Cochran v. Kindred Hospitals Limited Partnership
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: The court DENIES Kindred Hospitals Limited Partnership's Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 10 ). (Ordered by Judge Jane J Boyle on 7/20/2016) (trk)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
SHELLY COCHRAN,
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Plaintiff,
v.
KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP d/b/a KINDRED
HOSPITAL FORT WORTH
Defendant.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:16-CV-0129-B
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 10). For the reasons that
follow, the Court DENIES the motion.
I.
BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff Shelly Cochran (“Cochran”) worked as the Director of Wound Care at Kindred
Hospital Fort Worth (“Kindred”) from July 2001 through October 2015. Doc. 5, First Am. Comp.
¶¶ 13–14. According to Cochran, Kindred failed to pay her overtime in accordance with the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for hours worked after leaving the hospital. Id. ¶¶ 16–19. Cochran
claims to have worked up to an additional fifty hours per week after leaving the hospital via cell
1
The background facts are derived from Cochran’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 5), the parties’ court
papers, and corresponding attachments. Where there may be a dispute over a stated fact, the Court has so
indicated by identifying the fact as one stated by that party to be true.
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phone communication with doctors, nurses, patients, and administrators. Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 22. In total,
Cochran alleges she was not paid for 7,400 hours of overtime during the last three years of her
employment, even though Kindred purportedly knew she was working more than forty hours per
week. Id. ¶ 19, 22. According to Cochran, she performed most of this overtime work from her home
in Grandview, Texas, which is located within the Dallas Division of the Northern District of Texas.
Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 19.
Cochran filed suit against Kindred in this Court on January 15, 2016, asserting a claim for
unpaid overtime compensation and other relief under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201. Doc. 1, Compl.;
Doc. 5, First Am. Compl. On April 22, 2016, Kindred moved to transfer the case to the Fort Worth
Division of the Northern District, arguing that (1) the events giving rise to Cochran’s claims
occurred there, (2) all records are stored there, and (3) many key witnesses reside or work there.
Doc. 10, Def.’s Mot. to Transfer Venue; Doc. 14, Pl.’s App. Cochran responded to Kindred’s Motion,
stating that the events giving rise to her claims occurred in the Dallas Division. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp.
Kindred has now replied, Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply, making its Motion ripe for review.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a district court may transfer a civil action to another district or
division if (1) a plaintiff could have brought that action there originally, and (2) transfer would be
for “the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
The movant bears the burden of proving both elements. In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d
304, 314 n.10 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); Calloway v. Triad Fin. Corp., No. 07-CV-1292, 2007 WL
4548085, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 27,2007).
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A plaintiff could have brought an action in a district or division initially if, at the time she
filed the action, (1) either she or the defendant resided in that district or division; and (2) both
resided within the state. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).
To demonstrate that transfer would be for “the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in
the interest of justice” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), a movant must show good cause. In re Volkswagen,
545 F.3d at 315 (citing Humble Oil & Ref. Co. V. Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53, 56 (5th Cir.
1963)). To determine whether a movant has shown good cause, courts examine a number of private
and public interest factors. In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330
U.S. 501 (1947)). “The private interest factors are: ‘(1) the relative ease of access to sources of proof;
(2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of
attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy,
expeditious and inexpensive.’” In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315 (quoting In re Volkswagen AG, 371
F.3d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2004)). The public interest factors include: “(1) the administrative
difficulties flowing from court congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided
at home; (3) the familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the
avoidance of unnecessary problems of conflict of laws [or in] the application of foreign law.” In re
Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315. The balance of these factors must clearly weigh in favor of transferring
to the new venue. Id. “[If] the transferee forum is no more convenient than the chosen forum, the
plaintiff’s choice should not be disturbed.” Thomas v. City of Fort Worth, No. 07-CV-1689, 2008 WL
4225556, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 15, 2008); see also In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 315.
Public and private factors aside, a court must also independently consider how much weight
to assign a plaintiff’s choice of forum. Davis v. City of Fort Worth, No. 14-CV-1698, 2014 WL
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2915881, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2014). That weight depends on whether a plaintiff has filed suit
within her home forum or outside of it. “A plaintiff’s choice is normally entitled to deference, but
when she files suit outside her home forum, the weight accorded to the choice is diminished.” Id. at
*2 (citing Sivertson v. Clinton, No. 11-CV-0836, 2011 WL 4100958, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 14, 2011)
(internal citations omitted)).
III.
ANALYSIS
Kindred moves to transfer venue within the Northern District of Texas, from the Dallas
Division to the Fort Worth Division. Neither party disputes that Cochran’s primary place of
employment was in Fort Worth, Texas; they disagree, however, as to whether the appropriate venue
for this case is the hospital’s Division (Fort Worth) or the Division where Cochran’s home is located
and most of the claimed overtime work occurred (Dallas). The parties do not dispute that suit could
have been properly filed in either Division. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Thus, the Court moves to the
multi-factor analysis explained above to determine if Kindred has shown good cause for why the
action should be transferred. See In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d at 312.
