Osayi v. Lynch

Filing 33

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The defendants' 27 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. (Ordered by Senior Judge A. Joe Fish on 1/31/2017) (twd)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION

IMUETINYAN FRANK OSAYI,
Beneficiary of a visa petition filed by
Barbara Earlene Osayi, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
LORETTA LYNCH, U.S. Attorney
General, ET AL.,
Defendants.

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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:15-CV-2439-G

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On October 7, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the claims of the
plaintiffs Imuetinyan Frank Osayi and Barbara Osayi (collectively, “the Osayis”)
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (docket entry 27). On
December 8, 2016, this court denied the motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(1) and converted the motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
to a motion for summary judgment (docket entry 29). Before the court is the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below, the motion
is granted.

I. BACKGROUND
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order dated December 8, 2016 (docket
entry 29), the court recited the following facts:
Barbara Osayi is a United States citizen. Complaint ¶ 12 (docket entry 17).
Imuetinyan Frank Osayi is a native of Nigeria. Defendants’ Brief in Support of Their
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (“Motion”) at 1 (docket entry 27).
On October 11, 2006, Barbara Osayi and Imuetinyan Frank Osayi married.
Complaint ¶ 1. Imuetinyan Frank Osayi previously had been married to Ikechiuka
Beatrice Osayi, a noncitizen, with whom he has two children. Motion at 1.
Imuetinyan Frank Osayi sought lawful permanent resident status on the basis
of his marriage to Barbara Osayi, a United States citizen. Id. at 2. To that end,
Barbara Osayi filed three Form I-130 petitions with the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) on behalf of Imuetinyan Frank Osayi. Id.
On December 7, 2007, Barbara Osayi filed the first I-130 petition. Complaint
¶ 12. In June 2008, USCIS interviewed the Osayis and found inconsistencies in their
testimony. Motion at 2. USCIS subsequently gave Barbara Osayi a chance to
reconcile these inconsistencies. Id. On May 30, 2009, USCIS denied the petition
and held that “Mrs. Osayi failed to meet her burden of proving the bona fides of her
marriage and concluded that the couple entered into the marriage to evade
immigration law.” Id. at 2; see also Complaint ¶ 20. On June 29, 2009, Barbara Osayi

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filed an appeal of this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), she but
later withdrew her appeal. Motion at 2; Complaint ¶¶ 21, 31.
On November 2, 2009, Barbara Osayi filed the second I-130 petition.
Complaint ¶ 22. In March of 2010, USCIS again interviewed the Osayis and found
inconsistencies in their testimony. Motion at 2-3. On November 23, 2010, USCIS
denied Barbara Osayi’s second petition. Id. at 3; Complaint ¶ 24. On December 23,
2010, Barbara Osayi filed an appeal of this decision to the BIA. Id. ¶ 25. USCIS
then reopened the case but ultimately denied the petition on March 4, 2011.
Motion at 3; Complaint ¶ 26. On April 5, 2011, Barbara Osayi filed another appeal
with the BIA based on this second denial of her second petition, but she later
withdrew this appeal. Motion at 3; Complaint ¶¶ 27, 31.
On May 24, 2011, Barbara Osayi filed a third I-130 petition. Complaint ¶ 28.
On September 7, 2011, USCIS approved the petition without an interview. Motion
at 3; Complaint ¶ 29. Thereafter, USCIS interviewed the Osayis and affirmed
approval of the third petition in December of 2011. Motion at 3. On June 29, 2013,
USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Revoke Petition Three “after an investigation and
site visits conducted in 2012 and 2013 revealed numerous discrepancies in the
Osayis’ sworn testimony and submissions to USCIS.” Id.; see also Complaint ¶ 36.
On September 7, 2013, USCIS revoked Barbara Osayi’s third petition “concluding
that Mrs. Osayi did not meet her burden of proving the bona fides of her marriage

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and that it was ‘established for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws.’”
Motion at 3. For example, USCIS discovered that Imuetinyan Frank Osayi in fact
had continued to reside with his ex-wife. Id. at 4. Barbara Osayi appealed this
decision to the BIA. Id. The BIA dismissed Barbara Osayi’s appeal and held that
USCIS’s revocation was based on good and sufficient cause. Id.
The Osayis challenge the USCIS’s revocation of Barbara Osayi’s third petition
and BIA’s decision to affirm that revocation and assert claims under the
Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 500, et seq. (“APA”), and Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See generally Complaint. Lastly, the
Osayis seek declaratory and mandamus relief. Id.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Evidentiary Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and that the moving parties are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.1 “[T]he substantive law
will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). The movants make such a showing by informing the court of the basis

