Harris et al v. Rivera et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 20 Motion for Judgment filed by Domingo Rivera, Joseph R Mullen, Jr., Angelo Dragija. The court grants defendants' Rule 12(c) motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismisses plaintiffs 9; federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the court is dismissing all federal claims alleged, it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' state-law claims. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 1/23/2013) (Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KENNETH HARRIS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
DOMINGO RIVERA, et al.,
Defendants.

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§ Civil Action No. 3:11-CV-3013-D
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§

MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER

In this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a City of Dallas Fire-Rescue Department
captain for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights in connection with his arrest and
criminal prosecution, defendants move under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) for a judgment on the
pleadings. For the reasons that follow, the court grants the motion as to plaintiffs’
federal-law claims (in part on a basis that the court raises sua sponte), does not reach one
defendant’s defense of qualified immunity or plaintiffs’ state-law claims, and grants
plaintiffs leave to replead.
I
This is an action by plaintiffs Kenneth Harris (“Capt. Harris”) and his wife Holly
Harris (“the Harrises”) alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. At all times
relevant to this suit, Capt. Harris was employed by the City of Dallas Fire-Rescue
Department, for which he commanded a fire engine company. At approximately 3:16 a.m.
on October 26, 2008, Capt. Harris’ engine company received an emergency call notifying

it of a traffic collision in which persons had been injured and a vehicle overturned. Capt.
Harris’ engine proceeded to the location of the accident on an emergency basis and, on
arrival, Capt. Harris assumed the position of incident commander.
In accordance with Fire-Rescue Department policy, Capt. Harris notified the City of
Dallas dispatcher by radio that he needed one wrecker to remove an inoperable and damaged
vehicle that was overturned as a result of the collision. The dispatcher acknowledged Capt.
Harris’ request and stated that the wrecker had been ordered. A period elapsed and no Dallas
police responded to the location. Capt. Harris initiated another radio call to determine
whether police had, in fact, been assigned. The dispatcher responded that no police units
were available. After waiting an additional period, Capt. Harris again contacted the
dispatcher and requested police units to respond on an emergency basis. Sometime
thereafter, defendants Domingo Rivera (“Officer Rivera”) and Angelo Dragija (“Officer
Dragija”), both City of Dallas police officers, arrived at the scene.
After Officer Rivera assumed control of the accident investigation, Capt. Harris
approached him to ask whether the police department still normally responded on a “Code
3” or emergency basis to freeway incidents. Officer Rivera told Capt. Harris that how and
when the police department responded to such calls was a policy question and that if Capt.
Harris wanted to know, he could ask the Chief of Police. Shortly thereafter, Capt. Harris
again approached Officer Rivera and asked whether he knew what had happened to the
wrecker Capt. Harris had ordered. Officer Rivera did not respond. The Harrises allege that,

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at the time, Officer Rivera was facing partially away from Capt. Harris such that Capt. Harris
thought that because of the extreme noise and confusion in the area, Officer Rivera might
not have heard him. The Harrises assert that Capt. Harris approached Officer Rivera and
“lightly placed two fingers of his right hand on [Officer Rivera’s] arm to attempt to get
[Officer Rivera’s] attention and in order to be sure that he was heard.” Compl. ¶ 4.5. They
aver that Capt. Harris’ action was in no way violent or offensive. In response, Officer Rivera
turned toward Capt. Harris in an aggressive and violent manner, grabbed his arm, doubled
his arm behind his back, slammed Capt. Harris against the side of the fire engine, and
handcuffed his hands tightly behind his back. When Capt. Harris demanded to know what
Officer Rivera thought he was doing, Officer Rivera told him that he would be charged with
aggravated assault on a police officer and would be taken to jail. Officer Dragija witnessed
Officer Rivera’s actions and heard his statements and remarks but did nothing to prevent his
actions.
The Harrises allege that Capt. Harris did not resist Officer Rivera’s efforts to arrest
him. Instead, he instructed his engine crew to contact the nearest battalion chief of the
Dallas Fire-Rescue Department and request that he come to the scene at once. Capt. Harris’
crew complied with this request, and, shortly thereafter, Dallas Fire-Rescue Battalion Chief
A.W. Walker (“Chief Walker”) arrived at the scene. Meanwhile, Officer Rivera had
telephoned defendant Joseph R. Mullen, Jr. (“Sgt. Mullen”), who was a police sergeant and
Officer Rivera’s regular supervisor, to ask him to come to the location. Although off duty,

