Valdez et al v. Celerity Logistics, Inc. et al
Filing
20
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 First MOTION for Leave to File Amended Complaint filed by Marta Patricia Castillo, Jesus Andres Valdez. Plaintiffs must file the amended complaint -- electronically or on paper -- within seven days of the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 8/20/2013) (Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JESUS ANDRES VALDEZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
CELERITY LOGISTICS, INC., et al.,
Defendants.
§
§
§
§ Civil Action No. 3:12-CV-4368-D
§
§
§
§
§
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Plaintiffs move for leave to amend their complaint.1 For the reasons that follow, the
court grants the motion.
I
Plaintiffs2 sued defendants Celerity Logistics, Inc. (“CLI”), Mike Medley, and Scott
Watts on October 30, 2012, alleging claims of overtime and minimum wage violations under
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216. On February 11, 2013 the court issued a scheduling order setting
several deadlines that are relevant to this motion. The deadline to file motions for leave to
join other parties was July 1, 2013, and the deadline to file motions for leave to amend the
pleadings was August 1, 2013.
On June 28, 2013—before either deadline had
1
Plaintiffs filed on the same day a first motion seeking leave to file and serve amended
complaint and an amended first motion seeking leave to file and serve amended complaint.
The initial motion is moot because it has been superseded by the amended motion.
2
Plaintiffs are Jesus Andres Valdez, Marta Patricia Castillo, and all others similarly
situated.
passed—plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint.3 Specifically, they seek leave to (1) add
Segue Distribution, Inc. (“Segue”), Celerity Acquisitions, Inc. (“CAI”) d/b/a Celerity
Logistics Company, Insperity, Inc. f/k/a Administaff, Inc., and Beavex, Inc. (“Beavex”) as
defendants to their claims for unpaid overtime and minimum wages; (2) add claims of
successor liability against CLI, Segue, CAI, and Beavex; and (3) add a retaliation claim for
damages against Beavex.
Defendants oppose the motion, arguing that the court should deny leave to amend
because adding defendants and claims after obtaining extensive discovery from the existing
defendants will cause prejudice by needlessly increasing the cost of the litigation. They also
maintain that the motion should be denied based on undue delay, because plaintiffs knew
from the outset the bases of their claim against Segue and their retaliation claim, yet failed
to include them. Defendants also posit that the court should deny the motion on the basis of
bad faith, because plaintiffs have no excuse for failing to include the new claims and parties
in their complaint. Finally, defendants contend, based on futility of amendment, that the
court should deny leave to amend to allege successor liability. Alternatively, defendants
3
Whether plaintiffs filed this motion before either of these deadlines had passed is
important, because “the standards by which a court evaluates a motion for leave to amend
the pleadings vary according to whether the motion was filed before or after the deadline
established in the scheduling order.” Hoffman v. L & M Arts, 2012 WL 4321739, at *2 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.); see also Orthoflex, Inc. v. ThermoTek, Inc., 2011 WL
4398279, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (“Motions for leave to amend are
typically governed by [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 15(a)(2), or, if the time to seek leave to amend has
expired, by Rule 16(b)(4) and then by Rule 15(a)(2).”). Defendants recognize that plaintiffs
did not miss any of the relevant deadlines. See Ds. Resp. Br. 3.
-2-
argue that, if the court grants the motion, it should do so on two conditions: (1) that plaintiffs
pay the existing defendants’ attorney’s fees for any re-deposition of, or additional written
discovery requests to, the original defendants for claims that could have been brought from
the outset; and (2) that plaintiffs be required to revise their proposed amended pleading to
“line up the facts that they allege in support of each of the elements of each of their claims
against each Defendant.” Ds. Resp. Br. 2.
II
Rule 15(a)(2) provides that “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “It is settled that the grant of leave to amend the
pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within the discretion of the trial court.” Garcia v. Zale
Corp., 2006 WL 298156, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 1, 2006) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). “When a party files a motion for leave to amend by the court-ordered deadline,
there is a ‘presumption of timeliness.’” Pyramid Transp., Inc. v. Greatwide Dall. Mavis,
LLC, 2012 WL 5875603, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting PolyAm., Inc. v. Serrot Int’l Inc., 2002 WL 206454, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2002) (Fitzwater,
J.)). “Granting leave to amend . . . ‘is by no means automatic.’” Hoffman v. L & M Arts,
2012 WL 4321739, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting Wimm v. Jack
Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1993) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, “[t]he court may consider factors
such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure
-3-
to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing
party, and futility of amendment.” Hoffman, 2012 WL 4321739, at *4 (citation omitted).
