McCollom v. City of Kemp et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 17 Motion to Stay filed by Jimmy Council. Therefore, this case is STAYED until the state criminal charge against Plaintiff in Kaufman County, Texas (Case No. 14-0049-CC-M, State of Texas v. Robert Scott M cCollom) is resolved. The Clerk of Court is directed to Administratively Close this action. Once the state criminal proceeding is concluded, Plaintiff may file a motion to reopen within twenty-one days. Otherwise, this case will be dismissed without prejudice. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 11/14/2014) (aaa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
ROBERT SCOTT MCCOLLOM,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF KEMP, TEXAS, JIMMY
COUNCIL, and MATT HINDS,
Defendants.
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§ CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-1488-B
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Stay Case (doc. 17), filed on July 30, 2014. In
their Motion, Defendants seek a stay of this case, arguing that pending criminal matters against
Plaintiff may bar the civil claims that are the subject of the present lawsuit. For the reasons set forth
below, the Court finds that this matter should be stayed pending resolution of the criminal charge
against Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Motion.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Robert Scott McCollom filed the present lawsuit on March 26, 2014, alleging
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants City of Kemp, Texas, as well as against Jimmy
Council, a law enforcement officer of the City of Kemp Police Department, and Matt Hinds, a
deputy for the Kaufman County Sheriff’s Department. Doc. 1, Compl. 1–9. The claims arise out of
an incident that occurred on April 1, 2012, during which Defendants stopped Plaintiff for a traffic
offense and allegedly used excessive force and unlawfully arrested Plaintiff. Id. at 2. Pursuant to the
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same April 1, 2012 event, Plaintiff was charged with the criminal offense of Resisting Arrest, Search,
or Transportation due to his alleged resistance to the same arrest. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 1, Information.
Plaintiff’s criminal charge is pending in the County Court at Law of Kaufman County, Texas, and
is currently set for trial on December 15, 2014.
Defendants City of Kemp and Jimmy Council (“Defendants”) filed the present Motion to
Stay Case (doc. 17) on July 30, 2014.1 In their Motion, Defendants seek a stay of this civil case
pending resolution of the state criminal charge against Plaintiff for resisting arrest during the April
1, 2012 incident. Defs.’ Mot. 2–3. Defendants argue that a stay is warranted because, under Heck
v. Humphrey and its progeny, a criminal conviction in the pending criminal matter would bar
Plaintiff’s civil claims here. 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Defs.’ Mot. 2–3. Plaintiff filed his Response in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Stay Case (doc. 21) on August 22, 2014, arguing that Heck
does not prevent his civil claims from proceeding while his criminal charge is pending because there
is no overlap between the claims he asserts against Defendants and the criminal charge against him.
Defendants filed their Reply (doc. 22) on August 29, 2014. The Motion is now ripe for the Court’s
review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
A.
Heck v. Humphrey Standard
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court declared that “in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
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Defendants City of Kemp and Jimmy Council have indicated that the remaining Defendant,
Matt Hinds, does not oppose the Motion to Stay Case and agrees with the relief it requests. Defs.’ Mot. 3.
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unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at 486–87; see also HoogWatson v. Guadalupe Cnty., Tex., 591 F.3d 431, 434 (5th Cir. 2009); Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300,
301 (5th Cir. 2000). The Heck court elaborated that when a plaintiff “seeks damages in a § 1983 suit,
the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512
U.S. at 487; see also DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 652 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth
Circuit has further explained that, under Heck, “a plaintiff who has been convicted of a crime cannot
recover damages for an alleged violation of his constitutional rights if the alleged violation arose from
the same facts attendant to the charge for which he was convicted,” unless he proves that his
conviction or sentence has been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Ballard v. Burton,
444 F.3d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006).
B.
Stay of Civil Case Pending Criminal Proceedings
In the present case, Plaintiff’s criminal charge remains pending, as he has not yet been tried
in state court. “When it is premature to determine whether a plaintiff’s civil damages claims may be
barred under Heck, the Fifth Circuit has counseled that this Court ‘may—indeed, should—stay
proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending criminal case has run its course, as until that
time it may be difficult to determine the relation, if any, between the two.’” Quinn v. Guerrero, No.
