Phillips v. Berryhill
Filing
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Memorandum Opinion and Order: The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. (Ordered by Magistrate Judge Rebecca Rutherford on 3/27/2018) (axm)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
NEWMAN PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff,
v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration,
Defendant.
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No. 3:17-CV-12-BT
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Newman Phillips brings this action for judicial review of the final
decision of the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“Commissioner”) denying his claim for supplemental security income under
Title XVI of the Social Security Act, pursuant to Title 42, United States Code,
Section 405(g). For the following reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner
is AFFIRMED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his initial claim on June 24, 2013 alleging that he was
disabled due to a variety of ailments, including, diabetes, hypertension, kidney
disease, depression, arthritis, and stomach pains. Tr. 58 [ECF No. 14-4]. After
Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration, a hearing
was held on April 9, 2015, in Dallas, Texas, before Administrative Law Judge Ann
H. Pate (the “ALJ”). Tr. 32 [ECF No. 14-3]. Plaintiff was born on February 16,
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1980 and was 35 years old at the time of the April 9, 2015 hearing. Tr. 32, 58.
Plaintiff attended high school through the tenth grade. Tr. 36 [ECF No. 14-3]. On
July 28, 2015, the ALJ issued her decision finding that Plaintiff has not been
under a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act from June 24,
2013, the date Plaintiff’s application was filed, through the date of her decision.
Tr. 24 [ECF No. 14-3]. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: spine disorder, diabetes mellitus, and affective disorder. Tr. 17
[ECF No. 14-3]. The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or a combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the
severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. Tr. 18 [ECF No. 14-3].
During the hearing, the ALJ sought the advice of a Vocational Expert
(“VE”) as to whether jobs exist in the national economy for an individual with
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and Residual Functional Capacity
(“RFC”), because Plaintiff’s ability to perform all or substantially all of the
requirements of light work has been impeded by additional limitations. Tr. 24
[ECF No. 14-3]. The VE testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s characteristics
could perform the tasks of the following light, unskilled occupations: (1) laundry
inspector; (2) belt inspector; and (3) food inspector. Tr. 24. Given this testimony,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was able to make a successful adjustment to
work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr. 24. Plaintiff
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appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Appeals Council, and on December 16, 2016,
the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s decision. Tr. 1 [ECF No. 14-3]. Plaintiff
filed this pro se action in the federal district court on January 3, 2017. Compl.
[ECF No. 1].
LEGAL STANDARDS
A claimant must prove that he is disabled for purposes of the Social
Security Act to be entitled to social security benefits. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d
558, 563-64 (5th Cir. 1995); Abshire v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 638, 640 (5th Cir.
1988). The definition of disability under the Act is “the inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically-determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Anthony v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1992).
The Commissioner utilizes a sequential five-step inquiry to determine
whether a claimant is disabled. Those steps are that:
(1)
an individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful
activity will not be found disabled regardless of medical findings;
(2)
an individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not
be found to be disabled;
(3)
an individual who meets or equals a listed impairment in
Appendix 1 of the regulations will be considered disabled without
consideration of vocational factors;
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(4)
if an individual is capable of performing the work the individual
has done in the past, a finding of “not disabled” will be made; and
(5)
if an individual’s impairment precludes the individual from
performing the work the individual has done in the past, other
factors including age, education, past work experience, and
residual functional capacity must be considered to determine if
other work can be performed.
Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Villa v. Sullivan,
895 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1990); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)). The burden of
proof lies with the claimant to prove disability under the first four steps of the
five-step inquiry. Leggett, 67 F.3d at 564. The burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner at step five of the inquiry to prove that other work, aside from the
claimant’s past work, can be performed by the claimant. Bowling v. Shalala, 36
F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Sullivan, 887 F.2d 630, 632-33
(5th Cir. 1989)).
The Commissioner’s determination is afforded great deference. Leggett, 67
F.3d at 564. Judicial review of the Commissioner’s findings is limited to whether
the decision to deny benefits is supported by substantial evidence and to whether
the proper legal standards were utilized. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236 (citing 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3)). An “ALJ’s decision is not subject to reversal, even if
there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported the
opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion that
was reached by the ALJ.” Corpany v. Colvin, 2014 WL 1255316, at *9 (N.D. Tex.
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Mar. 26, 2014) (citing Dollins v. Astrue, 2009 WL 1542466, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June
2, 2009)). Substantial evidence is defined as “that which is relevant and sufficient
for a reasonable mind to accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it must be
more than a scintilla, but it need not be a preponderance.” Leggett, 67 F.3d at
564. The reviewing court does “not reweigh the evidence, try the issues de novo,
or substitute” its own judgment, but rather scrutinizes the record as a whole to
determine whether substantial evidence is present. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236.
“Absent an error that affects the substantial rights of a party,
administrative proceedings do not require ‘procedural perfection.’” Wilder v.
Colvin, 2014 WL 2931884, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 2014) (quoting Taylor v.
