Kamm v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Motion to Transfer Venue: Accordingly, the Court ORDERS the case TRANSFERRED to the United States Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 10/10/2013) (twd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
TERRIE J. KAMM,
Plaintiff and Counter-Defendant,
v.
THE NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Counter/ThirdParty Plaintiff,
v.
SOUTHERN STRUCTURES, INC.,
Third-Party Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-0710-B
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Third-Party Defendant Southern Structures, Inc.’s (“SSI”) Motion to
Transfer Venue (doc. 24), filed June 18, 2013. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that
SSI’s Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a breach of contract dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant The
Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company (“Northwestern Mutual”). Plaintiff claims to be the
rightful owner and beneficiary of a life insurance policy (the “Policy”) that Northwestern
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Mutual issued on the life of Stefan Leonpacher (“Leonpacher”),1 a former executive of SSI. Because
of competing claims as to the Policy’s proceeds, Northwestern Mutual has not released the funds to
Plaintiff.
Since its issuance, the Policy has had three named owners. In February 2003, SSI applied for
and was named the original owner and beneficiary of the Policy. Mot. Trans. 2. In June 2005,
ownership changed from SSI to Leonpacher (“the 2005 Ownership Change”). Id. at Ex. 12. This
transfer was made pursuant to an Owner Designation Form that was executed by Larry Blanchet,
id., the principal and president of Young Street Development, LLC, a company that purchased SSI’s
assets (including the Policy) following SSI’s 2004 bankruptcy. Id. at Ex. 9. In October 2010,
ownership of the Policy changed a second and final time when Leonpacher completed a separate
Owner Designation Form to transfer the Policy from himself to Plaintiff. Id. at Ex. 14. On the same
day, Plaintiff designated herself as the primary beneficiary. Id. at Ex. 15.
Leonpacher died on September 23, 2012, and Plaintiff submitted a claim to Northwestern
Mutual for proceeds under the Policy. On September 28, 2012, Northwestern Mutual received
notice of a challenge to Plaintiff’s claim,2 in which it was alleged that the 2005 Ownership Change
from SSI to Leonpacher was invalid, making the subsequent transfer of ownership and designation
of beneficiary to Plaintiff similarly void. Northwestern Mutual First Am. Countercl. ¶ 12. Thereafter,
on November 16, 2012,
Alfred Leonpacher (Leonpacher’s father) and Jenifer Leonpacher
1
The Policy bears the number 16-348-444 and has a death benefit of $2,000,000.00. Mot. Trans.
2
It is unclear from the pleadings whether the challenge came from SSI or Leonpacher’s family.
Ex. 1.
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(Leonpacher’s sister) began proceedings in Louisiana state court to undo the 2005 Ownership
Change.3 See Mot. for Order Rev. Because Leonpacher had been under full interdiction at the time
of the 2005 Ownership Change,4 and neither Mr. Leonpacher (as curator) nor Ms. Leonpacher (as
undercurator) had consented thereto, they moved the court to rescind the transfer. Id. Both
Northwestern Mutual and Plaintiff were joined in the proceeding. Id.
In light of these competing claims, Northwestern Mutual did not release the Policy’s proceeds
to Plaintiff. Consequently, on January 22, 2013, Plaintiff sued Northwestern Mutual in Texas state
court for breach of contract.5 See Pl.’s Orig. Pet. Northwestern Mutual subsequently removed the
case to this Court (doc. 1) and filed its Answer, Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint for
Interpleader (doc. 3) against Jenifer Leonpacher, Alfred Leonpacher, and SSI. In addition, it filed
its Motion for Leave to Deposit Interpled Funds into the Registry of the Court (doc. 4). The Court
granted Northwestern Mutual’s motion (doc. 10) but did not discharge Northwestern Mutual from
the case. On June 18, 2013, following Jenifer Leonpacher and Alfred Leonpacher’s agreement to stay
their case in Louisiana state court and to waive any claim to the Policy, Northwestern Mutual
amended its pleading (doc. 26)to assert its third-party complaint solely against SSI. That same day
3
Alfred and Jenifer Leonpacher filed their “Motion for Order Revoking / Rescinding Transfer /
Donation to Interdict During Interdiction” in In the Matter of the Interdiction of Stefan A. Leonpacher, 20050546 (La. 15th Dist. Ct.).
