Lee v. Colvin

Filing 26

Memorandum Opinion and Order: The hearing decision is reversed and this case is remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. (See order for specifics) (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L Horan on 4/23/2014) (mcrd)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHAWN LEE,

§
§
Plaintiff,
§
§
V.
§
§
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
§
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, §
§
Defendant.
§

No. 3:13-cv-1811-BN

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Shawn Sang Lee seeks judicial review of a final adverse decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). For the reasons stated
herein, the hearing decision is reversed and remanded.
Background
Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled due to a variety of ailments, including a
breathing-related sleep disorder, left wrist tenosynovitis (arthritis), right wrist
tenosynovitis (arthritis), cervical spine myofascial syndrome, lumbar spine myofascial
syndrome, left knee patellofemoral syndrome, right knee patellofemoral syndrome,
depression, fibromyalgia, and tinea versicolor. See Administrative Record [Dkt. Nos.
15 & 16] (“Tr.”) at 142. After his application for disability benefits was denied initially
and on reconsideration, Plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law
judge (“ALJ”). See id. at 1, 10, 70-71. That hearing was held on January 11, 2013. See
id. at 27-50. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 44 years old. See id. at 30. He is
a college graduate and has past work experience as a transportation supervisor and

automobile salesman. See id. at 32-34. Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since August 31, 2010. See id. at 30.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to
disability benefits. See id. at 13. Although the medical evidence established that
Plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine, a history of
patellofemoral syndrome of the bilateral knees with limited extension, sleep disorder
with mild obstructive sleep apnea, and major depressive disorder, see id. at 15-16, the
ALJ concluded that the severity of those impairments did not meet or equal any
impairment listed in the social security regulations, see id. at 16-17. The ALJ further
determined that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a limited
range of sedentary work, see id. at 17-20, but could not return to his past relevant
employment, see id. at 20-21. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff was capable of working as a cutter/paster and an addresser – jobs
that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. See id. at 21-22.
Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Appeals Council. See id. at 9. The Appeals
Council affirmed. See id. at 1.
Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court. See Dkt. No. 1. In a single
ground for relief, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly rejected the opinions of
his treating physician. See Dkt. No. 22 at 9.
The Court determines that the hearing decision is reversed and this case is
remanded to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
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Legal Standards
Judicial review in social security cases is limited to determining whether the
Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the proper
legal standards were used to evaluate the evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ripley v.
Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995). Substantial evidence is “more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The
Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence, including
weighing conflicting testimony and determining witnesses’ credibility, and the Court
does not try the issues de novo. See Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 174 (5th Cir.
1995); Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 1994). This Court may not
reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s but must
scrutinize the entire record to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports the
hearing decision. See Hollis v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1378, 1383 (5th Cir. 1988).
A disabled worker is entitled to monthly social security benefits if certain
conditions are met. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). The Act defines “disability” as the inability to
engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or last for a continued
period of 12 months. See id. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also Cook v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 391, 393
(5th Cir. 1985). The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step sequential evaluation
process that must be followed in making a disability determination:

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1.

The hearing officer must ascertain whether the claimant is
engaged in substantial gainful activity. A claimant who is working
is not disabled regardless of the medical findings.

2.

The hearing officer must determine whether the claimed
impairment is “severe.” A “severe impairment” must significantly
limit the claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. This determination must be made solely on the basis of
the medical evidence.

3.

The hearing officer must decide if the impairment meets or equals
in severity certain impairments described in Appendix 1 of the
regulations. The hearing officer must make this determination
using only medical evidence.

4.

If the claimant has a “severe impairment” covered by the
regulations, the hearing officer must determine whether the
claimant can perform his or her past work despite any limitations.

5.