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Sgt. Mullen came to the scene in his personal vehicle and acted as a police supervisor.
Once Sgt. Mullen arrived, he telephoned Dallas Police supervisors at the Dallas
County Jail to have them approve, in advance, Capt. Harris’ arrest for interfering with a
public servant in the performance of his duties and assault on a public servant (a felony
offense). Sgt. Mullen was advised that, based on his description of the incident, the matter
should be handled in the field (i.e., no custodial arrest should be made), and that the highest
charge the supervisor would accept would be a Class C misdemeanor assault charge for
“offensive contact.” Dissatisfied with these legal impediments, and disregarding the
supervisors’ advice, Sgt. Mullen ordered Capt. Harris to be placed in custody, arrested, and
placed in a patrol car with his hands handcuffed behind his back. Sgt. Mullen instructed
Officer Dragija to act as the arresting officer, to transport Capt. Harris to jail, and to charge
him with felony assault on a public servant.
While at the scene, Sgt. Mullen never spoke with Capt. Harris, but did speak directly
with Chief Walker. Chief Walker requested that Capt. Harris be immediately released to
return to his duties. Sgt. Mullen refused to talk further with Chief Walker and implied that
if he did not immediately cease all contact with police department personnel, he would also
be arrested. Chief Walker walked away and took over command of the incident to protect
fire department personnel, the victims, and the damaged vehicles.
Capt. Harris was placed in Officer Dragija’s police vehicle to be transported to jail.
While in the vehicle, Officer Dragija informed Capt. Harris that he had no part in the

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decision to arrest him or to file charges and, further, that he did not want to be involved in
“this mess,” but was just following Sgt. Mullen’s orders. Id. ¶ 4.13. En route to the jail,
Officer Dragija received a radio and/or telephone call. Afterward, he suddenly pulled the
vehicle off the freeway into a darkened area near the parking lot of a service station. Several
other Dallas police officers in police vehicles soon arrived. Officer Dragija exited the
vehicle. Although from the vehicle Capt. Harris could not see the other officers clearly, he
believed that both Officer Rivera and Officer Dragija were present, and he “feared that he
could be beaten or worse.” Id. at ¶ 4.14. Instead, following a lengthy delay, Officer Dragija
returned to the vehicle and transported Capt. Harris to jail.
On arriving at the jail, Capt. Harris was brought before a “book in” police supervisor,
a sergeant. Officer Dragija informed the supervisor that Capt. Harris was being charged with
“[a]ggravated assault on a police officer.” Id. ¶ 4.15. The book-in sergeant left the area, and
a higher-ranking police official promptly appeared and stated: “This ain’t going down like
this, don’t write another thing until you hear from me.” Id. Capt. Harris was then taken to
another area, where his handcuffs were removed. He was forced to put on an orange
jumpsuit and was denied shoes, even though he requested them. He was then “processed”
and forced to sit in a holding area occupied by inmates who laughed at and ridiculed him.
Sometime thereafter, Capt. Harris was advised that the charges against him had been reduced
to “offensive contact” and that he would be released from jail on his own recognizance
without the requirement of posting bond. Officer Dragija then wrote Capt. Harris a citation,

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and he was released to Chief Walker at approximately 7:15 a.m.
Following the arrest and release of Capt. Harris, the City of Dallas Police Department
and the City of Dallas Fire-Rescue Department each conducted independent investigations
of the conduct of all parties. During the course of this investigation, Officer Rivera, Officer
Dragija, and Sgt. Mullen were required to give written statements under oath. The Harrises
allege that, in the course of both investigations, Officer Rivera, Officer Dragija, and Sgt.
Mullen attempted to manufacture evidence to support the groundless charges against Capt.
Harris and perjured themselves as to the actual events and circumstances. They aver that the
City of Dallas prosecuted Capt. Harris on the charge of offensive contact.
In March 2011 the case against Capt. Harris was called to trial and Officers Rivera
and Dragija testified against him. During the trial, Officers Rivera and Dragija repeated their
false and perjured testimony, essentially as they had given it to fire and police investigators.
Following a lengthy jury trial that resulted in a mistrial, the criminal charges against Capt.
Harris were dismissed on March 31, 2011.
On November 3, 2011 the Harrises filed the instant suit against Officer Rivera,
Officer Dragija, and Sgt. Mullen. They assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false
arrest, illegal seizure of Capt. Harris’ person, and the use of excessive and unreasonable
force, in violation of Capt. Harris’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They also
bring a claim under § 1983 for causing and participating in the unlawful prosecution of
criminal charges using manufactured evidence and perjured testimony, without probable

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cause, in violation of Capt. Harris’ Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
Harrises also allege a claim for conspiracy to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and plaintiffs’ civil
rights,1 and they allege state-law claims for false arrest, the use of excessive and
unreasonable force, unlawful seizure of Capt. Harris’ body, false imprisonment, and
unlawful filing and malicious prosecution of criminal charges.
Defendants move under Rule 12(c) for partial judgment on the pleadings. They argue
that the Harrises’ federal claims are barred by a two-year statute of limitations; that
plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment claim fails to state a claim for relief because defendants are not
federal actors; that plaintiffs have failed to plead a plausible conspiracy claim; that plaintiffs
have failed to plead a plausible constitutional “malicious prosecution” claim; and that Sgt.
Mullen is entitled to qualified immunity based on undisputed facts pleaded in his answer.
The Harrises oppose the motion as to most of their claims.

