Timpa et al v. The City of Dallas et al

Filing 365

Memorandum Opinion and Order: Because Intervenor Joe Timpa has not shown sufficiently extraordinary circumstances to justify the extraordinary remedy of setting aside a jury finding, the Court denies Intervenor Timpa's motion for a new trial on damages. (Ordered by Chief District Judge David C Godbey on 6/11/2024) (ndt)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
VICKI TIMPA, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DUSTIN DILLARD, et al.,
Defendants

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Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-3089-N

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This Order addresses Intervenor Joe Timpa’s motion for a new trial on damages
[348]. For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the motion.
I. ORIGINS OF THE MOTION
The circumstances giving rise to this litigation have been detailed extensively in
prior court orders and are not recounted in great detail here. See Order [173]; Timpa v.
Dillard, 20 F.4th 1020 (5th Cir. 2021). In 2016, Tony Timpa (“Decedent”) died while in
the custody of four Dallas police officers — Dustin Dillard, Raymond Dominguez, Kevin
Mansell, and Danny Vasquez (collectively, the “Defendants”). Decedent’s mother and son
brought this action; Joe Timpa, Decedent’s father, later intervened. Intervenor Complaint
[65]. After a two-week trial, the jury found that the Defendants were responsible for
Decedent’s death, that three of the four Defendants were shielded by qualified immunity,
and that Decedent’s minor son, K.T., was entitled to one million dollars in damages. The
jury awarded no damages to any other plaintiff. After filing a motion for a new trial,
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 1

Plaintiffs Cheryl Timpa and K.T. reached a settlement agreement with the Defendants and
thereafter filed a notice of settlement and dismissed all their claims. Notice of Dismissal
and Settlement [363]. Intervenor Timpa did not settle with the Defendants and now moves
for a new trial. Intervenor Timpa argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the issue of
damages because it was an abuse of jury discretion to not award damages to any plaintiff
other than K.T. Motion at 1 [348].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 59(a)(1)(A), a court can grant a new trial “after a jury trial[ ] for any
reason for which a rehearing has heretofore been granted in a suit in equity in federal
court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1)(B). “Courts do not grant new trials unless it is reasonably
clear that prejudicial error has crept into the record or that substantial justice has not been
done, and the burden of showing harmful error rests on the party seeking the new trial.”
Sibley v. Lemaire, 184 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Del Rio Distrib., Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 179 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979)). Whether to grant or deny the
motion is within “the sound discretion of the trial court.” Sibley, 184 F.3d at 487. The
Court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury “merely because the Court
would have reached a different conclusion.” Transverse, LLC v. Iowa Wireless, LLC, 2013
WL 12120969, at *1 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (citing Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d 1076 (4th
Cir. 1993); Dawson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 978 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1992)). The
Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, affirming
the verdict unless the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the other

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 2

party that the court believes that reasonable persons could not arrive at a contrary
conclusion. Dawson, 978 F.2d at 208.
III. THE COURT DENIES THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Upon reviewing the trial proceedings, the Court finds that the jury’s verdict is
consistent with the evidence presented by the parties. Accordingly, the Court denies
Intervenor Timpa’s motion for a new trial.
A. The Law Does Not Require the Jury to Award Damages For This Claim
No federal or state law requires the jury to award damages to Intervenor Timpa for
emotional damages associated with the death of Decedent. Intervenor Timpa brought this
case under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code (“Section 1983”). Section
1983 provides an individual the right to sue state government employees and others acting
“under color of state law” for civil rights violations. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
does not provide specific remedies for any such violations, so state law governs specific
claims as long as the state law is consistent with the Constitution and other federal law. 42
U.S.C. § 1988; see also Slade v. City of Marshall, Tex., 814 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2016).
The Fifth Circuit has determined that the Texas Wrongful Death Act (“TWDA”) is the
“relevant source of [state] law,” where, as here, the plaintiff claims that a civil rights
violation caused a wrongful death. See Delesma v. City of Dallas, 770 F.2d 1334, 1338
(5th Cir. 1985).
Neither Section 1983 nor the TWDA specifically mandate that a party who prevails
on a claim be awarded noneconomic damages.

