Browning v. Colvin

Filing 18

Memorandum Opinion: The Commissioner's decision is affirmed. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 12/3/2013) (jrr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CAROLYN ANN BROWNING,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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§ Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-1562-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Carolyn Ann Browning (“Browning”) brings this action under § 205(g) of
the Social Security Act (the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her claim for
disability insurance benefits under Title II and supplemental security income under Title
XVI. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I
On March 23, 2011 Browning filed a Title II application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. She also protectively filed a Title XVI application for
supplemental security income. In both applications, she alleged a disability beginning
September 23, 2010. Her application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Following
a hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that Browning is not disabled.
The ALJ followed the five-step sequential process prescribed in 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4) (2013). At step one,1 he concluded that Browning has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since September 23, 2010 (the alleged onset date).
At step two, the ALJ determined that Browning has the following severe impairments:
cervical disc disease and hypertension. He found that Browning’s depression is nonsevere,
presented no more than a mild limitation, and did not cause more than minimal limitation on
her ability to perform basic mental work activities. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ
applied the psychiatric review technique (“PRT”) and considered the four broad functional
areas set forth in § 12.00C of the Listing of Impairments (20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, Subpart P,
Appendix 1): daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; episodes
of decompensation. He found that Browning has no limitations in the first, second, and
fourth areas, and a mild limitation in the third. He therefore concluded that Browning’s
mental impairment is nonsevere.
At step three, the ALJ found that Browning does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals any impairment listed in 20
C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ found that Browning has the following
residual functional capacity (“RFC”):

1

Prior to reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found that Browning meets the insured
status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2014.
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the claimant has the [RFC] to perform light work as defined in
20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except that she must avoid
climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She is also limited to
occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, and occasional
bending, stooping, and overhead reaching bilaterally. Further,
she cannot keep her head or neck in the same position for longer
than one hour.
R. 25 (bold font omitted).
At step four, based on the hearing testimony of the vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ
found that Browning is capable of performing past relevant work as a production coordinator,
sedentary and skilled, because this work does not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by Browning’s RFC.
At step five, the ALJ made the alternative finding that, considering Browning’s age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there are other jobs that exist in significant numbers
in the national economy that Browning can perform, including mail clerk, photocopy
machine operator, and counter clerk.
The ALJ therefore found that Browning has not been under a disability, as defined in
the Act, from September 23, 2010 through the date of his decision. He denied Browning’s
application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits and her application for
supplemental security income on the basis that she is not disabled under the Act.
Browning sought review by the Appeals Council, which denied her request, and the
ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. Browning now seeks judicial
review based on the following three contentions: (1) the PRT is not based on substantial
evidence, making the step two findings erroneous; (2) the hypothetical question posed to the
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VE did not reasonably incorporate all of Browning’s disabilities, as recognized by the ALJ;
and (3) the ALJ erred by not considering 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.927
factors before declining to give weight to the opinions of Browning’s treating specialist.
II
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether
substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standards to evaluate the evidence. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995);
Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). “The Commissioner’s
decision is granted great deference and will not be disturbed unless the reviewing court
cannot find substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision or
finds that the Commissioner made an error of law.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th
Cir. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
“The court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo or substitute its
judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1219 (5th Cir.
1984) (citations omitted). “If the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, then the findings are conclusive and the Commissioner’s decision must be
affirmed.” Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173. “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Greenspan v. Shalala,
38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“It is more than a mere scintilla, and less than a preponderance.” Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d
357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
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curiam)). “To make a finding of ‘no substantial evidence,’ [the court] must conclude that
there is a ‘conspicuous absence of credible choices’ or ‘no contrary medical evidence.’”
Dellolio v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Even if the court
should determine that the evidence preponderates in the claimant’s favor, the court must still
affirm the Commissioner’s findings if there is substantial evidence to support these findings.
See Carry v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 1985). The resolution of conflicting
evidence is for the Commissioner rather than for the court. See Patton v. Schweiker, 697
F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
For purposes of social security determinations, “disability” means an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether an applicant is disabled, the ALJ follows a five-step
sequential analysis. See, e.g., Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir. 2005). If the
ALJ finds that the claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any step in the analysis, the
analysis is terminated. Id. Under the five-step sequential inquiry the Commissioner
considers whether (1) the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity, (2) the
claimant’s impairment is severe, (3) the claimant’s impairment meets or equals an
impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) the impairment
prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work, and (5) the claimant cannot presently
perform relevant work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See, e.g.,
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Leggett, 67 F.3d at 563-64 n.2; Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173-74; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)
(2011). “The burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps, but shifts to the
[Commissioner] at step five.” Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (citing Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)).
When determining the propriety of a decision of “not disabled,” this court’s function
is to ascertain whether the record considered as a whole contains substantial evidence that
supports the final decision of the Commissioner, as trier of fact. The court weighs four
elements of proof to decide if there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical
facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant’s
subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) age, education, and work history.
Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174 (citing Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991) (per
curiam)). “The ALJ has a duty to develop the facts fully and fairly relating to an applicant’s
claim for disability benefits.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. “If the ALJ does not satisfy [this] duty,
[the] decision is not substantially justified.” Id. Reversal of the ALJ’s decision is
appropriate, however, “only if the applicant shows that he was prejudiced.” Id. The court
will not overturn a procedurally imperfect administrative ruling unless the substantive rights
of a party have been prejudiced. See Smith v. Chater, 962 F. Supp. 980, 984 (N.D. Tex.
1997) (Fitzwater, J.).