1

The court recognizes that a plaintiff can maintain under § 1983 a claim of conspiracy
to deprive him of constitutional rights. See Bullard v. City of Hous., 1996 WL 4405777, at
*4 (5th Cir. July 2, 1996) (per curiam); Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1187
(5th Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Martin v. Thomas, 973 F.2d
449, 455 (5th Cir. 1992). Section 1983, however, cannot be “violated.” “Rather than
creating substantive rights, § 1983 simply provides a remedy for the rights that it
designates[,]” and an “underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to
liability under § 1983.” Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnston v. Harris Cnty. Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d
1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989)).
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II
Rule 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to
delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” “‘A motion brought pursuant
to [Rule] 12(c) is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and
a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and
any judicially noticed facts.’” Great Plains Trust Co. v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co.,
313 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hebert Abstract Co. v. Touchstone Props., Ltd.,
914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). The standard for deciding a motion under
Rule 12(c) is the same as the one for deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See
Hoffman v. L & M Arts, 2011 WL 3567419, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2011) (Fitzwater,
C.J.) (citing Gentilello v. Rege, 627 F.3d 540, 543-44 (5th Cir. 2010)).
In deciding defendants’ motion, the court evaluates the pleadings by “accept[ing] ‘all
well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[s].’” In
re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). To
survive defendants’ motion, the Harrises must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff[s] plead[] factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [are] liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant

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has acted unlawfully.” Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]”). “[W]here the well-pleaded
facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘shown’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679 (alteration omitted) (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)). “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.
at 678 (citation omitted).
III
Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ federal-law claims are barred by limitations.
A
Limitations is an affirmative defense. See Rule 8(c)(1). “‘Although dismissal under
Rule 12[(c)] is ordinarily determined by whether the facts alleged in the complaint, if true,
give rise to a cause of action, a claim may also be dismissed if a successful affirmative
defense appears clearly on the face of the pleadings.’” Sivertson v. Clinton, 2011 WL
4100958, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Clark v. Amoco Prod.
Co., 794 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1986)), appeal docketed, No. 12-11085 (5th Cir. Oct. 26,
2012); see also White v. Padgett, 475 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that claim is
“subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . when [an] affirmative defense clearly appears
on the face of the complaint.”). In other words, defendants are not entitled to dismissal
under Rule 12(c) unless the Harrises have “pleaded [themselves] out of court by admitting

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to all of the elements of the defense.” Sivertson, 2011 WL 4100958, at *3.
B
Because Congress has not adopted a statute of limitations for actions brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, the limitations period is determined by reference to the appropriate state
statute of limitations and coordinate tolling rules. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y. v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1980). In § 1983 actions, district courts apply the forum
state’s personal injury limitations period. Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir.
1994). The Texas general personal injury limitations period is two years. Id.; Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (West 2002).
Although the statute of limitations is governed by Texas law, federal law determines
when a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 accrues. Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254,
257 (5th Cir. 1993). “Ordinarily, a cause of action under section 1983 accrues when the
plaintiff ‘knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.’” Price
v. City of San Antonio, 431 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson v.
Johnson, 950 F.2d 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1992)); Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 576
(5th Cir. 2001) (same).
Defendants argue that the complaint makes clear that Capt. Harris’ seizure (which
includes both Capt. Harris’ initial detention and his custodial arrest), all uses of physical
force against him, and the initiation of a criminal charge against him occurred on October
26, 2008. Defendants argue that, because the Harrises did not file their complaint until

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November 3, 2011, they failed to file suit within the applicable two-year limitations period.
The Harrises respond that, under Price, claims for unlawful seizure and false arrest,
in conjunction with a malicious prosecution case, are part of the malicious prosecution claim,
and therefore accrue at the same time as does the malicious prosecution claim, i.e., when
criminal proceedings are terminated favorably to the plaintiff. Accordingly, they argue that
the statute of limitations for their claim for malicious prosecution, unlawful seizure, and false
arrest did not begin to run until the criminal charges against Capt. Harris were dismissed on
March 31, 2011.
C
In Price the Fifth Circuit held that “the statute of limitations does not begin running
on section 1983 prosecution claims until proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Price, 431 F.3d at 894. The panel cited Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196, 199 (5th
Cir. 1995), for the proposition that “when false arrest claims are brought in conjunction with
such claims, the false arrest claims are ‘essentially part’ of the prosecution claims and
therefore accrue at the same time.” Price, 431 F.3d at 894 (quoting Brandley, 64 F.3d at
199). Because criminal proceedings were still pending against the plaintiff in Price, the
panel held that neither his false arrest nor his prosecution claim had yet accrued. Id. Thus
it was erroneous for the district court to dismiss such claims as barred by the statute of
limitations. Id.
In 2007 the Supreme Court addressed, in Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007),

