Chastain v. United Parcel Service, Inc
Filing
21
Memorandum Opinion and Order denying 15 Partial Motion to Dismiss. (Ordered by Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn on 7/10/2013) (twd)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JACQUELINE P. CHASTAIN
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC.
Defendant.
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
No. 3:13-CV-00317-M
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Partial Motion to Dismiss, filed by Defendant United Parcel
Service, Inc. (“UPS”) [Docket Entry #15]. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This action presents claims for alleged age and disability discrimination arising under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). Plaintiff Jacqueline Chastain worked for UPS from July 2, 1996, until August 6,
2010. She claims that due to various medical problems in her lower extremities, she required use
of a dolly to perform her work as a loader. Sometime in 2008, Chastain’s supervisor made the
dolly inaccessible to Chastain. At some point after that, Chastain requested that UPS return the
dolly to assist with her loading duties. UPS denied that request.
Chastain claims UPS violated the ADA by, among other things, failing to reasonably
accommodate her disability. UPS filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss, targeted only at Chastain’s
reasonable accommodation claim, on the grounds that it was untimely filed. The single issue
raised by the Motion is whether Chastain’s reasonable accommodation claim arose more than
Page 1 of 3
300 days before she filed her charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on
June 1, 2010.
II. DISCUSSION
To preserve a claim under the ADA, plaintiffs must file a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117
(incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)); see also Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178,
181 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding a plaintiff’s discrimination claim untimely when more than 300 days
had passed between the alleged discriminatory act and the plaintiff’s filing with the EEOC).
Filing an EEOC charge “is a precondition to filing suit in district court.” See Cruce v.
Brazosport Indep. School Dist., 703 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1983). Chastain filed a
discrimination charge with the EEOC on June 1, 2010. Thus, the challenged events are
actionable only if they occurred on or after August 4, 2009, 300 days before she filed her EEOC
charge.
When the claim arises from an alleged failure to make a reasonable accommodation, “the
pivotal question in assessing statute of limitations issues is whether [plaintiff] made a specific
request for accommodation that was denied during the statutory period.” Tobin v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 553 F.3d 121, 133 (1st Cir. 2009); see also Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d
155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996). In other words, a reasonable accommodation claim accrues only when
the plaintiff requests an accommodation, and the defendant denies the request. Here, Chastain
does not allege that UPS violated the ADA simply by removing the dolly in 2008. Rather, her
claim is based on UPS’s refusal to return the dolly after she requested it to help her complete her
loading duties. Her claim did not accrue until UPS first denied this request.1
1
UPS does not argue that it was unaware of Chastain’s request for a reasonable accommodation, nor does
it argue that it never denied Chastain’s request to use a dolly.
Page 2 of 3
According to Chastain’s Amended Complaint, she made multiple requests for
accommodation, and UPS denied these requests, within 300 days of her EEOC filings. Chastain
pleads:
[O]n multiple later occasions, including occasions resulting from changes in her
physical condition relating to her mobility impairment, and within 300 days prior
to filing her EEOC Charge of Discrimination, Chastain notified UPS that she
needed the dolly to do her job efficiently due to her mobility impairment.
However, UPS provided no explanation as to why the dolly would not be made
available for her to use after these requests and it remained locked away,
unavailable to her for a long period of time. Chastain’s notifications as described
herein were requests for reasonable accommodation which were effectively
denied by UPS.
Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 18 [Docket Entry #13] (emphasis added).
Discovery may very well reveal that Chastain requested an accommodation in 2008,
when use of the dolly was no longer made available to her, but the Amended Complaint does not
say so. UPS’s 12(b)(6) motion is based on the facts pleaded. Those facts, viewed in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, do not clearly support UPS’s contention that Chastain requested, and
UPS denied, an accommodation outside of the 300-day period. See Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v.
Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (when resolving a motion to dismiss
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts, and view
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Accordingly, UPS’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
July 10, 2013.
_________________________________
BARBARA M. G. LYNN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Page 3 of 3
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?