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III
Browning first contends that the Commissioner and ALJ failed to fulfill their duty to
base the PRT findings on substantial evidence.
A
Browning essentially argues that the ALJ erred in performing the PRT, and his
evaluation of the severity of Browning’s mental impairment is not based on substantial
evidence but is instead based on his own lay opinion, because he did not order a
psychological consultative exam (“CE”) by a medical examiner (“ME”), did not have the ME
complete the PRT, failed to develop the relevant facts and substantiate his findings that
Browning does not have severe mental impairments, and the record indicates that her
limitations in the four PRT functional areas are more severe than the ALJ found. Browning
maintains that the ALJ’s procedural failures are harmful error because, given the strength of
the evidence of her mental depression, conclusions different from the ALJ’s are conceivable.
She relies on the following evidence in the record to demonstrate that her mental impairments
are severe: Dallas MetroCare Services (“MetroCare”) determined that she had a GAF score
of 44; during her period of treatment with MetroCare, she exhibited severe depression; she
testified that she does not like to be around people much; and she has difficulty
concentrating.
In response, the Commissioner argues that Browning’s evidence of mental
impairments is limited; that the ALJ discussed in detail the objective medical evidence
(including the MetroCare records, in particular) and found that her objective mental status
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was still within normal limits; the GAF score of 44 is derived from “an other medical source”
not “an acceptable medical source”; the ALJ properly found that Browning does not have a
severe mental impairment since symptoms of depression do not automatically equate to a
medically determinable mental impairment; Browning did not demonstrate that her
depression caused even minimal work-related limitations; the evidence (including findings
by Hardeep Rai, M.D. (“Dr. Rai”), Browning’s treating physician) contradicts Browning’s
allegations; and Browning failed to meet her burden of demonstrating that she had severe
mental impairments, the ALJ had no duty to request a CE, and the ALJ’s findings did not
prejudice Browning.
B
“The ALJ’s duty to undertake a full inquiry . . . ‘does not require a consultative
examination at government expense unless the record establishes that such an examination
is necessary to enable the administrative law judge to make the disability decision.’” Pierre
v. Sullivan, 884 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Turner v. Califano, 563 F.2d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)). “The decision to require
such an examination is within the discretion of the ALJ.” Id. (citing Jones v. Bowen, 829
F.2d 524, 526 (5th Cir. 1987)). “Reversal is appropriate, however, only if the applicant
shows that she was prejudiced.” Reynaud v. Astrue, 226 Fed. Appx. 401, 402 (5th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam). “Prejudice can be established by showing that had the ALJ adequately
performed his duty, he ‘could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the
result.’” Id. (quoting Kane, 731 F.2d at 1220).
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Even if the court assumes arguendo that the ALJ abused his discretion by failing to
order a CE, Browning has failed to demonstrate that this could and would have adduced
evidence that might have altered the result. As noted, Browning relies on the following
evidence to establish that her mental impairments are more severe than the ALJ found: her
GAF score of 44; she exhibited severe depression while being treated by MetroCare; her
testimony that she does not like to be around people much; and evidence that she has
difficulty concentrating. None of these facts, alone or in combination, is sufficient to show
that completion of the PRT by an ME could and would have adduced evidence that might
have altered the result.
The GAF score of 44 is reflected in a February 17, 2012 treatment plan completed by
Monica R. Thomas (“Nurse Thomas”), an Advanced Practice Nurse (“APN”). Nurse
Thomas is an APN, not a physician or psychologist. An APN is not an “acceptable medical
source,” but is considered an “other medical source” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)(1). The
opinion of an “other medical source,” even one who has regularly treated the claimant, is not
entitled to the same deference as an opinion provided by an “acceptable medical source.”
Thibodeaux v. Astrue, 324 Fed. Appx. 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). “Only
‘acceptable medical sources’ can establish the existence of a medically determinable
impairment, give medical opinions, and be considered treating sources whose medical
opinions may be entitled to controlling weight.” Id.2