4
A state district judge in Lafayette, Lousiana found Leonpacher to be mentally incompetent and
placed him under full interdiction on March 11, 2005. At that time Alfred Leonpacher and Jenifer
Leonpacher were named his curator and undercurator, respectively. In the Matter of the Interdiction of
Stefan A. Leonpacher, 2005-0546 (La. 15th Dist. Ct. 3/11/05).
5
Kamm v. The Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, No. DC-13-00851-I, was filed in the
162nd Judicial District, Dallas County, Texas.
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SSI filed the present Motion to Transfer. Plaintiff responded (doc. 29) on July 9, 2013, and SSI
replied (doc. 31) on July 23, 2013. Northwestern Mutual has not responded to the present Motion.6
It is now ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to another district
or division where the action could have been brought originally, provided the transfer would be for
the convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The
burden falls upon the movant to demonstrate why the alternate venue is more appropriate. In re
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 314 n.10 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Calloway v. Triad Fin.
Corp., Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1292-B, 2007 WL 4548085, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2007). To
meet this burden, the movant must first prove that the plaintiff could have originally filed his
complaint in the transferee venue. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 312; In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d
429, 433 (5th Cir. 2003). Next, the defendant must show good cause as to why the action should
be sent to the transferee venue. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir. 1963)). “[T]o show good cause means the moving
party, in order to support its claim for a transfer, must . . . clearly demonstrate that a transfer is ‘[f]or
6
On August 5, 2013, Northwestern Mutual filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on Its
Interpleader Claim (doc. 32), requesting the Court dismiss it from the suit, award it reasonable attorneys’
fees and court costs, and also order that Plaintiff and SSI take nothing on any claims they have or could
have against Northwestern Mutual. Mot. Summ. J. 12. Pursuant to this Order, Northwestern Mutual’s
motion will be transferred to the Western District of Louisiana for decision.
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the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.’” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at
315 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
In assessing the interests of convenience and justice, courts look to a series of private and
public factors. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501
(1947)). “The private interest factors are: ‘the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the
availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance
for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.’” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201,
203 (5th Cir. 2004)). The public interest factors include: “(1) the administrative difficulties flowing
from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary
problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315.
The balance of these factors must clearly weigh in favor of transferring to the new venue. Id. If the
transferee venue “is no more convenient than the chosen forum, the plaintiff’s choice should not be
disturbed.” Thomas v. City of Fort Worth, Civil Action No. 3:07-CV-1689-O, 2008 WL 4225556, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
III.
ANALYSIS
Third-Party Defendant SSI seeks to transfer venue to the Western District of Louisiana. As
set forth above, SSI must therefore prove both that the case could originally have been brought in
that district and that the balance of private and public interest factors clearly favors transfer.
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A.
Motions to Transfer by Third-Party Defendants
Before the Court determines whether SSI has met its burden, it will first discuss the
difference, for purposes of motions to transfer, between third-party defendants who have been
impleaded pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 14 and those who have been interpleaded under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1335 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 22. Not only is this distinction critical to the Court’s analysis below, it also
addresses a point raised briefly by the Plaintiff in her Response.
A motion to transfer venue filed by a third-party defendant represents an “atypical” situation.
See Lafargue v. Union Pac. R.R., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1001, 1004 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2001); Gundle Lining
Constr. Corp. v. Adams Cnty. Asphalt, Inc., 85 F.3d 201, 209 (5th Cir. 1996). Indeed “there is very
little case law on the issue of whether a third-party defendant may move for transfer of venue under
§ 1404(a).” Nalco Co. v. Environmental Mgmt., Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 994, 997 (N.D. Ill. March 8,
2010). In the Court’s review of existing case law it has found that many cases focus on third-party
defendants who have been impleaded under Rule 14. For these defendants, courts maintain that
“statutory venue limitations have no application . . . even if they would require the third-party action
to be heard in another district had it been brought as an independent action.” 6 Charles Alan
Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1445 (3d ed. 2010).
