Pope et al v. Mountcastle Mortgage et al

Filing 12

ORDER ADOPTING 11 Findings and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge; granting 5 Motion to Dismiss; denying 6 Motion to Dismiss. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 10/18/2011) (aaa)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MICHAEL R. POPE, SR., ET AL.
Plaintiffs,
v.
MOUNTCASTLE MORTGAGE
CORP., ET AL.
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3-11-CV-1689-B

ORDER
This action came on for consideration by the Court, and the issues having been duly considered and
a decision duly rendered,
It is ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that:
1.

Mountcastle's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss (doc. 5) is GRANTED. All claims against this

Defendant are DISMISSED with prejudice.
2.

The Motion to Dismiss filed by Iberia (doc. 6), an entity not sued by Plaintiffs, is DENIED as

unnecessary.
3.

So far as Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendant Victoria Mortgage Corporation, although not the

subject of a motion to dismiss, the pleadings contain the same “hodgepodge of unconnected words and
phrases” that Mountcastle challenges and that the Magistrate Judge recommends be dismissed. District
Courts have the inherent authority to dismiss a pro se litigant’s frivolous or malicious complaint sua sponte
even when the plaintiff has paid the requiring filing fee. Fitzgerald v. first East Seventh Street Tenants, 221
F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000); Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995); Homan v. Wooten, No.
4:09-1634-CWH, 2010 WL 691263, at *2 (D.S.C. Feb. 24, 2010); Larrimore v. Bank of New York Mellon,

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No. 4:09-1647-TLW-TER, 2009 WL 4920776, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2009); McCracken v. Natale, No.
04 Civ. 5456, 2008 WL 5274317 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2008). The Supreme Court, while never having
directly ruled on the matter, has also stated (albeit in dicta) that federal courts have the inherent power
to dismiss frivolous lawsuits. See Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490
U.S. 296, 307-308 (1989) (“Statutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or powers. Section
1915(d), for example, authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’ action, but there is little doubt
they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”). Nonetheless, because
the Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, the Court has liberally construed her pleadings and has attempted to discern
a basis in law for relief. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Still, the Complaint appears, as
described by Judge Kaplan, “a hodgepodge of incoherent ramblings.” (citations omitted). For these reasons
this case is DISMISSED with prejudice as to the named Defendants.
The Clerk shall transmit a true copy of this Order adopting the Findings and Recommendation of
the United States Magistrate Judge to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED October 18, 2011

_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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