2

Browning contends in her reply brief that it is improper for the Commissioner to
contend that Nurse Thomas is not an “acceptable medical source” because the ALJ did not
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Browning argues that the score should be accorded the weight given to an acceptable
medical source because Dr. Ikechukwu Ofomata (“Dr. Ofomata”) oversaw her treatment,
and, because Dr. Ofomata did not alter Nurse Thomas’ GAF, this indicates that he agreed
with the score. She maintains that MetroCare, not just Nurse Thomas, was her treating
source, and MetroCare qualifies as an acceptable medical source, requiring that the ALJ
consider the factors of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) before rejecting the GAF score. But the
authorities she cites do not support her conclusion that a diagnosis or medical finding akin
to a GAF score should be deemed to be that of an acceptable medical source when not
rendered by someone who actually qualifies by regulation as an acceptable medical source.
Her assertion that Dr. Ofomata’s failure to alter the GAF score indicates his agreement with
it is pure supposition that is not even supported by a reasonable inference from the record.
And Browning’s overall diagnosis at MetroCare, of which the GAF score is a part, is
“MAJOR DEPRESSIVE DISORDER, SINGLE EPISODE, SEVERE WITH PSYCHOTIC
FEATURES,” R. 376 (emphasis added); the examination notes from the same day indicate
that Browning’s mental status is normal in many of the functional categories; and the

reject the GAF score on that basis. She invokes the rule that the ALJ’s decision “must stand
or fall with the reasons set forth in the ALJ’s decision.” Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455
(5th Cir. 2000). This is a misapplication of Newton. As this court has explained before,
Newton and the case it cites, Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 149 n.16 (10th Cir. 1985),
address substantial evidence issues. Newton should not be interpreted to require that ALJs
write opinions that give detailed explanations for why they accepted or rejected certain
evidence. See Stephens v. Heckler, 766 F.2d 284, 287 (7th Cir. 1985) (“The ALJs work
under great burdens . . . . When they slow down to write better opinions, that holds up the
queue and prevents deserving people from receiving benefits.”).
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treatment plan reflects that the expected course of treatment is three months, all of which
provide substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s specific finding (which references the
MetroCare records) that “[t]he mental status examination was virtually within normal limits.”
Id. at 23.
Browning notes that she was treated at MetroCare for severe depression. But there
is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding under the PRT that Browning’s
“medically determinable mental impairment of depression does not cause more than minimal
limitation in [her] ability to perform basic mental work activities and is therefore nonsevere,”
id. at 24, as well as his constituent findings under the four broad functional areas of § 12.00C
that she has no limitations in the activities of daily living and social functioning, has
experienced no episodes of decompensation that have been of extended duration, and has
mild limitation in the functional area of concentration, persistence, or pace. Records from
MetroCare indicate that Browning exhibited an organized thought process, normal speech,
cooperative behavior, intact memory, and normal attention.

Additionally, although

Browning was seen by several physicians during the relevant time period, no physician noted
that Browning suffered from a mental impairment. In fact, a January 9, 2012 record from Dr.
Rai, Browning’s treating physician, indicates that Browning was alert and intact
neurologically, with no abnormalities in her insight or judgment. Finally, in her disability
applications, Browning indicated that she did not have trouble completing tasks,
concentrating, understanding, following instructions, or getting along with others.
Accordingly, not only did the ALJ not commit reversible error by failing to arrange for an
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ME to complete the PRT following a consultative examination, the ALJ’s findings based on
his application of the PRT are supported by substantial evidence.
IV
Browning next argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the VE did not
reasonably incorporate all of her disabilities as recognized by the ALJ.3
A
The ALJ posed a hypothetical to the VE that took into account all of Browning’s
physical impairments. As plaintiff acknowledges, “[t]he hypothetical question mirror[ed] the
RFC.” P. Br. 13.4 But plaintiff complains that the ALJ also found that she suffers from mild

