Jones v. Hunt County, Texas et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The court concludes that Jones has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by the PLRA with respect to all remaining claims. The court, therefore, grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Jones's remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the PLRA. (Ordered by Judge Sam A Lindsay on 10/27/2017) (sss)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PHILLIP ALLEN JONES,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUNT COUNTY, TEXAS,
JOSHUA RICHARDSON, and
STUART ROBERTS,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 3:15-CV-02751-L

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20), filed March 7,
2016. After considering the motion, response, reply, summary judgment evidence, record, and
applicable law, the court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
I.

Background
On August 21, 2015, Plaintiff Phillip Allen Jones (“Jones”) filed this action pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Hunt County Sheriff’s Office employees Joshua Richardson (“Richardson”)
and Stuart Roberts (“Roberts”), and Hunt County, Texas (“Hunt County”), alleging violations of
his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On November 23, 2015,
Jones filed a First Amended Complaint (“Amended Complaint”), alleging that on November 20,
2014, while he was a pretrial detainee in the custody of the Hunt County Sheriff’s Office, and
following transport to the Hunt County Courthouse for a routine court appearance, Defendants
Richardson and Roberts: (1) used excessive force while escorting him from inside the courthouse
to the transportation vehicle located in the parking lot outside the courthouse; and (2) subsequently
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falsely arrested him on charges of assault on a public servant. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-73. Jones also
sues Defendant Hunt County pursuant to section 1983, alleging that it maintained a policy, practice,
or custom of “excessive and unlawful force against handcuffed prisoners and denial of adequate
medical care to those individuals injured at the hands of Hunt County deputies and employees.” Id.
¶ 77. In addition, Jones alleges Hunt County failed to train its deputy sheriffs in, among other
things, the use of force and the proper treatment of prisoners, pretrial detainees, and those under
arrest. Id. ¶ 80. Jones seeks monetary damages for alleged physical injuries and pain and suffering,
as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Id. ¶¶ 88-89.
The November 20, 2014 incident about which Jones complains resulted in the issuance of
two warrants for Jones’s arrest on charges of assault on a public servant. Jones ultimately pled
guilty to resisting arrest, search, or transportation, a lesser included offense, and was sentenced to
336 days in the Hunt County Jail. See State v. Jones, No. 30724 (354th Jud. Dist Ct., Hunt Cty.,
Tex.); State v. Jones, No. 30728 (354th Jud. Dist Ct., Hunt Cty., Tex.).
Defendants Richardson and Roberts have answered, asserting the defense of qualified
immunity. On December 4, 2015, following a telephonic conference with the parties, the court
issued an order staying discovery except with respect to the issue of qualified immunity. See Order
(Doc. 16). On March 7, 2016, following the period of limited discovery, Defendants filed their
motion for summary judgment, which has been fully briefed.
The court now sets forth the facts from the summary judgment record. In its recitations of
the facts, the court applies the applicable legal standard set forth below. See infra Sec. II. In ruling
on a summary judgment motion, the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable

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inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. In this case, the
evidence includes two videotapes of the events in question taken at the Hunt County Courthouse on
November 20, 2014. Defs.’ Summ. J. App. 101. Captured on two videotapes, the entire incident
lasts approximately sixty-five seconds. Viewed in the light most favorable to Jones, the material
facts are as follows:
On November 13, 2014, Jones was booked into the Hunt County Jail on multiple charges.
On November 20, 2014, Jones, along with other inmates, was transported to the Hunt County
Courthouse by Defendant Richardson as well as another Hunt County Sheriff’s Department transport
officer. Prior to leaving the jail, Jones and the other inmates were placed in leg shackles and a belly
chain. Defendant Richardson instructed the inmates that they were not to talk at the courthouse
unless it was to an attorney or a judge, or they would be brought back to the jail. Once inside the
courthouse, the inmates walked down a hall to line up on the north side of the east corridor, with
Jones being first in line. At that point, a civilian friend of Jones’s named John George (“George”)
began speaking with Jones from across the hall. Court security officers instructed George not to
speak to the inmates. When he failed to comply, he was removed from the courthouse without
incident. Defendant Roberts instructed Jones to “be quiet.” Jones continued to talk and used
expletives directed at Roberts and other officers. Richardson then quickly approached Jones,
grabbed the back of his shirt, and took him down the corridor through which the inmates had
originally entered. At the doorway leading out to the parking lot, Jones resisted by planting his feet
on the ground to prevent being removed from the courthouse.