If the claimant does not have the residual functional capacity to
perform past work, the hearing officer must decide whether the
claimant can perform any other gainful and substantial work in
the economy. This determination is made on the basis of the
claimant’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f); Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 447-48 (5th Cir. 2007)
(“In evaluating a disability claim, the Commissioner conducts a five-step sequential
analysis to determine whether (1) the claimant is presently working; (2) the claimant
has a severe impairment; (3) the impairment meets or equals an impairment listed in
appendix 1 of the social security regulations; (4) the impairment prevents the claimant
from doing past relevant work; and (5) the impairment prevents the claimant from
doing any other substantial gainful activity.”). The claimant bears the initial burden
of establishing a disability through the first four steps of the analysis; on the fifth, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other substantial work in the
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national economy that the claimant can perform. See Audler, 501 F.3d at 448. A finding
that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is
conclusive and terminates the analysis. See Lovelace v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 55, 58 (5th
Cir. 1987).
In reviewing the propriety of a decision that a claimant is not disabled, the
Court’s function is to ascertain whether the record as a whole contains substantial
evidence to support the Commissioner’s final decision. The Court weighs four elements
to determine whether there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical
facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) subjective
evidence of pain and disability; and (4) the claimant’s age, education, and work history.
See Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174.
The ALJ has a duty to fully and fairly develop the facts relating to a claim for
disability benefits. See Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. If the ALJ does not satisfy this duty, the
resulting decision is not substantially justified. See id. However, the Court does not
hold the ALJ to procedural perfection and will reverse the ALJ’s decision as not
supported by substantial evidence where the claimant shows that the ALJ failed to
fulfill the duty to adequately develop the record only if that failure prejudiced Plaintiff,
see Jones v. Astrue, 691 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2012) – that is, only if Plaintiff’s
substantial rights have been affected, see Audler, 501 F.3d at 448. “Prejudice can be
established by showing that additional evidence would have been produced if the ALJ
had fully developed the record, and that the additional evidence might have led to a
different decision.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 n.22. Put another way, Plaintiff “must show
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that he could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result.”
Brock v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1996).
Analysis
In a single issue, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to adequately consider
the opinion of his treating physician, Dr. Anthony C. Jung. Plaintiff asserts that the
ALJ failed to provide good cause, supported by substantial evidence, for rejecting Dr.
Jung’s opinions, that the ALJ failed to analyze the six factors found in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(c) before rejecting Dr. Jung’s opinions, and that Plaintiff was prejudiced by
these errors.
On December 14, 2013, Dr. Jung completed a Physical Residual Functional
Capacity Questionnaire in which he offered his opinion regarding the severity of and
functional limitations caused by Plaintiff’s impairments. See Tr. at 695-97. Dr. Jung
opined that, during an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could sit for five hours, stand or
walk for one hour, and needed to lie down or recline for two hours due to the severity
of his back pain. See id. at 695. Dr. Jung also noted that Plaintiff would need flexibility
to change positions frequently. See id. Dr. Jung limited Plaintiff to lifting and carrying
twenty pounds occasionally and up to ten pounds frequently due to back and neck pain.
See id. at 696. Dr. Jung also restricted Plaintiff from repetitive action involving
pushing or pulling with both hands. See id. Dr. Jung assessed Plaintiff’s pain as
moderate to severe, meaning that it would either cause a marked handicap in or
preclude the performance of the activity precipitating pain, and opined that Plaintiff’s
pain would frequently interfere with attention and concentration. See id. at 696-97. Dr.
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Jung also opined that Plaintiff would need frequent rest periods during the day, and
that, as a result, Plaintiff would be an unreliable worker. See id. at 697.
The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to
perform sedentary work but that Plaintiff was limited to occasional stooping,
balancing, and climbing of ramps and stairs and precluded from crouching, crawling,
kneeling, or climbing ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The ALJ also found that, due to
psychologically based factors, Plaintiff has some limitations but is able to understand,
remember, and carry out simple instructions, make simple decisions, attend and
concentrate for extended periods, interact with others, accept instructions, and respond
to changes in a routine work setting. See id. at 17.
The ALJ gave Dr. Jung’s opinion “some weight” because the ALJ determined
that “only some of the restrictions were supported by objective medical evidence.” Id.
at 19-20. The ALJ found that Dr. Jung’s opinions concerning Plaintiff’s restrictions in
sitting, standing/walking, and lifting were consistent with Plaintiff’s lumbar pain, and,
given the restrictions on standing/walking, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary work
based, in part, on Dr. Jung’s opinion. See id. at 19, 20. But the ALJ did not include any
functional limitations regarding use of the hands in the RFC finding because he found
there was no clinical evidence of weakness or limited range of motion in the bilateral
hands and because x-rays of both hands and the right wrist were normal. See id. at 19.
And the ALJ did not address Dr. Jung’s opinions that Plaintiff would need flexibility
to change positions frequently and frequent rest periods during the day, Plaintiff’s
attention and concentration would frequently be impaired due to pain, and Plaintiff
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would be an unreliable worker. See id. at 19-20. The ALJ stated that he considered the
opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of and cited to 20 C.F.R.
404.1527, see id. at 17, but he did not expressly address the Section 404.1527(c)(2)
factors in his decision, see id. at 14-23.
The opinion of a treating physician who is familiar with the claimant’s
impairments, treatments, and responses should be accorded great weight in
determining disability. See Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 566 (5th Cir. 1995);
Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237. A treating physician’s opinion on the nature and severity
of a patient’s impairment will be given controlling weight if it is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with ... other substantial evidence.” Martinez, 64 F.3d at 175-76 (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)). And “[t]he opinion of a specialist generally is accorded greater
weight than that of a non-specialist.” Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 455 (5th Cir.
2000). However, the ALJ is “free to reject the opinion of any physician when the
evidence supports a contrary conclusion” when good cause is shown. Id. at 455-56
(internal quotations omitted). An ALJ may show good cause “where the treating
physician’s evidence is conclusory, is unsupported by medically acceptable clinical,
laboratory, or diagnostic techniques, or is otherwise unsupported by the evidence.” Id.
at 456.
Section 404.1527(c)(2) requires the ALJ to consider specific factors “to assess the
weight to be given to the opinion of a treating physician when the ALJ determines that