3

In her reply brief, plaintiff contends that she has essentially two complaints about the
hypothetical question posed to the VE, one of which is that the PRT findings of none and
mild are not based on substantial evidence. This assertion, however, is not precisely on
point, because plaintiff is challenging how the hypothetical question was framed rather than
whether the hypothetical was based on substantial evidence. Moreover, for the reasons
explained above, the court concludes that the ALJ’s PRT findings are based on substantial
evidence.
4

The ALJ posed the following question to the VE:
Assume this individual has the following limitations; assume the
individual can do light work as defined in our regulations and by
the Secretary of Labor . . . . However, there are further
limitations such as no climbing ladders, ropes and scaffolds;
occasional climbing of ramps and stairs. Also, occasional
bending, stooping and overhead reaching, obviously bilaterally,
all of that occasional and in addition, the individual cannot keep
his or her head or neck in the same position for longer than one
hour. Would such an individual be able to do any of the past
work of this particular claimant or not at all?

R. 64-65.
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limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace, and that the ALJ did not include this
limitation in the hypothetical. She therefore maintains that the ALJ committed reversible
error by failing to adhere to the requirement that he incorporate reasonably all recognized
disabilities. The Commissioner argues on various grounds that the ALJ did not err, but the
court need only consider her contention that Browning had, and took, the opportunity to
correct any perceived defects in the ALJ’s hypothetical question.
B
Under Bowling, if the administrative law judge’s hypothetical
omits a recognized limitation “and the claimant or his
representative is afforded the opportunity to correct deficiencies
in the administrative law judge’s question by mentioning or
suggesting to the vocational expert any purported defects in the
hypothetical questions (including additional disabilities not
recognized by the administrative law judge’s findings and
disabilities recognized but omitted from the question),” there is
no reversible error.
Wise v. Barnhart, 101 Fed. Appx. 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting Bowling,
36 F.3d at 436). Where the claimant’s “representative was allowed to cross-examine the
[VE] regarding the [ALJ’s] hypothetical[,] . . . even assuming, arguendo, that the [ALJ’s]
hypothetical was deficient in the respects urged on appeal, because [the claimant’s]
representative was afforded an opportunity to correct any perceived deficiencies, there is no
reversible error.” Id. (citing Bowling, 36 F.3d at 436). See also, e.g., Gardner v. Massanari,
264 F.3d 1140, 2001 WL 822457, at *2 (5th Cir. June 18, 2001) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision) (“[Plaintiff] does not dispute that his non-attorney representative was allowed
to cross-examine the VE regarding the ALJ’s hypothetical question. Thus, even assuming,
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arguendo, that the ALJ’s hypothetical question was deficient in the respects urged on appeal,
affording [the claimant’s] representative an opportunity to correct any perceived deficiencies
precludes a finding of reversible error.”).
In this case, Browning’s attorney was afforded an opportunity to, and did, crossexamine the VE in order to correct deficiencies in the ALJ’s question by mentioning or
suggesting to the VE any purported defects in the hypothetical. Browning’s attorney was
aware of the mental limitations that Browning was alleging, and, after the ALJ failed to
include mental limitations in the hypothetical, asked the VE in her cross-examination
whether Browning could perform the job of production coordinator if she “was limited to
understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions,” and whether there would
be “transferable skills to sedentary . . . [w]ork if the individual was limited to understanding,
remembering and carrying out simple instructions[.]” R. 67.
Browning maintains, however, that she must be given a “real” opportunity to correct
the defects in the hypothetical in order for the error not to be reversible, and she posits that
she had no such opportunity because she had no way of knowing that the ALJ would
determine that she has moderate and mild mental limitations.5 The court disagrees.
First, this contention is not supported by the law of this circuit, which only requires
that the claimant’s attorney or representative be given the opportunity through crossexamination to correct deficiencies in the ALJ’s question by mentioning or suggesting to the

