Gonzales v. Colvin

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM OPINION granting the Commissioner's MOTION for summary judgment and denying 15 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Johnny Manuel Gonzales. The Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 1/11/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
JOHNNY GONZALES,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, ACTING
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.

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§ Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-0685-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Johnny Gonzales (“Gonzales”) brings this action under § 205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (the “Act”), for judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his claim for disability
insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”) under Titles II and
XVI of the Act. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.
I
Gonzales filed an application for DIB and SSI under Titles II and XVI of the Act in
September 2011, alleging a disability beginning June 10, 2010 due to liver failure, hepatitis
C, and severe headaches. The Commissioner denied Gonzales’ application initially and on
reconsideration. Following a hearing, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that
Gonzales is “not disabled.” The Appeals Council denied Gonzales’ request for review, and
the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Commissioner.

In making his decision, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential process prescribed
in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a). At step one, he found that Gonzales has not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since June 10, 2010, his alleged onset date. At step two, the ALJ
found that Gonzales has severe impairments of lung disease and a history of hypertension
exacerbated by his weight. At step three, the ALJ found that Gonzales’ impairments failed
to meet or equal a listed impairment for presumptive disability under 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. The ALJ found that Gonzales has the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”)
to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR
404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). Specifically, he can lift and carry
20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; he can sit,
stand or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday. His postural and
other work functions are not affected.
R. 48. At step four, the ALJ found that Gonzales is capable of performing his past relevant
work as a supervisor landscaper, which does not require the performance of work-related
activities precluded by Gonzales’ RFC. Because the ALJ concluded at step four that
Gonzales had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, at any time from June 10,
2010 (the alleged onset date) through November 26, 2013 (the date of the ALJ’s decision),
he did not proceed to step five.
Gonzales maintains on three grounds that the Commissioner’s decision must be
reversed: first, the ALJ failed to adequately account for Gonzales’ mental health problems,
both by not finding that such problems are severe impairments and by not including any

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mental limitations in the RFC; second, the ALJ calculated the RFC without performing a
function-by-function assessment of Gonzales’ limitations and without the opinion of an
acceptable medical source; and, third, the ALJ determined that Gonzales could perform his
past work as a supervisor landscaper, without explaining how he arrived at this classification
of his past work and without making specific findings as to the physical and mental demands
of his past work.
II
The court’s review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to determining whether
substantial evidence supports the decision and whether the Commissioner applied the proper
legal standards to evaluate the evidence. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 1995);
Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). “The Commissioner’s
decision is granted great deference and will not be disturbed unless the reviewing court
cannot find substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s decision or
finds that the Commissioner made an error of law.” Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (5th
Cir. 1995) (footnotes omitted).
“The court may not reweigh the evidence or try the issues de novo or substitute its
judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Kane v. Heckler, 731 F.2d 1216, 1219 (5th Cir.
1984) (citations omitted). “If the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, then the findings are conclusive and the Commissioner’s decision must be
affirmed.” Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173. “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a

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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Greenspan v. Shalala,
38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).
“It is more than a mere scintilla, and less than a preponderance.” Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d
357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Moore v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir. 1990) (per
curiam)). “To make a finding of ‘no substantial evidence,’ [the court] must conclude that
there is a ‘conspicuous absence of credible choices’ or ‘no contrary medical evidence.’”
Dellolio v. Heckler, 705 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir. 1983) (citation omitted). Even if the court
should determine that the evidence preponderates in the claimant’s favor, the court must still
affirm the Commissioner’s findings if there is substantial evidence to support these findings.
See Carry v. Heckler, 750 F.2d 479, 482 (5th Cir. 1985). The resolution of conflicting
evidence is for the Commissioner rather than for the court. See Patton v. Schweiker, 697
F.2d 590, 592 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
For purposes of social security determinations, “disability” means an “inability to
engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.”

42 U.S.C.

§ 423(d)(1)(A). In determining whether an applicant is disabled, the Commissioner follows
a five-step sequential analysis. See, e.g., Perez v. Barnhart, 415 F.3d 457, 461 (5th Cir.
2005). If the Commissioner finds that the claimant is disabled or is not disabled at any step
in the analysis, the analysis is terminated. Id. Under the five-step sequential inquiry the

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Commissioner considers whether (1) the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful
activity, (2) the claimant’s impairment is severe, (3) the claimant’s impairment meets or
equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) the impairment
prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work, and (5) the claimant cannot presently
perform relevant work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. See, e.g.,
Leggett, 67 F.3d at 563 n.2; Martinez, 64 F.3d at 173-74; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). “The
burden of proof is on the claimant for the first four steps, but shifts to the [Commissioner]
at step five.” Bowling v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing
Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). At step five, once
the Commissioner demonstrates that other jobs are available to a claimant, the burden of
proof shifts to the claimant to rebut this finding. Selders v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 618 (5th
Cir. 1990) (per curiam).1
When determining the propriety of a decision of “not disabled,” this court’s function
is to ascertain whether the record considered as a whole contains substantial evidence that
supports the final decision of the Commissioner, as trier of fact. The court weighs four
elements of proof to decide if there is substantial evidence of disability: (1) objective medical
facts; (2) diagnoses and opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the claimant’s
subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4) age, education, and work history.
Martinez, 64 F.3d at 174 (citing Wren v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1991) (per