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The disposition of a case through summary judgment “reinforces the
purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would
otherwise be lengthy and expensive.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190,
1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
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of their motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are
no genuine material fact issues. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). Once the movants make this showing, the nonmovants must then direct the
court’s attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the
opponents must do more than simply show some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, they must show that the evidence is sufficient to
support a resolution of the factual issue in their favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. All
of the evidence must be viewed, however, in a light most favorable to the motion’s
opponents. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59
(1970)).
B. APA
Under the APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA mandates
that a reviewing court “set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be
. . . unsupported by substantial evidence.” Id. § 706(2)(E). The “substantial
evidence” standard requires a court “to ensure only that the [agency]’s decision is
supported by record evidence and is substantially reasonable.” Alaswad v. Johnson,

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574 Fed. Appx. 483, 485 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
Additionally, a “reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. § 706(2)(A); Defensor v. Meissner, 201
F.3d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has explained that an agency’s
action is arbitrary and capricious
“if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not
intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for
its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to
a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”
Luminant Generation Company, L.L.C. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
675 F.3d 917, 925 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Texas Oil and Gas Association v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 161 F.3d 923, 955 (5th Cir. 1998)).
The scope of review of agency actions under Section 706(2)(A) is “very
narrow.” Delta Foundation, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.3d 551, 563 (5th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Louisiana v. Verity, 853 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1988)). “The court’s role is
not to weigh the evidence pro and con but to determine whether the agency decision
‘was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear
error of judgment.’” Id. (quoting Louisiana, 853 F.2d at 327). “Thus, if the agency
considers the factors and articulates a rational relationship between the facts found
and the choice made, its decision is not arbitrary and capricious.” Id. (quoting Harris
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v. United States, 19 F.3d 1090, 1096 (5th Cir. 1994)). “The ‘agency’s decision need
not be ideal, so long as it is not arbitrary or capricious, and so long as the agency gave
at least minimal consideration to relevant facts contained in the record.’” Id.
(quoting Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). Thus, in order to obtain reversal of the
decisions regarding the third petition by the USCIS and the BIA, the Osayis “must
show that the evidence . . . must not merely support the alien’s conclusion but must
compel it.” Silwany-Rodriguez v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 975 F.2d 1157,
1160 (5th Cir. 1992).
After reviewing the record, the court concludes that the USCIS did not act
arbitrarily or capriciously in its decision to revoke Barbara Osayi’s third petition, and
that the BIA acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously when it affirmed USCIS’s
revocation of Barbara Osayi’s third petition.2 Moreover, the court finds these

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The Osayis also seek a declaratory judgment that USCIS and BIA acted
arbitrarily and capriciously, as well as mandamus relief. Complaint ¶ 9. The
Declaratory Judgment Act gives federal courts the power to “declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration. . . .” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a). The Mandamus Act vests courts with original jurisdiction “to compel an
officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Because the court has ruled that USCIS
and the BIA did not act arbitrarily and capriciously, the plaintiffs’ claim for
declaratory judgment is denied. Similarly, because the plaintiffs have asserted a
request for relief under the APA, they are not entitled to a writ of mandamus. See
Cardenas v. Napolitano, No. CIV. A. 08-CV-459-KC, 2010 WL 1544367, at *3 (W.D.
Texas April 15, 2010). Accordingly, the court grants the defendants’ motion for
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decisions were supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the defendants’
motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ APA claim is granted.
C. Due Process
The Osayis contend that the USCIS and the BIA violated their due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Complaint ¶¶ 9, 57, 58. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall
deprive any person of due process or equal protection of the laws. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. It does not provide a cause of action against federal agencies or
persons acting under color of federal law. The plaintiffs do not assert constitutional
violations or unlawful conduct by a state government or state actors. See Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). Thus, to the extent that the plaintiffs seek relief
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on
that claim is granted.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED.

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summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ claim for a writ of mandamus.
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SO ORDERED.
January 31, 2017.

___________________________________
A. JOE FISH
Senior United States District Judge

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