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At this point, Jones disputes Defendants’ account of what took place on the exterior of the
courthouse. See Pl.’s Summ. J. App. (Unsworn Decl. Under Penalties of Perjury by Phillip Jones)
(Doc. 29). Jones states in his Declaration that once he was on the exterior of the courthouse, he was
not resisting transportation and that all physical contact with Roberts and Richardson was
unintentional. Id. at 13-14. Evidence submitted by Defendants, including a videotape of the entire
incident viewed by the court, conflicts with Jones’s Declaration. The courthouse videotape shows
an approximately fifty-one second struggle outside the courthouse where Jones can be seen resisting
Defendants’ attempts to bring him under control on the way to the transportation vehicle. This
includes Jones pushing off of a blue car with his legs, continuing to struggle, kicking at Richardson
and pushing off the tire of a nearby van, and eventually being taken to the ground and the officers
gaining control of him. The videotape then shows Jones being placed into the transportation vehicle.
Richardson and Roberts, as well as Jones, suffered injuries as a result of the incident.
Defendants Richardson and Roberts both pressed charges against Jones based on the incident. A
magistrate determined that probable cause existed and issued two warrants for Jones’s arrest on the
charges of assault of a public servant. Jones pled guilty to the lesser included offense of resisting
arrest, search, or transportation. Under Texas law, a person is guilty of resisting arrest, search, or
transportation if he intentionally prevents or obstructs a person he knows is a peace officer from
effecting an arrest, search, or transportation by using force against the officer or another. Tex. Penal
Code Ann. § 38.03.
On March 7, 2016, Defendants Hunt County, Richardson, and Roberts filed Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 20), contending that: (1) all Defendants are entitled to

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summary judgment because Jones failed to exhaust his administrative remedies at the Hunt County
Jail as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) before filing this lawsuit; (2)
Defendants Richardson and Roberts are entitled to summary judgment because Jones’s claims of
false arrest and excessive force are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (3)
Defendants Richardson and Roberts are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity
because they did not deprive Plaintiff of a clearly established right and their conduct was objectively
reasonable.
On April 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed a response to the motion. With regard to Defendants’
argument that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit, Jones
admits he did not file any grievance related to his claims before bringing suit, but he contends that
Defendants have no evidence that the administrative remedies available at the Hunt County Jail
applied to incidents outside the jail, and specifically incidents at the Hunt County Courthouse. As
to Defendants’ argument that Jones’s false arrest and excessive force claims are barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, Jones concedes that Heck bars his false arrest claim, but he contends that genuine
disputes of material fact preclude entry of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor on his excessive
force claim. Pl.’s Resp. 6 and note 13. Finally, Jones argues that Defendants Richardson and
Roberts are not entitled to qualified immunity because there is a genuine dispute of material fact as
to whether they violated his right to be free from the use of excessive force.
For the reasons that follow, the court concludes that Jones’s false arrest and excessive force
claims are barred by Heck. The court also concludes that Jones’s claim that he was deprived of
adequate medical care when he returned to the Hunt County Jail, as well as all claims he is seeking

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to allege arising from conduct and policies or practices within the Hunt County Jail, are barred under
the PLRA because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. In
light of the foregoing, the court need not reach the issue of whether Defendants Richardson and
Roberts are entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
II.

Legal Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is “genuine”
if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the court is required to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift
Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court “may not make credibility
determinations or weigh the evidence” in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary
judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). On the other hand, “if the movant bears the burden
of proof on an issue, either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative

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defense, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense
to warrant judgment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986)
(emphasis in original). “[When] the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at
587. (citation omitted). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment
evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73
F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996).

Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and

unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19
F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994).
The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record
and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Ragas, 136
F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to “sift through the record in search of
evidence” to support the nonmovant’s opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also
Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992). “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the
entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues that are “irrelevant
and unnecessary” will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id.
If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must
be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

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III.

Analysis
A.

Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck, the Supreme Court held that when a successful civil rights action would necessarily
imply the invalidity of a plaintiff’s conviction or sentence, the claim must be dismissed unless the
plaintiff demonstrates that the decision resulting in his conviction or sentence has been reversed on
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make
such a determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
Defendants Richardson and Roberts argue they are entitled to summary judgment because
Jones’s claims of false arrest and excessive force are barred by Heck. In his response, Jones
concedes that his false arrest claim is barred by Heck but contends that Heck does not bar his
excessive force claim because there are fact issues with respect to the temporal proximity of his
resistance and the excessive force alleged. According to Jones, his excessive force claim does not
arise out of the same facts as his conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. See Pl.’s
Resp. 6-7.
The court has reviewed the videotape in the record and concludes that the events in the
videotape flatly contradict the version of the events presented by Jones. When the facts set forth by
a party are overshadowed and clearly contradicted by what is shown on a videotape, a court is
required to view “the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.372, 381
(2007). This is exactly what the court has done in this case.

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The videotape shows that Jones’s resistance to transport, to which he pled guilty, is not
temporally distinct from his claim of excessive force. The videotape from the interior of the
courthouse shows Richardson escorting Jones down the corridor and lasts for approximately fifteen
seconds. Jones admits he was resisting as he was exiting the courthouse by planting his feet. The
exterior courthouse videotape shows an approximately fifty-one-second struggle where Jones can
be seen resisting Defendants’ attempts to bring him under control on the way to the transportation
vehicle. This includes Jones pushing off of a blue car with his legs, continuing to struggle, kicking
at Richardson and pushing off the tire of a nearby van. At this point, Jones is taken to the ground
so that Richardson and Roberts can gain control of him. The videotape then shows Jones being
placed into the transportation vehicle.
Jones relies on the case of Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2008). In that case, the
court held that a claim of excessive force after an arrestee had ceased resistance would not
necessarily imply the invalidity of a conviction for earlier resistance. Id. at 498. Unlike in Bush and
other cases cited by Jones, the videotape of the incident, as described fully above, shows that
Jones’s resistance to transport is not temporally distinct from his claim of excessive force. In other
words, the videotape unequivocally shows that the incident involving Jones from the time he was
removed from the courthouse until he was placed in the transportation van was one continuous
episode that lasted approximately sixty-five seconds. Jones’s claim of excessive force, therefore,
will be dismissed under Heck, as a favorable judgment on his excessive force claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transport.

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With respect to his false arrest claim, Jones has conceded that this claim is barred by Heck.
See Pl.’s Resp. 6 and note 13. Accordingly, and as requested by Defendants in their reply brief,
Jones’s claim of false arrest will be dismissed under Heck, as a favorable judgment on this claim
would imply the invalidity of his conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transport.
B.

Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), as amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PLRA”), provides: “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under § 1983 of
this title, or any other federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “[T]he PLRA’s
exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.”
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). Even when an inmate seeks monetary damages, which
may not be available through prison grievance proceedings, exhaustion is a prerequisite to filing suit.
Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001); Wright v. Hollingsworth, 260 F.3d 357, 358 (5th Cir.
2001). When a prisoner fails to exhaust his administrative remedies without any valid excuse, a
court may enter judgment as a matter of law. Wendell v. Asher, 162 F.3d 887, 891 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted a strict approach to the exhaustion
requirement. See Ferrington v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corrections, 315 F.3d 529, 531-32 (5th Cir.
2002) (finding that blindness did not excuse the plaintiff from exhausting administrative remedies
and affirming district court’s dismissal without prejudice of prisoner’s section 1983 claims);
Richardson v. Spurlock, 260 F.3d 495, 499 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal for failure to exhaust