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whether a § 1983 claim based on an allegedly unconstitutional arrest was timely filed. In
Wallace the plaintiff had been arrested in 1994 and convicted of first degree murder. Id. at
386. On direct appeal, the state appellate court held that the officers had arrested the plaintiff
without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and, after further appeals,
concluded that the effect of the illegal arrest had not been sufficiently attenuated to render
the plaintiff’s statements admissible, and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 387. After
the prosecutors dropped the charges against the plaintiff on April 10, 2002, the plaintiff filed
on April 2, 2003 a § 1983 suit seeking damages arising from his unlawful arrest. Id. The
district court granted summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, holding that the § 1983 suit was time-barred because the plaintiff’s cause of action
accrued at the time of his arrest, and not when his conviction was later set aside. Id. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, explaining:
If there is a false arrest claim, damages for that claim cover the
time of detention up until issuance of process or arraignment,
but not more. From that point on, any damages recoverable
must be based on a malicious prosecution claim and on the
wrongful use of judicial process rather than detention itself.
Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court declined to hold that,
in circumstances where a § 1983 claim accrues before a criminal conviction is set aside (at
which point the plaintiff would be able to file a malicious prosecution claim), the statute of
limitations on the already-accrued § 1983 claim is tolled until the criminal conviction is set
aside. Id. at 394-95. Instead, it held that “the statute of limitations upon a § 1983 claim

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seeking damages for a false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, where the arrest
is followed by criminal proceedings, begins to run at the time the claimant becomes detained
pursuant to legal process.” Id. at 397.
The Harrises argue that because the plaintiff in Wallace did not assert a claim for
malicious prosecution, Wallace did not change the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Price that, when
false arrest claims are brought in conjunction with malicious prosecution claims, both claims
accrue at the same time. The court disagrees. Although Wallace did not involve a false
arrest claim brought in conjunction with a malicious prosecution claim, the Court in Wallace
clearly held that the statute of limitations for a false arrest claim is not tolled until the
prosecution terminates the case in the plaintiff’s favor. Moreover, numerous courts within
the Fifth Circuit have held that Wallace abrogated Price and Brandley, on which Price
relied. Recently, in Humphreys v. City of Ganado, Texas, 467 Fed. Appx. 252 (5th Cir.
2012) (per curiam), the Fifth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion that, even though the
plaintiff alleged § 1983 claims for unreasonable search and seizure, false arrest, and
malicious prosecution, “the statute of limitations on [the plaintiffs’] claim for false arrest
began running, at the latest, when he was indicted in July 2005,” and not when the charges
against him were dismissed in July of 2009. Id. at 256 (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391); see
also Mapes v. Bishop, 541 F.3d 582, 584 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (noting, in case in
which plaintiff brought § 1983 claim based both on false arrest and malicious prosecution,
that to the extent Wallace conflicted with the holding in Brandley that a false arrest cause

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of action accrues when the criminal prosecution terminates in favor of the accused, Wallace
abrogates Brandley, and remanding to district court to determine date on which plaintiff was
detained pursuant to legal process because statue of limitations for false arrest claim began
to run from that date, not date prosecution terminated case in plaintiff’s favor); LeBlanc v.
City of Haltom City, 2011 WL 2149908, at *5 (N.D. Tex. May 31, 2011) (McBryde, J.)
(noting other district court decisions in which courts “have ruled that the limitations tolling
principle announced in Brandley and followed in Price was abrogated by Wallace,” and
holding that “the reason given in Wallace for non-tolling of a § 1983 claim seeking damages
for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment applies equally to claims seeking
damages for unconstitutional searches and seizures and related activities.”).
The court concludes that, to the extent Brandley and Price hold that the statute of
limitations for a § 1983 claim alleging false arrest or unconstitutional seizure is tolled until
the criminal prosecution terminates in favor of the accused, Wallace abrogated Brandley and
Price. Because the Harrises became aware of the injuries on which they base their claim for
false arrest, illegal seizure, and the use of excessive and unreasonable force on the day the
injuries allegedly occurred—October 26, 2008—the statute of limitations began to run on
each component of this claim that day. See Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir.
2002) (stating that limitation period begins to run “when the plaintiff ‘becomes aware that
he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured’”
(quotation omitted)); Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (stating that cause of action accrues when

