Compton v. United States of America

Filing 11

ORDER 9 ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE: It is ORDERED that Petitioner's section 2255 1 Motion to Vacate is hereby DENIED. (Ordered by Judge Reed C O'Connor on 3/2/2016) (sss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUR
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

CRYSTAL COMPTON,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

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Civil Action No. 3:14-CV-4133-O-BK
(3:12-CR-0175-O-35)

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The United States Magistrate Judge made findings, conclusions, and a recommendation
in this case (ECF No. 9), filed November 24, 2015. On December 10, 2015, Petitioner filed
objections (ECF No. 10). The Court has conducted a de novo review of those portions of the
proposed findings and recommendation to which objections were made.

The Court finds that

the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation (“FCR”) of the United States Magistrate Judge
are correct. Accordingly, Petitioner’s objections are OVERRULED, and the Court ACCEPTS
the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation.
I.

BACKGROUND
Petitioner and 40 other co-defendants were charged in a one count indictment with

conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. See Factual Resume 2, ECF No. 1015, United
States v. Compton, No. 3:12-CR-175-O-35 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (Cureton, M.J.), appeal dismissed,
583 F. App’x 434 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam). Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner admitted
to her role in a conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, waived her appellate rights, and

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was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. FCR 1, ECF
No. 9. Petitioner’s subsequent direct appeal was dismissed as frivolous. Compton, 583 F. App’x
434. Petitioner filed this timely section 2255 motion, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea proceedings and at sentencing. FCR 1, ECF No. 9.
Petitioner claims she did not participate in the narcotics conspiracy and her counsel failed
to adequately investigate her case. Id. at 2. Petitioner contends her counsel neither requested nor
reviewed the police report and had he done so, he would have realized the charge against her for
the 9.41 grams of powder cocaine found in her residence, had no basis in fact.1 Id. According to
Petitioner, the cocaine was actually confiscated from her codefendant, Antworion Gates, outside
her residence and placed on the kitchen table to be photographed. Id.
In her objection to the Magistrate Judge’s findings, Petitioner denied she purchased crack
cocaine from Gates and her involvement in the narcotics conspiracy. Def.’s Obj. 1-2, ECF 10.
Petitioner also asserts that her counsel forced her to enter a guilty plea. Id. at 3-4. According to
Petitioner, she refused to sign the plea agreement four times and wanted to take her case to trial,
but decided to accept the plea agreement after her attorney warned she risked life imprisonment.
Id.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
“[D]istrict judges have almost unlimited authority to ‘accept, reject, or modify, in whole

or in part, the finding or recommendations made by’ a magistrate.” Brown v. Kelly, 393 F. App’x
208, 211 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)). When a party
timely objects to a magistrate judge’s findings, conclusion, and recommendation, the district
court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
Petitioner’s factual resume states 10.3 grams of cocaine were found but further laboratory testing revealed
it was actually 9.41 grams. Resp. Mot. Vacate 2 n. 2, ECF 7.
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findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). The
district court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the magistrate judge [and] may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to
the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.
“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to the pleabargaining process.” Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (citing Missouri v. Frye,
132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012)). During plea negotiations defendants are “entitled to the
effective assistance of competent counsel.” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, (1970).
In Hill, the Court held “the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to challenges to guilty
pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).
“An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside
the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691
(citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-65 (1981)). “[A]ny deficiencies in counsel’s
performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under
the Constitution.” Id. at 692. To prove prejudice, petitioner “must show a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors.” Crane v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1999). “‘A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694). “However, the mere possibility of a different outcome is not sufficient to prevail .
. . [r]ather, the defendant must demonstrate that the prejudice rendered sentencing ‘fundamentally
unfair or unreliable.’” Id. at 612-13 (quoting Ransom v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 716, 721 (5th Cir.
1997)). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim is evaluated under the standard announced in
Strickland v. Washington.” Crane, 178 F.3d at 312. “A convicted defendant’s claim that

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counsel’s assistance was so defective as to require reversal . . . has two components.” Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
“First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. In order
to show deficiency, the petitioner must show that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id.
“Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.
“Both prongs must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence.” Crane, 178 F.3d at 312.
“Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689. In evaluating counsel’s performance, the court “must make every effort to ‘eliminate
the distorting effects of hindsight.’” Crane, 178 F.3d at 312 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689). “[A] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. In other words, “the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101
(1955)). “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. “Thus, a court deciding an actual
ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts
of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id.
III.