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[the opinion] is not entitled to ‘controlling weight.’” Id. at 456. Specifically, the ALJ
must consider:
(1) the physician’s length of treatment of the claimant;
(2) the physician’s frequency of examination;
(3) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship;
(4) the support of the physician’s opinion afforded by the medical evidence
of record;
(5) the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole; and
(6) the specialization of the treating physician.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see also Newton, 209 F.3d at 456. The ALJ must consider
all six of the Section 404.1527(c)(2) factors if “controlling weight” is not given to a
treating physician’s medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) (“Unless we give a
treating source’s opinion controlling weight under paragraph (c)(2) of this section, we
consider all of the following factors in deciding the weight we give to any medical
opinion.”); see also Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 2001); McDonald v. Apfel,
No. 3:97-CV-2035-R, 1998 WL 159938, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1998).
In Newton, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “an ALJ is required to consider each
of the § 404.1527[(c)] factors before declining to give any weight to the opinions of the
claimant’s treating specialist.” 209 F.3d at 456. However, in decisions construing
Newton, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “[t]he Newton court limited its holding to
cases where the ALJ rejects the sole relevant medical opinion before it.” Qualls v.
Astrue, 339 F. App’x 461, 467 (5th Cir. 2009). Therefore, where there are competing

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opinions of examining physicians, the ALJ need not necessarily set forth his analysis
of the Section 404.1527(c) factors when declining to give controlling weight to a
treating physician. See id. at 466-67.
To make the RFC determination, the ALJ reviewed Dr. Jung’s opinions as well
as medical evidence concerning Plaintiff’s back, knees, right wrist, and mental
disorders, Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, and the opinions of evaluating
psychologists and the State agency medical consultant. See Tr. at 17-21. The ALJ first
noted that Plaintiff was in the Army from 2003 to 2010 and had been granted veterans
benefits based on a 70% disability rating for his physical and mental impairments. See
id. at 18. The ALJ gave weight to the Veterans Administration ruling but explained
that the Veterans Administration and Social Security Administration define disability
differently. See id.
The ALJ concluded that there was a lack of objective medical evidence to
substantiate Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain. See id. In March 2012, a MRI of
Plaintiff’s lumbar spine showed a disc protrusion at L5-S1 indenting the thecal sac but
with no significant narrowing, and a cervical spine x-ray showed that all disc spaces
were maintained and well aligned. See id. at 18, 240-43. Plaintiff also had negative xrays of the bilateral knees and right wrist. See id. at 18, 243-44, 479. Treating records
noted that there were no arthritic changes seen on x-ray, examination of the bilateral
wrist and hands yielded no significant clinical findings, and examination of the knees
was unremarkable, with normal range of motion and no signs of redness, swelling, or
palpable crepitus. See id. at 18, 407, 409, 542-44, 647.
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The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff’s allegations of disability are inconsistent
with his reported activities of daily living. See id. at 18. Plaintiff reported no significant
limitations in activities of daily living in his Function Report. See id. at 18, 207-14.
Treating notes indicated that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living were intact and that
he was able to attend to them independently with little difficulty. See id. at 18-19, 770778. But see id. 542-43 (“activities of daily living are not limited, though they are
difficult to accomplish”).
Based on his review of Plaintiff’s medical records, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
appeared to be a fairly active individual, able to enjoy playing golf and going to the
gym, as well as being able to take care of his elderly parents by driving them to doctor’s
appointments and running errands for them. See id. at 19, 208, 361, 371, 580.
