party is absent, the
Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 2
burden of disputing this initial appraisal falls on the party who opposes joinder.” Hood ex. rel. Miss.
v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 570 F.3d 625, 628 (5th Cir.2009) (internal citation and quotations
omitted).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiffs contend that Oncor’s request to join the Union as a party should be denied because
(1) complete relief can be granted in the Union’s absence, and (2) there is no risk to Oncor or the
Union of incurring inconsistent obligations as a result of the Agreement entered on February 23,
2011, by Oncor and the Union. According to Plaintiffs, their wages were originally set by Oncor
at Oncor’s sole discretion before the Agreement was implemented. Plaintiffs therefore contend that
the Agreement is irrelevant to their wage discrimination claim even though their wages were
grandfathered under the Agreement. Pls.’ Resp. 1. For support, Plaintiffs submitted the affidavit
of Johnny Flowers, who is the “former” business manager of the Union and a signatory to the Field
Service Representative (“FSR”) Memorandum of Agreement that was entered into by Oncor and the
Union in June 2010. Pls.’ App. 1, ¶¶ 2, 4.
Flowers explains in his affidavit that the wages of Plaintiffs and certain other FSRs were
grandfathered because, when the Agreement was negotiated and entered, they were already earning
more than the top step of the wage plan for FSRs in the Agreement. Oncor and the Union therefore
agreed to grandfather in the salaries of these employees until the negotiated wage rates in the
Agreement caught up with what they were earning. Pls.’ App. 2, ¶ 7. Flowers maintains that
because Plaintiffs’ wages were grandfathered and remained the same, they were unaffected by the
Agreement. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. Flowers therefore concludes that any order by this court increasing
Plaintiffs’ wages will not affect the wage rates set by the Agreement. Id. ¶ 10.
Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 3
Oncor counters that because Plaintiffs’ current wages were grandfathered under the
Agreement, they are subject to the Agreement between Oncor and the Union. Oncor further asserts
that Plaintiffs’ wages will be subject to the applicable job classifications in the Agreement after the
negotiated rates in the Agreement catch up to the higher hourly wages earned by Plaintiffs. Oncor
therefore contends that Plaintiffs’ wages are governed by the terms of the Agreement and cannot be
changed unilaterally by Oncor or the court without agreement by the Union. Oncor further asserts
that an order by the court requiring it to pay Plaintiffs higher wages would subject it to inconsistent
legal obligations under the agreement if the Union is not joined. The court agrees.
The parties obviously disagree regarding the relevance of the Agreement entered into
between Oncor and the Union as it applies to Plaintiffs’ wage claims in this lawsuit. Based on the
limited information available to the court, however, it appears that resolution of Plaintiffs’ wage
discrimination claims will require the court to consider the Agreement between Oncor and the
Union. Even if the wages alleged by Plaintiffs to be discriminatory were originally set by Oncor,
it is undisputed that the Union and Oncor agreed to grandfather and incorporate those wages into
the Agreement.
Moreover, it is unclear from Flowers’s affidavit whether he is still employed by the Union
or has the capacity to speak on behalf the Union. Although the Union has not come forward and
claimed an interest in the subject of this action, it has an interest in the Agreement and the wages
governed by that Agreement. As a result, Oncor could be subject to multiple or inconsistent
obligations under the Agreement and subsequent litigation if the Union is not joined in this action.
See, e.g., Forsberg v. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 623 F. Supp. 117, 122 (D. Or. 1985)
(concluding that joinder of union in action against employer for wage discrimination was appropriate
Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 4
to avoid leaving the employer subject to a substantial risk that the judgment will be inconsistent with
the employer’s obligations under the collective bargaining agreement); Hodgson v. School Bd., 56
F.R.D. 393, 395 (W.D. Pa.1972) (holding that joinder of union in action against employer for
violations of the Equal Pay Act was necessary because action involved the potential for altering and
restructuring the compensation provisions of the collective bargaining agreement). Accordingly,
without commenting on the merits of the parties’ claims or defenses, the court concludes after an
initial appraisal of the facts that the Union is a necessary party and joinder of the Union as a party
will not destroy the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
IV.
Conclusion
For the reasons herein explained, the court grants Defendant’s Motion to Join Union as a
Necessary Party. Accordingly, Plaintiffs shall file an amended pleading by December 9, 2011,
that adds the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local No. 69 (“Union”) as a defendant
to this action and effect service on the Union in accordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
It is so ordered this 30th day of November, 2011.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
Memorandum Opinion and Order – Page 5
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