1

Step five is not at issue in this case.
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curiam)). “The ALJ has a duty to develop the facts fully and fairly relating to an applicant’s
claim for disability benefits.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557. “If the ALJ does not satisfy [this] duty,
[the] decision is not substantially justified.” Id. Reversal of the Commissioner’s decision
is appropriate, however, “only if the applicant shows that [she] was prejudiced.” Id. The
court will not overturn a procedurally imperfect administrative ruling unless the substantive
rights of a party have been prejudiced. See Smith v. Chater, 962 F. Supp. 980, 984 (N.D.
Tex. 1997) (Fitzwater, J.).
III
Gonzales maintains that the ALJ failed to adequately take into account his mental
health problems. This argument rests on two premises: first, the ALJ did not sufficiently
consider evidence that Gonzales suffers from severe mental impairments; and, second, the
ALJ erred by not including any mental limitations in the RFC determination.
A
1
Gonzales asserts that, although the ALJ purported to apply the correct legal standard
at step two, the record lacks substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that his bipolar
disorder and antisocial personality disorder are non-severe impairments. Rather, he contends
that the evidence in the record shows that his mental impairments are severe. Gonzales relies
on evidence that Dallas Metrocare Services (“Metrocare”) repeatedly discontinued and
reinitiated multiple medications in unsuccessful attempts to control his symptoms; that he

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was treated for, and ultimately diagnosed with, bipolar disease; that in his application for
disability benefits, he alleged disability, in part, due to depression; that he testified about his
anger outbursts, criminal history, difficulty conforming to societal norms, avoidance of
others, and difficulty completing a conversation; that many clinical findings suggested that
his mental impairments are severe; and that consultative examiner, Stephanie Hall, Psy. D.
(“Dr. Hall”), found that Gonzales had limited attention and concentration, a blunted mood,
and an inability to perform reverse serial sevens or recite the alphabet.
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ carefully reviewed the evidence pertaining
to Gonzales’ mental health problems and properly found that these problems are not severe
impairments. She points out that Gonzales never sought mental health treatment; rather, the
Salvation Army referred him for treatment after he tested positive for the use of
methamphetamine. The Commissioner also relies on Gonzales’ testimony that he had
experienced depression since 2002, many years before he stopped working, and that he quit
his previous job for reasons unrelated to his alleged impairments. The Commissioner also
maintains that the medical evidence in the record reflects no severe mental impairments
because, other than a few abnormalities that Gonzales relies on, the record repeatedly notes
cooperative behavior, normal speech, no psychosis, euthymic mood, fair insight, fair
judgment, organized thoughts, and intact memory. The Commissioner asserts that most of
Dr. Hall’s findings were normal, and that she ultimately concluded that Gonzales had
“sufficient ability to make occupational, personal, and social adjustment.” D. Br. 6 (quoting

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R. 383).
2
At step two, the ALJ considers whether the claimant suffers from any severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii),
(c) (2012). To comply with this regulation, the ALJ “must determine whether any identified
impairments are ‘severe’ or ‘not severe.’” Herrera v. Astrue, 406 Fed. Appx. 899, 903 (5th
Cir. 2010) (per curiam). A severe impairment is “any impairment or combination of
impairments which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic
work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) (“Severity Regulation”). A literal interpretation
of the Severity Regulation would be inconsistent with the Act, however, because it would
sometimes lead to the denial of benefits to claimants unable to perform substantial gainful
activity. See Stone v. Heckler, 752 F.2d 1099, 1101-03 (5th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, an ALJ
may properly conclude that an impairment is not severe only after expressly finding that it
“is a slight abnormality [having] such minimal effect on the individual that it would not be
expected to interfere with the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education or
work experience.” Id. at 1101 (alteration in original) (quoting Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d
340, 341 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam)).
In addition to the severity standard that is used to evaluate all impairments, the ALJ
must follow an even more precise standard when evaluating the severity of a claimant’s
mental impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). This evaluation process is often referred

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to as the “special technique” or the “technique.” See, e.g., Randall v. Astrue, 570 F.3d 651,
658 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citing to 20 C.F.R. § 404 .1520(a)). The special technique
requires that the ALJ first consider whether a claimant has a medically determinable mental
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(b)(1).
Once the ALJ finds that a claimant has a mental impairment, he must rate the degree of
functional limitation resulting from the impairment pursuant to the categories identified in
paragraphs A, B, and sometimes C, of the adult mental disorders listings. See 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1 § 12.00; 20 C.F.R. § 416.920a(b)(2), (c). Paragraph B contains four
broad functional areas: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration,
persistence, and pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(b)(2), (c)(3);
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1, § 12.00C. The first three functional areas are rated on
a five-point scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4).
The fourth functional area is rated on a four-point scale ranging from “none” to “four or
more” episodes. Id. After the ALJ rates the degree of functional limitation resulting from
any mental impairment, the ALJ determines the severity of such impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920a(d). If the degrees of limitation in the first three areas are “none” or “mild,” and
the degree of limitation in the fourth area is “none,” “the ALJ must find the impairment ‘not
severe,’ which generally concludes the analysis and terminates the proceedings.” Boyd v.
Apfel, 239 F.3d 698, 705 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1)).

