Cherie v. Wells Fargo Bank NA
Filing
43
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 32 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Wells Fargo Bank NA, denying 35 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Judgment will be entered for Wells Fargo. (Ordered by Senior Judge A. Joe Fish on 9/22/2016) (aaa)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
CHERIE ALLEN, as Executrix for
Fahamme Nation of Nations Foundation
Trust,
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
VS.
)
)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., as Trustee )
on Behalf of the Registered Certificate
)
Holders of Trust 2004-FF4, Mortgage
)
Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004)
FF4,
)
)
Defendant.
)
CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:15-CV-2785-G
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court are the cross-motions for summary judgment of the defendant
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee on Behalf of the Registered Certificate Holders of
Trust 2004-FF4, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-FF4 (“Wells
Fargo”) (docket entry 32), and the pro se plaintiff Cherie Allen (“Allen”) (docket entry
35). For the reasons stated below, Wells Fargo’s motion is granted, and Allen’s
motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 12, 2004, David Henderson and Kathy Henderson (“the
Hendersons”) secured a loan in the amount of $160,000 to purchase a home at 628
Regalwood Drive, DeSoto, Texas, 75115 (“the Property”). Appendix in Support of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defendant’s Appx.”) at App. 010-028
(docket entry 34). On October 21, 2014, the Hendersons conveyed the Property to
the Fahamme Nation of Nations Foundation Trust (“the Fahamme Trust”). Id. at
030. On June 2, 2015, Wells Fargo purchased the Property at a non-judicial
foreclosure sale and secured a substitute trustee’s deed. Brief in Support of
Defendant’s Motion for Summary (“Motion”) at 3; Defendant’s Appx. at 034-036.
On August 12, 2015, Allen filed this case in the 44th Judicial District Court of
Dallas County, Texas, against Wells Fargo in her alleged capacity as the “Executrix of
the Fahamme Nation of Nations Foundation Trust[.]” Notice of Removal
(“Removal”) ¶ 1 (docket entry 1); see also Petitioner’s Verified Original Petition for
Trespass to Try Title, Request for Disclosures, and Application or Motion by Special
Deposit Incorporated by Affiant’s Uncontested Affidavit in Support Thereof
(“Petition”) (docket entry 1-4). Allen asserted claims for quiet title and unlawful
foreclosure, as well as violations of the Texas Penal Code and 15 U.S.C. § 7003. See
generally id. On August 26, 2015, Wells Fargo removed the action to this court
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based on federal question and diversity jurisdiction.1 Removal ¶¶ 11, 14. On
September 20, 2015, Allen allegedly obtained a quitclaim deed from the Fahamme
Trust. Defendant’s Appx. at 042. On September 24, 2015, Allen amended her
complaint after the court ordered her to replead only her personal claims as she could
not represent a trust in this action without legal representation. See Notice of
Deficiency and Order (docket entry 5); Second Amended Petition to Remove
Fahamme Nation of Nations Foundation Trust Add Temporary Restraining Order
and Petitioner’s Verified Original Petition for Trespass to Try Title, Request for
Disclosures, and Application or Motion by Special Deposit Incorporated by Affiant’s
Uncontested Affidavit in Support Thereof (docket entry 8).
A. Evidentiary Burdens on Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show
that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, and that the moving party is
1
Allen asserts that Wells Fargo violated 15 U.S.C. § 7003 because the
substitute trustee’s deed was electronically recorded. Second Amended Petition to
Remove Fahamme Nation of Nations Foundation Trust Add Temporary Restraining
Order and Petitioner’s Verified Original Petition for Trespass to Try Title, Request
for Disclosures, and Application or Motion by Special Deposit Incorporated by
Affiant’s Uncontested Affidavit in Support Thereof at 8. Wells Fargo, on the other
hand, argues that 15 U.S.C. § 7003 is “inapplicable” in the present case as Texas
state law modifies, limits and supersedes that statute. Motion at 9. The court agrees
and thereby only exercises diversity jurisdiction over this case. See Uniform Real
Property Electronic Recording Act, TEX. PROP. CODE § 15.000, et seq.
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.2 “[T]he substantive law
will identify which facts are material.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). The movant makes such a showing by informing the court of the basis
of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no
genuine material fact issues. See Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). Once the movant make this showing, the nonmovant must then direct the
court’s attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Id. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the
opponent must do more than simply show some metaphysical doubt as to the
material facts. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475
U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, she must show that the evidence is sufficient to
support a resolution of the factual issue in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. All
of the evidence must be viewed, however, in a light most favorable to the motion’s
opponent. Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59
(1970)).
2
The disposition of a case through summary judgment “reinforces the
purpose of the Rules, to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
actions, and, when appropriate, affords a merciful end to litigation that would
otherwise be lengthy and expensive.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Company, 780 F.2d 1190,
1197 (5th Cir. 1986).
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B. Standing
Wells Fargo maintains that Allen has no valid ownership claim to the Property,
and that she lacks standing to challenge the foreclosure sale of the Property. Motion
at 1, 4-7. The sale of the Property to Wells Fargo on June 2, 2015 extinguished any
interest in the Property held by the Fahamme Trust. See O’Meara v. Moore, 178
S.W.2d 510, 513 (Tex. 1944). Thus, the quitclaim deed executed on September 20,
2015 by the putative representative of that trust was ineffective and did not convey
the Property to Allen. Moreover, Allen has provided no evidence that the signer of
the quitclaim deed had legal authority to convey the Property on behalf of the
Fahamme Trust. Furthermore, the Dallas Central Appraisal District recognizes Wells
Fargo as the current record owner of the Property. See Defendant’s Appx. at 040.
Allen has submitted no evidence that she is the mortgagor or a party who is in privity
with the mortgagor. Thus, Allen has no standing to challenge the foreclosure sale and
was not entitled to notice of that sale. See Goswami v. Metropolitan Savings and Loan
Association, 751 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. 1988) (citations omitted); T EX. PROP. CODE
§ 51.002. Under Texas law, Allen lacks standing to bring her claims against Wells
Fargo.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Wells Fargo’s motion is GRANTED, and Allen’s
motion is DENIED. Judgment will be entered for Wells Fargo.
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SO ORDERED.
September 22, 2016.
___________________________________
A. JOE FISH
Senior United States District Judge
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