Nieves v. John Bean Technologies Corporation
Filing
14
Memorandum Opinion and Order Denying 12 MOTION to JoinEMR Elevator, Inc. filed by Marangelis Nieves. (Ordered by Chief Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 6/10/2014) (cea)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MARANGELIS NIEVES,
Plaintiff,
VS.
JOHN BEAN TECHNOLOGIES
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
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§ Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-4059-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Plaintiff Marangelis Nieves (“Nieves”) moves for leave to join EMR Elevator, Inc.
(“EMR”) as a defendant more than two months following the expiration of the deadline for
filing motions for leave to join parties. For the reasons that follow, the court denies the
motion.
I
Nieves alleges that she was injured in an accident involving an escalator at the
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport in June 2012. During pre-suit settlement discussions, defendant
John Bean Technologies Corporation (“JBT”) informed Nieves’ counsel in writing on April
8, 2013 that it was not liable because its subcontractor, EMR, inspected and approved the
escalator the day before the accident. After settlement discussions ended, Nieves filed suit
in state court, alleging claims against JBT for negligence, premises liability, and negligence
per se. JBT removed the action to this court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332. The court entered a scheduling order on November 21, 2013, which set
February 14, 2014 as the deadline for filing motions for leave to join parties. On May 2,
2014 Nieves filed this motion for leave to join EMR as a defendant. JBT opposes the
motion.
II
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A) provides that the court’s “scheduling order must limit the
time to join other parties.” When a motion for leave to join parties is filed after the
court-ordered deadline, the court must first decide whether to modify the scheduling order
under the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard. See S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank
of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003); Am. Tourmaline Fields v. Int’l Paper Co.,
1998 WL 874825, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 1998) (Fitzwater, J.). When the motion is for
leave to join parties, the movant must satisfy the requirements of Rule 16(b)(4) before the
court can consider whether to grant leave to join under the more liberal standard of Rule 20,
which provides:
Persons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if:
(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally,
or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
and
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.
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Rule 20(a)(2).1 Because Nieves’ motion for leave to join EMR was filed more than two
months after the deadline for the joinder of parties, Nieves must satisfy Rule 16(b)(4) and
demonstrate good cause for amending the scheduling order.
The good cause standard “require[s] the movant ‘to show that the deadlines cannot
reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’” Puig v.
Citibank, N.A., 514 Fed. Appx. 483, 487-88 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (quoting S&W
Enters., 315 F.3d at 535). The court assesses four factors when deciding whether the movant
has shown good cause under Rule 16(b)(4): “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely
move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in
allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.”
S&W Enters., 315 F.3d at 536 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). The court
considers the four factors holistically and “does not mechanically count the number of factors
that favor each side.” EEOC v. Serv. Temps, Inc., 2009 WL 3294863, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct.
13, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.), aff’d, 679 F.3d 323 (5th Cir. 2012).
1
“Courts have described Rule 20 as creating a two-prong test, allowing joinder of
plaintiffs when (1) their claims arise out of the ‘same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences’ and when (2) there is at least one common question of law or
fact linking all claims.” Acevedo v. Allsup’s Convenience Stores, Inc., 600 F.3d 516, 521
(5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “Generally, as long as both prongs of the test are met,
‘permissive joinder of plaintiffs . . . is at the option of the plaintiffs.’” Id. (quoting
Applewhite v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 67 F.3d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1995)). “However, even
if this test is satisfied, district courts have the discretion to refuse joinder in the interest of
avoiding prejudice and delay, ensuring judicial economy, or safeguarding principles of
fundamental fairness.” Id. (citations omitted).
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III
Nieves neither identifies the correct standard nor cites Rule 16(b)(4) in her brief, but
the grounds on which she relies enable the court to apply the pertinent four-factor test.2
A
The court first considers Nieves’ explanation. Nieves argues that JBT failed to
disclose EMR under N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 3.1(c), which requires
a separately signed certificate of interested persons . . . that
contains—in addition to the information required by Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7.1(a)—a complete list of all persons, associations of
persons, firms, partnerships, corporations, guarantors, insurers,
affiliates, parent or subsidiary corporations, or other legal
entities that are financially interested in the outcome of the case.
She contends that she relied on JBT’s certificate of disclosure and did not realize until after
the deadline for moving to join parties had elapsed that EMR may have also been responsible
for maintaining the escalator in question. JBT responds that it informed Nieves before the
deadline that EMR might be a potential defendant. It contends that it did so twice: (1) by
2
In its response brief, JBT notes that Nieves fails to identify the correct standard for
granting the requested relief. Nieves did not file a reply brief, and has therefore failed to
address this issue. “When a party files an untimely motion . . . and does not address the good
cause standard under Rule 16(b)(4), this court typically denies the motion for that reason
alone.” Wachovia Bank, Nat’l Ass’n v. Schlegel, 2010 WL 2671316, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June
30, 2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Serv. Temps, 2009 WL 3294863, at *1) (addressing
motions for leave to amend). But the court has made exceptions in cases where the movant
did not address the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard but the grounds on which it relied to
establish good cause were relatively clear. See, e.g., Cartier v. Egana of Switzerland (Am.)
Corp., 2009 WL 614820, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2009) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (“Cartier does not
brief its motion under the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard or related case law, but the
grounds on which it relies to establish good cause are relatively clear.”).
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letter dated April 8, 2013,3 and (2) by its Rule 26 disclosures, which were filed December 17,
2013.4
The court finds that Nieves’ explanation is inadequate. Regardless whether JBT
included EMR in its certificate of interested persons,5 JBT disclosed the identity of the
subcontractor on two separate occasions—well before the deadline for seeking leave to join
parties. Under these circumstances, it is clear that Nieves was on notice that EMR, as a
subcontractor to JBT, had inspected the escalator in question the day before the accident.
