Parker v. Bill Melton Trucking, Inc. et al
Filing
116
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The defendants' 89 Partial Motion to Dismiss Rev. Parker's claims for spoliation and attorney's fees against defendant Frankie Thacker is GRANTED. However, the 89 Motion is DENIED as moot as to Rev. Parker's claims against defendant Bill Melton Trucking Inc. (Ordered by Senior Judge A. Joe Fish on 12/8/2016) (twd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
BRIANNA PARKER,
Plaintiff,
VS.
BILL MELTON TRUCKING, INC.,
ET AL.,
Defendants.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:15-CV-2528-G
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the defendants’ partial motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s
claims for spoliation and attorney’s fees (docket entry 89). For the reasons stated
below, this motion is granted as to the defendant Frankie Thacker, as representative
of the estate of Charles Edward Thacker (“Thacker”). However, this motion is
denied as moot as to the defendant Bill Melton Trucking, Inc. (“Melton Trucking”).*
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Because the court dismissed Rev. Parker’s claims for spoliation and
attorney’s fees against Melton Trucking, see docket entry 115, the court need only
decide whether to dismiss Rev. Parker’s claims against Thacker.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2016, the plaintiff Brianna Parker (“Rev. Parker”) filed an
amended complaint adding parties and claims. Plaintiff’s Second Amended
Complaint ¶¶ 43-46, 48, 54 (docket entry 80). On October 5, 2016, the defendants,
Melton Trucking and Thacker, filed the instant motion to dismiss Rev. Parker’s
claims for spoliation and attorney’s fees. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Failure
to State a Claim (docket entry 89); Defendants’ Brief in Support of Their Motion
(docket entry 90). On October 19, 2016, Rev. Parker timely responded. Plaintiff’s
Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Response”) (docket entry 100). The
motion is now ripe for decision.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard: Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss
“To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead
‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Katrina
Canal Breaches Litigation, 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corporation v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1182
(2008). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of [his
or her] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
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U.S. at 555 (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted). “Factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the
assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in
fact).” In re Katrina Canal, 495 F.3d at 205 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “The court accepts all well-pleaded facts as true,
viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quoting Martin K. Eby
Construction Company, Inc. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir.
2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has prescribed a “two-pronged approach” to determine
whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The court must “begin by identifying the pleadings
that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Id. at 679. The court should then assume the veracity of any well-pleaded
allegations and “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of
relief.” Id. The plausibility principle does not convert the Rule 8(a)(2) notice
pleading standard to a “probability requirement,” but “a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully” will not defeat a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. The
plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
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misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader
is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2)). The court, drawing on its judicial experience and common sense, must
undertake the “context-specific task” of determining whether the plaintiff’s
allegations “nudge” [his or her] claims against the defendant “across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” See id. at 679, 683.
B. Application
Texas does not support an independent cause of action for spoliation. Trevino
v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 953 (Tex. 1998); Crain v. City of Selma, No. CV SA-16CA-408-XR, 2016 WL 4212341, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2016) (“Texas does not
recognize an independent cause of action for spoliation of evidence.”). However, a
party asserting a claim for spoliation is not without remedy. As the Trevino court
noted, spoliation is best handled within the “context of the lawsuit” through
sanctions and procedures. See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 953. Here, Rev. Parker has
already filed a motion for sanctions for spoliation. See Plaintiff’s Motion for
Sanctions Against Melton Trucking and Thacker for Destruction and Concealment of
Evidence (“Motion for Sanctions”) (docket entry 84). Thus, Rev. Parker’s claim for
spoliation should be dismissed and Rev. Parker may obtain any appropriate relief
through her motion for sanctions.
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Similarly, because Rev. Parker’s claim for attorney’s fees arises from her
spoliation claim, Rev. Parker’s request for attorney’s fees in the complaint should be
dismissed as well. See Response at 4.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the defendants’ motion to dismiss Rev. Parker’s
claims for spoliation and attorney’s fees against Thacker is GRANTED. However,
the motion is DENIED as moot as to Rev. Parker’s claims against Melton Trucking.
SO ORDERED.
December 8, 2016.
___________________________________
A. JOE FISH
Senior United States District Judge
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