The ALJ also concluded that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living undermined
allegations that he is incapable of sustaining the mental demands of regular,
competitive work activity. See id. at 19. Treating records indicate that Plaintiff has a
history of sleep disorder with mild obstructive sleep apnea and depression. See id. at
19, 376, 394-97. During a psychological examination in March 2011, Plaintiff reported
symptoms of insomnia, diminished pleasure, fatigue, feelings of worthlessness/guilt,
and poor concentration. He was treated with medications and regular behavioral
therapy. See id. at 19, 348, 358, 373, 379-82, 633, 829. Plaintiff was found to meet the
criteria for major depressive disorder in May 2012. See id. at 19, 549, 759. But the ALJ
observed that Plaintiff reported enjoying several hobbies, such as playing golf, going
to the gym, and going out socially with friends, and that, in the fall of 2012, Plaintiff
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chose to return to school to pursue a graduate degree, which led to reduced therapy
sessions. See id. at 19, 361, 371, 549, 759, 764. Based on this evidence, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff’s psychological symptoms were not disabling. See id. at 19.
The ALJ also considered the opinions of two clinical psychologists who evaluated
Plaintiff in December 2012. See id. at 20, 769-78. Plaintiff’s primary diagnosis was
major depressive disorder, mainly as a result of current unemployment. See id. at 20,
769, 778. Plaintiff reported depressed mood with anxiety attacks one to two times a
month and passive suicidal ideations once a week. See id. at 20, 773-74, 776. Despite
his symptoms, Plaintiff’s intellectual functioning was average and his activities of daily
living were intact. See id. at 778. Overall, Plaintiff was expected to have mild to
moderate occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity
due to symptoms of poor motivation, difficulties with concentration and focus,
irritability, and isolation from family. See id. at 20, 771, 778. Plaintiff’s chronic pain
symptoms would also affect his functioning. See id. at 778.
The ALJ observed that, while the psychologists opined that Plaintiff’s major
depressive disorder and sleep disorder rendered it difficult to secure work, they found
only mild to moderate impairment in social and occupational functioning, and the ALJ
considered their conclusion to be consistent with the treating evidence and Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living reflecting adequate adaptive living. See id. at 20. The ALJ
therefore concluded that Plaintiff is capable of carrying out simple work in the course
of regular, competitive work activity. See id.

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The ALJ also considered the opinions of the State agency medical consultants
who determined in May 2012 that Plaintiff could perform the exertional demands of
light work, with frequent balancing, occasional stooping, kneeling, crouching, crawling,
and climbing of ramps and stairs and no climbing of ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. See
id. at 20, 522-20. They also determined that Plaintiff is maximally able to understand,
remember, and carry out detailed but not complex instructions, make basic decisions,
attend and concentrate for extended periods, interact with others, accept instructions,
and respond to changes in a routine work setting. See id. at 20, 530-33. Even though
the ALJ gave this evidence some weight as the opinions of a non-examining source, the
ALJ limited Plaintiff to sedentary work based on the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating
physician and in consideration of Plaintiff’s back and knee problems. See id. at 20. The
ALJ also limited Plaintiff to simple work because of the combined effect of Plaintiff’s
depression and chronic pain. See id.
The ALJ gave the treating physician’s opinions some, but not controlling, weight
because he concluded that only some of Dr. Jung’s restrictions were supported by
objective medical evidence. See id. at 19.
First, the ALJ found that Dr. Jung’s opinions concerning Plaintiff’s disabilities
related to his back and knees to be consistent with his lumbar pain; the ALJ therefore
limited Plaintiff to sedentary work with postural restrictions. See id. at 19-20. But,
although the ALJ seemingly found Dr. Jung’s limitations on Plaintiff’s sitting,
standing, and walking to be supported by objective medical evidence, Plaintiff argues