ANALYSIS
Petitioner objects to the findings of the Magistrate Judge on three grounds: (1) her counsel

was deficient for failing to properly investigate her arrest; (2) she did not purchase any crack
cocaine or involve herself in any conspiracy to distribute it; and (3) her attorney coerced her to
plead guilty. Def.’s Obj. 1-4, ECF 10. The Court addresses each objection in turn.

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A.

The Record Supports the Magistrate Judge’s Finding of Effective Assistance of
Counsel During the Guilty Plea.
1.

Failure to Investigate Claims

Central to Petitioner’s Motion are her claims that the 9.41 grams of cocaine was
confiscated from co-defendant Gates’ pocket and that she had no involvement in the narcotics
conspiracy, other than her occasional cocaine use. Id. at 1. Petitioner avers that had her counsel
adequately investigated this alleged conspiracy, he would have not pressured her to agree to a plea
bargain. Id.
Petitioner presented conclusory allegations of counsel’s failure to investigate her arrest,
which is insufficient to prove her claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. United States v.
Curtis, 769 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 2014), cert denied, 135 S. Ct. 691 (2014) (cited cases omitted)
(“To establish [a] failure to investigate claims, [the defendant] must allege with specificity what
the investigation would have revealed and how it would have benefited him.”).
Petitioner is correct that counsel has a duty to investigate her case under Strickland. 466
U.S. 680. However, the record indicates counsel fulfilled his duty. The Addendum to the
Presentence Report (“PSR”) details five investigating officers’ statements that they found a bag
containing white powder on Petitioner’s kitchen table in the initial search of her house. FCR 3,
ECF No. 9 (citing Crim. Doc. 1268 at 1-2). Petitioner’s codefendant, Gates, admitted in his plea
agreement that he engaged in a narcotics distribution conspiracy with Petitioner and he personally
saw Petitioner sell narcotics from her residence approximately twenty times. Gates Factual
Resume 4, ECF No. 1000. Likewise, Petitioner “admitted she purchased the [9.41 grams] of crack
cocaine from Gates.” FCR 3, ECF No. 9 (citing Crim. Doc. 1138-1 at 6).
Thus, Petitioner fails to specify what further counsel review would have uncovered and
how it would have changed the outcome in her plea. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Curtis,
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769 F.3d at 276. Petitioner has not “produced independent indicia of the likely merit of [her]
allegations.” U.S. v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1998). Nothing from the police
report, as summarized in the PSR, helps Petitioner’s motion. FCR 3, ECF No. 9. Thus, Petitioner
has failed to carry her burden because it is wholly unclear what a more thorough investigation
would have revealed. Curtis, 769 F.3d at 276. Having failed to demonstrate ineffective assistance
of counsel, the Court need not consider the prejudice prong of the inquiry. Crane, 178 F.3d at
312.
Petitioner also challenges the evidence. She contests the relevance of the caffeine powder
and razor blades found in her home. Def.’s Obj. 2, ECF No. 10. While Petitioner correctly asserts
that the possession of such drug paraphernalia does not definitively prove her role in the narcotics
conspiracy, it is strong circumstantial evidence of her involvement. United States v. Winters, 530
F. App’x 390, 397 (5th Cir. 2013). Petitioner complained the Magistrate Judge erred in quoting
her PSR, where Petitioner admitted to purchasing crack cocaine from codefendant Gates. Def.’s
Obj. 3, ECF No. 10. Petitioner now denies purchasing crack cocaine from Gates, she contends
that the substance was powder cocaine allegedly planted at her residence. Id. The Court finds
this mischaracterization of the type of cocaine found in Petitioner’s home is harmless because the
reference did not otherwise affect Petitioner’s sentencing or her substantive rights. United States
v. Kennedy, 303 F. App’x 237, 239 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding the district court did not clearly err by
converting specific grams of powder cocaine to a crack cocaine equivalent amount for sentencing
in a conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute case).
Furthermore, in the preceding sentence, the Magistrate Judge referred to the correct
amount of powder cocaine recovered from Petitioner’s home. FCR 3, ECF No. 9. Throughout
the FCR, the Magistrate Judge refers to the substance as cocaine, rather than crack cocaine. Id. at

