Robinson v. J & K Administrative Management Services Inc et al
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER accepting 32 Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge. The court denies Defendants' 10 Application for Order Compelling Separate Arbitrations, and for Appointment of Arb itrators, Subject to Motion to Transfer Venue; grants Plaintiff's 14 Motion to Compel Arbitration; and grants Third Party Defendants' 15 Motion to Compel Arbitration. The court determines that, in accordance with the arbitration agree ments signed by Plaintiff and each of the Third Party Defendants, all claims are arbitrable and orders the parties to arbitrate any dispute between them in accordance with those agreements. Having determined that all of the issues raised by the parties must be submitted to binding arbitration, the court dismisses this action with prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Sam A Lindsay on 3/24/2015) (ykp)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NEFFERTITI ROBINSON,
INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF
THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED
Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
v.
J&K ADMINISTRATIVE
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. AND
KIMBERLY M. MEYERS
Defendants/Counter-Claimaints,
v.
SANDRA HARRIS, et. al.,
Third Party Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-00956-L
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case was referred to Magistrate Judge Renee Harris Toliver, who entered Findings,
Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge (“Report”) on February
17, 2015, recommending that the court deny Defendants’ Application for Order Compelling Separate
Arbitrations, and for Appointment of Arbitrators, Subject to Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 10);
grant Plaintiffs’ Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 14); and grant Third Party Defendant’s Motion
to Compel Arbitration (Doc. 15). Defendants filed their Objection to Magistrate’s Finding,
Conclusions, and Recommendation (Doc. 34), filed March 3, 2015, contending that the magistrate
judge incorrectly concluded that the arbitrator, not the court, should decide whether the parties’
arbitration agreement allows for collective arbitration.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 1
In deciding whether to grant a motion to compel arbitration, the court must determine
whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and whether the dispute in question falls within the
scope of that arbitration agreement. Dealer Computer Servs., Inc. v. Old Colony Motors, Inc., 588
F.3d 884, 887 (5th Cir. 2009). The court next evaluates whether “federal statute or policy renders
the claims nonarbitrable.” Id.
Defendants do not dispute that their claims are subject to valid arbitration agreements. Defs.’
Obj. 3 (“Defendants do not dispute that J&K and Robinson agreed to submit Robinson’s Individual
Claims to arbitration. Defendants also do not dispute that J&K entered into identical agreements
with the other Employees [Third Party Defendants].”); see also Defs.’ App. 1-5. Instead, Defendants
argue that the court should compel separate arbitrations for Plaintiff Neffertiti Robinson (“Plaintiff”
or “Robinson”) and each of the other members in the collective action, including Ann Knight, Joan
Stanton, Gloria Turner, and Sandra Harris, who are also third party defendants in this action
(collectively, “Third Party Defendants”).
Defendants contend that whether the parties must submit to collective arbitration is a decision
for the court, not an arbitrator. Defendants further argue that the Fifth Circuit precedent concluding
otherwise and relied on by the magistrate judge was wrongly decided and is not binding on this court.
See Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355 (5th
Cir. 2003) (determining that an arbitrator should decide whether an action proceeds as a class
arbitration). Moreover, Defendants argue that subsequent Supreme Court precedent compels this
court to grant Defendants’ objection and decide the issue of arbitrability based on the contract
between the parties. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
Plaintiffs counter that Pedcor is binding upon this court and has not been overruled, and that
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 2
Defendants’ protestations to the contrary are creative attempts to avoid the application of binding
precedent.
The court finds Defendants’ objections unavailing in light of the holding in Pedcor. Pedcor
held that “arbitrators should decide whether class arbitration is available or forbidden . . . .” 343
F.3d at 363. Pedcor interpreted the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).1 Defendants argue that Bazzle creates confusion as to whether
arbitrators should decide issues regarding class or collective arbitration. Even so, the Fifth Circuit’s
interpretation and application of Bazzle is unequivocal and binding upon this court. Pedcor, 343
F.3d at 359 (“The clarity of [Bazzle’s] holding
that arbitrators are supposed to decide whether an
arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitration
leaves us to decide only whether the
instant case is sufficiently analogous to [Bazzle] to come within its rule. That the district court
ordered a type of class arbitration here is self-evident.”). Accordingly, the magistrate judge properly
applied Pedcor and determined that, under these circumstances, the arbitrator should decide whether
the arbitration agreement permits proceeding with the arbitration collectively.
