Crawford v. Target Stores Inc

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 Opposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff is instructed to file her Amended Complaint with the Court. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 6/18/2014) (twd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHERRI CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
TARGET CORPORATION,
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-0090-B
§
§
§
§

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Opposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint
(doc. 19). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
On January 13, 2014, Plaintiff Sherri Crawford filed a one-count Complaint (doc. 1) against
Defendant Target Corporation1 for violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 227, et seq. Shortly thereafter, the Court issued its Status Report Order (doc. 9), requiring the
parties to submit a joint status report no later than March 11, 2014. On March 7, 2014, the parties
complied and filed their Joint Status Report (doc. 13). Accordingly, the Court issued its Scheduling
Order (doc. 15), which set the deadline for amended pleadings as May 9, 2014.
On May 9, 2014, Plaintiff filed her present Opposed Motion for Leave to File First Amended

1

The caption of the Complaint listed Defendant as Target Stores, Inc., however Defendant has
indicated in its own filings that this is incorrect and it is properly referred to as Target Corporation. Def.’s
Resp. 1. The Court will refer to Defendant accordingly.
-1-

Complaint (doc. 19). On May 30, 2014, Defendant filed its Response (doc. 21). On June 17, 2014,
Plaintiff filed her Reply (doc. 25). The Motion is now ripe for the Court’s review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
“It is settled that the grant of leave to amend the pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within
the discretion of the trial court.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330
(1971). Leave should be freely given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However,
granting leave to amend “is by no means automatic.” Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137, 139
(5th Cir. 1993). The district court may consider such factors as “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory
motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of the amendment.” Inline Corp. v. Tricon
Restaurants Int’l, No. 3:00–CV–0990, 2002 WL 1331885, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 14, 2002)(citing
Wimm, 3 F.3d at 139). “When, as here, a party files a motion to amend by the court-ordered
deadline, there is a ‘presumption of timeliness.’” Id. (quoting Poly-America, Inc. v. Serrot Int’l Inc., No.
3:00–CV–1457, 2002 WL 206454, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2002)).
III.
ANALYSIS
In her Motion, Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to include an additional count
for declaratory relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq. Pl.’s Mot. Ex.
A. 4. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks a declaration regarding her rights under the credit card contract on
which Defendant bases its affirmative defense of prior express consent. Id. at 4–5. Defendant opposes
the amendment because Plaintiff allegedly fails to identify the controversy under the contract. Def.’s
-2-

Resp. 3. According to Defendant, the proposed filing neither claims that Defendant breached the
credit card agreement nor that Defendant engaged in unlawful debt collection practices nor that it
invaded Plaintiff’s privacy. Id. at 4. Accordingly, Defendant insists the amendment would be
immediately subject to a motion to dismiss for failure to state claim and therefore should be denied
as futile. Id.
An amended complaint is futile if it would “fail to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.” Stripling v. Jordan Prod. Co., LLC, 234 F.3d 863, 873 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, “to determine
futility, [courts] apply the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under Rule 12(b)(6).” Id.
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted).The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a federal
court to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). However, the Declaratory Judgment Act does not create a
substantive cause of action. See Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666, 677 (1960). In other words, “[a]
declaratory judgment action is merely a vehicle that allows a party to obtain an early adjudication
of an actual controversy arising under other substantive law.” MetroPCS Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Mobile
USA, L.P., 2009 WL 3075205, at *19 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2009)(internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
After reviewing the pleadings and relevant law, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
properly connected her proposed claim for declaratory relief with an actual controversy, namely the
pre-existing cause of action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. From the limited
information before the Court, it appears the parties’ rights under the credit card agreement are
directly related to this claim by virtue of the clause regarding consent; hence Defendant’s affirmative
defense. Plaintiff makes this clear in the amended filing. See Pl.’s Mot. Ex. A. 4–5 at ¶¶ 26–28.
-3-

Defendant’s suggestion that Plaintiff has failed to give notice of the actual case or controversy is thus
unavailing, and its argument that the pleading is doomed because Plaintiff failed to allege other
claims under the contract is also of no moment. The connection to an underlying claim is apparent,
and Defendant has failed to show how Plaintiff’s amendment is otherwise futile.2
Turning to the other factors that may be considered in weighing Plaintiff’s Motion, the Court
concludes there is no indication that Plaintiff has engaged in undue delay or that Plaintiff has acted
in bad faith or with a dilatory motive. Further, there is no suggestion that allowing Plaintiff to file
the amended pleading would result in undue prejudice to Defendant. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s Motion should be and hereby is GRANTED.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is instructed to file her
Amended Complaint with the Court.
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: June 18, 2014.

2

The Court acknowledges that the claim for declaratory relief may still be vulnerable to a Rule
12(b)(6) motion by virtue of the possible insufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleading her related cause under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act. See, e.g., Diaz v. Ocewen Loan Servicing, No. 3:13–CV–2928–N–BK,
2014 WL 1012521, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2014)(slip copy)(“In this case, because Plaintiff’s substantive
claim fails for the reasons stated above, he is not entitled to any relief under the Declaratory Judgment
Act.”)(citing Marban v. PNC Mortg., No. 12–CV–3952, 2013 WL 3356285, at *11 (N.D. Tex. July 3,
2013)(declining to entertain plaintiff’s request for declaratory judgment where he had not pleaded a plausible
substantive claim)). However, the Court is of the opinion that this cannot be a basis to deny leave to amend
as no judgment on the latter claim has yet been rendered.

-4-

________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

-5-