5

The Commissioner disagrees that the ALJ made such a determination, see D. Br. 13
n.7, but the court will assume arguendo for purposes of this argument that he did.
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VE any purported defects in the hypothetical questions, “including additional disabilities not
recognized by the ALJ’s findings.” Bowling, 36 F.3d at 436 (emphasis added).
Second, even if more than such an opportunity were required, Browning’s attorney
knew at the time of the hearing that Browning was seeing a mental health worker, that she
does not like being around people much, and that she sometimes has problems with memory
and concentration. Her questions to the VE on cross-examination demonstrate that she
contemplated that Browning might rely on evidence of such limitations to establish that she
is disabled.
Because Browning’s attorney was clearly afforded the opportunity on crossexamination to correct deficiencies—assuming there were any—in the ALJ’s hypothetical
to the VE by mentioning or suggesting any purported defects in the hypothetical, any error
is not reversible error.
V
Finally, Browning contends that the ALJ erred by failing to consider the 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1527 and 416.927 factors before declining to give weight to her treating specialist.
She essentially asserts what is known as Newton-type error.
A
Browning contends that the ALJ implicitly rejected the opinions of two of her treating
physicians, Byron E. Strain, M.D. (“Dr. Strain”) and Kavitha Nalla, M.D. (“Dr. Nalla”). She
cites Dr. Strain’s opinion limiting her to performing work in sedentary light-duty positions
with certain restrictions and Dr. Nalla’s restrictions on Browning’s work activities, and she
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maintains that neither physician’s opinion would allow her to perform a full range of light
work. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ did not commit Newton-type error because
he relied on the opinions of Browning’s treating and examining physicians. Addressing
Browning’s assertion that the medical source statements of Drs. Nalla and Strain would not
allow her to perform the full range of light work, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ
only found that Browning could perform a restricted range of light work. Browning argues
in reply that the ALJ was still required to explain the weight given to the treating physicians
and provide a rationale for the weight given, and, even if he did not give a treating source
controlling weight, the source was still entitled to deference and must be weighed by using
all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927.
B
Under Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000), “an ALJ is required to consider
each of the § 404.1527(d) factors before declining to give any weight to the opinions of the
claimant’s treating specialist.” Id. at 456. The ALJ may give little or no weight to a treating
source’s opinion only if good cause is shown. Id. at 455-56. Here, however, the ALJ did not
decline to give weight to the medical source statements and opinions of Drs. Strain and Nalla.
Browning has therefore failed to establish reversible Newton-type error.
On October 7, 2010 Dr. Nalla treated Browning after she slipped and fell at work,
“hurting [her] head, neck, shoulders, arms, and right knee.” R. 255. Dr. Nalla noted that
Browning could return to work, but could not climb, drive or operate machinery, or function
in a safety-sensitive position. Dr. Nalla also noted that Browning should avoid overhead
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work. Dr. Strain opined on February 7, 2011 that Browning was able to return to “a
sedentary light-duty position with no overhead reaching or lifting. She should be able to
lift/carry 10-15 pounds. She should be able to push/pull 10-15 pounds.” Id. at 271. The ALJ
noted in his decision the “Physician Activity Status Report” (a report that Dr. Nalla
completed) in which Dr. Nalla released Browning to “return to work on October 7, 2010 with
the following restrictions: unable to drive or operate machinery, no climbing, and may not
function in a safety sensitive position.” Id. at 22. He also noted a “Texas Workers’
Compensation Work Status Report” completed by Dr. Strain that
indicated that the claimant could return to work as of February
7, 2011 with the restrictions of: lift/carry objects more than 1015 pounds for more than 4 hours per day, walking a maximum
of 6 hours per day, no climbing stairs or ladders, no overhead
reaching, pushing/pulling a maximum of 4 hours per day,
bending stooping a maximum of 6 hours per day, and no
running.
Id. at 23. The ALJ found that Browning can perform “light work” with the following
restrictions:
she must avoid climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She is also
limited to occasional climbing of ramps and stairs, and
occasional bending, stooping, and overhead reaching bilaterally.
Further, she cannot keep her head or neck in the same position
for longer than one hour.
Id. at 25 (bold font omitted). The ALJ did not find that Browning can perform the full range
of light work without restrictions. It is therefore apparent from the ALJ’s RFC finding that
he in fact gave weight to the opinions of Drs. Strain and Nalla. No further explanation or
discussion of the 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927 factors was necessary in these
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circumstances. Browning has therefore failed to show reversible error on this ground.
*

*

*

Accordingly, for the reasons explained, the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
December 3, 2013.

_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE

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