This is because “the [Rule 14] third-party defendant is protected against an inconvenient or
oppressive forum by the requirement that the court have personal jurisdiction over [him] and [by]
the court’s ability to take account of venue considerations when exercising its discretion to decide
whether to disallow impleader or to sever the third-party claim.” Id. This is not to suggest that Rule
14 third-party defendants are barred from bringing such motions altogether. Rather, it is to point out
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that “a [Rule 14] third-party defendant generally cannot successfully move to transfer venue based
upon its convenience, as personal jurisdiction is the third-party defendant’s principal protection
against suit in an inconvenient forum.” Lafargue, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
This is not so for third-party defendants who have been interpleaded under Rule 22 or 28
U.S.C. § 1335. For third-party defendants in interpleader actions “[q]uestions relating to the
propriety of venue . . . should be resolved as are similar questions that arise in other contexts.” 7
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1712
(3d ed. 2001). In other words, in interpleader cases “[w]hen a party seeks transfer to a more
convenient forum, the considerations governing the request are the same as those in other actions,
except that no weight will be given to the stakeholder-plaintiff’s choice of forum if the stakeholder
is disinterested and thus will be discharged from the action.” Id. Thus there appears no distinction
between third-party defendants and other parties who move for transfer of venue in interpleader
actions. If “the convenience of the parties and other factors bearing on the efficient and just
adjudication of the dispute . . . dictate,” then “the case should be transferred pursuant to Section
1404(a) of Title 28 to a district where it could have been brought as an original matter.” Id.
Given this difference between impleaded and interpleaded third-party defendants, Plaintiff’s
oblique argument that SSI is not permitted to move for transfer under § 1404(a) is inapposite. See
Pl.’s Resp. 6-7. Though Plaintiff is correct that third-party defendants generally cannot successfully
move to transfer venue based on convenience, id., her argument here fails because this statement
(and the authorities on which she relies) concern third-party defendants who have been impleaded
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 14. In the present matter SSI has been interpleaded. See Northwestern Mutual
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First Am. Countercl. For this reason, the Court will consider SSI’s motion under the customary §
1404(a) analysis.
B.
Transferee Venue
To support its motion, SSI must first demonstrate that this case could have originally been
brought in the venue to which it seeks transfer. See In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d at 433. SSI
argues that Plaintiff’s underlying breach of contract case (and Northwestern Mutual’s subsequent
interpleader) could have been brought in the Western District of Louisiana because all of the
relevant documents, transactions, and operative facts arose in Louisiana. See SSI Reply 6; Mot.
Trans. 6. Plaintiff disagrees and argues that the conduct that gave rise to the contract dispute
occurred in Texas. See Pl.’s Resp. 17. Further, she claims that SSI has provided no evidence of
“continuous and systematic” contact between Northwestern Mutual and Louisiana to support
personal jurisdiction. Id. Thus, she maintains SSI has failed to satisfy its initial burden with respect
to its motion.
In responding to the parties’ arguments, the Court must first make clear that venue and
jurisdiction are two separate issues. Jurisdiction refers to the Court’s power to adjudicate a matter
in controversy (subject matter jurisdiction) and to bind particular parties to its judgment (personal
jurisdiction). Venue, on the other hand, is simply the selection of the forum where the Court’s power
may be properly exercised. As these are independent requirements, the Court will analyze the
parties’ arguments with respect to each separately.
1.
Personal Jurisdiction
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Plaintiff’s assertion that a Louisiana federal court would lack personal jurisdiction over
Northwestern Mutual is without merit. In a diversity case such as this, “a federal court has personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to the same extent that a state court in that forum has
such jurisdiction.” Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 646 (5th Cir. 1994). The reach of either court’s
jurisdiction is limited by: (1) the state’s long-arm statute and (2) the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Louisiana’s long-arm statute has been interpreted by the Fifth Circuit
to be co-extensive with the Due Process Clause, and thus the statutory and constitutional inquiries
regarding jurisdiction merge.7 See Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1361 (5th Cir. 1990).