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3
The court concludes that substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s
determination that Gonzales’ mental impairments are not severe. The ALJ evaluated
Gonzales’ impairments under the de minimis standard of Stone and the special technique and
found that Gonzales’ degree of limitation in the first three functional areas is “within normal
limits” with “only mild limitations,” and that the degree of limitation in the fourth functional
area is “none.” The ALJ therefore concluded that Gonzales has no severe mental impairment
and that his bipolar disorder, which is fully controlled by medication, is a non-severe
impairment. See Boyd, 239 F.3d at 705 (citing to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1)) (explaining
that if degrees of limitation in first three areas are “none” or “mild,” and degree of limitation
in fourth area is “none,” “the ALJ must find the impairment ‘not severe,’ which generally
concludes the analysis and terminates the proceedings”).
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ discussed and relied on the disability report,
which states that Gonzales did not have difficulty with hearing, reading, breathing,
understanding, coherency, concentration, talking, or answering, or other difficulties; the
functional report, in which Gonzales alleged some physical limitations but no mental
limitations; and medical records from Parkland Memorial Hospital (“Parkland”) concluding
that Gonzales “is reported normal from a psychiatric point.” R. 51 (citing R. 565 (explaining
that, with respect to his “psychiatric,” Gonzales “has a normal mood and affect,” and “[h]is
behavior is normal”)). The ALJ also discussed an “unremarkable” mental status examination

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conducted by a Metrocare physician assistant2 on October 17, 2011, in which Gonzales
reported sad mood, low motivation, and mild irritability, denied manic highs, and stated that
he had been doing fairly well. The physician assistant also noted that Gonzales had been
compliant with medications. As the ALJ points out, this Metrocare examination, as well as
another Metrocare mental status examination conducted by an advanced nurse practitioner
on January 10, 2012, concluded that Gonzales had fair insight, judgment, and impulse
control, intact memory, normal speech, cooperative behavior, and organized thought, and that
Gonzales was well groomed. The ALJ also summarized the findings of Dr. Hall’s
psychological examination:
[Gonzales] is able to handle activities of daily living while
living in his sister’s house. Social activity is with his family
members. Mental status examination showed [Gonzales] was
dressed appropriately and paid adequate attention. He possessed
an adequate fund of general information given his reported
academic achievement. Memory was intact and emotional
expression was appropriate. No thought disorder, judgment was
fair and insight was limited. After evaluating [Gonzales], Dr.
Hall diagnosed bipolar II disorder; cocaine abuse, early full
remission; cannabis abuse, sustained full remission and
antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Hall assigned a GAF of 62
with a fair prognosis and indicating that [Gonzales’] bipolar
symptoms were going to improve and remit but expects the
course of treatment will be comprised by continued use of
cocaine or being incarcerated again.

2

In discussing this October 17, 2011 mental status examination, the ALJ states that
“Dr. Hall noted that [Gonzales] reports sad mood, low motivation, and mild irritability.” R.
50. But the ALJ cites the Metrocare report in the record, which clearly shows that a
physician assistant, not Dr. Hall, conducted this exam.
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R. 50. Dr. Hall ultimately concluded that, “[b]ased on the current evidence obtained during
this examination, [Gonzales] is demonstrating sufficient ability to reason and to make
occupational, personal, and social adjustments.” R. 383. The ALJ also explained that state
agency medical consultant, Susan Thompson, M.D. (“Dr. Thompson”), completed a
psychiatric review technique assessment on November 22, 2011, and opined that Gonzales
has non-severe impairments of bipolar disorder, cocaine and cannabis abuse in remission that
causes only mild restrictions in activities of daily living, in difficulties in social functioning
and in concentration, persistence, or pace and no extended episodes of decompensation. And
the ALJ stated that he accepted Dr. Thompson’s ultimate conclusion that Gonzales’ mental
impairments are non-severe because this conclusion is consistent with the subsequently
added medical evidence and the record as a whole. Accordingly, the court concludes that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Gonzales does not have a severe
mental impairment.
B
1
Gonzales also contends that, even if the ALJ properly found that his mental
impairments are not severe, the ALJ still should have included limitations resulting from his
mental impairments in Gonzales’ RFC. He asserts that the RFC must reflect both severe and
non-severe impairments, and even if an impairment is non-severe, the RFC determination
must include limitations associated with that impairment. Gonzales also maintains that the

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record shows that he has work-related mental limitations resulting from his mental
impairments. He points out that his alleged disability is in part due to depression, he testified
that he had anger outbursts and difficultly completing a conversation, and he reported that
he had an extensive criminal history and avoided others. Gonzales also maintains that the
ALJ found that his bipolar disorder, while not severe, resulted in mild limitations in activities
of daily living, maintaining social functioning, and maintaining concentration, persistence,
or pace, but the ALJ did not explain why the RFC failed to contain any psychological
limitations.
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ thoroughly considered Gonzales’ alleged
mental impairments and properly excluded any mental limitations from the RFC because the
record reveals no evidence of functional limitations.
2
The court holds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination not to
include any mental limitations in the RFC. Although the ALJ found that Gonzales’ bipolar
disorder is a non-severe impairment, “the ALJ must still consider the impact of [Gonzales’]
non-severe mental impairments—either singly or in combination with other
conditions—when he determines [his] RFC.” Williams v. Astrue, 2010 WL 517590, at *8
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(2)). The ALJ’s
decision demonstrates that he took into account Gonzales’ mental impairments when
performing his RFC analysis. Before formulating the RFC, the ALJ noted that Gonzales

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complained of depression, bipolar, and anxiety at the administration hearing. The ALJ
analyzed the paragraphs B and C criteria, determined that Gonzales has no severe mental
impairment, and listed “bipolar disorder (fulling controlled by medication)” as a non-severe
impairment that causes “no functional limitations to basic work activities.”