Texas courts have determined that

nonmonetary damages in these cases on the basis of emotional pain and suffering are not
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 3

presumed and must be proven by sufficient evidence. See, e.g., Hancock v. Variyam, 400
S.W.3d 59, 68 (Tex. 2013); Saenz v. Fid. & Guaranty Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607,
614 (Tex. 1996); Parkway v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995). Additionally,
the Fifth Circuit has previously upheld verdicts in which only one of multiple plaintiffs
received damages after a finding of liability. See Arceneaux v. Mike Hooks, Inc., 15 F.3d
1079, 1079 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the jury to
determine that “damages should be awarded only to Joyce Arceneaux, and not to Valerie
Arceneaux, for loss of support and services and that no damages should be awarded to
compensate for Arceneaux’s pain and suffering”). Accordingly, the Court will not invade
the role of the jury or the legislature and mandate that damages are awarded here to all
plaintiffs for noneconomic harm in conjunction with the finding of liability for Decedent’s
wrongful death.
B. The Jury Verdict Is Entitled to Great Deference
In the Fifth Circuit, jury verdicts are overturned only under the extraordinary
circumstance that a party makes a “clear showing” of an “absolute absence of evidence” to
support the jury verdict. Whitehead v. Food Max of Mississippi, Inc., 163 F.3d 265, 269
(5th Cir. 1998). Intervenor Timpa has failed to make such a clear showing in this instance.
“The size of the award a plaintiff is entitled to is generally a question of fact, and
the reviewing court should be ‘exceedingly hesitant’ to overturn the decision of the jury.”
Foradori v. Harris, 523 F.3d 477, 504 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Shows v. Jamison Bedding,
Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 934 (5th Cir. 1982)). Courts appear to grant particular deference to
jury verdicts involving non-economic harms. The Fifth Circuit has previously declared
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 4

that due to the “intangibility of nonpecuniary harms like pain and suffering or emotional
distress,” courts should be particularly reluctant to overturn a factfinder’s award for this
type of claim. Stokes v. United States, 753 F. App’x 279, 283 (5th Cir. 2018) (unpub.)
(citing McCaig v. Wells Fargo Bank (Tex.), N.A., 788 F.3d 463, 484 (5th Cir. 2015)).
Courts in this district have similarly held that a jury should have “especially broad leeway”
when awarding non-economic damages because they are “to a large degree not susceptible
to monetary quantification.” See, e.g., In re DePuy Ortho., Inc. Litig., 2017 WL 3841608,
at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (citing Seidman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 1134, 1141 (5th Cir.
1991)).

The harm that Intervenor Timpa asserts he experienced, and any resulting

damages, are purely non-economic.
Intervenor Timpa’s basis for recovery in this suit is the emotional pain and suffering
he experienced due to the wrongful death of his son. After hearing Intervenor Timpa’s
evidence, the jury determined that Intervenor Timpa was entitled to an award of zero
damages for this alleged harm. Honoring the particular deference that the Fifth Circuit
gives to the factfinder for such cases, the Court does not find that this award is improper
as a matter of law so as to warrant a new trial on damages. Intervenor Timpa has not shown
any good reason to believe that the jury unreasonably ignored evidence. He is not entitled
to have the jury be persuaded by the evidence he put on. Intervenor Timpa had ample
opportunity to put on the best evidence he had. The jury simply was not persuaded by that
evidence.
Furthermore, the Defendants put forth evidence that the jury could have reasonably
relied on in making its determination that Intervenor Timpa is entitled to no damages. At
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 5

trial, Intervenor Timpa testified that he saw Decedent’s body post-autopsy.

The

Defendant’s witness, the Chief Medical Examiner, testified that this viewing never
occurred. Intervenor Timpa also testified that he had a close relationship with Decedent
and that Decedent played an integral role in Intervenor Timpa’s business. However,
Intervenor Timpa was unable to name any of Decedent’s close friends during his
deposition, Plaintiff Vicki Timpa’s testimony called to question the closeness of Decedent
and Intervenor Timpa’s relationship, and the evidence regarding Decedent’s frequent and
lengthy rehabilitation stays could undercut Intervenor Timpa’s testimony regarding his
close daily contact with Decedent. A reasonable jury could see the discrepancies in the
evidence and disbelieve Intervenor Timpa’s testimony regarding the closeness of his
relationship with Decedent and accordingly find that he was not entitled to damages for
pain and suffering or other emotional harm. Intervenor Timpa has not carried his burden
to show that there is no evidence supporting the jury’s finding.
The jury verdict is not, as Intervenor Timpa argues, so inconsistent that it evidences
an abuse of juror discretion. While the jury found that the Defendants caused wrongful
death, the wrongful death was Decedent’s; it was Decedent’s constitutional rights that the
jury found were violated. How damages were allocated was dependent on who the jury
believed suffered harm from it. In this case, the jury found that only K.T. suffered harm
and was entitled to damages. Regardless of whether the Court would find the same, the
jury is entitled to this finding.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 6

CONCLUSION
Because Intervenor Joe Timpa has not shown sufficiently extraordinary
circumstances to justify the extraordinary remedy of setting aside a jury finding, the Court
denies Intervenor Timpa’s motion for a new trial on damages.

Signed June 11, 2024.

___________________________
David C. Godbey
Chief United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER – PAGE 7