“The due process clause limits the courts’ power to assert personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants to situations in which they engage in ‘certain minimum contacts’ with [the forum] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’” Id. (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). “When a cause of
action arises out of the defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum, minimum contacts are found
to exist and the court may exercise ‘specific’ jurisdiction.” Dalton, 897 F.2d at 1361 (citing World-
7
Specifically, Louisiana’s statute provides:
A.
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising
from any one of the following activities performed by the nonresident:
(1)
Transacting any business in the state;
(2)
Contracting to supply services or things in this state . . .
B.
In addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of this
state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on
any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the
Constitution of the United States.
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:3201 (West 2013).
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Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). Where a cause of action does not arise
out of such purposeful contacts with the forum, due process requires the defendant have engaged
in “continuous and systematic contacts” in the forum to support a court’s “general” jurisdiction over
him. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
“Qualification to do and doing business in Louisiana is sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ to
confer jurisdiction on Louisiana courts.” Morse v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 301 So. 2d 741, 744 (La.
Ct. App. 1974) (citing Smith v. Globe Indemnity Co., 243 So. 2d 882 (La. Ct. App. 1971), abrogated
on different grounds by Fox v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ. and Agric. and Mech. Coll., 576 So.
2d 978 (La. 1991)). There is no dispute that Northwestern Mutual is qualified to do and in fact does
business in Louisiana. Indeed Northwestern Mutual has an office in Louisiana from which it
repeatedly interacted with the parties and otherwise availed itself of the benefits of the state’s laws.
See de Reyes v. Marine Mgmt. and Consulting, Ltd., 586 So. 2d 103, 109 (La. 1991). Finally, pursuant
to the Louisiana Insurance Code, which has been held to be sufficiently broad to vest Louisiana
courts with jurisdiction over matters involving “minimum contacts,” Northwestern Mutual has
necessarily appointed the secretary of state to be its true and lawful attorney in Louisiana. See La.
Rev. Stat. § 22:335 (West 2013)(renumbered from La. Rev. Stat. § 22:985 by Act of 2008, No. 415,
§ 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2009); Morse, 301 So. 2d at 743. For these reasons it is clear that Louisiana courts
would have personal jurisdiction over Northwestern Mutual in the present matter.
2.
Venue
Having determined a federal court in Louisiana would have personal jurisdiction over
Northwestern Mutual, the Court now considers whether Plaintiff’s underlying breach of contract
dispute could have been brought in the Lafayette Division of the Western District of Louisiana.
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28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) provides that a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district
where any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State in which the district is
located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the
claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3)
a judicial district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought. A defendant that
is a corporation “shall be deemed to reside in any district in that State within which its contacts
would be sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a separate State . . . .”
28 U.S.C. § 1391(d).
Despite Plaintiff’s contentions otherwise, the Court finds that a “substantial part of the
events” giving rise to the claim of breach of contract did occur in the Western District of Louisiana.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). It is undisputed that the Policy was issued in Lafayette, Louisiana. See SSI
Countercl. ¶ III. Further all subsequent events and transfers of ownership that potentially undermine
Plaintiff’s status as owner and beneficiary of the Policy similarly occurred in the Western District.
See Mot. Trans. Exs. 9, 11. For these reasons, the Court finds a sufficient portion of the events
occurred in Western District of Louisiana such that the case could have been brought there.
C.
Interest of Justice
Next, the Court must weigh the private and public interest factors to determine whether the
transferee venue clearly serves “the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice.” In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d at 315 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
1.
Private Factors
a.