III
The court concludes that the relevant factors do not support denying leave to amend.
Defendants’ assertions about whether plaintiffs can prove their successor liability claims are
better addressed in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 motion.4
[This] court’s almost unvarying practice . . . is to address the
merits of [a] claim or defense in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
or Rule 56 motion. The court only infrequently considers the
merits of new causes of action in the context of Rule 15(a). The
court prefers instead to do so in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6)
or Rule 56 motion, where the procedural safeguards are surer.
Hoffman, 2012 WL 4321739, at *5 (quoting Garcia, 2006 WL 298156, at *1) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Nor have defendants shown undue delay (they in fact recognize that plaintiffs have
not missed any of the relevant deadlines set in the scheduling order) or bad faith. And they
have not demonstrated that they will be unfairly prejudiced by amendment.5
4
Likewise, defendants’ alternative argument that, should the court grant the motion
for leave to amend, it should do so on the condition that plaintiffs “be required to revise their
proposed amended pleading to line up the facts that they allege in support of each of the
elements of each of their claims against each Defendant,” Ds. Resp. Br. 2, can be addressed
by a motion under Rule 12(b).
5
Defendants rely on Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. National Fire Insurance Co. of
Hartford, 2007 WL 2592353 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.), to support their
argument that leave should be denied, but this reliance is misplaced for at least two reasons.
First, in Home Depot the defendant moved for leave to amend after it had already lost
one summary judgment motion and after a second summary judgment motion had been filed
-4-
Concerning defendants’ alternative request for the imposition of conditions on
granting leave to amend, if defendants can demonstrate later that they must conduct
additional discovery due to the parties and/or claims added by the amended complaint, or are
required to respond to discovery that is unnecessarily duplicative, they can seek appropriate
relief.6 The court denies the alternative request without prejudice as premature.
against it. Id. at *3 (“Only after [plaintiff] moved for and obtained summary judgment in [an
earlier stage of the litigation], obtained leave to file a second summary judgment motion . . .,
and over 18 months had elapsed since suit was filed, did [defendant] move for leave to
amend.”). Here, neither party has moved for summary judgment (and only eight months
have passed since the lawsuit was filed). Home Depot reflects the principle that “[a] party
should not, without adequate grounds, be permitted to avoid summary judgment by the
expedient of amending its complaint.” Overseas Inns S.A. P.A. v. United States, 911 F.2d
1146, 1151 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting this court’s opinion below). That principle is inapposite
here.
Second, the Home Depot defendant’s motion for leave to amend was timely only
because the court had previously granted the defendant’s unopposed motion to extend the
pretrial deadlines. Home Depot, 2007 WL 2592353, at *4. In moving to extend the pretrial
deadlines, the defendant had represented that it needed more time to pursue its claims against
a third party—it did not disclose that it might file a new counterclaim against the plaintiff.
Id. As this court explained, had the plaintiff known that it might face a new counterclaim,
it likely would have opposed the defendant’s motion to extend the pretrial deadlines. Id. In
the present case, plaintiffs filed their motion in a timely manner, without relying on an
extension of the pretrial deadlines. As such, the fairness issue presented in Home Depot is
not at issue in the instant case.
6
Rule 15(a)(2) “presupposes that the court may use its discretion to impose conditions
on the allowance of a proposed amendment as an appropriate means of balancing the
interests of the party seeking the amendment and those of the party objecting to it.” 6
Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1486, at 693 (3d ed. 2010).
Indeed, numerous courts have required the movant to pay the costs of additional discovery.
See id. at 694, 695 & n.8 (collecting cases); Duran v. N.M. Dep’t of Labor, 42 Fed. Appx.
326, 328 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
condition that plaintiff pay additional discovery costs on granting leave to amend, and
concluding that “[w]hen tardy amendments to a complaint force the opposing party to
undertake additional preparation in order to meet new issues raised, such a condition
-5-
*
*
*
The court grants plaintiffs’ June 28, 2013 amended first motion seeking leave to file
and serve amended complaint. They must file the amended complaint—electronically or on
paper—within seven days of the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed.
SO ORDERED.
August 20, 2013.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE
remedies the economic prejudice to the opposing party.”); Datel Holdings Ltd. v. Microsoft
Corp., 2011 WL 2437265, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2011) (shifting certain fees and costs
to movant after granting motion for leave to file an amended answer); Jones v. Xerox Corp.,
2000 WL 680207, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 2000) (granting plaintiff’s motion for leave to file
an amended complaint upon the condition that plaintiff pay certain costs).
-6-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?