Khan v. City of Dallas et al
Filing
22
ORDER of RE-REFERENCE adopting in part Report and Recommendations re 19 Findings and Recommendations on Case. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 7/14/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
MOHAMMAD K. KHAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CITY OF DALLAS, et al.,
Defendants.
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§ Civil Action No. 3:15-CV-3254-D
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ORDER OF RE-REFERENCE
After making an independent review of the pleadings, files, and records in this case, the
March 18, 2016 findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the magistrate judge, and plaintiff’s
March 29, 2016 objections, the court concludes that the findings and conclusions are correct in part
and are therefore adopted in part.
The Supreme Court has explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “is a narrow one and
‘is confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court
judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court
review and rejection of those judgments.’” Truong v. Bank of Am., N.A., 717 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir.
2013) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). “The
Supreme Court has cautioned that in light of the ‘narrow ground’ Rooker-Feldman occupies, it does
not prohibit a plaintiff from ‘present[ing] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a party.’” Id. (quoting Exxon
Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284, 293).
Without suggesting that plaintiff Mohammad K. Khan’s
(“Khan’s”) claims have merit (or are clearly pleaded), the court cannot say that they are all barred
under Rooker-Feldman. For example, in his pro se complaint, Khan appears to allege that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated when the compliance officer defendant visited his property and
issued a citation. This alleged injury does not appear to be caused by any state court judgment. See,
e.g., Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1285 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that plaintiff
filed case in federal district court after state court found mistreatment of plaintiff’s horses and
ordered forfeiture of horses, but holding that plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims—that municipal
officers improperly searched her property and seized her horses—were not barred by RookerFeldman because “[s]he could raise the same claims even if there had been no state-court
proceedings”); cf. Mosley v. Bowie Cnty., 275 Fed. Appx. 327, 328-29 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(explaining that plaintiffs’ complaint filed in federal district court alleged constitutional violations
related to state court judgment that ordered payment of child support, and holding that RookerFeldman did not bar claim that state government defendants violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights
in course of enforcing the order because “such claims do not ask the district court to review, modify,
or nullify a final order of a state court”) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
Accordingly, the court re-refers defendants’ October 29, 2015 motion to dismiss for want
of subject-matter jurisdiction to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
July 14, 2016.
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SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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