Ease of access to sources of proof
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SSI argues that “no proof whatsoever [is] located in the Northern District of Texas, and
virtually all of the proof in this case is located in Louisiana.” Mot. Trans. 13. In particular, it notes
that Northwestern Mutual agent files and the contents of court proceedings related to SSI’s
bankruptcy and Leonpacher’s interdiction are located in Louisiana. Id. at 13-14. Further, key
witnesses such as Larry Blanchet, Marcy Dauphine (who provided Mr. Blanchet with the 2005
Owner Designation form to sign), and Dawn Duhon (who worked for Mr. Blanchet at Young Street
Development, LLC) are all residents of Louisiana. SSI Reply 8. In response, Plaintiff argues that SSI
has failed to show that transfer would provide easier access to the proof in this case. Pl.’s Resp. 1920. She claims that, by virtue of SSI’s comments that the case involves uncontested facts and
Blanchet does not recall signing the Ownership Designation Form, there is no reason to transfer the
case. Id. The Court finds this response unconvincing as Plaintiff does not contradict, let alone
address, the fact that the documentary evidence for this case is in Louisiana. Because the location
of these documents is undisputed and there is no indication any other evidence is in Texas, the
Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
b.
Availability of compulsory process to secure attendance of witnesses
SSI claims that compulsory process will be required to secure attendance of certain witnesses,
including Larry Blanchet. Mot. Trans. 14. Further, any documents in Blanchet’s or his company’s
possession might be subject to compulsory process. Id. Plaintiff counters that Blanchet’s testimony
is “close to irrelevant to any issue likely to arise in this matter.” Pl.’s Resp. 20. Further, she alleges
that SSI has submitted no evidence that would suggest the Court should grant a motion to transfer
based on Blanchet’s convenience. Id.
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The Court finds that this factor again weighs in favor of transfer. Both parties agree that this
case turns on the validity of the 2005 Ownership Change. Moreover, they agree that Blanchet signed
the Ownership Designation Form that prompted the transfer. Finally, as Plaintiff herself points out,
“Blanchet and/or a representative, acting in the capacity as owner of the Policy, discussed the Policy
and asked Northwestern Mutual to prepare the Owner Designation Form.” Pl. Resp. 20. Given these
facts, it seems clear that Blanchet’s testimony–and any documents in his possession–would be
relevant to the proceeding. Indeed, it was his actions that potentially undermined Plaintiff’s
subsequent designation as owner and beneficiary. As a resident of Youngsville, Louisiana, Blanchet
is approximately 400 miles from this Court. Consequently, he is beyond the Northern District’s
subpoena power for deposition under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(2), and any trial subpoena for him to
travel more than 100 miles would be subject to a motion to quash under Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(c)(3)(A)(ii). See In re Vioxx Products Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 664, 667 (E.D. La. July 21,
2006); see also In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 316. For these reasons, this factor supports transfer.
c.
Cost of attendance for willing witnesses
The third private interest factor is the cost of attendance for willing witnesses. Though its
Rule 26 Disclosure includes six individuals, four of whom reside in either Lafayette or Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, SSI’s Motion only identifies Alfred Leonpacher (Leonpacher’s father) as a willing witness
for whom transfer would be more convenient. See Mot. Trans. Ex. 16; Mot. Trans. 15. Mr.
Leonpacher resides in Lafayette, Louisiana, which is approximately 400 miles from Dallas. As to him,
it is clear that it would be more convenient if the case is tried in Louisiana.
Plaintiff similarly identifies many witnesses in her Rule 26 Disclosure. Mot. Trans. Ex. 17. Of
the ten potential witnesses listed(other than SSI and Northwestern Mutual), all but two currently
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reside outside Louisiana. It is not clear from Plaintiff’s filings who among these would be willing
witnesses for whom transfer might be inconvenient.
Because SSI has only identified Mr. Leonpacher as a witness for whom transfer would be
preferable and Plaintiff has identified many for whom either venue would be inconvenient, the Court
finds SSI has not demonstrated that this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
d.
All other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and
inexpensive
The final private factor concerns all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive. SSI argues that the locations of the witnesses and exhibits clearly
indicate Louisiana is a more practical forum. Mot. Trans. 15. Further, because Plaintiff has already
retained a Louisiana attorney, there is no practical barrier to having this matter tried in Louisiana.