R. 48

(parenthesis in original). The ALJ also explained that
[t]he limitations identified in the “paragraph B” and “paragraph
C” criteria are not a [RFC] assessment, but are used to rate the
severity of mental impairments at steps 2 and 3 . . . . The mental
[RFC] assessment used at steps 4 and 5 . . . requires a more
detailed assessment by itemizing various functions contained in
the broader categories found in paragraphs B and C . . . .
However, the above “B” and “C” criteria findings translate into
the [RFC] assessment of no impairment in basic mental work
requirements. [Gonzales’] mental function, as stated, is within
normal limits.
R. 48. Additionally, as discussed supra at § III(A)(3), when the ALJ analyzed Gonzales’
RFC, he discussed the Parkland and Metrocare mental health records, psychological
examinations conducted by Drs. Hall and Thompson, and Gonzales’ testimony and reports
regarding his mental impairments. The ALJ also noted that none of Gonzales’ treating
physicians recommended any serious restrictions. Accordingly, the court concludes that the
ALJ sufficiently considered Gonzales’ mental impairments in calculating the RFC, and did
not err by not including any mental limitations in the RFC.3

3

Gonzales’ reliance on Williams is misplaced. In Williams the court held that the ALJ
failed to fully analyze every impairment of which he was aware. Williams, 2010 WL 517590,
at *7. The court also concluded that “the ALJ’s determination that [the claimant] does not
have a severe mental impairment—while drawing unexplained conclusions and failing to
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IV
Gonzales contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is deficient as a matter of law for two
reasons: first, the ALJ formulated the RFC without performing the required function-byfunction analysis; and, second, when the ALJ determined how Gonzales’ impairments affect
his ability to work, he did so without an opinion from a medical source.
A
1
Gonzales maintains that the ALJ formulated his RFC without performing the functionby-function analysis required by Policy Interpretation Ruling Titles II and XVI: Assessing
Residual Functional Capacity in Initial Claims, SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1, 3-6
(S.S.A. 1996) (hereinafter “SSR 96-8p”). He posits that the ALJ found that his lung disease
is a severe impairment, and that, although his bipolar disorder is non-severe, he has mild
limitations in his ability to carry out activities of daily living, maintain social functioning, and
maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. And Gonzales posits that, by failing to conduct
the function-by-function analysis, the ALJ failed to address any environmental limitations
associated with his lung disease, and any mental limitations associated with his mental
impairments.

mention relevant facts from the record—is not supported by substantial evidence.” Id. at *8.
Williams is inapposite because, in the present case, the ALJ adequately analyzed Gonzales’
mental impairments by discussing and considering facts in the record addressing such
impairments and drawing conclusions based on those facts.
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The Commissioner responds that the ALJ’s decision comports with SSR 96-8p
because it considered the totality of the medical evidence, and no records support a contrary
conclusion, and she posits that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
2
SSR 96-8p requires that, before making an RFC determination, the ALJ perform a
function-by-function assessment of the claimant’s capacity to perform sustained work-related
physical and mental activities “based upon all of the relevant evidence,” taking into account
“both exertional and nonexertional factors.” Myers v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 617, 620 (5th Cir.
2001) (per curiam) (citing SSR 96-8p). But an ALJ’s decision complies with SSR 96-8p
when it considers the totality of the medical evidence and no records support a contrary
conclusion. See Porter v. Barnhart, 200 Fed. Appx. 317, 319 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam);
Williams v. Barnhart, 70 Fed. Appx. 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). In Porter the
claimant maintained that the ALJ committed prejudicial legal error in calculating the RFC,
in part because the ALJ “fail[ed] to address his alleged limitations in manipulation and
gripping through a function-by-function analysis” and thus “did not comply with [SSR 968p].” Porter, 200 Fed. Appx. at 319. The Fifth Circuit held, however, that
[t]he ALJ complied with SSR 96-8p by considering all of the
medical evidence, including the testing performed by the
chiropractor, and [the claimant’s] subjective complaints of pain.
The ALJ analyzed each alleged impairment in detail. The ALJ
concluded that this evidence demonstrated that [the claimant]
“retain[ed] the functional capacity to perform the exertional
demands of sedentary work . . . .” The medical opinions did not
warrant a contrary decision.
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Id. (some alternations in original). In Williams the claimant argued that “the Commissioner
erred by failing to conduct a function-by-function analysis in light of all [her] impairments,”
and the Fifth Circuit held that, “[a]lthough the Commissioner did not consider each function
of [the claimant’s] past work, there was no conflicting evidence and substantial evidence
supported the Commissioner’s finding.” Williams, 70 Fed. Appx. at 184 (citing Myers, 238
F.3d at 620; Mays v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988)).
3
The court holds that the ALJ’s decision complies with SSR 96-8p. Although the ALJ
did not perform a function-by-function analysis, he considered all of the medical records, and
no records support a contrary conclusion. See Porter, 200 Fed. Appx. at 319; Williams, 70
Fed. Appx. at 184. The ALJ thoroughly discussed the Metrocare and Parkland records, and
Dr. Hall’s and Dr. Thompson’s reports, and he noted that the treatment records “reveal[ed]
no serious restrictions recommended by the treating physicians.” R. 51. Moreover, Gonzales
does not cite any medical records that the ALJ failed to consider in formulating the RFC or
any records or other evidence, other than his own statements, that support a contrary RFC
finding. And Gonzales does not argue that the ALJ erred by discrediting his statements.
The ALJ’s decision shows that he considered Gonzales’ lung disease and mental
impairments when formulating the RFC, and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
decision not to include environmental and psychological limitations in the RFC. The court
has already discussed and reached this conclusion with respect to Gonzales’ mental