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plaintiff knows of existence of an injury and the connection between the injury and
defendant’s actions).
Plaintiffs allege that Capt. Harris received the call summoning him to the scene of the
accident at 3:16 a.m. on October 26, 2008. They assert that, after Capt. Harris “lightly
placed two fingers of his right hand on Defendant Rivera’s arm to attempt to get Defendant
Rivera’s attention,” Officer Rivera grabbed Capt. Harris’ arm, slammed him against the side
of the fire engine, and handcuffed him and told him he would be charged with aggravated
assault on a police officer and would be taken to jail “despite the fact that [Capt.] Harris had
done nothing wrong.” Compl. ¶¶ 4.5-4.6. They further allege that Sgt. Mullen ordered Capt.
Harris to be placed in custody and arrested, even though he knew “there was absolutely no
factual or legal basis to charge [Capt. Harris] with felony assault on a public servant.” Id.
at ¶ 4.11. The Harrises aver that, after Capt. Harris arrived at the Jail, he was brought before
a “book in” police supervisor and was then “processed,” before being charged with
“offensive contact” and released from the Jail at approximately 7:15 a.m. that same day
(October 26, 2008). Id. at ¶¶ 4.15-4.17. In sum, plaintiffs have affirmatively pleaded that
all of the events related to their § 1983 claim for false arrest, illegal seizure, and the use of
excessive and unreasonable force occurred on October 26, 2008. Accordingly, the statute
of limitations on these claims expired on October 26, 2010, over one year before the Harrises
filed their complaint on November 3, 2011. The court therefore grants defendants’ Rule
12(c) motion as to plaintiffs’ claim under § 1983 for false arrest, illegal seizure, and the use

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of excessive and unreasonable force.2
D
Plaintiffs’ § 1983 conspiracy claim is also governed by a two-year statute of
limitations. See Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (“The statute of limitations for a suit brought
under § 1983 is determined by the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries
in the forum state . . . . Texas has a two year statute of limitations for personal injury
claims.”). For purposes of determining whether the statute of limitations has expired, when
a civil conspiracy is alleged, “the actionable civil injury to a plaintiff results from the overt
acts of the defendants, not from the mere continuation of a conspiracy.” Helton v. Clements,
832 F.2d 332, 335 (5th Cir. 1987). It is axiomatic that a cause of action accrues, and thus
the statute of limitations begins to run, “as soon as plaintiff knew or should have known of
the overt acts involved in the alleged conspiracy.” Id.
Plaintiffs base their conspiracy claim on allegations that defendants conspired to
participate in the commission of each of the constitutional violations set forth in Counts One
and Two. They allege that each defendant “supported the other in the making of the original
false arrest, in the use of unlawful and excessive force, in the falsifying of government

2

Because the court is granting defendants’ Rule 12(c) motion as to plaintiffs’ claim
under § 1983 for false arrest, illegal seizure, and the use of excessive and unreasonable force,
it does not address defendants’ argument that Sgt. Mullen is entitled to qualified immunity.
Although Sgt. Mullen appears to have pleaded qualified immunity as an affirmative defense
to all three of plaintiffs’ federal claims, defendants only raise this defense in their Rule 12(c)
motion as to plaintiffs’ claims for false arrest and unlawful seizure. If plaintiffs replead and
defendants intend to assert anew that qualified immunity applies to the actions of Sgt.
Mullen, defendants should address all claims as to which they maintain the defense applies.
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reports and records, by giving false testimony to investigators and by giving false testimony
at trial.” Compl. ¶ 7.2. As explained above, the use of unlawful and excessive force and the
making of a false arrest both occurred during the early morning hours of October 26, 2008.
It is apparent from the face of the complaint that Capt. Harris was aware of these alleged
wrongs at the time they occurred on that date. Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs allege
that defendants conspired to violate their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and made
the original false arrest and used unlawful and excessive force in furtherance of this
conspiracy, their claim is time-barred.
Defendants argue that the other alleged overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy are
merely the continuation of the conspiracy and do not extend the limitations period. The
court disagrees. Although the “mere continuation of a conspiracy” does not extend the
limitations period, see Helton, 832 F.2d at 335, plaintiffs have alleged more than the “mere
continuation” of the conspiracy. In support of their allegations that defendants conspired to
commit the constitutional violations set forth in Count Two of the complaint, plaintiffs aver
that defendants falsified government reports and records, provided false testimony to
investigators, and testified falsely at trial. In Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230 (1st Cir.
1977), on which the Fifth Circuit relied in Helton, the court explained “that a cause of action
for each invasion of the plaintiff’s interest arises at the time of that invasion and . . . the
applicable statute of limitations runs from that time.” Kadar, 549 F.2d at 234 (brackets and
citations omitted) (considering whether any additional overt acts occurred during the