Kindred argues that the applicable factors necessitate transfer to Fort Worth because
(1) Cochran complains about acts that occurred in the course of her employment in Fort Worth,
(2) the evidence is stored in Fort Worth or accessible by employees working and living there,
(3) witnesses reside in or are located in Fort Worth, and (4) Fort Worth has a localized interest in
justice. Doc. 10, Def.’s Mot. to Transfer Venue 5–8. Kindred also contends that not all of the alleged
unlawful practices occurred in Dallas and that none of the relevant employment records are
maintained here. Id. at 5–6; Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply 4.
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Cochran, on the other hand, argues that Dallas is the proper forum because (1) either
Kindred’s relevant employment records are kept online, or it is not a significant inconvenience to
transport them to Dallas, (2) she performed the relevant overtime at her home within this Division,
(3) both of Cochran’s material witnesses reside in this Division,2 and (4) Kindred’s counsel is located
in Dallas. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 6–7, 12–15, 19.
To determine whether the Defendant has shown good cause for venue transfer, the relevant
private interest factors are the cost of attendance for willing witnesses, practical concerns, and access
to sources of proof. The only relevant public interest factor is the local interest of the venue.
A.
Private Interest Factors
1.
Cost of Attendance for Willing Witnesses
The convenience of non-party witnesses is often the most important factor in the transfer
analysis. Isbell v. DM Records, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-1408, 2004 WL 1243153, at *14 (N.D. Tex.
June 4, 2004). A defendant seeking transfer “must specifically identify the key witnesses and outline
the substance of their testimony.” N2 Consulting, LLC v. Engineered Fastener Co., No. 3:02-CV-0308,
2002 WL 31246770, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Dupre
v. Spanier Marine Corp., 810 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Tex. 1993)). Kindred states that it has
“identified key non-party witnesses by their position, their location, and has provided descriptions
of their proposed testimony.” Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply 2–3. But it has not identified any particular
witnesses who would be significantly inconvenienced by proceeding in the Dallas Division. See
2
Cochran’s material witnesses include her husband, Roy Cochran, and a nurse who worked with her
at Kindred Hospital, Dani Hood. Both plan to testify about witnessing or placing after-hours overtime calls
to Cochran. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 7–8.
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Ashmore v. Ne. Petroleum Div. of Cargill, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 36, 38–39 (D. Me. 1996) (denying transfer
motion where, inter alia, the defendant failed to present evidence that a transfer “would appreciably
expand the pool of potential witnesses”). Instead, Kindred simply refers to witnesses generically by
job title (“former managers”), rather than identifying any specific individuals or their addresses. Doc.
15, Def.’s Reply 3. “To transfer venue for the purposes of convenience, however, the moving party
must make more than a general allegation that certain key witnesses are necessary; the movant must
specifically identify key witnesses and outline the substance of their testimony.” Aland v. Faison
Assocs., No. Civ. A. 3-97-CV2482, 1998 WL 355468, at *4 (N.D. Tex. June 22, 1998). Here,
Kindred fails to identify a single potential witness by name, nor does it describe, even in general
terms, the substance of their testimony. It simply states that it plans to call “former managers,” as
stated above, and the former Human Resources and Benefits Coordinators,3 who can “provide
testimony regarding, ‘personnel records, payroll registers, job descriptions, work schedules, personnel
policies, and other records pertinent to Hospital employees.’” Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply 2–3. This is not
enough to carry Kindred’s burden. See Magana v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 3:10-CV-1451, 2010 WL
5108850, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2010). Cochran, on the other hand, has named two specific
witnesses who both currently reside in the Dallas Division, Roy Cochran and Dani Hood, and
specifically explained their expected testimony. See Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶¶ 7–8.
Ultimately, the Court finds that Kindred’s failure to specifically identify key witnesses and
outline the substance of their testimony precludes the Court from being able to undertake a thorough
evaluation of the propriety of transfer here. See Mohamed v. Mazda Motor Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 757,
3
Kindred has not provided these coordinator’s names or current addresses.
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776 (E.D. Tex. 2000). Even so, the burden of bringing witnesses from Fort Worth to Dallas is
minimal. See id. (Finding a 150 mile distance to be “negligible”). Thus, this factor weighs against
transfer.
2.
Practical Concerns that Make Trial of a Case Easy, Expeditious, and Inexpensive
Cochran argues that a plaintiff’s choice of forum is generally given strong deference and
should be the “primary” factor in a forum analysis. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 3. A court usually should
not disturb a plaintiff’s selection unless the balance of factors strongly favors the moving party. See
Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966). But the plaintiff’s choice of forum is by no
means conclusive. In re Horseshoe Entm’t, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2003); Gundle Lining Constr.
Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1163, 1165 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (“[T]he plaintiff’s choice
of forum is not accorded the decisive weight it enjoyed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.”).
Cochran cites Mohamed to support her position. Doc. 13, Pl’s Resp. ¶ 10. While the Mohamed court
noted that “the plaintiff’s choice of forum never ‘disappears’ under any circumstances,” it proceeded
to characterize that choice as only one factor that “routinely falls under this Court’s analysis with the
other . . . private and public interest factors necessary for a proper Section 1404(a) analysis.” 90 F.
Supp. at 774. Accordingly, the Court gives some, but not determinative, weight to Cochran’s choice
of forum.
Cochran also points out practical problems of transfer: she has already served answers to the
Court’s interrogatories, settlement conferences have been scheduled, and there may be a delay in
resolution by transferring the case to the Fort Worth Division. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 17. Kindred,
on the other hand, relies on the present stay on discovery, which would minimize the inconvenience
of any delay associated with transferring the case to Fort Worth. Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply 5. If anything,
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because Cochran has already answered this Court’s interrogatories (Doc. 12) and Kindred has
submitted a Verified Summary of Hours Worked by Plaintiff (Doc. 16), this factor also weighs slightly
against transfer.
3.
Access to Sources of Proof
Kindred also argues for transfer because the evidence, files, personnel and payroll records, and
employees who can access its electronic records are all located in Fort Worth. Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply
2. Kindred has not explicitly argued, though, that it would be substantially more difficult to bring its
evidence to Dallas than to keep it in Fort Worth. Further, Kindred asserts that “only certain local
[Fort Worth] Hospital employees have access to such electronic records,” and that accessing these
electronic documents is “not done as easily in locations in the Dallas Division.” Id. (emphasis in
original) (internal quotations omitted). It may be more convenient for Kindred to transport its
evidence within Fort Worth, but it has not shown any hardship or disadvantage in bringing the
evidence to Dallas.4 Overall, this factor weighs only slightly in favor of transfer, if at all.
B.
Public Interest Factors
1.
Local Interest
Additionally, Kindred argues for transfer because it employed Cochran in Fort Worth. But
Cochran clearly alleges that her home and vehicle were the primary locations where the unpaid
overtime work took place. Doc. 14, Pl.’s App. 1–7. While the location of her employment is relevant,
it is not necessarily a dispositive consideration, as the place where the harm occurred does not always
4
Cochran also points out that, because Kindred’s counsel is located in Dallas, it will be easy to
conduct depositions from their Dallas office. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 14. That may be true, but “[t]he factor
of ‘location of counsel’ is irrelevant and improper for consideration in determining the question of transfer
of venue.” Horseshoe, 337 F.3d at 434.
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coincide with the place where the facts of operative legal significance occurred. See, e.g., Mohamed,
90 F. Supp. 2d at 776–77 (finding that the location of accident giving rise to the case was not of
controlling significance in transfer analysis); Nobel Ins. Co. v. Acme Truck Line, Inc., No. CIV.A.
3:99CV-2950, 2000 WL 298908, at *3–4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2000) (denying transfer to district
where the accident underlying the claim occurred because the actions which led to the suit occurred
in Dallas County). Cochran argues that because her home is located in Grandview, and most of the
work was performed from her home, the Dallas Division has a stronger connection to the claims
asserted. Doc. 13, Pl.’s Resp. ¶ 19.
Kindred has failed to demonstrate that the cause of action arises in Fort Worth, or that the
overtime work for which Cochran demands pay occurred in Fort Worth. It points to Cochran’s
statement that she did some of the work from her car as weakening her argument in favor of venue
in Dallas. Doc. 15, Def.’s Reply 4. But there is no evidence showing that she was in Fort Worth at
the time of these calls. On balance, Dallas and Fort Worth have, at best, an equally strong local
interest in the fair administration of this case, rendering this factor is neutral.
After considering all of the relevant factors and weighing each accordingly, the Court finds
that they do not favor transfer to Fort Worth. Cochran’s choice of forum is entitled to deference;
moreover, she and her named witnesses reside in the Dallas Division, and the majority of her
allegedly uncompensated overtime work occurred here. Conversely, Kindred will incur only a
minimal inconvenience in bringing evidence and (mostly unspecified) witnesses to Dallas. In short,
the Court finds that Kindred has not met its burden of showing that Fort Worth would be a more
convenient and natural place for this action, or that the interest of justice dictates that this case be
transferred there for adjudication.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Kindred’s Motion to Transfer Venue (Doc. 10).
SO ORDERED.
SIGNED: July 20, 2016.
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