Id. Plaintiff counters that her need for Louisiana counsel is diminished because of the stay of the
Louisiana state court proceeding. Pl.’s Resp. 21. In addition, she points out that SSI has hired Texas
counsel and thus the present venue is no more inconvenient for SSI than Louisiana is for her. Id.
Because the Court has already acknowledged that ease of access to proof and compulsory
attendance of Blanchet support transfer, it is reluctant to double-count these factors in the present
analysis. Further, it is unconvinced by SSI’s argument that because Plaintiff has retained Louisiana
counsel transfer would be more practical. Consequently, the Court finds that SSI has not
demonstrated that this factor weighs in favor of transfer.
2.
Public Factors
a.
Administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion
The first public factor to consider is the administrative difficulties that flow from court
congestion. Initially SSI argued this factor is inapplicable to the present motion. See Mot. Trans. 15.
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However, Plaintiff maintains that the Western District of Louisiana is slower and more congested
than the Northern District of Texas such that transfer would be inappropriate. Pl.’s Resp. 22. In
particular, she notes that, as compared to civil cases in the Northern District of Texas, civil cases
in the Western District of Louisiana take approximately four months longer to proceed from filing
to disposition and approximately six months longer to proceed from filing to trial. Id. SSI does not
dispute these differences, but argues they are insignificant, especially since this case could be
narrowed or resolved by motion for summary judgment. See SSI Reply 9.
SSI’s view regarding the Districts’ varying degrees of congestion as well its determination that
the case could be disposed of by motion for summary judgment do not convince the Court that these
administrative issues weigh in favor of transfer. Consequently, the Court finds that this factor
supports maintaining the present forum.
b.
Local interest in having localized interests decided at home
SSI is adamant that transfer is appropriate because the Western District of Louisiana has
extensive connections with relevant facts and events of the case. See Mot. Trans. 15-16. In
particular, it highlights that SSI is a Louisiana corporation; the Policy was issued in Louisiana; and
subsequent transfers of ownership of the Policy occurred in Louisiana. See SSI Reply 9. Plaintiff
disagrees with the extent of Louisiana’s connections and argues that the core of this case is a dispute
between Plaintiff (a Texas resident) and Northwestern Mutual (a Wisconsin insurance company).
See Pl.’s Resp. 22.
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s underlying claim is for breach of contract with
Northwestern Mutual. Nevertheless, the contract at issue and the events that have called into
question her rights thereunder took place in Louisiana. Indeed, other than Plaintiff’s residence here,
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Texas has no connection to the present case. Consequently, the Court finds this factor weighs in
favor of transfer.
c.
Familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case
SSI argues that this case necessarily involves Louisiana insurance, contract, corporate, and
guardianship law. See SSI Reply 10. Though it recognizes that this Court is no doubt capable of
deciding this matter, it points out that an experienced Louisiana federal judge might be more familiar
with the “peculiarities” of that state’s law. Mot. Trans. 16. Plaintiff does not dispute that this case
involves Louisiana law. Instead she argues that SSI has failed to raise a novel issue of Louisiana law
that this Court would need to decide. See Pl.’s Resp. 22-23. Further, she is confident that the
Northern District of Texas is familiar enough with Louisiana law to rule. Id.
The Court agrees with the parties that this case requires application of Louisiana state law
and, further, finds that a Louisiana federal judge would be more familiar with any issues or
“peculiarities” that might arise thereunder. Consequently, the Court finds this factor supports
transfer.
d.
Avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws or in the application of
foreign law
The parties agree that there are no major conflict of law issues and foreign law does not
apply. This factor is therefore neutral.
IV.
CONCLUSION
After considering the above factors, the Court finds that transfer would be for the
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS SSI’s Motion and ORDERS the case TRANSFERRED
to the United States Court for the Western District of Louisiana, Lafayette Division.
So ordered.
Signed October 10, 2013.
_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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