The Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company NA v. Carr et al

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: Drawing from Defendants' own Notice of Removal (doc. 1 ), the Court finds that it lacks any basis for having subject matter jurisdiction over this action. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (doc. 5 ) and REMANDS the present action to Tarrant County Court of Law No. 1. (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 4/17/2015) (bdb)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
THE BANK OF NEW YORK
MELLON TRUST COMPANY, N.A.,
AS TRUSTEE ON BEHALF OF
CWABS ASSET-BACKED
CERTIFICATES TRUST 2007-2,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHESTER CARR, II, et al.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-4020-B

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is a Motion to Remand (doc. 5) filed by Plaintiff The Bank of New York
Mellon Trust Company, N.A., as trustee on behalf of CWABS Asset-Backed Certificates Trust 20072 on December 12, 2014. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS the Motion and
REMANDS this case to Tarrant County Court at Law No. 1.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from a forcible detainer and eviction proceeding initiated in Texas state court
by Plaintiff against Defendants Wayne S. Bragg Sr., Pamela Bragg, Chester Carr II, and All Other
Occupants of the property located at 4401 Genesis Ct., Masfield, Texas 76063 (the “Property”). Doc.
5-1, Sworn Compl. for Forcible Detainer. Plaintiff filed a Sworn Complaint for Forcible Detainer
against Defendants on August 21, 2014 in Tarrant County, Justice of the Peace Court 7. Id.
Following a hearing on the merits, the Justice of the Peace Court entered judgment in favor of
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Plaintiff on September 9, 2014. Doc. 5, Mot. to Remand 2. Defendants appealed the decision on
September 15, 2014, and the Tarrant County Court at Law No. 1 scheduled a trial on the matter
for November 13, 2014. Id. On November 13, 2014, apparently prior to the scheduled trial,
Defendants removed the action to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1, Notice of
Removal 2–3.
On December 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed the present Motion to Remand (doc. 5), seeking to
remand this action to state court. Due to Defendants’ failure to respond to the Motion, the Court
issued an Order to Show Cause (doc. 6), directing Defendants to respond to the Motion and provide
an explanation as to why they failed to timely do so. To date, Defendants have responded to neither
the Motion to Remand nor to the Court’s Order to Show Cause. As such, the Motion to Remand
is ripe for the Court’s review, which the Court conducts without briefing from Defendants.
II.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916
(5th Cir. 2001). They possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute, which is
not to be expanded by judicial decree. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994) (citations omitted); see also McKee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 358 F.3d 329, 337 (5th Cir.
2004). District courts “must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden
of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum.” Howery, 243 F.3d
at 916.
District courts have original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000 and the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of
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each defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Thus, when a party removes a suit to federal court on
diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the removing party must demonstrate that each element
of § 1332 is met. Furthermore, an action removable solely on the basis of diversity jurisdiction “may
not be removed if any of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen
of the State in which such action is brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2).
“[A]ny doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand.” Gasch v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2007); Manguno v. Prudential Prop. &
Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that any questions or ambiguities “should
be strictly construed in favor of remand”).
III.
ANALYSIS
In their Notice of Removal, Defendants assert that the requirements for diversity jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 are satisfied. Notice of Removal 2–3. Specifically, they contend that the
action is between citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy—which they claim
to be the current fair market value of the Property that is the subject of this lawsuit—is $250,000.00.
Id. Plaintiff moves to remand this case to state court, noting, among other things, that removal is
barred because Defendants and all other occupants of the Property are citizens of Texas. Doc. 5, Pl.’s
Mot. to Remand 8.
Even when complete diversity exists between the parties, removal is improper when any
defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In Defendants’
Civil Cover Sheet, filed with their Notice of Removal (doc. 1), Defendants clearly identify as citizens
of Texas. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
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based on diversity. Because Defendants’ Texas citizenship precludes diversity jurisdiction, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand and need not address Plaintiff’s remaining arguments in
support of remand.1
IV.
CONCLUSION
Drawing from Defendants’ own Notice of Removal (doc. 1), the Court finds that it lacks any
basis for having subject matter jurisdiction over this action. For the foregoing reasons, the Court
GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (doc. 5) and REMANDS the present action to Tarrant
County Court of Law No. 1.

SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 17, 2015.

_________________________________
JANE J. BOYLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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Additionally, nowhere do Defendants assert the existence of a federal question that would support
this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Court is likewise unable to discern
a federal question in this matter, as it is solely based on a post-foreclosure eviction suit in which Plaintiff seeks
possession of the Property.

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