Goberman v. Cascos
Filing
16
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 12 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Ordered by Senior Judge A. Joe Fish on 7/12/2016) (twd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
PAVEL GOBERMAN,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CARLOS CASCOS, Texas Secretary of
State,
Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO.
3:16-CV-0994-G (BH)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is the motion of the defendant, Carlos H. Cascos, in his
official capacity as Texas Secretary of State (“Secretary Cascos”), to dismiss the
claims of the plaintiff, Pavel Goberman (“Goberman”), pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(1) (docket entry 12). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 11, 2016, Goberman filed this suit against Secretary Cascos, seeking
an order that would allow Goberman to register to vote without making his physical
address public information, as is currently required by Texas state law. Complaint ¶ 1
(docket entry 3); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 18.005(a)(2); 18.066(a) (West 2015).
Additionally, Goberman would like to run for public office without making his
physical address public information, as is also required by Texas state law. Complaint
¶ 1; TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 141.031(a)(4)(I); 141.035 (West 2015). In order to
maintain confidentiality of his physical address, Goberman would like to disclose his
P.O. Box address instead. Complaint ¶ 1. In his complaint, Goberman alleges that
Secretary Cascos violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution by requiring Goberman and other
United States citizens to disclose their physical addresses in order to vote. Id. On
June 2, 2016, Secretary Cascos filed the instant motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Under
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (“Motion”) at 3 (docket entry
12).
Because this court concludes Goberman lacks standing to bring his claims, the
court need not address Secretary Cascos’s contentions that Goberman’s claims are
moot, that Goberman cannot bring a Fifth Amendment claim, or that the Eleventh
Amendment bars Goberman’s claims. See Defendant’s Brief in Support of Motion to
Dismiss (“Defendant’s Brief”) at 5-6, 10-12 (docket entry 13). Additionally, this
court need not reach Secretary Cascos’s 12(b)(6) motion. Motion at 3.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard for Rule 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the dismissal
of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
must be considered by the court before any other challenge because “the court must
find jurisdiction before determining the validity of a claim.” Moran v. Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted); see also
Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Company, 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (“The requirement
that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter . . . is inflexible and without
exception”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). On a Rule 12(b)(1)
motion, which “concerns the court’s ‘very power to hear the case . . . [,] the trial court
is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear
the case.’” MDPhysicians & Associates, Inc. v. State Board of Insurance, 957 F.2d 178,
181 (5th Cir.) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 897 (1981)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 861 (1992). In ruling on a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the court may rely on: “1) the complaint alone; 2) the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts; or 3) the complaint supplemented by
undisputed facts and the court's resolution of disputed facts.” MCG, Inc. v. Great
Western Energy Corporation, 896 F.2d 170, 176 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Williamson, 645
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F.2d at 413). Once jurisdiction is challenged, the burden rests upon the party seeking
to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to prove that jurisdiction is proper. Boudreau v.
United States, 53 F.3d 81, 82 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1071 (1996).
Importantly, lack of Article III standing is a defect in subject matter
jurisdiction. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 475 U.S. 534, 541-42,
(1986); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493-95, (1974). Therefore, when a plaintiff
lacks standing to sue in federal court, it is appropriate for the court to dismiss the
action, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Chair
King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corporation, 131 F.3d 507, 509 (5th Cir. 1997); Bender,
475 U.S. at 541.
In the instant motion, Secretary Cascos has asserted that Goberman lacks
standing to bring his claims because “he has not established an injury in fact” and
that Goberman lacks standing to sue on behalf of the “many U.S. citizens who do not
vote.” Defendant’s Brief at 7-9. For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that
Goberman has not established Article III standing to sue on behalf of himself, or on
behalf of unidentified third parties.
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B. Application
1. Goberman Lacks Standing to Bring His Claims
Article III of the United States Constitution limits federal courts’ jurisdiction
to “cases” and “controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. Standing -- i.e., the need to
show that the plaintiffs have a direct, personal stake in the outcome of the suit -- is an
“essential and unchanging part” of this case-or-controversy requirement. Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “The federal courts are under an
independent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and standing is perhaps the
most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.” United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737,
742 (1995) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). As the Supreme Court explained in Lujan, the “irreducible
constitutional minimum of standing” has three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” -an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of -- the injury has to be “fairly
. . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be
“likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury
will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
504 U.S. at 560-61 (internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Vermont Agency
of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); Public
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Citizen, Inc. v. Bomer, 274 F.3d 212, 217-18 (5th Cir. 2001). All three elements must
exist to establish Article III standing. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771. Because these
elements “are not mere pleading requirements but rather an indispensable part of the
plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as any other matter
on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of
evidence required at the successive stages of litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. “At
the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s
conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations
embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” Id. (quoting
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)).