4:09-CV-166, 2010 WL 412901, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 28, 2010) (quoting Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d
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744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added); see also Busick v. City of Madison, Miss., 90 F. App’x
713, 713–14 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiff’s civil claims should have been stayed pending the
resolution of the criminal proceedings against him because it was impossible to determine whether
the civil claims necessarily implicated the validity of any conviction or sentence that plaintiff had
received or might receive); Davis v. Zain, 79 F.3d 18, 19 (5th Cir. 1996) (“if some presently
unforeseen or unarticulated conflict arises between the criminal retrial and the pending § 1983 case,
the district court may consider the propriety of a stay or, perhaps, abstention”).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Court must determine whether Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims for false arrest and
excessive force must be stayed pending resolution of the state criminal charge against him for
resisting arrest. Defendants request a stay of the civil proceeding pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s
criminal charge, arguing that the two cases arise out of the same April 1, 2012 incident. Defs.’ Mot.
2–3. They maintain that Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest and excessive force “at least potentially[]
impugn the validity of a criminal conviction against Plaintiff for resisting arrest.” Id. at 3. Therefore,
they argue, the civil claims would be barred under Heck. Id. at 2–3. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s
decision in Mackey v. Dickson, they contend that Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims should be stayed
because the ongoing criminal matter might result in the claims’ preclusion under Heck. Id. at 2
(citing Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746; Brown v. Sudduth, 255 F. App’x 803, 805–07 (5th Cir. 2007)).
In response, Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ reliance on the Fifth Circuit cases Mackey v.
Dickson and Brown v. Sudduth is misplaced. Doc. 21, Pl.’s Resp. 4–6. Plaintiff instead directs the
Court to the portions of these decisions that reiterate Heck’s conclusion that section 1983 claims do
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not “necessarily imply the invalidity” of an underlying conviction. 512 U.S. at 487; Mackey, 47 F.3d
at 746; Brown, 255 F. App’x at 806; Pl.’s Resp. 4–6. By referring to these excerpts from Mackey and
Brown, Plaintiff attempts to suggest that his claims against Defendants are not interconnected with
the criminal charge pending against him, noting that “the issues that will be adjudicated [in the civil
case] are entirely irrelevant to the criminal prosecution.” Pl.’s Resp. 6.
Plaintiff further asserts that “there is absolutely no overlap between the elements of the
offense with which Plaintiff has been charged and the causes of action that form the basis of
Plaintiff’s civil complaint in this case.” Pl.’s Resp. 6. In support of this argument, Plaintiff offers a
chart listing the respective elements of each offense. Id. at 3. The elements of a charge for resisting
arrest are: (1) a person; (2) intentionally; (3) prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace
officer or a person acting in a peace officer’s presence and at his direction from effecting an arrest
. . . of the actor or another; (4) by using force against the peace officer or another. Tex. Penal Code
§ 38.03; Guevara v. State, 585 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) overruled on other grounds
by Jones v. State, 606 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). Having established the elements of his
pending criminal charge, Plaintiff then proceeds to outline the elements of the two claims which he
brings against Defendants and argues that they do not contain any of the elements included in the
charge for resisting arrest. Pl.’s Resp. 3. The elements of a claim for false arrest are: (1) the willful
detention; (2) without consent; (3) without authority of law. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 92
S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex. 2002). The elements of a claim for use of excessive force are: (1) an injury;
(2) that resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; (3)
and the excessiveness of which was objectively unreasonable. Aujla v. Hinds Cnty., Miss., 61 F. App’x
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917, at *3 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir.), opinion on
rehearing, 186 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Whether a stay of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims is warranted depends upon the relation
between the civil and criminal cases; if it is “premature to determine whether or not [Plaintiff’s]
damages claims are barred under Heck,” or if it is clear that they would be barred under this standard,
“[t]he court may—indeed should—stay proceedings in the section 1983 case until the pending
criminal case has run its course.” Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746. In evaluating whether Plaintiff’s civil
claims might be barred under Heck, the Court must “conduct a fact-specific analysis to determine
whether success on his [excessive force and false arrest claims] would require negation of an element
of the criminal offense [of resisting arrest] or proof of a fact that is inherently inconsistent with a
conviction on . . . the underlying criminal charge[].” Quinn, 2010 WL 412901, at *2 (citing Bush
v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “if the factual basis for the conviction
[would be] temporally and conceptually distinct” from Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims, these claims
would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the criminal charge and would thus not be barred under
Heck. Bush, 513 F.3d at 498. Accordingly, the present civil case would not need to be stayed pending
the criminal case. Conversely, if the facts supporting the criminal charge are not temporally and
conceptually distinct from the facts supporting the civil claims, or if it is unclear whether they would
be distinct, the civil claims must be stayed. Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746.
