Williams v. Sorrells

Filing 27

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff's Attorney Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 [Dkt. No. 21 ]. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge David L Horan on 4/8/2016) (sss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NAKIA WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
V.
RICK SORRELLS and DALLAS
COUNTY SCHOOLS,
Defendants.

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No. 3:15-cv-351-M

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Defendants Rick Sorrells and Dallas County Schools have filed a Motion for
Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s Attorney Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see Dkt. No. 21,
which United States District Judge Barbara M.G. Lynn has referred to the
undersigned United States magistrate judge for recommendation or determination, see
Dkt. No. 24. Plaintiff Nakia Williams has filed a response, see Dkt. No. 25, and
Defendants have filed a reply, see Dkt. No. 26.
For the reasons explained below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for
Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s Attorney Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 [Dkt. No. 21].1
See generally Brown v. Bridges, No. 3:12-cv-4947-P, 2015 WL 410062, at *1*4 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015) (explaining that, when a district judge refers a motion
for sanctions to a magistrate judge, the sanction chosen by the magistrate judge,
rather than the sanction sought by the party, governs the determination of whether
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) or 72(b) applies and that, when the magistrate
judge finds that dismissal or another sanction disposing of a claim or defense in
unwarranted, the motions should be characterized as non-dispositive and may be
ruled on by the magistrate judge); Allen v. Travis, No. 3:06-cv-1361-M, 2007 WL
1989592, at *2 n.3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2007) (explaining that none of the motions for
sanctions involve issues that are dispositive of the claims and that the magistrate
judge could therefore rule on the motions as non-dispositive).
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Background
On July 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint against
Defendants Dallas County Schools and its Superintendent, Rick Sorrells, asserting
claims for sex discrimination, harassment, and hostile environment under Texas Labor
Code § 21.125 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and for retaliation under the
Texas Labor Code. See Dkt. No. 9.
On August 31, 2015, Plaintiff and Defendants filed a Stipulation of Dismissal
and requested that the Court sign the parties’ proposed Agreed Order of Dismissal
With Prejudice. See Dkt. No. 12. In the Stipulation of Dismissal, Plaintiff, through his
counsel, stipulated that he was dismissing with prejudice all claims he had asserted
or could have asserted against Defendants. See id. The Court entered the parties’
Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice on September 2, 2015. See Dkt. No. 14.
On September 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Vacate Agreed Order of
Dismissal with Prejudice or Alternatively Dismiss Without Prejudice. See Dkt. No. 15.
Plaintiff sought vacatur or amendment of the Agreed Order of Dismissal With
Prejudice on the bases that he “believes that he has received additional information
regarding his claims and has, at this point, changed his mind regarding the
settlement” and that he “has not, at this point, executed final settlement documents
and is free to change his position notwithstanding the Agreed Order of Dismissal.” See
id. at 4-5.
On November 24, 2015, the undersigned entered Findings, Conclusions and
Recommendation. See Dkt. No. 20. The undersigned found that it was undisputed that
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Plaintiff authorized his counsel to accept a settlement offer and that Plaintiff’s counsel
did so. Based on that settlement, Plaintiff’s counsel signed a Stipulation of Dismissal
and asked the Court to enter an Agreed Order of Dismissal With Prejudice. It was
further undisputed that Plaintiff’s counsel did not hear back from Plaintiff until
September 2, 2015, the same day that the Court entered the Agreed Order of
Dismissal, when he informed counsel that he had changed his mind regarding the
terms of the settlement. See id. at 7-8. The undersigned concluded that the motion to
vacate was untimely and that, even if it had been timely, Plaintiff could not back out
of the parties’ settlement simply because he had changed his mind and had not
personally executed the final settlement documents.
The undersigned noted that Plaintiff cited no legal authority for the argument
that he was free to change his mind notwithstanding the Agreed Order of Dismissal
because he had not personally executed the final settlement documents, and concluded
that the law was contrary to Plaintiff’s position. See id. at 11-13. Moreover, Plaintiff
provided no information concerning the additional information regarding his claims
that he allegedly learned after authorizing his counsel to accept the settlement offer.
See id. at 143-15.
The undersigned recommended that the Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Vacate
Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice or Alternatively Dismiss Without Prejudice.
See Dkt. No. 19. On December 18, 2015, Judge Lynn accepted the Findings,
Conclusions, and Recommendation and denied the motion to vacate, see Dkt. No. 20.
On January 27, 2016, Defendants filed their Motion for Sanctions Against
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Plaintiff’s Attorney Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, asserting that Plaintiff’s attorney
unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied these proceedings by filing Plaintiff’s Motion
to Vacate Agreed Order of Dismissal with Prejudice or Alternatively Dismiss Without
Prejudice because the motion was filed untimely and without providing any factual or