Defendants’ argument that Stolt-Nielsen abrogates the holding in Pedcor is unsupported by
the text of the case. Admittedly, Stolt-Nielsen’s interpretation of Justice Stevens’s concurrence in
1
Pedcor determined that the plurality relied on two considerations:
First, it found that the contract’s provision to submit to arbitration “all disputes, claims, or
controversies arising from or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this
contract” reflected the parties’ intent to commit a broad scope of questions to arbitration, including
the class arbitration question because that issue “relat[ed] to the contract.” Second, the plurality
reasoned that there exists only a narrow exception for certain gateway matters that parties normally
expect a court rather than an arbitrator to decide, which include (1) “whether the parties have a valid
arbitration agreement at all” and (2) “whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a
certain type of controversy.”
343 F.3d at 359.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 3
Bazzle varies from Pedcor’s analysis of the same. Pedcor determined that “the plurality [consisting
of four Justices], plus Justice Stevens, i.e., the Court, held that ‘this matter of contract interpretation
should be for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide.’” 343 F.3d at 359 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added). Stolt-Nielsen, in contrast, determined that Bazzle did not yield a majority decision on that
question. 559 U.S. at 678-79. Nonetheless, even with Stolt-Nielsen’s nuanced interpretation of
Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Bazzle, Pedcor remains binding precedent and interpreted Bazzle
to require arbitrators to decide whether arbitration agreements forbid or permit class arbitrations.
See Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 358 (“[A] plurality of the Court held that ‘[u]nder the terms of the parties’
contracts, the question
whether the agreement forbids class arbitration
is for the arbitrator to
decide.’”).
Notably, Stolt-Nielsen did not consider whether the court or an arbitrator should decide
whether an arbitration provision permits class arbitration. In Stolt-Nielsen, the parties had an
agreement that expressly assigned that question to the arbitrators. 559 U.S. at 680. The court held
that the arbitrator in that action
having the authority to determine whether the action should
proceed as a class arbitration by nature of the parties’ agreement
exceeded his authority because
there was no contractual basis for proceeding to arbitration as a class. Id. at 684 (“From these
principles, it follows that a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”); see also Reed v.
Florida Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the issue of whether an
arbitration agreement provided for class arbitration was properly submitted to the arbitrator because
the parties agreed to do so, but that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because there was no legal
basis for proceeding with the class arbitration), abrogated by Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter,
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 4
133 S. Ct. 2064, 2069 (2013) (summarizing the holding in Stolt-Nielsen as one that “overturned the
arbitral decision there because it lacked any contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not
because it lacked, in Oxford’s terminology, a ‘sufficient’ one.”).
Ultimately, the court is confronted with a question preliminary to the considerations analyzed
in Stolt-Nielsen.
Before considering whether a contract permits an arbitration to proceed
collectively, the court must first determine the appropriate decision maker to interpret that contract,
and Stolt-Nielsen does not supply an answer to that question.
Defendants contend that Stolt-Nielsen’s holding cannot apply equally to the arbitrator and
the court, and, therefore, the only possible conclusion to draw from the case is that the question of
collective arbitrability is for the court. Stolt-Nielsen, however, does not preclude an arbitrator from
determining whether a contract allows for collective arbitration. Subsequent Supreme Court cases
clarified the holding in Stolt-Nielsen, concluding that the Court “overturned the arbitral decision
there because it lacked any contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it
lacked . . . a ‘sufficient’ one.” Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2069.2 Stolt-Nielsen requires the
arbitrator to interpret the contract before him or her, and, contrary to Defendant’s objection, it does
2
Oxford Health Plans elaborated further, stating:
Because the parties “bargained for the arbitrator’s construction of their agreement,” an arbitral
decision “even arguably construing or applying the contract” must stand, regardless of a court’s view
of its (de)merits. Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers, 531 U.S. 57, 62 (2000) (quoting
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960); Paperworkers v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Only if “the arbitrator act[s] outside
the scope of his contractually delegated authority”—issuing an award that “simply reflect[s] [his] own
notions of [economic] justice” rather than “draw[ing] its essence from the contract”—may a court
overturn his determination. Eastern Associated Coal, 531 U.S. at 62 (quoting Misco, 484 U.S. at 38).
So the sole question for us is whether the arbitrator (even arguably) interpreted the parties’ contract,
not whether he got its meaning right or wrong.
133 S. Ct. at 2068.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 5
nothing to bar arbitrators from interpreting those contracts. Thus, Stolt-Nielsen did not abrogate or
overrule Pedcor. Accordingly, Defendants’ argument that “Pedcor was wrongly decided and need
not be followed” by this court is without merit. Defs.’ Obj. 10. Pedcor is binding precedent, and
this court has neither the inclination nor the effrontery to disregard it.