Nieves’ notice of these facts before the February 14, 2014 deadline suggests that it could
have complied with the scheduling order deadline for seeking leave to join EMR. See Am.
Tourmaline Fields, 1998 WL 874825, at *2 (holding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate good
cause where it was aware of certain facts but failed to amend by the court-ordered deadline).
3
JBT has attached a copy of the April 8, 2013 letter to its response brief. The letter,
which is addressed to Nieves’ counsel, plainly states: “The police report also indicates that
our subcontractor, EMR Elevator, checked the escalator and found it to be functioning
properly. EMR did not report, and we have not received any reports from the time period at
issue, which would suggest that the escalator was grabbing pedestrians’ shoes or operating
anything other than normally.” D. App. A.
4
JBT has also attached a copy of its Rule 26 disclosures, which disclose EMR as being
the entity that “was hired to install and maintain the escalator in question.” D. App. B-2.
5
A certificate of interested persons, as contemplated by N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 3.1(c) and
Rule 7.1(a), is required to provide financial information that enables the judge to determine
whether recusal is required based on the judge’s financial self-interest. See Rule 7.1
Advisory Committee’s note (2002 Adoption) (“Although the disclosures required by Rule
7.1(a) may seem limited, they are calculated to reach a majority of the circumstances that are
likely to call for disqualification on the basis of financial information that a judge may not
know or recollect.”). Nieves has failed to show that EMR is financially affiliated with JBT
so that JBT was obligated to include EMR in the certificate of interested persons.
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Nieves’ assertion that her counsel did not “realize” EMR could be joined as a defendant until
after the deadline is not sufficient to demonstrate good cause. See, e.g., EEOC v. Serv.
Temps, Inc., 679 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding this court did not abuse its discretion
in denying motion for leave to amend because movant did not offer plausible explanation for
delay); 6A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.2, at 322-25 (3d
ed. 2010) (“Attorney neglect or inadvertence will not constitute good cause supporting
modification.”).
B
The next factor is the importance of the requested relief. Because Nieves has not
briefed her motion under the Rule 16(b)(4) good cause standard, she makes no attempt to
show that the relief is important. At best, she asserts that EMR “may also have been
responsible for the maintenance of the escalator at issue.” P. Mot. 1. The court concludes
that Nieves has failed to demonstrate the importance of the requested relief.6
C
The court next considers the potential prejudice to JBT in granting the requested relief
and the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Nieves asserts in conclusory
fashion that she “does not see how [JBT] would be prejudiced by the joinder of another
6
JBT states in its response brief that Nieves filed a separate lawsuit against EMR in
state court on the same day she filed the instant motion in this court. Therefore, the record
indicates that Nieves will not be precluded from recovering against EMR if she has a valid
claim.
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Defendant,” and notes that “[JBT] could only benefit from the addition of another potentially
responsible party.” P. Mot. 2. JBT responds that it would be prejudiced by the court’s
granting leave to join EMR because it would destroy diversity jurisdiction and force JBT to
litigate the case in state court since EMR is a non-diverse party.
The court concludes that granting Nieves leave to join EMR, who is a non-diverse
party, would prejudice JBT, and that a continuance would not cure such prejudice. “When
a plaintiff seeks to join a non-diverse defendant after a case is removed based on diversity,
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) gives the court the discretion to deny joinder or permit it and remand the
case to state court.”7 Alba v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4287786, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 19, 2008) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182
(5th Cir. 1987)). “The court must therefore balance the original defendant’s interest in
maintaining a federal forum with the competing interest in avoiding potentially parallel
litigation.” Anaya v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 2011 WL 1807786, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 12,
2011) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citation omitted).
In determining whether to allow a non-diverse party to be
joined, the court considers four factors: (1) whether plaintiff’s
purpose is to defeat federal jurisdiction; (2) whether plaintiff has
been dilatory in asking for an amendment; (3) whether plaintiff
will be significantly injured if amendment is not allowed; and
(4) any other factors bearing on the equities.
7
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e): “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants
whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or
permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.”
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Id. (citing Hensgens, 833 F.2d at 1182).
Here, Nieves has been dilatory in seeking leave to join EMR as a party, and she has
failed to demonstrate that she will be significantly prejudiced if she cannot do so. Although
she may be forced to litigate her action against EMR in state court,8 which would entail
parallel litigation that would involve inefficiency and additional expense, this cost is
insufficient to demonstrate that she will be significantly injured. See Anaya, 2011 WL
1807786, at *3 (noting that denying motion to join does not deprive plaintiff of all of her
remedies against non-diverse potential defendant). Moreover, granting leave to join EMR
would undermine JBT’s interest in maintaining a federal forum, and this interest outweighs
any injury that Nieves may have from pursuing her lawsuit against EMR in state court
because Nieves could have avoided this injury by suing EMR in the first place. See
id. (concluding that diverse defendant’s interest in maintaining federal forum outweighed
plaintiff’s interest in avoiding parallel litigation). The court concludes that, under these
circumstances, the equities favor denying amending the scheduling order so that Nieves can
seek leave to join EMR.
D
Assessing the four factors holistically, see Service Temps, Inc., 2009 WL 3294863,
at *3, the court holds that Nieves has failed to demonstrate good cause to amend the
8
As noted, see supra note 6, JBT states that Nieves has already filed a separate lawsuit
against EMR in state court.
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scheduling order so that she can join EMR.
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For the reasons explained, plaintiff’s motion for leave for joinder is denied.
SO ORDERED.
June 10, 2014.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
CHIEF JUDGE
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