Cochran v. Astrue

Filing 10

ORDER OF RE-REFERENCE. The court declines to adopt 8 the Findings and Recommendation of the magistrate judge an re-refers this matter to the magistrate judge to make a recommendation regarding whether the limitations period should be equitably tolled and Cochran should be permitted to litigate this action on the merits. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 8/10/2011) (Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
WILLIE CHARLES COCHRAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1257-D

ORDER OF RE-REFERENCE
The magistrate judge recommends that the court summarily dismiss the pro se civil action
of plaintiff Willie Charles Cochran (“Cochran”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) on the basis that
it is time-barred. In response to the findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge, Cochran
has filed an objection that the court concludes supports further inquiry regarding whether the
limitations period should be extended based on equitable tolling.1 The court therefore declines to
adopt the July 1, 2011 findings and recommendation of the magistrate judge, and it re-refers this
case to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.
The court agrees with the magistrate judge that Cochran did not file his complaint within 60
days after the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) was mailed
to him denying his application for disability insurance benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).2 Cochran

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In his objection, Cochran appears to aver for the first time that his medication affected his
ability to function. The magistrate judge therefore had no reason to consider this as a basis for
equitable tolling when he filed his findings and recommendation.
2

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides that

[a]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner of
Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party,

filed his complaint 77 days after the Commissioner’s final decision was mailed to him. In Cochran’s
objection, he maintains that he has been sick and taking a lot of medication; that during considerable
periods he did not know what day it was, how to read, or what to do; that he did not know that he
could ask for an extension of the deadlines; and that he has been on so much medication that he
could not think.
The 60-day time period to file an action challenging a final decision of the Commissioner
is a period of limitations rather than a jurisdictional requirement. See Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476
U.S. 467, 478 (1986). Traditional equitable tolling principles apply to the 60-day requirement of
§ 405(g). Id. at 479-80. In some circumstances, mental disability can be grounds for equitable
tolling of federal periods of limitation. See, e.g., Brumfield v. Xavier Univ., 1999 WL 20938, at *2-3
(E.D. La. Jan. 14, 1999) (noting traditional rule that “mental illness tolls a federal statute of
limitations only if the illness in fact prevents the sufferer from managing his own affairs and thus
from understanding his legal rights and acting upon them” and that other courts have tolled
limitations periods “when a plaintiff’s mental condition prevented him from filing during the
specified time period and when the condition existed for the majority of the filing period” (citations
and footnotes omitted)).

irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a review
of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days
after the mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such
further time as the Commissioner of Social Security may allow.
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The court therefore re-refers this matter to the magistrate judge to make a recommendation
regarding whether the limitations period should be equitably tolled and Cochran should be permitted
to litigate this action on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
August 10, 2011.

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SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE

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