Jones v. City of Red Oak Police Department et al
Filing
18
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting 5 MOTION to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim filed by City of Red Oak Police Department. (Ordered by Judge Sidney A Fitzwater on 11/17/2016) (Judge Sidney A Fitzwater)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
DEION JONES,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CITY OF RED OAK POLICE
DEPARTMENT, et al.,
Defendants.
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§ Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-1442-D
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Defendant City of Red Oak Police Department (“Department”) moves under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss plaintiff’s constitutional claim asserted against it. Because the
Department lacks the jural capacity to be sued, the court grants the Department’s motion.1
I
Plaintiff Deion Jones (“Jones”) brings an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Department, various unknown officers of the Department, and various unknown employees
of the Department, alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment2 right to be
1
Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of “written
opinion” adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a “written opinion[]
issued by the court” because it “sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court’s decision.”
It has been written, however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case,
and not for publication in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly.
2
The Department contends that Jones’s constitutional claim for alleged deprivation
of his right to medical care as a pretrial detainee arises under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because the court is dismissing Jones’s claim against the Department for the reasons
explained in this memorandum opinion and order, it does not address whether Jones should
free from cruel and unusual punishment. Jones alleges that, during his confinement in the
Red Oak City Jail following his arrest, defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his
serious medical needs by failing to address his repeated complaints that he was experiencing
pain in his groin and that his right testicle had become swollen and twisted.
The Department moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Jones’s complaint with
prejudice, contending, inter alia, that the Department is a division of the City of Red Oak and
is not a separate jural entity that is subject to suit. Jones responds that “[a]fter examining the
arguments and authorities in Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff does not oppose dismissal on the
grounds of lack of jural existence only[.]” P. Br. 2.3
II
Jones names the Department as a defendant in this case. “Federal courts in Texas
have uniformly held that entities without a separate jural existence are not subject to suit.”
Torti v. Hughes, 2007 WL 4403983, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2007) (Kaplan, J.), rec.
adopted (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2007) (Lynn, J.). The Department is not a separate legal entity
having jural authority. See Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep’t, 939 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that city police department cannot be sued as an independent entity absent
authorization by the city); Williams v. Garland Police Dep’t, 2013 WL 5502808, at *2 (N.D.
have pleaded his constitutional deprivation claim under the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than under the Eighth Amendment.
3
The Department also moves to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) on the
ground that Jones has failed to plead a medical inattention claim. In his response, Jones
“does not agree that his claim is inadequately pleaded.” P. Br. 2.
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Tex. Aug. 27, 2013) (Horan, J.) (holding that Garland police department is not a legal entity
capable of being sued), rec adopted, 2013 WL 5502808 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2013) (Lynn, J.);
Lane v. Red Oak Police Dep’t, 2006 WL 385112, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2006) (Kaplan,
J.) (“Plaintiff has the burden of showing that the Red Oak Police Department and the Ellis
County Judicial System have the capacity to be sued. However, plaintiff fails to allege or
otherwise demonstrate that such defendants are separate legal entities having jural authority.
For that reason alone, dismissal is proper.”), rec. adopted, 2006 WL 618762 (N.D. Tex. Mar.
13, 2006) (Lindsay, J.). Therefore, Jones’s claim against the Department must be dismissed.
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Accordingly, for the reasons explained, Jones’s claim against the Department is
dismissed with prejudice by Rule 54(b) final judgment filed today.
SO ORDERED.
November 17, 2016.
_________________________________
SIDNEY A. FITZWATER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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