In the present case, Goberman has not met his burden of alleging the first
element, an “injury in fact.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Goberman has first failed to
show that he has a legally protected interest in his physical address remaining
confidential. Texas laws do not protect this general interest. See TEX. ELEC. CODE
ANN. §§ 18.005(a)(2); 18.066(a); 141.031(a)(4)(I); 141.035; TEX. GOV’T CODE
§ 552.021 (West 2015). While Texas voting laws do protect the confidentiality of
home addresses for certain groups of individuals, Goberman does not claim to belong
to any of these groups. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 18.066(b)(2) (West 2015)
(protecting the confidentiality of home addresses of federal and state judges and their
spouses); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 56.82 (West 2015) (protecting the
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confidentiality of home addresses of victims of certain crimes). Complaint ¶ 1.
Additionally, Goberman has not pointed to any specific federal law which protects
this interest. Complaint ¶ 1. See Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, 283 F.3d 315,
319 (5th Cir. 2002) (“To establish an injury in fact, plaintiff[] must demonstrate an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is . . . concrete and particularized”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Regardless of the type of interest Goberman has in the confidentiality of his
physical address, Goberman has not alleged that this interest has been invaded. See
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Looking to Goberman’s complaint, it appears as though he
has not yet registered to vote or filed his application to run for public office. See
Complaint ¶ 1 (“I want to register to vote and to vote. Also I want to run for the
public office.”; “The state codes, rules, and regulations are [sic] make me not eligible
to vote.”; “I’m asking this court . . . to give an Order to keep my physical address
confidential and allow me to vote.”). If Goberman did not register to vote or file his
application to run for public office, then his physical address was not part of the
public record for someone to find. Therefore, the confidentiality of his physical
address could not have suffered an “actual” invasion. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
Even if Goberman has registered to vote or filed his application to run for public
office, the invasion Goberman alleges, Complaint ¶, 1 is not actual, concrete, or
particularized because Goberman has failed to point to any instance of someone
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searching the public records to find his physical address. See id. Goberman’s
complaint involves a hypothetical future invasion. See Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352,
358 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Additionally, the continuing controversy may not be
conjectural, hypothetical, or contingent; it must be real and immediate, and create a
definite, rather than speculative threat of future injury.”).
This hypothetical future invasion is also not imminent. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at
560. The Supreme Court has emphasized that imminence “cannot be stretched
beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative
for Article III purposes -- that the injury is certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA,
U.S.
, 133 S.Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (emphasis in original)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 2015). The basis Goberman relies on -that at some future time someone is going to go into the public records to search out
his home address -- is highly speculative. See id. Moreover, if Goberman has not
registered to vote and his address is not part of the public record -- as seems to be the
case -- then predicting any future injury is not just highly speculative, but not
possible. Goberman has not sustained his burden of establishing an “invasion of a
legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or
imminent.” See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
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2. Goberman Lacks Standing to Bring His Claims on Behalf
of “many U.S. citizens who do not vote”
“Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the
constitutional rights of some third party.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 114
(1976) (internal quotations omitted). When evaluating potential exceptions to this
general rule, the Supreme Court has looked to two elements: “The first is the
relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert,” Singleton, 428
U.S. at 114, and “[t]he other . . . is the ability of the third party to assert his own
right.” Id. at 115-16. Goberman’s attempt to assert constitutional claims on behalf
of “many U.S. citizens” falls within the general rule. See id. There is no relationship
between Goberman and the “many U.S. citizens who do not vote,” nor is there any
reason why those citizens could not themselves assert any claims they may have. See
id. Accordingly, Goberman lacks standing to assert his constitutional claims on behalf
of these unidentified third parties. See id.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Secretary Cascos’s 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. Goberman’s claims will be
dismissed, without prejudice, at his cost.
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SO ORDERED.
July 12, 2016.
___________________________________
A. JOE FISH
Senior United States District Judge
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