Freo Texas LLC v. Silva

Filing 11

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Freo Texas's Motion to Remand 5 is GRANTED. Freo Texas's Motion for Expedited Consideration 10 is similarly GRANTED. This case is REMANDED to the County Court at Law Number 1 in Tarrant County, Texas, for further proceedings. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 4/11/2014) (tla)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
FREO TEXAS LLC,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARCO SILVA and All Occupants,
Defendants.

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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:13-CV-4795-B
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Freo Texas, LLC’s Motion to Remand (doc 5), filed December
19, 2013, and Motion for Expedited Consideration (doc. 10), filed March 27, 2014. For the reasons
stated below, the Court finds that both motions should be, and hereby are, GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a foreclosure sale of Defendants Marco Silva and Maria Silva’s home
(“the Property”) and a subsequent forcible detainer action brought in state court by Plaintiff Freo
Texas, LLC (“Freo Texas”). Doc. 5, Pl.’s Br. 1-2. Following the foreclosure sale, Freo Texas
demanded that Defendants vacate the property. Doc. 5-4, Demand Letter Ex. 3. Defendants refused,
and Freo Texas then initiated a forcible detainer action in state court on October 4, 2014. Doc. 5-5,
Pl.’s Orig Pet. Ex. 4. The court granted judgment in favor of Freo Texas, and Defendants appealed.
Docs. 3, State Court Judgment; 3, Notice of Appeal. On December 9, 2014, the date of the
scheduled hearing on appeal, Defendants removed this case to this Court. Doc. 1, Notice of
Removal.
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II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916
(5th Cir. 2001). They possess only the power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is
not to be expanded by judicial decree. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)
(citations omitted); see also McKee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 337 (5th Cir. 2004).
District courts “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery, 243 F.3d at
916.
Federal courts must have subject matter jurisdiction, either in the form of diversity or federal
question jurisdiction, to serve as the forum in a civil case. District courts have federal question
jurisdiction “of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
28 U.S.C. § 1331. District courts have diversity jurisdiction, generally, when complete diversity of
state citizenship exists between all plaintiffs and all defendants, and the amount in controversy
exceeds the statutory minimum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. When a party removes a suit to federal court
on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the removing party must demonstrate that each
element of § 1332 is met. Furthermore, an action removable solely on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction “may not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as
defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). “[A]ny
doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.” Gasch v. Hartford Acc.
& Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007); Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.,
276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that any questions or ambiguities “should be strictly
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construed in favor of remand”).
III.
ANALYSIS
Defendants’ arguments to establish jurisdiction in this Court are difficult to decipher.
Defendants cite to both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 to support removal in their Notice of Removal,
but they only present arguments in support of diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1, Notice of Removal.
Defendants’ response to Freo Texas’s Motion to Remand similarly argues that jurisdiction is proper
under §§ 1331 and 1332. Doc. 7, Defs.’ Obj. Again, however, the bulk of the response is dedicated
to showing that this Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter, and only makes the conclusory
allegation that “Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges a cause of action under the laws of the United States,
15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.” Doc. 7, Defs.’ Objection 2. Although such conclusory statements generally
cannot sustain federal jurisdiction, the Court will address Defendants’ claims that the Court has both
federal question and diversity jurisdiction over this action.
A. Federal Question Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
The Defendants’ arguments that the Court has jurisdiction over this action under § 1331 are
unsupported by the pleadings and the law. “The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction
is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only
when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392(1987); Metro Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
145 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 1998) (“for both removal and original jurisdiction, the federal question
must be presented by plaintiff’s complaint as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed and
the case seeks entry into the federal system”). Freo Texas’s Original Petition only alleges a forcible
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detainer action, which arises solely under Texas law. Fannie Mae v. Song Wha Lee, No. 3:10-CV1047-L, 2010 WL 3025533, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2010) (finding that a forcible detainer action
“did not raise issues of federal law sufficient to support federal question jurisdiction”). The petition
does not otherwise raise a claim under federal law, nor do Freo Texas’s claims necessarily depend on
the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. Singh v. Duane Morris, LLP, 538 F.3d 334, 338
(5th Cir. 2008) (“In other words, federal question jurisdiction exists where (1) resolving a federal
issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim; (2) the federal issue is actually disputed; (3)
the federal issue is substantial; and (4) federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of federal and
state judicial responsibilities.”); Borden v. Allstate, 589 F.3d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted). Defendants’ citation to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., also does
not confer federal jurisdiction over this matter because it is, at most, an attempt to plead a federal
defense or counterclaim, which is insufficient to establish federal jurisdiction. Caterpillar Inc., 482
U.S. at 393; see also Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (“Federal jurisdiction cannot be
predicated on an actual or anticipated defense. . . . Nor can federal jurisdiction rest upon an actual
or anticipated counterclaim.”). Accordingly, this matter does not fall within this Court’s federal
question jurisdiction.
B. Diversity Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332
Defendants’ claim of diversity jurisdiction is similarly faulty. As noted above, a case “may not
be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2). Plaintiffs admit in both their
Notice of Removal and their Response to Freo Texas’s Motion to Remand that they are and have
been throughout the course of this action, citizens of Texas. Accordingly, they could not remove to
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this Court based on federal diversity jurisdiction.
Because the Court has neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction over this matter,
removal was improper. Freo Texas’s Motion to Remand should therefore be GRANTED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Freo Texas’s Motion to Remand (doc. 5) is GRANTED. Freo
Texas’s Motion for Expedited Consideration (doc. 10) is similarly GRANTED. This case is
REMANDED to the County Court at Law Number 1 in Tarrant County, Texas, for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: April 11, 2014.

_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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