Norman v. RJM Acquisitions LLC
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 10 Motion to Dismiss filed by RJM Acquisitions LLC, and denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wayne H Norman. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 9/20/2011) (Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
WAYNE H. NORMAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
RJM ACQUISITIONS, LLC,
Defendant.
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§ Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-1330-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
The court denies the July 26, 2011 motion to dismiss of defendant RJM Acquisitions,
LLC (“RJM”) and the August 3, 2011 motion for summary judgment of plaintiff Wayne H.
Norman (“Norman”).*
I
Proceeding pro se, Norman alleges that RJM violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”),
15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., by obtaining Norman’s credit report without a permissible purpose
under FCRA. RJM moves to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that
Norman’s complaint effectively concedes that RJM had a permissible purpose under FCRA
for accessing the credit report.
*
Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of “written
opinion” adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a “written opinion[]
issued by the court” because it “sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court’s decision.”
It has been written, however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case,
and not for publication in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly.
FCRA permits agencies to furnish credit reports only for “certain statutorily
enumerated purposes.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 23 (2001) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(e)(a); 15 U.S.C. § 1681b). Norman’s complaint asserts five instances where RJM
allegedly “obtain[ed] without any FCRA-sanctioned purpose, and without authorized
consent, a credit report on . . . Norman from Experian Information Solutions, a credit
reporting agency.” Compl. 3. The complaint does not effectively concede that RJM had a
permissible purpose for accessing Norman’s credit report. Accordingly, without suggesting
a view regarding whether RJM would or would not be entitled to summary judgment, the
court denies the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
II
Norman moves for summary judgment establishing his right to recover from RJM
under FCRA and FDCPA. Because he is moving for summary judgment on claims for which
he will bear the burden of proof at trial, he “must establish ‘beyond peradventure all of the
essential elements of the claim[s.]’” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep’t of Hous.
& Cmty. Affairs, 749 F.Supp.2d 486, 494 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Bank
One, Tex., N.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 878 F. Supp. 943, 962 (N.D. Tex. 1995)
(Fitzwater, J.)). “Th[is] court has noted that the beyond peradventure standard is heavy.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because Norman has failed to meet this
heavy burden, his motion is denied.
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The court denies RJM’s July 26, 2011 motion to dismiss and denies Norman’s August
3, 2011 motion for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.
September 20, 2011.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE
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