The Court first considers Plaintiff’s argument that Defendants improperly relied on Mackey
and Brown. Though Plaintiff correctly emphasizes that theses cases echo Heck and reiterate that a
claim for unlawful arrest does not necessarily undermine the validity of an underlying conviction,
Plaintiff fails to note the central holdings articulated in these cases. Mackey, 47 F.3d at 746; Brown,
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255 F. App’x at 806. In Mackey, the Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s
section 1983 claim, noting that it was not barred under Heck because it did not necessarily implicate
the validity of his criminal conviction. Id. at 745–46. Even though the court held that the civil claims
should not have been dismissed, it did state, however, that the civil matter should be stayed pending
resolution of the criminal proceeding, “as until that time it may be difficult to determine the relation,
if any, between the two.” Id. at 746.
Plaintiff’s attack on Defendants’ reliance on Brown similarly fails to distinguish between
reversing a dismissal of a civil claim pursuant to Heck and finding that the civil claim should
nonetheless have been stayed. Plaintiff emphasizes Brown’s reasoning that an unlawful arrest claim
is not necessarily barred under Heck, but he overlooks the fact that the court in Brown simply
reversed the district court’s finding that the civil claim is barred under Heck; it did not state that a
stay of the civil proceeding is not warranted in such circumstances. 255 F. App’x at 806–08.
The Court next turns to Plaintiff’s assertion that the elements of his present civil claims are
distinct from the elements of the pending criminal charge against him. Despite the fact that the
elements of resisting arrest do not overlap with the elements of the civil claims for excessive force
and false arrest, the Court finds that the criminal and civil cases arise out of the same incident and
are so closely interrelated that resolution of the civil claims may implicate the validity of any
conviction in the criminal matter. Defendants’ alleged civil rights violations arise from the same facts
attendant to Plaintiff’s pending criminal charge for resisting his April 1, 2012 arrest. The claims are
not temporally distinct, as they arise out of one incident occurring on April 1, 2012. Moreover, they
are not conceptually distinct because they arise from the same set of facts—the traffic stop and the
ensuing encounter during which Defendants allegedly used excessive force and falsely arrested
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Plaintiff (according to the present civil case), and during which Plaintiff allegedly resisted this
particular arrest (according to the pending criminal case). Plaintiff challenges the legality of his arrest
and the degree of force used during this arrest. However, resolving these issues may directly implicate
the validity of a conviction on the criminal charge of resisting arrest. Consequently, the present civil
case must be stayed pending the outcome of the state criminal proceeding against Plaintiff.
Finally, the Court notes that, in light of Heck, it would be a waste of judicial time and
resources, as well as of the time and resources of the parties, for this case to remain active pending
resolution of the criminal proceedings against Plaintiff.
Finding that Plaintiff’s civil claims arise out of the same occurrence which forms the basis for
the criminal charge against him, the Court concludes that the interrelation between the two cases
warrants a stay of the present case and therefore GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ Motion to Stay Case (doc. 17) is hereby
GRANTED. Therefore, this case is STAYED until the state criminal charge against Plaintiff in
Kaufman County, Texas (Case No. 14-0049-CC-M, State of Texas v. Robert Scott McCollom) is
resolved. The Clerk of Court is directed to Administratively Close this action. Once the state
criminal proceeding is concluded, Plaintiff may file a motion to reopen within twenty-one days.
Otherwise, this case will be dismissed without prejudice.
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SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: November 14, 2014.
_______________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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