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impairments, see supra at § III(B)(2), and the court will therefore limit its discussion to
Gonzales’ lung disease. As a general matter, there is “no inherent contradiction in finding
that [Gonzales’] [lung disease] is severe at step two and also finding that he has no exertional
limitations on working.” Boothe v. Colvin, 2013 WL 3809689, at *6 (N.D. Tex. July 23,
2013) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (“Because the ALJ determines whether an impairment is severe
without regard to the individual’s age, education, or work experience, finding that an
impairment is severe does not of itself mean that the impairment affects the claimant’s ability
to work.”). In determining the RFC, the ALJ noted that Gonzales complained of lung disease
at the administrative hearing. He then explained that, although Gonzales has “a past history
significant for lung disease,” chest Xrays taken at Parkland on January 27, 2010 and July 21,
2011 showed that his “lungs [were] clear,” and that there was “no significant change”
between these Xrays. R. 49. And another exam on August 17, 2011 showed that his “lungs
were clear” and his “chest x-ray [was] normal.” Id. Additionally, the ALJ relied on
Gonzales’ statement to Dr. Hall that he had “an inability to work since 2010 because [he] was
working for a company that went out of business,” not because of any limitations associated
with his lung disease (or other impairments). R. 50.
Other evidence in the record also supports the ALJ’s decision not to include any
limitations for Gonzales’ lung disease. Parkland records dated January 27, 2010 reflected
that, with respect to Gonzales’ “pulmonary/chest,” he had “[e]ffort normal and breath sounds
normal. No respiratory distress. He had no wheezes.” R. 299. Additionally, at the

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administrative hearing, when the ALJ asked Gonzales why he could not perform his past
work, Gonzales responded that he is more edgy and not as good at explaining things to other
people as he used to be, but did not testify to any physical limitations.
Moreover, the two cases that Gonzales relies on to support his argument that the ALJ
was obligated to include mental limitations in the RFC determination—Tusken v. Astrue,
2010 WL 2891076 (N.D. Tex. May 25, 2010) (Cureton, J.), rec. adopted, 2010 WL 2891075
(N.D. Tex. July 20, 2010) (McBryde, J.), and Ellis v. Astrue, 2010 WL 3422872 (N.D. Tex.
July 27, 2010) (Stickney, J.), rec. adopted, 2010 WL 3398257 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2010)
(O’Connor, J.)—are distinguishable. In Ellis the court held that the hypothetical question
posed to the vocational expert (“VE”) was deficient.4 Ellis, 2010 WL 3422872, at *5. Here,
the ALJ did not pose a hypothetical question to a VE, so Ellis does not apply. In Tusken the
court concluded that the ALJ erred by not considering the limiting effects of all the
claimant’s impairments, even his non-severe impairments.5 Tusken, 2010 WL 2891076, at
4

In Ellis, although the ALJ found that the claimant had mild restriction in activities of
daily living and social functioning, and moderate deficiencies in concentration, persistence,
or pace, he posed a hypothetical question to the VE describing a person with no restrictions
in activities of daily living and social functioning, and mild deficiencies in concentration,
persistence, or pace. Ellis, 2010 WL 3422872, at *5. The court concluded that “[a]
significant discrepancy exist[ed] between the limitations included in the hypothetical
question posited to the VE and the limitations the ALJ found in his decision,” and because
the hypothetical question needed to reasonably include all recognized limitations, including
the non-exertional limitations recognized by the ALJ, the hypothetical was deficient. Id.
5

This statement is dicta. The court in Tusken overruled the ALJ’s decision at step two,
which found that the claimant’s mental impairment was not severe, held that her mental
impairment was severe, and ordered the ALJ to reformulate the claimant’s RFC to include
her severe mental impairment. Tusken, 2010 WL 2891076, at *11.
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*12. By contrast, the court has already held in this case that the ALJ adequately discussed
and considered the limiting effects of Gonzales’ mental impairments in formulating his RFC.
See supra at § III(B)(2). Accordingly, the court holds that the ALJ complied with SSR 96-8p
and substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
B
1
Gonzales next maintains that the ALJ erred by determining that he can perform “light
work,” without a physician’s indicating that he could do so. Gonzales contends that the ALJ,
as a layman, lacks the qualifications to determine how an impairment results in work-related
limitations, and that only medical practitioners are qualified to make such a determination.
He also posits that the raw medical data in the record establishes that Gonzales has
impairments, but does not clearly establish the effect of these impairments on his ability to
work, and there is therefore no evidence in the record of any work-related limitations, much
less of the “light exertional” category.
The Commissioner responds that an RFC finding is a legal conclusion and that
determining the RFC is the sole responsibility of the ALJ. She further contends that the ALJ
was not required to seek the opinion of a medical practitioner when assessing Gonzales’
limitations. And the Commissioner posits that the ALJ properly made the RFC determination
based on all of the relevant medical and other evidence in the record, and that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

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2
“Under the regulations and our case law, the determination of [RFC] is the sole
responsibility of the ALJ.” Taylor v. Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 602-03 (5th Cir. 2012) (per
curiam) (citing Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c). The ALJ “is
responsible for assessing the medical evidence and determining the claimant’s [RFC].”
Perez v. Heckler, 777 F.2d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Jones v. Heckler, 702 F.2d 616,
616 (5th Cir. 1983)). The ALJ makes an RFC determination based on all the relevant
medical and other evidence in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). “Usually, the ALJ
should request a medical source statement describing the types of work that the applicant is
still capable of performing. The absence of such a statement, however, does not, in itself,
make the record incomplete.” Ripley, 67 F.3d at 557 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(b)(6)
(1994)). “[W]here no medical statement has been provided, our inquiry focuses upon
whether the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence in the existing record.”
Id.; see also Gutierrez v. Barnhart, 2005 WL 1994289, at *7 (5th Cir. Aug. 19, 2005) (per
curiam) (holding that ALJ’s determination of claimant’s RFC to perform a modified level
of light work was “based on substantial evidence even without such a medical opinion”).
3
The court concludes that the ALJ did not err in determining the RFC without the
opinion of a medical source on Gonzales’ ability to work. This is so because, although there
is no statement from a medical source describing the types of work that Gonzales is capable