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limitations period in deciding whether conspiracy claim was time-barred). Therefore,
“[i]njury and damage in a civil conspiracy action flow from the overt acts, not from ‘the
mere continuance of a conspiracy.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hoffman v. Halden, 268
F.2d 280, 303 (9th Cir. 1959)); see also O’Connor v. St. John’s Coll., 290 Fed. Appx. 137,
141 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The applicable statute of limitations . . . runs separately from each
overt act of the conspiracy that allegedly caused injury”); Graff v. Kohlman, 28 Fed. Appx.
151, 154 (3d Cir. 2002) (“the statute of limitations for civil conspiracies runs separately for
each overt act causing damage.” (citations omitted)).
The alleged falsification of government reports and records, providing false testimony
to investigators, and testifying falsely at trial would each constitute an “overt act” supporting
the allegation that defendants conspired to violate 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by causing and
participating in the unlawful prosecution of criminal charges using manufactured evidence
and perjured testimony without probable cause, as alleged in the complaint. This alleged
constitutional violation is separate from the allegation that defendants made a false arrest and
used excessive force on October 26, 2008. The complaint does not specify the dates on
which defendants allegedly falsified government reports and records, provided false
testimony to investigators, or testified falsely at trial. Plaintiffs only allege that these acts
occurred “[f]ollowing the arrest and release of [Capt.] Harris.” Compl. ¶ 4.20. Capt. Harris’
criminal trial did not conclude until March 31, 2011. It is therefore plausible that each of
these alleged “overt acts”—falsifying government reports and records and giving false

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testimony to investigators and at trial—occurred within the two-year limitations period.
Accordingly, to the extent plaintiffs base their conspiracy claim on the allegation that
defendants falsified government reports and records and gave false testimony to investigators
and at trial in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate Capt. Harris’ rights under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, it is not apparent from the face of their complaint that
this aspect of their conspiracy claim is time-barred.
E
Although defendants seek dismissal of “Harris’ Federal Claims” based on limitations,
it is unclear whether they seek dismissal of Count Two on that basis. In Count Two the
Harrises assert a § 1983 claim for causing and participating in the unlawful prosecution of
criminal charges using manufactured evidence and perjured testimony, without probable
cause. Assuming that defendants do seek dismissal of Count Two, the court holds that the
Harrises have not pleaded facts that would enable the court to determine, from the face of
the complaint, that Count Two is time-barred.
The Harrises allege that the charges against Capt. Harris were dismissed on March
31, 2011. Because this suit was filed fewer than two years after the underlying criminal
proceeding terminated in Capt. Harris’ favor, Count Two is timely. See Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1994) (“Just as a cause of action for malicious prosecution does not
accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor, so also a
§ 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence

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does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” (citations omitted)).
The court therefore declines to grant judgment on the pleadings dismissing Count Two as
time-barred.
IV
The court next considers whether the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Castellano v. Fragozo,
352 F.3d 939 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc), precludes Count Two as a matter of law.
A
In Castellano the Fifth Circuit held that “causing charges to be filed without probable
cause [does] not without more violate the Constitution.” Id. at 953. Accordingly, a
freestanding § 1983 claim based solely on “malicious prosecution” is not cognizable. Id. at
942. The Castellano panel added, however, that “additional government acts that may attend
the initiation of a criminal charge could give rise to claims of constitutional deprivation.”
Id. at 953. Thus “[t]he initiation of criminal charges without probable cause may set in force
events that run afoul of explicit constitutional protection—the Fourth Amendment if the
accused is seized and arrested, for example, or other constitutionally secured rights if a case
is further pursued.” Id. To prevail, therefore, a § 1983 plaintiff must allege that officials
violated specific constitutional rights in connection with a “malicious prosecution.” Cuadra
v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808, 812 (5th Cir. 2010); see also Castellano, 352 F.3d
at 945 (“[W]e must insist on clarity in the identity of the constitutional violations asserted.”).

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B
Defendants argue that Count Two is a freestanding claim because any claim that the
Harrises may have had for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment is time-barred, any
claim they may have had under the Fifth Amendment must be dismissed because plaintiffs
have failed to allege that defendants were federal actors, and any claim they may have had
under the Fourteenth Amendment for the denial of procedural due process fails based on the
pleadings.
In their Rule 7 reply, which plaintiffs adopt and incorporate into their response to
defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, plaintiffs acknowledge that a stand-alone
claim for malicious prosecution is no longer actionable. They argue, however, that their §
1983 claim for false arrest “clearly states a claim under the Fourth Amendment for the period
of time from the original arrest or detention up to and including the time of the actual
commencement of the resulting criminal proceedings,” and that their § 1983 claim for
unlawful institution and prosecution of criminal charges based on perjured or manufactured
evidence “clearly states a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for the period of time from the commencement of the criminal proceedings through the trial
and until the criminal prosecution is concluded in the Plaintiff’s favor.” Ps. R. 7 Reply 1415.