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3-4. This error did not affect Petitioner’s substantive rights because she pleaded guilty to
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and the Magistrate Judge correctly calculated her mandatory
minimum punishment. See Factual Resume 2, ECF No. 1015, Compton, No. 3:12-CR-0175-O35. Thus, it is immaterial whether the substance was in its powder form at the time of her arrest.
Kennedy, 303 F. App’x at 239.
In fact, Petitioner admitted she committed all the essential elements of the conspiracy. FCR
4, ECF No. 9 (citing Crim. Doc. 1273 at 32). She affirmed that the factual résumé was true and
correct. FCR 4, ECF No. 9 (citing Crim. Doc. 1273 at 53-55). “Declarations under oath before
an open court carry a strong presumption of truth and form a barrier to relief in any subsequent
collateral proceedings. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977); Cervantes, 132 F.3d at
1110; United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d 641, 649 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Groome, 494
F. App’x 486, 487 (5th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, Petitioner has not proven counsel failed to
adequately investigate her claims. The Court finds the same is true for Petitioner’s claim that
counsel coerced her to enter a guilty plea, which will be addressed next.
b. Coerced Guilty Plea
Petitioner claims her counsel forced her to plead guilty by informing her that she risked
life in prison if found guilty at trial. Def.’s Obj. 3-4, ECF 10. As Petitioner stated in her objection,
“Who wants to take the chance to go to trial after your counsel has informed you that you would
get life?” Id. at 4.
“[T]he negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase of litigation for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 678 F.3d 353,
356 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010)). Thus, when
navigating this critical phase, a defendant should be aware of the “relevant circumstances and the

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likely consequences of his decision so that he can make an intelligent choice.” Rivas-Lopez, 678
F. 3d 356.
Counsel was obligated to inform Petitioner of her sentencing exposure. In fact, counsel’s
failure to properly inform Petitioner about potential sentencing exposure could have constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. In Rivas-Lopez, accounts differed as to whether the counsel
incorrectly estimated his client’s sentencing range; however, in the present case, Petitioner does
not assert her counsel erroneously estimated her sentencing exposure. Id. at 358. In fact, it appears
her counsel accurately appraised her sentencing range.2
The record belies Petitioner’s assertion that she was coerced into a guilty plea. At rearraignment, Petitioner confirmed she had not been coerced into accepting the guilty plea, she
understood her constitutional rights and the consequences of her plea, and she entered the plea
freely and voluntarily. FCR 5, ECF No. 9. Furthermore, Petitioner stated she was fully satisfied
with her counsel’s representation. Id. Such “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong
presumption of verity” and any subsequent recantation will inevitably meet strong skepticism.
Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1110 (quoting Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 73-74). Though Petitioner states
her fear of a life sentence induced her to plead guilty, fear of greater punishment does not render
a guilty plea invalid. United States v. Araiza, 693 F. 2d 382, 384-385 (5th Cir. 1982). Thus, the
record does not support that Petitioner’s counsel forced her to accept the guilty plea. Crane, 178
F.3d at 312. Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate is therefore DENIED as to these issues.

Indeed, Petitioner’s codefendants who chose not to pled guilty were subsequently charged with three additional
counts by superseding indictment—(1) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (Count Two);
(2) conspiracy to maintain a drug-involved premises (Count Three); and (3) possession of a firearm in furtherance of
drug trafficking crime related to the drug-involved premises charge (Count Four). Gov. Obj. 13, ECF 7. If Petitioner
had not taken the original plea agreement, she likely faced up to 65 additional years imprisonment based on the
superseding indictment. Id. Petitioner pleaded guilty to Count One for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.
This carried a sentencing exposure of ten years to life. Id.
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B.

The Record Supports the Magistrate Judge’s Finding of Effective Assistance of
Counsel at Sentencing.
Petitioner asserted her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present

mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing, specifically that her husband suffered from colon
cancer and he would be without personal care while she was incarcerated. Mot. Vacate 12, ECF
No. 1. However, the Magistrate Judge found, and the record indicates, Petitioner’s counsel
mentioned numerous mitigating circumstances at sentencing, including the fact that Petitioner
was the primary caretaker for her husband as he suffered from colon cancer. Crim. Doc. 1271
at 6-7. Furthermore, Petitioner cannot succeed in her ineffective assistance of counsel claim by
merely showing counsel was not successful in obtaining a sentence below the mandatory
minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200, 203-04
(2001) (holding to establish prejudice of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing,
petitioners must show the deficient performance of defense counsel increased the sentence).
Since Petitioner cannot prove the deficient performance in Strickland, her claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel at sentencing is hereby DENIED. The Court need not address Strickland’s
prejudice prong since Petitioner was unable to prove counsel performed deficiently.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ACCEPTS the Magistrate Judge’s findings. Therefore,

it is ORDERED that Petitioner’s section 2255 Motion to Vacate is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED on this 2nd day of March, 2016.

_____________________________________
Reed O’Connor
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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