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because the inmate “incorrectly filed an administrative appeal rather than a disciplinary appeal”);
Parker v. Adjetey, No. 03-40787, 2004 WL 330866 *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2004) (rejecting a claim
of exhaustion based on an inmate’s coma because, after he recovered, he made no attempt to file a
grievance). Administrative remedies, however, may be deemed unavailable when: (1) an inmate is
unable to file a grievance because of physical injury, and (2) the inmate attempts to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a grievance as soon as the injury improves, but the grievance is
rejected as untimely. Days v. Johnson, 322 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2003).
It is undisputed that Hunt County has a four-step written grievance plan for inmate
complaints regarding: (1) a violation of civil rights; (2) a criminal act; (3) an unjust denial or
restriction of inmate privileges; and (4) prohibited acts by facility staff. Defs.’ Summ. J. App. 2-3,
50. Each inmate receives a copy of the Hunt County Inmate Handbook (“Inmate Handbook”),
which includes the written grievance plan. Id. at 3, 50. Jones acknowledged that he received and
understood the Inmate Handbook. Id. at 3, 7, 95. During the period of his incarceration at the Hunt
County Jail, Jones filed fourteen grievances. Id. at 8-40. Jones admits he did not file a grievance
regarding any of the claims he makes in this lawsuit. Id. at 91-95.
In this case, Jones contends that Hunt County had a policy, practice, or custom of denying
adequate medical care to individuals injured by its deputies and employees. In his response brief,
Jones does not deny that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Instead, he argues that the
grievance procedures outlined in the Inmate Handbook only apply to incidents that occur inside the
jail facility, and not at the courthouse. Def.’s Resp. at 4-5. Jones’s allegations concerning denial
of medical care, as well as his allegations regarding Hunt County’s policies, practices, and failure

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to train officers, relate to his treatment after he was transported back to the Hunt County Jail, and
to the conditions of his confinement more generally.
In light of Jones’s concession that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies available
to him at the Hunt County Jail, which he concedes apply to alleged constitutional violations that
took place at the Hunt County Jail, his remaining claims against Hunt County are dismissed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit, as required by the PLRA.
C.

Attorney’s Fees

Defendants request that the court award them attorney’s fees as the prevailing party under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court declines to award Defendants attorney’s fees in this action, as it is
unable to conclude that Jones’s lawsuit was “vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit.”
Dean v. Riser, 240 F.3d 505, 508 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[A]ttorney’s fees for prevailing defendants [in
a civil rights suit] are presumptively unavailable unless a showing is made that the underlying civil
rights suit was vexatious, frivolous, or otherwise without merit.”).
IV.

Conclusion
For the reasons herein stated, the court concludes that Jones’s false arrest and excessive

force claims are not conceptually or temporally distinct from the facts and events underlying his
conviction for resisting arrest, search, or transportation. Thus, a favorable judgment on these claims
would imply the invalidity of his conviction. Jones has failed to show that his conviction for
resisting arrest, search, or transportation has been reversed or otherwise declared invalid. Thus, no
section 1983 claim has yet accrued, and these claims are barred by Heck. Moreover, Jones has
conceded that his false arrest claim is barred by Heck. Accordingly, no genuine dispute of material

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fact exists on these claims, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Jones’s
false arrest and excessive force claims. The court, therefore, grants Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, and Jones’s false arrest and excessive force claims are dismissed with
prejudice to being asserted again unless Jones can demonstrate that the conditions set forth in Heck
have been satisfied. See Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating dismissal
should be with prejudice until Heck conditions are met).
Further, the court concludes that Jones has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as
required by the PLRA with respect to all remaining claims. Accordingly, no genuine dispute of
material fact exists, and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these remaining
claims. The court, therefore, grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, and Jones’s
remaining claims are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies
prior to filing this lawsuit, as required by the PLRA.
A judgment will issue separately as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
So ordered this 27th day of October, 2017.

_________________________________
Sam A. Lindsay
United States District Judge

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