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C
Because Castellano precludes plaintiffs from bringing a free-standing “malicious
prosecution” claim, for Count Two to survive defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must
plausibly allege that defendants violated a specific constitutional right in connection with the
alleged “malicious prosecution.” Caudra, 626 F.3d at 812; Castellano, 352 F.3d at 945, 953.
To the extent plaintiffs allege that defendants’ actions from the original arrest or
detention up to and including the time of the actual commencement of the resulting criminal
proceedings violated the Fourth Amendment,3 the court concludes, for the reasons explained
in § III(B), that this claim is time-barred. Accordingly, Count Two cannot survive under the
rationale of Castellano unless plaintiffs have pleaded a plausible Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim.
In support of their due process claim, plaintiffs allege “[t]he conduct of the
Defendants also constituted a violation of [Capt.] Harris’ right to be free from the unlawful
institution and prosecution of criminal charges based on manufactured evidence and perjured
testimony as guaranteed by the” Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Compl. ¶ 6.2. In Castellano the Fifth Circuit agreed that the “manufacturing of evidence and
knowing use of perjured testimony attributable to the state is a violation of due process.”
Castellano, 352 F.3d at 958. The court cautioned, however, that, on remand, the plaintiff

3

The court notes that plaintiffs’ Rule 7 reply suggests that they only intend to base
Count Two on an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Id.
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would “face the well-established rule that prosecutors and witnesses, including police
officers, have absolute immunity for their testimony at trial.” Id.
Defendants argue that plaintiffs’ due process claim fails based on the pleadings
because of the “well-settled rule” that trial witnesses enjoy absolute immunity for testimony
given in adversarial judicial proceedings. Ds. Br. 17. Because plaintiffs do not allege, other
than by conclusory assertion, that defendants manufactured evidence, their Fourteenth
Amendment claim reduces solely to allegations that Officers Rivera and Dragija offered false
and perjured testimony at trial.
The Supreme Court held in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983), that police
officers are absolutely immune from § 1983 perjury claims based on their testimony during
a criminal trial. Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 326; see also Castellano, 352 F.3d at 958 (noting “the
well-established rule that prosecutors and witnesses, including police officers, have absolute
immunity for their testimony at trial.”). Defendants thus argue that, under the rule
announced in Briscoe, plaintiffs cannot plausibly plead a due process violation based solely
on allegedly false or perjured testimony given during Capt. Harris’ criminal trial.
In response, plaintiffs argue that the “complaining witness” exception to the rule of
absolute immunity dictates that the police officers who testified at Capt. Harris’ trial enjoy
no absolute immunity for their perjury. They cite Enlow v. Tishomingo County, Mississippi,
962 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1992), and argue that the Fifth Circuit has rejected the testifying
witness immunity rule in the context of malicious prosecution cases. In Enlow, decided

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before Castellano announced the rule that stand-alone claims for malicious prosecution are
no longer actionable, the panel refused to extend the holding of Briscoe to afford absolute
immunity to a highway patrol officer’s grand jury testimony. Id. at 511-12. The panel
explained:
In a defamation action, as was Briscoe, a plaintiff seeks to hold
a perjurious witness liable for the defamatory effect of his
testimony; at common law, the witness enjoyed absolute
immunity upon a threshold showing that the allegedly
defamatory statements were relevant to the judicial proceeding.
In a malicious prosecution action, however, as in the present
case, a plaintiff seeks to hold the complaining witness liable for
the witness’s role in the initiation of a baseless prosecution; at
common law, complaining witnesses were not absolutely
immune.
Id. at 511 n.29 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs argue that, based on the holding in Enlow, “at
least in the Fifth Circuit, the police officers who testified specifically, Rivera and Dragija,
enjoy no absolute immunity for perjury if they serve as complaining witnesses which the
Complaint alleges and the record supports that they in fact did.” Ps. Br. 14. The court
disagrees.
Although courts have recognized an exception to the doctrine of absolute testimonial
immunity “insofar as [an official] performed the function of a complaining witness,” Kalina
v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997); see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41
(1986), this exception does not extend to testimony given during a criminal trial. Briscoe,