Moreover, as emphasized by Plaintiffs and Third Party Defendants, this court applied the
holding in Pedcor after the Stolt-Nielson decision. See Pacheco v. PCM Const. Servs., LLC, No. 124057, 2014 WL 145147 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2014), aff’d, No. 14-10193, 2015 WL 690273 (5th Cir.
Feb. 19, 2015). Pacheco concluded that the plaintiffs in the action could not file a peremptory
federal class action in an attempt to avoid binding arbitration agreements. Id. at *3. It also cited
Pedcor and stated, “[T]he issue of whether a particular arbitration agreement forbids or allows class
arbitration is for the arbitrator to decide, not the court.” Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly,
Pacheco confirms the prevailing precedential effect of Pedcor.
Additionally, Defendants object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that, notwithstanding
the holding in Pedcor, the “arbitration agreement itself, which provides that claims challenging its
applicability to particular disputes or claims proceed to arbitration . . . supports deferring to the
arbitrator on the issue of class versus individual arbitration . . . .” Report 5 (citations omitted).3
They further object because, while each of the arbitration provisions at issue have identical
provisions, there are five separate contracts and that Robinson’s Contract with J&K does not provide
a basis for arbitrating the collective action’s members’ claims. Defendants object and argue that,
when an agreement is silent, the court should decide the question of arbitrability as a collective
3
The language from which the magistrate judge draws this conclusion states that “claims challenging the validity
or enforceability of this Agreement (in whole or in part) or challenging the applicability of the Agreement to a particular
dispute of claim” are covered by the arbitration agreement. Defs.’ Obj. App. 5.
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 6
action. The holding of Pedcor precludes this argument, as the agreement at issue in Pedcor had “no
express provision in the [arbitration] clause regarding consolidation or class treatment of claims in
arbitration.” 343 F.3d at 357. Moreover, Pedcor involved 408 different plans, noted that the
arbitration of each of the contracts had the identical arbitration provisions, and concluded that, under
those circumstances, the arbitrator should decide the issue of class arbitration. 343 F.3d at 357.
Ultimately, the magistrate judge did not err in concluding that the arbitration agreement
supports a conclusion that the arbitrator is the proper decision-making authority for the question of
collective arbitrability. In particular, the agreement at issue states, “[C]laims challenging the validity
or enforceability of this Agreement (in whole or in part) or challenging the applicability of the
Agreement to a particular dispute of claim” are covered by the arbitration agreement. Defs.’ Obj.
App. 4. Bazzle interpreted a similar contract provision. In Bazzle, the plurality found that the parties
agreed to submit “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this contract” to
arbitration and “the dispute about what the arbitration contract in each case means (i.e., whether it
forbids the use of class arbitration procedures) is a dispute ‘relating to this contract’ and the resulting
‘relationships.’” Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452-53 (Breyer, J., plurality). While courts determine the
validity of arbitration agreements, whether the contract forbids collective arbitration does not fall
within the limited circumstances under which “courts assume that the parties intended courts, not
arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter,” because the question involves contract
interpretation regarding the “kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.” Id. The
objections lodged by Defendants do not impact the court’s determination that the arbitrator must
determine whether the action can proceed collectively. Moreover, in light of the court’s holding, it
is not appropriate to proceed with an analysis as to whether the terms in the contract authorize
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 7
collective arbitration, as the arbitrator can interpret the contracts and answer that question.
Accordingly, the court overrules Defendants’ Objection to Magistrate’s Finding, Conclusions, and
Recommendation.
Having reviewed the pleadings, file, and record in this case, and the findings and conclusions
of the magistrate judge, the court determines that the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions
are correct, and accepts them as those of the court. Accordingly, the court denies Defendants’
Application for Order Compelling Separate Arbitrations, and for Appointment of Arbitrators, Subject
to Motion to Transfer Venue; grants Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Arbitration; and grants Third
Party Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. The court determines that, in accordance with
the arbitration agreements signed by Plaintiff and each of the Third Party Defendants, all claims are
arbitrable and orders the parties to arbitrate any dispute between them in accordance with those
agreements. Having determined that all of the issues raised by the parties must be submitted to
binding arbitration, the court dismisses this action with prejudice. See Alford v.Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1992). The reason for dismissal with prejudice is that
retaining jurisdiction of the action by the district court serves no purpose because any remedies after
arbitration are limited to judicial review as set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. (citation
omitted).
It is so ordered this 24th day of March, 2015.
_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge
Memorandum Opinion and Order - Page 8
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