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that those limitations are inconsistent with the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could do
sedentary work.
Second, the ALJ stated that he did not find a basis to assign restrictions in
grasping or fine manipulation – but Dr. Jung did not recommend those restrictions. See
id. 19, 696. Dr. Jung opined that Plaintiff’s hand-related disorders would limit him in
repetitive action involving pushing and pulling, but the ALJ found no clinical evidence
of weakness or limited range of motion in the bilateral hands and noted that x-rays of
both hands and the right wrist were normal. See id. at 19, 542-45. The ALJ therefore
rejected Dr. Jung’s opinion and did not include any functional limitations regarding
use of the hands. See id. at 18.
Third, the ALJ did not expressly address Dr. Jung’s opinions that Plaintiff
needed the flexibility to change positions frequently, that Plaintiff’s pain would
frequently interfere with attention and concentration, that Plaintiff would need
frequent rest periods during the day, and that, as a result of these frequent rest
periods, Plaintiff would be an unreliable worker. See id. at 19-20, 695, 697. Plaintiff
argues that the failure to do so was prejudicial because the vocational expert testified
that the need to lie down or recline for two hours during the workday – a limitation
assessed by Dr. Jung – would preclude the performance of competitive employment,
as would the lifting, carrying, sitting, and standing limitations and concentration
issues assessed by Dr. Jung. See id. at 47-48.
The Court acknowledges that the ALJ did recite, with no further elaboration,
that he considered “all symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can
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reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and other
evidence, based on the requirements of 20 CFR § 404.1529 and SSRs 96-4p and 96-7p,”
and that he “also considered opinion evidence in accordance with the requirements of
20 CFR § 404.1527 and SSRs 96-2p, 96-5p, 96-6p and 06-3p.” Id. at 19. But this
statement, on its own, is not sufficient to satisfy Newton’s standards. The ALJ did not
find that Dr. Jung’s findings, as the treating physician, were brief, conclusory,
unsupported by acceptable diagnostic techniques, or otherwise unsupported by the
evidence in way other than the lack of clinical evidence concerning hand limitations.
See Newton, 209 F.3d at 456; see also Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 237. To the extent the ALJ
may have found that Dr. Jung’s opinions were inconsistent with other evidence in the
record – rather than inconsistent with the conclusions of other experts – those alleged
inconsistencies seem to rely on Plaintiff’s activities of daily living or the State agency
medical consultants’ opinions. See Tr. at 17-20.
Courts in this district do not always require the ALJ to discuss each of the
Section 404.1527(c)(1) factors if it is clear that the ALJ has nevertheless considered the
factors and the ALJ’s decision to give no weight to the treating physician constitutes
“good cause.” Brock v. Astrue, No. 3:10-cv-1399-BD, 2011 WL 4348305, at *4 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 16, 2011).
But, in this case, the ALJ did not provide “good cause” for rejecting Dr. Jung’s
opinion, which was supported by the medical record and which the ALJ partially cited
but eventually rejected without explanation. “Good cause does not exist when the ALJ

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has not considered all relevant evidence of record.” Bragg v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 567 F. Supp. 2d 893, 911 (N.D. Tex. 2008).
The Court notes that the evidence in the record may well support a finding that
Plaintiff is not disabled. But “[t]he ALJ’s decision must stand or fall with the reasons
set forth in the ALJ’s decision, as adopted by the Appeals Council.” Newton, 209 F.3d
at 455. “Reviewing courts do not consider rationales supporting an ALJ’s decision that
are not invoked by the ALJ.” Bragg, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
The ALJ’s failure to consider the Section 404.1527 factors when rejecting Dr.
Jung’s opinions was prejudicial error. It is the ALJ’s responsibility to weigh the
evidence, and the Court is unable to say what the ALJ would have done had he
weighed all relevant evidence of record. The opinions expressed by Dr. Jung included
significant limitations beyond those that the ALJ recognized in determining both
Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity and his ability to engage in any form of
substantial gainful activity. Had the ALJ given proper consideration to the treating
physician’s records and assessment of Plaintiff’s ability to engage in work-related
activities, the ALJ might have reached a different decision as to disability.
This is especially true in light of the fact that the burden lies with the
Commissioner at Step 5 to identify gainful employment available in the national
economy that the claimant is capable of performing. See Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236; see
also Myers, 238 F.3d at 621-22 (holding that remand was required when the ALJ failed
to consider all evidence from a treating source and failed to present good cause for
rejecting it); Newton, 238 F.3d at 621-22 (holding that remand was required when the
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ALJ failed to consider each of the Section 404.1527 factors before declining to give
weight to the opinions of the claimant’s treating specialist); Harris v. Astrue, No.
3:11-cv-1089-M-BH, 2012 WL 4442303, at *15 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2012), rec. adopted,
2012 WL 4458405 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2012).
The ALJ’s failure to consider the Section 404.1527 factors in connection with Dr.
Jung’s opinion was prejudicial error, and this matter must be reversed and remanded.
Conclusion
The hearing decision is reversed and this case is remanded to the Commissioner
of Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
DATED: April 23, 2014

_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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