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460 U.S. at 326.4 Plaintiffs do not allege that, in testifying falsely at trial, defendants were
acting as “complaining witnesses.” In fact, they allege that defendants were testifying
witnesses who gave “perjured testimony” at Capt. Harris’ criminal trial. Compl. ¶ 6.2.
Defendants are therefore entitled to absolute testimonial immunity in this respect. See
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 326. Plaintiffs offer no other support for their alleged Fourteenth
Amendment due process deprivation.
Because plaintiffs have failed to plead an actionable claim in addition to the standalone “malicious prosecution” claim, under binding Fifth Circuit authority, Count Two must
be dismissed. See Castellano, 352 F.3d 953 (“‘[M]alicious prosecution’ standing alone is
no violation of the United States Constitution[.]”).
V
Although the court concludes in § III(D) that plaintiffs’ conspiracy claim is not timebarred to the extent it is based on the allegation that defendants conspired to participate in
the commission of the constitutional violations set forth in Count Two, the court raises sua

4

Recently, in Rehberg v. Paulk, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1497 (2012), the Supreme
Court extended the holding of Briscoe and held that a “complaining witness” who testifies
during an ex parte grand jury proceeding is entitled to the same immunity in a § 1983 action
as a witness who testifies at trial. Id. at 1500. In explaining its rationale, the Court noted that
it would be “anomalous to permit a police officer who testifies before a grand jury to be sued
for maliciously procuring an unjust prosecution when it is the prosecutor, who is shielded by
absolute immunity, who is actually responsible for the decision to prosecute.” Id. at 1508
(citations omitted).
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sponte5 that this claim should be dismissed for a different reason. “A conspiracy may be
charged under section 1983 as the legal mechanism through which to impose liability on all
of the defendants without regard to who committed the particular act, but ‘a conspiracy claim
is not actionable without an actual violation of section 1983.’” Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d
914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Tittle v. Raines, 231 F.Supp.2d 537, 553
(N.D. Tex. 2002) (Lindsay, J.) (“A conspiracy by itself is not actionable under § 1983.”
(citation omitted)). Because, as explained supra at § IV(C), plaintiffs have failed to plead
a plausible claim for a violation of Harris’ right to be free from the unlawful institution and
prosecution of criminal charges based on manufactured evidence and perjured testimony, as
guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, they have also failed to state
a claim for conspiracy to commit these alleged constitutional violations.
The court raises sua sponte this basis for judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ § 1983
conspiracy claim. Plaintiffs may in their amended complaint address this deficiency if they
have grounds to do so.

5

Because the court is allowing plaintiffs to replead, the procedure employed here is
fair and is therefore permissible. See, e.g., Biggers v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 767
F.Supp.2d 725, 733-34 n.7 (N.D. Tex. 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (noting that district court has
authority to consider sufficiency of complaint and dismiss action on its own motion as long
as procedure employed is fair, raising ground for dismissal sua sponte, and concluding that
procedure was fair because court was granting plaintiffs leave to replead).
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VI
The Harrises also assert state-law claims for false arrest, the use of excessive and
unreasonable force, unlawful seizure of Capt. Harris’ body, false imprisonment, and
unlawful filing and malicious prosecution of criminal charges. Although this court can
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
“when all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial, [the
Fifth Circuit has] stated that [its] ‘general rule’ is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the
pendent state law claims.” McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998)
(citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)), overruled on other grounds
by Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 440 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). Having
dismissed the Harrises’ federal-law claims, the court in its discretion declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims.6
VII
Although the court is granting defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, it
will permit the Harrises to replead. See, e.g., In re Am. Airlines, Inc., Privacy Litig., 370
F.Supp.2d 552, 567-68 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (Fitzwater, J.) (noting that district courts often
afford plaintiffs at least one opportunity to cure pleading deficiencies before dismissing case,
unless it is clear that defects are incurable or plaintiffs advise court that they are unwilling
or unable to amend in a manner that will avoid dismissal). Because there is no indication
6

If the court later determines that the Harrises have pleaded a plausible federal-law
claim, it can address any proper challenge to the viability of their state-law claims.
- 27 -

that the Harrises cannot,7 or are unwilling to, cure the defects that the court has identified,
the court grants 30 days from the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed to file an
amended complaint.
*

*

*

For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendants’ July 18, 2012 Rule 12(c)
motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismisses the Harrises’ federal claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because the court is dismissing all federal claims alleged, it
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Harrises’ state-law claims. The
Harrises may file an amended complaint within 30 days of the date this memorandum
opinion and order is filed.
SO ORDERED.
January 23, 2013.

_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE

7

Although the court questions whether the Harrises can replead in a manner that
avoids the limitations bar as to their time-barred claims, it will give them the opportunity to
amend since the court is addressing the sufficiency of their complaint.
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