White Glove Staffing Inc et al v. Methodist Hospitals of Dallas et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 42 Motion for Class Certification. (Ordered by Judge Ed Kinkeade on 5/29/2018) (zkc)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
WHITE GLOVE STAFFING, INC.,
CAROLYN CLAY, LINDEY DANCEY,
LEA REED, and KAMARIO SIMPSON,
Individually, and on Behalf of a Class of
Similarly Situated Individuals,
Plaintiffs,
v.
METHODIST HOSPITALS OF
DALLAS, and DALLAS METHODIST
HOSPITALS FOUNDATION,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 3:17-CV-1158-K
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and Notice to
Potential Plaintiffs (Doc. No. 42). After carefully considering the motion, relevant
documents, and applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion because the
proposed class is too speculative to be clearly ascertainable.
I. Background
Plaintiff White Glove Staffing, Inc. (“White Glove”), a staffing agency,
entered contract negotiations to provide for Defendants’ staffing needs. During these
initial negotiations, Defendants Methodist Hospitals of Dallas and Dallas Methodist
Hospitals Foundation (collectively “Methodist”) allegedly informed White Glove that
the head chef preferred Hispanic employees. Before entering a contract, Methodist
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asked White Glove to provide Methodist with a prep cook. White Glove sent
Plaintiff Carolyn Clay (“Clay”). Clay is African American. Allegedly, Clay worked for
Methodist for only a few days before Methodist told White Glove that Clay was not
working out and asked White Glove to send someone else. The next day, White
Glove sent Clay back to Methodist because White Glove could not find another prep
cook on short notice. Methodist allegedly asked Clay to leave. Methodist contacted
White Glove and allegedly stated the head chef only wanted Hispanic employees.
Later that day, Methodist ended contract negotiations and informed White Glove
that it would not enter a staffing contract with White Glove.
White Glove and Clay filed suit against Methodist for employment
discrimination and retaliation. Plaintiffs Lindey Dancey, Lea Reed, and Kamario
Simpson joined the suit as African American individuals White Glove allegedly would
have supplied to work for Methodist had Methodist entered the staffing contract.
Plaintiffs now seek class certification to include 40 to 75 other individuals who were
allegedly discriminated against.
II. Motion Is Timely
In its response, Methodist argues Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification is
untimely under Local Civil Rule 23.2, which requires a plaintiff to move for
certification within 90 days of filing its class action complaint or as ordered by the
court. Plaintiffs argue they filed the motion after the 90-day deadline because some
discovery needed to be completed to support the motion for class certification.
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Because some discovery was needed, the Court holds the motion for class certification
is timely.
III.
Class Certification
a. Legal Standard
Before establishing the requirements under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 23 to certify a class, the plaintiff must show it has met Rule 23’s implicit
ascertainability requirement. Frey v. First Nat'l Bank Southwest, 602 Fed. App’x 164,
168 (5th Cir. 2015). “[I]n order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be
represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” Id. A proposed
class’s definability and ascertainability are consequently implied prerequisites to Rule
23’s requirements for class certification. John v. Nat'l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d
443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) Once the party seeking certification establishes that a
putative class is definable and ascertainable, that party must demonstrate that the
putative class meets all four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one of the three
requirements of Rule 23(b). Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 345 (2011).
Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that class certification is appropriate.
Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005). Class certification is at the
discretion of the court, which has inherent power to manage and control pending
litigation. Fener v. Operating Eng’r Const. Indus. & Miscellaneous Pension Fund (Local 66),
579 F.3d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 2009). Although a court does not reach the merits of the
case in evaluating whether class treatment is appropriate, it may look past the
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pleadings to understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable
substantive law to make a meaningful decision on class certification. Unger, 401 F.3d
316 at 321.
b. Analysis
i. Definability and Ascertainability
The Court must determine that membership in a proposed class is
ascertainable by objective criteria before it reaches the Rule 23 class certification
analysis. Frey v. First Nat’l Bank Southwest, Civ. Action No. 3:11-CV-3093, 2013 WL
11309592, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2013) (Godbey, J.) aff’d, 602 Fed. App’x 164,
168–69 (5th Cir. 2015). Plaintiffs define the proposed class as “all employees of
White Glove Staffing who would have been supplied to Defendants to be banquet
servers, prep cooks, dishwashers, and set-up crews.” Plaintiffs argue this proposed
class is readily ascertainable from White Glove’s employment records. Methodist
argues the proposed class relies on multiple highly speculative assumptions that make
the proposed class unascertainable.
While “[t]he court need not know the identity of each class member before
certification,” the class must be clearly ascertainably such that “the court [is] able to
identify class members at some stage of the proceeding.” Frey, 602 Fed. App’x at 168.
“It is elementary that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be
represented must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” DeBremaecker v.
Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding a proposed class made up of
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“residents of this State active in the ‘peace movement’” too vague). “[V]ague and
subjective elements within the definition may render a class unascertainable.” Simms
v. Jones, 296 F.R.D. 485, 506 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (Lynn, J.).
The proposed class here are “all employees of White Glove Staffing who would
have been supplied to Defendants to be banquet servers, prep cooks, dishwashers,
and set-up crews.” However, this proposed class relies on multiple assumptions that
cannot be readily verified. The proposed class assumes: (1) Methodist would have
entered a staffing contract with White Glove; (2) Methodist would have asked White
Glove to provide banquet servers, prep cooks, dishwashers, and set-up crews despite
no evidence that the proposed contract included such a requirement; (3) White Glove
would have sent each of the proposed class members in response to Methodist’s
hypothetical request; and (4) the proposed class members would be qualified,
available, and agreeable to work at Methodist. These assumptions make the proposed
class too vague and speculative. No additional discovery or time could clearly and
objectively determine who would fall within this highly speculative class. Thus, the
proposed class is too vague to be clearly ascertainable, as implicitly required under
Rule 23. See id; see also Frey, 602 Fed. App’x at 168.
IV.
Conclusion
Although other grounds exist for denying class certification, the Court need
not address the other class certification requirements under Rule 23 because White
Glove’s highly speculative proposed class falls far short of being clearly ascertainable.
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Because White Glove’s proposed class is too speculative to meet the implicit
ascertainability requirement, the Court DENIES White Glove’s motion for class
certification.
SO ORDERED.
Signed May 29th, 2018.
____________________________________
ED KINKEADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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