legal support for the requested relief. See Dkt. No. 21. Defendants seek reimbursement
for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of the filing of the motion to vacate.
See Dkt. Nos. 21 & 23.
Legal Standards
A court may impose sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees and costs against
“[a]ny attorney ... who ... multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. To impose sanctions against an attorney under Section
1927, the court must find that the sanctioned attorney multiplied the proceedings both
“unreasonably” and “vexatiously.” See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d
519, 526 (5th Cir. 2002). Proving that a counsel’s behavior was both “vexatious” and
“unreasonable” requires “evidence of bad faith, improper motive, or reckless disregard
of the duty owed to the court.” Edwards v. Gen. Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 246 (5th
Cir. 1992).
Sanctions under Section 1927 are “‘punitive in nature and require clear and
convincing evidence that sanctions are justified.’” Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Doubletree
Partners, L.P., 739 F.3d 848, 872 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bryant v. Military Dep’t of
Miss., 597 F.3d 678, 694 (5th Cir. 2010)). Because of its punitive nature, Section 1927
is construed strictly, see Proctor & Gamble Co., 280 F.3d at 525, and in favor of the
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sanctioned party, see FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1384 (5th Cir. 1994). Section 1927
sanctions “‘should be employed only in instances evidencing a serious and standard
disregard for the orderly process of justice, lest the legitimate zeal of an attorney in
representing [a] client [be] dampened.’” Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 739 F.3d at 872
(quoting Conner, 20 F.3d at 1384).
Section 1927 only authorizes shifting fees that are associated with “the
persistent prosecution of a meritless claim.” Proctor & Gamble Co., 280 F.3d at 525.
The courts often use repeated filings, despite warnings from the court, or other proof
of excessive litigiousness to justify sanctions. See Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Employees v. Nat’l
Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1988).“‘An unsuccessful claim is
not necessarily actionable.’” Lawyer’s Title Ins. Corp., 739 F.3d at 872 (quoting Hogue
v. Royse City, Tex., 939 F.2d 1249, 1256 (5th Cir. 1991)).
In awarding fees under Section 1927, the court is required to “(1) identify
sanctionable conduct and distinguish it from the reasons for deciding the case on the
merits, (2) link the sanctionable conduct to the size of the sanctions, and (3)
differentiate between sanctions awarded under different statutes.” Proctor & Gamble
Co., 280 F.3d at 526. Punishment under Section 1927 is “‘sparingly applied.’” Lawyer’s
Title Ins. Corp., 739 F.3d at 872 (quoting Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v.
Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 535 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Analysis
Plaintiff’s counsel filed one motion at the insistence of a client who had become
dissatisfied with a settlement after the offer had been accepted and the case had been
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dismissed based on the settlement but before he signed the formal settlement
documents. And, as Defendants argue, that motion was untimely and was not
supported by either the law or any evidence.
But the filing of this single motion presents neither the persistent prosecution
of a meritless claim or the bad faith, improper motive, or reckless disregard necessary
for a finding that Plaintiff’s counsel has vexatiously and unreasonably multiplied the
proceedings in this case.
Even though the Court rejected the arguments that Plaintiff’s counsel advanced
in the motion to vacate as unpersuasive, those arguments are not so untenable as to
be “vexatious” or “unreasonable.” See Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th
Cir. 1993). Section 1927 focuses on the conduct of the litigation, not on the merits, and
requires more than knowledge of an argument’s weaknesses. See Bryant, 597 F.3d 678,
694; Temple v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 48 F. App’x 480, No. 01-11569, 2002 WL 31049426,
at *4 (5th Cir. 2002). And a sanctioning court must do more than disagree with a
party’s legal analysis. See Ratliff v. Stewart, 508 F.3d 225, 234 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Calhoun, 34 F.3d at 1300). A mere disagreement with an attorney’s legal theory,
standing alone, is not sufficient to satisfy the vexatiousness requirement. See id.
Plaintiff’s motion to vacate was untimely, but it was filed only one day after the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) deadline, and Plaintiff explained that he
calculated the due date based on the Court’s Agreed Order of Dismissal instead of the
Stipulation of Dismissal. While Plaintiff was mistaken, the mistake was not
unreasonable. See Smith Int’l, Inc. v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 844 F.2d 1193, 1199 (5th
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Cir. 1988) (“Merely because plaintiffs and their counsel were mistaken as to the law
does not mean that the mistake was unreasonable.”). And Plaintiff’s arguments that
he was not bound by the settlement because he had not signed the final settlement
documents was not so untenable as to be “vexatious” or “unreasonable” for purposes
of Section 1927 sanctions, even if it, too, was mistaken. See Proctor & Gamble Co., 280
F.3d at 531.
For all of these reasons, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to impose 28
U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel.
Conclusion
The Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions Against Plaintiff’s
Attorney Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 [Dkt. No. 21].
SO ORDERED.
DATE: April 8, 2016

_________________________________________
DAVID L. HORAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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