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of performing, the ALJ’s conclusion that Gonzales can perform “light work” is supported by
substantial evidence. The ALJ found that Gonzales’ lung disease and history of hypertension
exacerbated by his weight are severe impairments, and that Gonzales’ “collar bone and
shoulder pain, migraines (subjective complaints not medically determinable but still
considered in conjunction with [medically determinable impairments]), bipolar disorder
(fully controlled by medication) and cocaine and cannabis abuse (in remission) are, singly
and in combination, non-severe” impairments, which “effect no functional limitations to
basic work activities.” R. 46 (parenthesis in original).6 The ALJ ultimately concluded that
“[n]othing suggests a physical inability to work,” and that Gonzales “does not have an
impairment, singly or in combination, of such severity as to preclude the performance of light
work.” R. 51-52.
In reaching this decision, the ALJ considered numerous medical reports from Parkland
and Metrocare that largely concluded that Gonzales’ impairments did not cause any
functional limitations. See Hames v. Heckler, 707 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
(“The mere presence of some impairment is not disabling per se. Plaintiff must show that
she was so functionally impaired by her back trouble that she was precluded from engaging
in any substantial gainful activity.”) (citing other cases). For example, the ALJ cited reports
concluding that Gonzales had a normal heart, clear lungs, no pulmonary abnormalities, no

6

Because Gonzales only challenges the ALJ’s determination as to his physical
limitations in this section, the court will only address physical limitations here.
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shortness of breath, no chest pain, normal gait, full range of motion, normal grip strength, no
evidence of cirrhosis or portal hypertension, and normal blood pressure with his medication.7
He further noted that none of Gonzales’ treating physicians recommended any serious
restrictions.
In addition to the medical evidence, the ALJ considered Gonzales’ appearance and
demeanor, as well as his testimony, which also revealed no functional physical limitations.
The ALJ explained that Dr. Hall’s report noted that Gonzales “stated an inability to work
since 2010 because [he] was working for a company that went out of business,” not because
of any physical limitations, and that he performs side jobs, such as mowing lawns or running
errands—jobs where he does not have to be involved with a lot of people. R. 50 (citing R.

7

The ALJ discussed the following Parkland medical records: (1) a report dated
October 10, 2011 that revealed a 1.7 centimeter mass in the right lobe of the liver, and
gallstones, but no evidence of cirrhosis; (2) a chest Xray dated July 21, 2011 that showed
clear lungs, normal heart, normal mediastinum, some degenerative change in the thoracic
spine, and no significant cardiopulmonary radiographic abnormality; (3) a physical exam
conducted August 17, 2011 that showed normal heart, clear lungs, unremarkable blood
pressure (130/89), no shortness of breath, no chest pain, no fever, normal gait, full range of
motion, normal grip strength, normal EKG, normal chest Xray, positive for hepatitis C, and
otherwise normal laboratory results, as well as a normal neurological exam (conducted at
prior office visit); (4) a record dated October 26, 2011 that revealed a normal stress test, a
CT scan of the head showing sinusitis but that was otherwise normal, and a CT scan of the
abdomen showing no evidence of cirrhosis or portal hypertension, but three lesions in the
liver; (5) a CT scan of the head dated August 22, 2011 that revealed no evidence of acute
intracranial abnormality and air-fluid level in the left maxillary sinus; and (6) a record dated
November 9, 2011 in which Gonzales reported heartburn after eating, but denied present
pain, and also reported chest pain the past two nights, but denied present pain and shortness
of breath, and revealed elevated blood pressure (131/95) due to Gonzales’ not taking his
medication; an unremarkable physical examination; and an assessment of heartburn, hepatitis
C carrier, and benign hypertension.
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379). Dr. Hall’s report also stated that Gonzales takes care of his sister’s yard. And at the
administrative hearing, when the ALJ asked Gonzales why he could not perform his past
work, Gonzales testified that he is more edgy and not as good at explaining things to other
people as he used to be, but he did not specify any physical limitations. See Gutierrez, 2005
WL 1994289, at *7 (explaining that substantial evidence supported ALJ’s determination that
claimant could perform modified level of light work, even without any medical opinion,
because ALJ properly made adverse credibility determinations against claimant and based
his determination that claimant retained RFC to perform at least part of her past relevant
work on evidence in the record, including her testimony in response to ALJ’s questions about
past work). Accordingly, the court holds that the ALJ did not err in determining the RFC
without the opinion of a medical source as to Gonzales’ ability to work, and that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Gonzales can perform, at a minimum, light
work.
4
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the ALJ erred by failing to fully develop
the record, the court will only reverse the ALJ’s decision when the claimant demonstrates
that he was prejudiced by this failure. See Gutierrez, 2005 WL 1994289, at *8 (citing Brock
v. Chater, 84 F.3d 726, 728 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (explaining that plaintiff must “show
that he could and would have adduced evidence that might have altered the result”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Smith v. Chater, 962 F. Supp. 980, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1997)

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(Fitzwater, J.). “Here, [Gonzales] makes no argument that [he] was prejudiced by the lack
of a physician statement detailing [his] ability to perform work-related activities.” Gutierrez,
2005 WL 1994289, at *7. Accordingly, reversal would not be warranted in this case even
if the ALJ had failed to fully develop the record.
V
Gonzales contends that the ALJ erred at step four by not following the proper
procedure when calculating Gonzales’ past work and determining whether he can perform
his past work. Gonzales maintains that the ALJ committed two errors: first, he did not
explain how he determined the classification of Gonzales’ past work; and, second, he failed
to make a specific finding regarding the physical and mental demands of his past work.
A
1
Gonzales first posits that the ALJ classified his past work as a supervisor landscaper,
as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”), without explaining how he
arrived at this classification and without testimony from a qualified VE identifying Gonzales’
past work. Gonzales also asserts that this classification is contrary to the evidence, because
the ALJ found that a supervisor landscaper is a skilled job, and the record shows that
Gonzales only completed the third grade and thus only has a “marginal education” (i.e., the
ability “to do simple, unskilled types of jobs”).
404.1564(b)(2), 416.964(b)(2)) (emphasis added).

