Arriaga v. Jess Enterprises, LLC et al
Filing
52
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The court grants Arriaga's 50 motion for attorney's fees. The court awards Arriaga the sum of $85,245.00 in attorneys' fees ($350 x 236.1 hours for J.H. Zidell, Esquire and Robert Manteuffel, Esquire's services, together with $90 x 29 hours for paralegal services) against defendants, jointly and severally. The court denies without prejudice the motion as to costs. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 11/5/2013) (ctf)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PEDRO GARCIA ARRIAGA, and all
§
others similarly situated under 29 U.S.C. §
§ 216(B),
§
§
Plaintiff,
§
§ Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-0094-D
VS.
§
§
CALIFCO, LLC, et al.,
§
§
Defendants. §
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Following a bench trial in this action for unpaid overtime pay under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., plaintiff Pedro Garcia Arriaga
(“Arriaga”) moves for an award of attorney’s fees and costs under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). For
the reasons that follow, the court grants the motion as to attorney’s fees and denies without
prejudice the motion as to costs.
I
Arriaga brought this suit under the FLSA against defendants Jess Enterprises, LLC
(“Jess”), SEJ Properties, L.P. (“SEJ”), Califco, LLC (“Califco”), and Elias Shokrian, also
known as Elias Shakrian (“Shokrian”) for unpaid overtime pay. On the eve of the scheduled
jury trial (and after the pretrial conference was conducted), defendants terminated their
counsel. The court struck the responsive pleadings of Jess, SEJ, and Califco and entered
default judgments against them. Although Shokrian had the right as a natural person to
appear pro se, he did not appear for trial. Arriaga waived a jury trial, and the court convened a
bench trial. The same evidence offered against Shokrian established Arriaga’s damages claims
against Jess, SEJ, and Califco. The court awarded Arriaga judgment against all defendants,
jointly and severally, in the principal sum of $14,500.31, liquidated damages in the sum of
$14,500.31, and post-judgment interest. Arriaga now moves for an award of $85,245.00 in
attorney’s fees and $4,136.80 in costs. Defendants have not responded to the motion.
II
A
“Under the FLSA, an employer who violates the statute is also required to pay
attorney’s fees.” Black v. SettlePou, P.C., ___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 5612304, at *7 (5th Cir.
Oct. 11, 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The Fifth Circuit “use[s] the lodestar method to
calculate an appropriate attorney’s fee award under the FLSA.” Id. (quoting Saizan v. Delta
Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir.2006)). “The lodestar is calculated by
multiplying the number of hours an attorney reasonably spent on the case by an appropriate
hourly rate, which is the market rate in the community for [the] work. There is a strong
presumption of the reasonableness of the lodestar amount.” Id. (citation omitted).
B
Arriaga’s attorneys expended a total of 265.1 hours prosecuting his case. After
reviewing their billing records—and in the absence of any opposition response—the court
finds no basis to conclude that any expenditure of time was unreasonable. Arriaga requests
that his attorneys be compensated at an hourly rate of $350 per hour and that a paralegal be
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compensated at an hourly rate of $90. Given the attorneys’ respective levels of experience
and the relevant prevailing rates, together with Arriaga’s showing that courts have awarded
fees using similar rates, the court, as an expert as to the reasonableness of attorney’s fees,
finds that these hourly rates are customarily charged in this locality for similar legal services
and that the rates for the attorneys and paralegal are reasonable. The rates will therefore be
used in calculating the lodestar. See, e.g., Gromer v. Mack, 2012 WL 28835, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 4, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (collecting cases holding that courts are experts regarding
reasonableness of attorney’s fees).
C
There is a “strong presumption that the lodestar award is the reasonable fee.”
Heidtman v. County of El Paso, 171 F.3d 1038, 1044 (5th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, “the
court must consider whether the lodestar amount should be adjusted upward or downward,
depending on the circumstances of the case and after addressing the Johnson factors.” SEC
v. AmeriFirst Funding, Inc., 2008 WL 2185193, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 27, 2008) (Fitzwater,
C.J.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). District courts “need not specifically
discuss the Johnson factors where [they have] applied the Johnson framework.” EEOC v.
Agro Distribution, LLC, 555 F.3d 462, 473 (5th Cir. 2009). Because defendants have not
opposed Arriaga’s motion, the court will not discuss each of the applicable factors
individually.
The court notes that Arriaga’s attorneys achieved nearly complete success in their suit
against defendants. See Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir. 1998)
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(reiterating that results obtained is crucial factor in determining proper fee award). Although
the requested fees exceed the award obtained, this is not uncommon in cases brought under
the FLSA. See, e.g., Hilton v. Exec. Self Storage Assocs., Inc., 2009 WL 1750121, at *8
(S.D. Tex. June 18, 2009) (“Given the nature of claims under [t]he FLSA, it is not
uncommon that attorneys’ fee requests will exceed the amount of judgment in the case.”
(quoting Powell v. Carey Int’l, Inc., 547 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2008)). The
prosecution of Arriaga’s case consumed considerable time because defendants diligently
litigated the case until the eve of trial, when they terminated their counsel, and then failed to
appear for trial. Cf. Roussell v. Brinker Int’l, Inc., 441 Fed. Appx. 222, 234 (5th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam) (noting that defendant “never offered to settle the case”). The court has already
found that the requested hourly rates are reasonable. The court further finds that Arriaga’s
attorneys have experience and ability in litigating FLSA cases. All of these findings confirm
the reasonableness of the fees calculated according to the lodestar amount. Based on its
application of the pertinent Johnson factors, the court holds that the lodestar amount is
reasonable and should not be adjusted.
III
Arriaga moves for an award of $4,136.80 in costs. In the court’s judgment in this
case, it awarded Arriaga his taxable costs of court, as calculated by the clerk of court.
Because Arriaga seeks in his motion only costs that he maintains are taxable, this request
should have been presented to the clerk of court, as provided in the judgment. His motion
for costs is therefore denied without prejudice.
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*
*
*
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Arriaga’s motion for attorney’s fees. The
court awards Arriaga the sum of $85,245.00 in attorneys’ fees ($350 x 236.1 hours for J.H.
Zidell, Esquire and Robert Manteuffel, Esquire’s services, together with $90 x 29 hours for
paralegal services) against defendants, jointly and severally. The court denies without
prejudice the motion as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
November 5, 2013.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE
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