Astrue, 706 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2012)). “The ALJ is not required to discuss
every piece of evidence in the record nor must the ALJ follow formalistic rules of
articulation.” Hunt v. Astrue, 2013 WL 2392880, at *7 (N.D. Tex. June 3, 2013)
(citing Castillo v. Barnhart, 151 F. App’x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2005)); see also Falco
v. Shalala, 27 F.3d 160, 164 (5th Cir. 1994) (“That [the ALJ] did not follow
formalistic rules in her articulation compromises no aspect of fairness or
accuracy that her process is designed to ensure.”). “Procedural errors affect the
substantial rights of a claimant only when they ‘cast into doubt the existence of
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision.’” Wilder, 2014 WL 2931884,
at *5 (quoting Morris v. Bowen, 864 F.2d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 1988)). “Remand is
required only when there is a realistic possibility that the ALJ would have
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reached a different conclusion absent the procedural error.” Id. (citing January
v. Astrue, 400 F. App’x 929, 933 (5th Cir. 2010)).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff states in his pro se filing1 that he is disabled due to extreme pain
that does not get better with medication. Pl.’s Aff. 1 [ECF No. 21]. In support of
his complaint, Plaintiff submits a letter from his nurse practitioner Megan Lane,
dated April 2, 2017, which states that Plaintiff has chronic and lifelong conditions
of inflammatory polyarthritis, diabetic polyneuropathy, osteoarthritis,
fibromyalgia, and chronic pain syndrome. Pl.’s Ex. [ECF No. 20 at 2]. Nurse
Lane states that Plaintiff experiences chronic and severe pain from these
conditions, that prevent him from using his hands due to cramping and locking of
his fingers. Pl.’s Ex. [ECF No. 20 at 2]. Plaintiff also submits Consultation Notes,
dated April 4, 2017, from his treating physician, Dr. John R. Richmond that
states that Plaintiff is disabled. Pl.’s Ex. [ECF No. 20 at 3].
In the response, the Commissioner argues that the ALJ correctly assessed
Plaintiff’s symptoms and provided specific reasons as to why his claims of
disability were not consistent with the evidence of record. Def.’s Br. 4 [ECF No.
23] (citing Tr. 17-23 [ECF No. 14-3]). The Commissioner argues that, although
Plaintiff alleges that he experiences disabling pain, subjective complaints do not
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Plaintiff asked the Court to construe as his Social Security brief two documents he filed with the titles
“Affidavit” and “Additional Attachments of Affidavit.” Aff. 2 [ECF No. 21].
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receive more weight than conflicting medical evidence. Def.’s Br. 5. The
Commissioner contends that Plaintiff cites no credible evidence showing that any
impairment or combination of impairments produce disabling functional
limitations. Def.’s Br. 5-6. With respect to the letter from Nurse Lane, the
Commissioner argues that her conclusory, unsupported statement conflicts with
the evidence from the relevant period that supports the ALJ’s decision, and does
not constitute a medical opinion within the meaning of the regulations. Def.’s Br.
6-7 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(d)). In the reply, Plaintiff reiterates that he is
unable to work due to pain, and asks the Court to consider the additional
materials submitted. Reply 1-3 [ECF No. 24].
“The Social Security Administration classifies medical sources into two
categories, ‘acceptable medical sources’ and other medical sources.” Matthews v.
Colvin, 2016 WL 8710706, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 5, 2016) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1513, 416.913). “Only ‘acceptable medical sources’ can establish the existence
of a medically determinable impairment, give medical opinions, and be
considered treating sources whose medical opinions may be entitled to
controlling weight.” Thibodeaux v. Astrue, 324 F. App’x 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2009);
SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939 (Aug. 9, 2006). “‘Acceptable medical sources’
include licensed physicians, licensed psychologists, licensed optometrists,
licensed podiatrists, and qualified speech pathologists.” Matthews, 2016 WL
8710706, at *4 (citing Thibodeaux, 324 F. App’x at 445; SSR 06-03p). “‘Other
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medical sources’ can include nurse practitioners, physicians’ assistants,
chiropractors, audiologists, and therapists.” Matthews, 2016 WL 8710706, at *4
(quoting Thibodeaux, 324 F. App’x at 445).
As the Commissioner points out, the April 2, 2017 letter Plaintiff submits
bears the names of Dr. Dhiman Basu and Nurse Lane, but only Nurse Lane
signed the letter. Pl.’s Ex. [ECF No. 20 at 2]. Nurse Lane, “not being an
acceptable medical source, cannot render a medical opinion relevant to a Social
Security disability appeal.” Matthews, 2016 WL 8710706, at *4 (citing Porter v.
Barnhart, 200 F. App’x 317, 319 (5th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2),
416.927(a)(2)); cf. Porter, 200 F. App’x at 319 (“[T]he ALJ was not required to
rely on the chiropractor’s evaluation in making the RFC finding because a
chiropractor is not an acceptable medical source.”).
Plaintiff also asks that the Court consider Dr. Richmond’s opinion stating
that Plaintiff is disabled. However, “[o]pinions on issues reserved to the
Commissioner, like the ultimate issue of disability, are not medical opinions . . . .”
Orange v. Colvin, 2016 WL 4034798, at *4 (M.D. La. June 14, 2016) (citing 20
CFR § 404.1527(d); Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 1995)). “A
statement made by a treating physician that a claimant is disabled does not mean
that the claimant is disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act . . . .” Barajas
v. Heckler, 738 F.2d 641, 645 (5th Cir. 1984). Therefore, a “statement by a
medical source that a claimant is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ does not require
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the Commissioner to find that claimant disabled.” Orange, 2016 WL 4034798, at
*4 (citing Barajas, 738 F.2d at 645).
The Court’s task is to scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and the “ALJ’s decision is not
subject to reversal, even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would
have supported the opposite conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports
the conclusion that was reached by the ALJ.” Corpany, 2014 WL 1255316, at *9;
Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236. Furthermore, “[p]rocedural errors affect the
substantial rights of a claimant only when they ‘cast into doubt the existence of
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision,’” and “[r]emand is required
only when there is a realistic possibility that the ALJ would have reached a
different conclusion absent the procedural error.” Wilder, 2014 WL 2931884, at
*5 (quoting Morris, 864 F.2d at 335; citing January, 400 F. App’x at 933). The
Court concludes that any alleged procedural errors do not cast into doubt the
existence of substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision. There is not a
realistic possibility that the ALJ would have reached a different conclusion, and
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the final decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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March 27, 2018.
_____________________________
REBECCA RUTHERFORD
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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