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P. Br. 13 (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§

The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
classification of Gonzales’ past work. She avers that the ALJ clearly explained in his
decision that he based the classification on Gonzales’ testimony that he supervised several
landscaping crews and oversaw his employer’s irrigation services at several properties. The
Commissioner also maintains that VE testimony is not required when, as here, a claimant is
found not disabled at step four. And the Commissioner posits that Gonzales’ reliance on the
DOT’s description of a supervisor landscaper is misguided because the DOT’s descriptions
represent the maximum requirements of occupations as generally performed, not the range
or requirements of a particular job as it is performed in specific settings, and a listed job may
be performed at a lower level than the DOT’s description. The Commissioner maintains that
the present case is an example of a listed job that may be performed at a lower level than the
DOT’s description because Gonzales supervised several landscaping crews, despite his thirdgrade education.
2
The court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s classification of
Gonzales’ past work as a supervisor landscaper, as defined in the DOT. Past relevant work
“is work that [the claimant] ha[s] done within the past 15 years, that was substantial gainful
activity, and that lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1560(b)(1). The ALJ explained that he classified Gonzales’ past work as supervisor
landscaper because Gonzales testified that he had performed this work. Gonzales testified

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that “[he] was running . . . the irrigation”; that his employer “gave [him] two crews to watch
over that were doing mowing”; and that “[he] was the one that was in charge of that property,
so if they had any questions or anything they would . . . bring them to [him].” R. 78. The
ALJ’s determination is also consistent with other evidence in the record, such as Gonzales’
work history report that states he performed “landscaping” from 2001 until 2004 and from
2009 until June 2010, and that in all the jobs he had in the 15 years before becoming unable
to work, he supervised five people all day, hired and fired employees, and was a lead worker.
Additionally, the ALJ’s classification of Gonzales’ past work is reconcilable with
Gonzales’ educational level. “The DOT lists maximum requirements of occupations as
generally performed, not the range of requirements of a particular job as it is performed in
specific settings.” Policy Interpretation Ruling : Titles II & XVI: Use of Vocational Expert
& Vocational Specialist Evidence, & Other Reliable Occupational Info. in Disability
Decisions, SSR 00-4P, 2000 WL 1898704, at *3 (S.S.A. Dec. 4, 2000) (hereinafter “SSR 004P”). Thus the fact that Gonzales did not have the maximum mental capability listed in the
DOT for a supervisor landscaper does not necessarily conflict with the classification of
supervisor landscaper, especially considering that Gonzales testified that he has in fact
performed this type of work.
The ALJ also did not err by classifying Gonzales’ past work without the assistance
of a VE, because “the testimony of a VE is not required when the ALJ determines at step four
that a claimant can perform her past relevant work.” Johnson v. Astrue, 2010 WL 4722275,

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at *9 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 22, 2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Talbert v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 1004,
1994 WL 733486, at *5 n.6 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1994) (“This testimony was not necessary
because the ALJ determined at step four that [the claimant] could perform her past relevant
work and was not disabled.”)); see also SSR 00-4P, at *2 (explaining that, at steps 4 and 5,
ALJs “rely primarily on the DOT . . . for information about the requirements of work in the
national economy,” but that ALJs “may also use VEs . . . to resolve complex vocational
issues”). Accordingly, the court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
classification of Gonzales’ past work as a supervisor landscaper.
B
1
Gonzales next contends that the ALJ concluded that he could perform his past work
as a supervisor landscaper without making a specific finding regarding the physical and
mental demands of this past work, as required by Social Security Ruling: Program Policy
Statement Titles II and XVI: A Disability Claimant’s Capacity To Do Past Relevant Work,
In General, SSR 82-62, 1982 WL 31386, at *4 (S.S.A. Nov. 30, 1981) (hereinafter “SSR 8262”). Gonzales posits that the ALJ erred by using generic terms to describe his past work,
and concluding on the basis of his RFC that he can perform his past work.
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ documented his findings in compliance with
SSR 82-62, and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Gonzales
could perform his past work as a supervisor landscaper.

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2
At step 4, the claimant bears the burden of showing that he cannot perform his past
relevant work. See Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. When determining whether a claimant retains
the RFC to perform his past relevant work, the ALJ can look either to (1) the job duties
peculiar to an individual job as the claimant actually performed it, or to (2) the functional
demands and job duties of the occupation as generally required by employees throughout the
national economy. Social Security Ruling: Program Policy Statement Titles II and XVI: Past
Relevant Work—The Particular Job or The Occupation As Generally Performed, SSR 82-61,
1982 WL 31387, at *1-2 (S.S.A. Nov. 30, 1981) (hereinafter “SSR 82-61”). If the ALJ
determines that the claimant retains the RFC to perform a past relevant job, the decision must
contain the following specific findings: “(1) a finding of fact as to the individual’s RFC; (2)
a finding of fact as to the physical and mental demands of the past job/occupation; and (3)
a finding of fact that the individual’s RFC would permit a return to his or her past job or
occupation.” SSR 82-62, at *4. Additionally, if the ALJ determines that the claimant can
return to his prior work, he must “directly compare the applicant’s [RFC] with the physical
and mental demands of [his] previous work.” Latham v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir.
1994).8 The categories “light” and “medium” work are “generic” terms that do not address

8

This statement in Latham is dicta. “The court remanded the case to the ALJ based
on the presence of new available evidence, not on the ALJ’s verbal formulation in describing
the claimant’s past work.” Bennett v. Astrue, 2010 WL 308747, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 27,
2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (citing Latham, 36 F.3d at 483). “The court appears to have intended
the comment to be additional instruction to the ALJ on remand.” Id. (citing Latham, 36 F.3d
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all barriers to returning to past relevant work, and a generic analysis does not sufficiently
explain how a claimant’s impairments do not prevent him from returning to work. Id.
3
The court holds that the ALJ did not fail to make a specific finding regarding the
demands of Gonzales’ past work as required by SSR 82-62. The ALJ determined that
Gonzales has the RFC to perform the full range of light work.9 He then found that Gonzales
“has past relevant work as a supervisor, landscaper (D.O.T. # 406.134-041), light and skilled,
SVP 6,” and concluded that “a hypothetical individual of the same age, education, work
experience as [Gonzales], and with the [RFC] I found, would be able to perform [Gonzales’]
past work as a supervisor landscaper.” R. 52.
The court addressed a similar issue in Bennett v. Astrue, 2010 WL 308747 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 27, 2010) (Fitzwater, C.J.). In Bennett the ALJ found at step four that the claimant’s
“past work as a maintenance repair builder was skilled at the medium exertional level and
his work as a maintenance supervisor was skilled at the light exertional level.” Id. at *3. The
ALJ concluded that “[i]n comparing the claimant’s [RFC] with the physical and mental
demands of this work, the undersigned finds that the claimant is able to perform it as actually
at 484 (“Latham has [also] raised possible problems [with the ALJ’s decision]. . . , which the
Secretary should also consider when this case is remanded[.]”)). “Even so, it is firmly rooted
in circuit precedent and in the Social Security Regulations.” Id.
9

The ALJ found that Gonzales has the RFC to “perform the full range of light work
as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b),” and that “he can lift and carry 20 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; he can sit, stand or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday. His postural and other work functions are not affected.” R. 48.
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and generally performed.” Id. The claimant argued that the Commissioner’s decision should
be reversed because “these two sentences [were] brief and generic,” and “violate[d] relevant
regulations.” Id. This court, however, held that Latham did not require reversal of the ALJ’s
decision. Id. at *4. The court explained:
In Latham the ALJ found that the claimant had a number of
nonexertional limitations. In describing the claimant’s capacity
to return to work, however, the ALJ discussed categories that
“refer[red] only to exertional capabilities and [did] not address
mental or emotional barriers to a return to previous
employment.” The Latham panel therefore faulted the ALJ for
failing to “explain how these impairments do not prevent
Latham from returning to his previous people-oriented
employment.”
Id. (alterations in original) (footnote and internal citations omitted) (quoting Latham, 36 F.3d
at 484) (citing Holman v. Astrue, 2009 WL 3047418, at *10-11 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2009)
(Averitte, J.), rec. adopted, 2009 WL 3047418, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2009) (Robinson,
J.) (holding that ALJ did not commit reversible error by using generic terms)). This court
explained in Bennett that the ALJ found no non-exertional impairments, and because this
finding was supported by substantial evidence, the ALJ did not commit reversible error by
failing to address the mental requirements of the claimant’s previous work. Id. (citing Rose
v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 943, 945 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting contention that ALJ erred in failing to
make specific findings regarding mental demands of claimant’s past work where ALJ had
already determined that mental limitations did not significantly affect claimant’s ability to
work, and there was substantial evidence that claimant did not have severe mental

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impairment)); see also Shearer v. Astrue, 2008 WL 5136949, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13,
2008) (Bleil, J.) (rejecting contention that ALJ erred by failing to address mental demands
of claimant’s past relevant work where claimant had no severe mental impairment; there was
no evidence that her mental abilities otherwise declined after she ceased working as bakery
manager; ALJ found no work-related mental restrictions; and claimant had not shown that
ALJ’s failure to assess mental restrictions was unsupported by substantial evidence), rec.
adopted, (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2008) (McBryde, J.).
In the present case, the ALJ found that Gonzales had no severe mental impairments
and no mental limitations, and the court has already concluded that substantial evidence
supports these findings See supra at § III(A)(3), (B)(2). The ALJ therefore did not err by
failing to address the mental demands of Gonzales’ past work. See Rose, 181 F.3d at 945;
Bennett, 2010 WL 308747, at *4. The ALJ also did not err by describing the physical
demands of Gonzales’ past work as “skilled” and “light.” See Bennett, 2010 WL 308747,
at *3-4 (using similar terms to describe the physical demands of claimant’s past work).10
Accordingly, the court holds that the ALJ’s findings as to the demands of Gonzales’ past

10

In addition to Latham, Gonzales cites Hines v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 23323615 (N.D.
Tex. June 5, 2003) (Bleil, J.), rec. adopted, (N.D. Tex. July 8, 2003) (Means, J.), in which
the court determined that the ALJ’s findings as to the demands of claimant’s past work were
too vague. But the Hines court remanded the case on other grounds. Id. at *5-6 (remanding
based on Appeals Council’s failure to consider new evidence). Moreover, even if Hines is
indistinguishable from this case, decisions of other judges of this court are not binding as the
“law of the district.” See SEC v. Cuban, 798 F.Supp.2d 783, 788 (N.D. Tex. 2011)
(Fitzwater, C.J.). The court therefore adheres to its prior decision in Bennett and declines to
follow Hines to the extent the two cases are inconsistent.
- 32 -

work do not violate SSR 82-62 or Latham.
*

*

*

For the reasons explained, the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED.
January 11, 2016.

_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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